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PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER Foreword 
Social protection systems continue to 
provide the bulk of expenditure on so-
cial support, health care and pensions 
in the Member States of  the EU and to 
play a fundamental  role  in ensuring 
income redistribution and social cohe-
sion. They also help to maintain politi-
cal stability and economic progress in 
the lives of citizens of the Union. 
As  pointed  out  in  the  Commission 
Communication on Modernising and 
Improving  Social Protection  (March 
1997) EU expenditure on social pro-
tection-currently running at an aver-
age of 28.5% of GDP- should be 
seen not as a financial burden but rather 
as an investment in human resources 
and as a form of insurance which pro-
vides the security necessary to the suc-
cessful  functioning  of increasingly 
flexible labour markets. Social protec-
tion is a productive factor which con-
tributes  to  economic  growth  and 
performance.  Getting  this  political 
message across will be especially im-
portant as the EU enlarges in the next 
few years. 
However, all Member States are hav-
ing to face up to the inexorable need to 
reform their social protection systems. 
As demand has risen, so at the same 
time fmancial  constraints have tight-
ened. Many of  the old assumptions on 
which social protection systems have 
been built-a low level of  unemploy-
ment,  one  full  time job without any 
major spells of inactivity, the man as 
the  bread-winner  and  so  on - are 
disappearing.  We only  have  to  look 
about  us  to  see  that  this  world  has 
moved on and we must move with it. 
Social  protection  systems  face  new 
challenges as a direct result of demo-
graphic change and the massive rise 
and  persistence  of long-term  unem-
ployment in our economies. Reform is 
an issue that cannot be ducked. 
This is our third report on social pro-
tection in Europe. As in the previous 
two  reports,  we  are  continuing  to 
monitor how Member States are meet-
ing the new realities which are replac-
ing  the  old  assumptions.  The  1993 
report was a first signal of the serious-
ness with which these issues were be-
ginning to be felt by Member States. In 
1995  the  debate  sharpened  with  the 
emergence of the  Commission's 
Framework for Debate on the Future 
of  Social Protection. This third report 
has  been  produced  at  a  time  when 
Member States are turning a political 
comer on  employment  policy.  The 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the special 
Jobs Summit that followed in Novem-
ber 1997 revealed the determination of 
EU  governments  to  abandon  the 
policies followed for more than three 
decades in favour of  active labour mar-
ket  policies  that emphasise  em-
ployability,  business  opportunity, 
equality at work and, above all, a readi-
ness  to  invest  in  the  EU's  most 
precious commodity: the skills of its 
people. Of all the components of the 
new European employment strategy, 
social  protection  is  one of the  most 
important. From the start it was under-
stood  that our social protection sys-
tems  had  to  become  more 
'employment-friendly'.  This  report 
analyses what this means in practice. 
The report examines the changes to the 
scale, pattern, growth and funding of 
social  expenditure.  It describes  how 
social expenditure remains one of the 
major  weapons  in  the  fight  against 
poverty and exclusion even while so-
cial  protection  systems  are  adapted 
better to  fit  the needs of the modem 
labour market. Most important of all, 
it logs the major policy developments 
in  social  protection  taking  place  as 
more emphasis is placed on the incen-
tive to work, as we seek to make the 
European  work  force  more  em-
ployable and more adaptable, as com-
petitive  pressures  on  businesses 
increase and as  people in Europe get 
older.  The  policy  issues  associated 
with this process are many and com-
plex.  They  range  from  how  people 
qualify for benefit to how jobs are cre-
ated, from how we perceive retirement 
to how our health systems are funded. 
Above  all,  the  report  explains  why 
these issues matter so much and why it 
is vital that we keep a constant eye on 
what is  happening in  this  most fun-
damental aspect of how we organise 
our societies. 
Padraig Flynn 
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-5-- 6 -Executive summary 
The political context 
T
his is the third report on Social Protection in Europe. 
It  sets out to monitor the progress achieved in relation 
to the objectives contained in the Council's Recommen-
dation on the convergence of  social protection objectives 
and policies of  July 1992 (92/442/EEC) and to update the 
analysis of the 1993 and 1995 reports. 
The Report is also intended to contribute to the debate on 
the future of social protection in the Union, launched by 
the Commission in 1995 with its Communication Frame-
work for Debate on the Future of  Social Protection. In 
March 1997, the Commission published a further Com-
munication, Modernising and Improving Social Protec-
tion, which reflected the main points made in the debate 
and drew attention to the major implications for policy. 
The report should also  be  seen  in  the  context both of 
Member States' efforts to consolidate public finances -
as  pointed out in the  1997 Broad Economic Guidelines 
and  the  two  Resolutions  on macro-economic  stability, 
growth and employment, adopted at the European Council 
in  Amsterdam - and  of the  European  Employment 
Strategy. At the Luxembourg Jobs Summit in November 
1997, Member States broadly endorsed the Commission's 
proposals for employment guidelines. They agreed that 
benefit as well as training systems should, where necess-
ary, be reviewed and adapted to ensure that they actively 
support employability. Social protection also has an im-
portant  role  to  play  in  helping  to  achieve  other aims 
emphasised in the  1998 Employment Guidelines which 
were subsequently adopted- developing entrepreneur-
ship,  encouraging  adaptability  of businesses  and  their 
employees and strengthening the policies for equal oppor-
tunities. A clear link has, therefore, been established at the 
highest level between social protection systems and the 
European Employment Strategy. 
The main quantitative findings 
T
he main points to emerge from the analysis of the 
revised ESSPROS database on social protection and 
the new European Community Household Panel are: 
The  scale of social expenditure: expenditure on  social 
protection in the Union amounted to  28'/2% of GDP in 
1995. This figure, however, ranged from 20% of GDP in 
Ireland and 21-22% in Greece, Spain and Portugal to over 
30%  in  France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  three  Nordic 
countries, with Sweden having the highest level at almost 
36%. 
The pattern of  social expenditure: old-age pensions are by 
some way the largest item of  social protection expenditure 
in the Union, accounting for 42
1/2% of the total in  1995, 
equivalent  to  12%  of GDP,  followed  by  health  care, 
amounting to around 22% of  the total in the Union, as well 
as in all Member States, except for Denmark ·c  only 14% ), 
and to  some 6% of GDP. Transfers to the unemployed 
accounted for only 8% of total expenditure in the Union 
Uust under 2'/2% of GDP). 
The growth of  social expenditure: in most Member States, 
the increase in social protection expenditure has slowed 
down in recent years. Although social expenditure across 
the Union increased in relation to GDP between 1990 and 
1995 (by just over 2 percentage points), this partly reflects 
the slowdown in GDP growth during the recession years. 
Between 1993  and  1995, spending grew no faster than 
GDP and in most countries rose by less. 
- 7-Sources offinancl: around 65% of the funding for social 
protection in the Union comes from social charges levied 
on employers and the people protected, most of the rest 
from  general  taxation.  Employers'  contributions  alone 
accounted for some 40% of total finance in 1995. 
Levels of  unemployment benefit: a significant proportion 
of people unemployed in a number of Member States, 
according  to  the  ECHP,  received  no  unemployment 
benefit at all  in  1993, even when out of work for three 
months or more. For those receiving benefit, the monthly 
amount averaged just over half of their net earnings for 
the months  when they  were  working,  though it ranged 
from  60-65% in  Denmark, France and Ireland to  only 
25% in Greece and the UK. 
The relief of  poverty: social transfers (including private 
pensions, but excluding benefits in kind, such as  health 
care) accounted for around 30% of  net household income 
in the Union in 1993. For some 35% of households, they 
were the main source of income and without them just 
under 40%  of households  would  have  had  a  level  of 
income of under half the national average (the conven-
tional measure of poverty). After transfers, around 17% 
of households in the Union had a level of income below 
this. 
Recent changes in policy 
T
he economic and social context in which European 
social protection systems operate has changed con-
siderably over the past decade or two (as analysed in the 
Commission Communication Modernising and Improv-
ing  Social Protection).  Over the  1990s,  low economic 
growth has increased both the difficulties of funding so-
cial protection across the Union and, in combination with 
demographic  and  social  trends,  the  number of people 
being supported. While income maintenance and preven-
tion of social exclusion continue to be fundamental objec-
tives of social protection systems, the aim of policy is to 
strengthen incentives  to  work and  to  improve the  em-
ployability and adaptability of the work force. The major 
policy developments are: 
Tightening  of eligibility for benefit:  in  many  Member 
States, qualifying conditions for benefit have been tight-
-8-
ened and the contribution record required for eligibility 
has been lengthened. 
Strengthening  incentives to  work:  in  several  countries, 
measures have been introduced to try  to  ensure that in-
come  from  work  is  always  higher  than  from  benefits 
through tax concessions for low-paid workers and in-work 
benefits as well as by reducing benefit rates. 
Shifting  towards more active policies: there  is  general 
recognition that providing income  support alone  is  not 
sufficient to tackle problems of unemployment and social 
exclusion. In the 1998 Employment Guidelines agreed by 
the Council, Member States have committed themselves 
to bringing about a shift from passive to active measures 
aimed at increasing the employability of  those out of  work 
and helping them find a job. 
Extending job creation schemes: in a number of Member 
States,  job creation  has  been  encouraged  by  selective 
reductions  in  social  contributions  as  well  as  by  direct 
subsidies. Member States, moreover, have agreed in the 
Employment Guidelines to investigate possible means of 
developing local employment opportunities in the social 
economy and new activities where needs are not being met 
by the market. 
Reducing dependency and social exclusion: throughout 
the Union, social assistance guarantees a minimum level 
of income. The general tendency within Member States' 
social assistance schemes is to address underlying causes 
of poverty and  social exclusion,  to  reduce  reliance on 
benefits and to encourage all  those able to  work to find 
employment. 
Helping people with disabilities: efforts have been made 
in many Member States to improve the employment op-
portunities  of those  with  disabilities,  through  deterring 
discrimination and removing obstacles to them working, 
while at the same tightening eligibility for benefit. 
Reversing the trend towards early retirement: there has 
been a long-term trend towards early retirement across the 
Union, pushing up  social expenditure and depriving the 
economy prematurely of the skills which the people con-
cerned have to offer. For women, this trend has been offset 
by a more powerful tendency for increased participation 
in employment, but for men, it has led to around half of men aged between 55 and 64 (ie below the official retire-
ment age in most countries) no longer being in work. In a 
number of Member States,  measures  have  been  intro-
duced to  discourage early retirement, by tightening the 
conditions  for  eligibility  and/or  reducing  the  amount 
payable. 
Encouraging partial retirement: attempts have been made 
(in Germany, France, Austria and Finland, especially) to 
encourage partial  retirement by  making  it  possible  for 
people to  receive  a partial pension if they  reduce  their 
hours of  work. So far, however, except in France, very few 
people have opted to take advantage of the possibility. 
Adapting to population ageing: reform of  pension systems 
continues to be the focus of political attention to limit the 
costs implied by an ageing population. In many Member 
States, the official retirement age has been raised, espe-
cially for women, and for both sexes is in most cases being 
standardised at 65, while measures have been introduced 
in a number of countries to reduce the pensions payable. 
A further tendency has been to link the pension receivable 
more closely to  the  contributions paid over a person's 
lifetime, so reinforcing the insurance aspect of  the system. 
So far, there has been no general tendency to shift away 
from pay-as-you-go to  funded schemes (from contribu-
tions  covering  current pensions  to  covering future  lia-
bilities),  though  there  is  widespread  growth  in 
occupational and private pensions. 
Containing health-care costs: a common feature of  recent 
policy developments in Member States has been to  im-
pose ceilings on expenditure of  national health services or 
of health insurance funds.  While this has generally suc-
ceeded in holding down spending relative to GDP, it has 
led to other concerns-about the way in which resources 
are  effectively  being  rationed  and  the  efficiency  with 
which  they  are  being  used.  In  many  countries,  direct 
charges for drugs and certain services have been intro-
duced or extended to make consumers aware of the costs 
involved in their supply and so encourage them to restrain 
their demand.  In  a number of Member States, govern-
ments have  sought to  exploit the  potentially beneficial 
effects of  market mechanisms on efficiency by separating 
purchasers and providers more clearly, by  encouraging 
both to adopt more commercial attitudes and by making 
room for managed competition in some areas. 
Providing long-term care: there is widespread debate on 
how  caring  needs  should  be  met - whether  through 
transfers or through the direct provision of services and 
how far the State should be involved. In the three Nordic 
EU countries, in particular, social services are well  de-
veloped, though they have been increasingly subject to 
budget constraints. Elsewhere, adequate arrangements for 
helping to  cover the  costs of care as  part of the  social 
protection system exist in few  Member States, the most 
notable examples being the schemes introduced in Austria 
in  1993 and in Germany in 1995, the former funded by 
general taxation, the latter by social contributions. 
Targeting expenditure: Targeting resources on those most 
in  need  is  of growing political concern throughout the 
Union. This is  reflected in both the extension of means-
testing - though so far in most cases this remains very 
limited in scale - and  the  imposition of taxes  and/or 
social charges on benefit recipients, which can serve to 
spread the cost of funding social protection more  equit~ 
ably, given the increasing prosperity of many pensioners. 
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and adapting systems to change 
S
ystems of social protection and 
their reform have become a cen-
tral area of policy concern across the 
European Union. The Commission's 
Communication Modernising  and 
Improving  Social Protection  in  the 
European  Union  (COM(97)102) 
pointed  out  that  the  financial  and 
operational  structures  of most  sys-
tems were established decades ago. 
Since then, the economic and social 
conditions under which they operate 
have changed, and will  continue to 
do so. Demands on social protection 
systems have grown and constraints 
on their funding have tightened. This 
concern has been reinforced by the 
ageing of the population and the im-
pending  growth  in  the  number  of 
people of pensionable age. In the ef-
forts to reform social protection sys-
tems, the common aims are to assure 
their continued effectiveness, to en-
sure  that  systems  strengthen  rather 
than obstruct economic growth and 
job creation, to contain the costs of 
providing social support to all those 
who need it  and to  shift towards  a 
more  active policy designed to  get 
people into employment rather than 
merely transferring income to  them 
when they are not working. 
This  new  emphasis  is  reflected  in 
recent  European  Council  declara-
tions. At Dublin at the end of 1996, 
the need for taxation and social pro-
tection systems to become more em-
ployment-friendly and more active in 
the fight against unemployment was 
stressed, while,  at  the  Luxembourg 
Jobs Summit at the end of 1997, the 
Council called for a more active ap-
proach to increase the employability 
of those out of work. The framework 
for such an approach is set out in the 
Commission's  Communication 
mentioned above  as  well  as  in  the 
1998  Employment  Guidelines 
agreed by the Council (OJ C 30 of  28 
January 1998). The main lines of ac-
tion identified in the latter-improv-
ing  employability,  developing 
entrepreneurship, encouraging adap-
tability of businesses and their em-
ployees  and  strengthening  the 
policies for equal oppmtunities-all 
have significance for the orientation 
of systems of social protection. 
The present Report is very much fo-
cused on the themes which were the 
subject  of the  Communication and 
the  Employment Guidelines,  and 
which are a prominent feature of the 
changes  being  made  to  systems  of 
social protection across  the  Union. 
Its specific aim is to contribute to the 
process of reform by reviewing and 
analysing  these  changes  and  so 
broaden  understanding  of the 
measures concerned.  In part,  it up-
dates  the  analysis  contained in  the 
two  previous  Social  Protection  in 
Europe Reports, for  1993 and  1995 
and  like  them  is  a  product  of the 
European Council Recommendation 
of July 1992 (92/442/EEC) to moni-
tor the progress achieved in relation 
to the convergence of social protec-
tion  aims  and  policies  across  the 
Union.  (The full report is  published 
in English, French and German; the 
present document which summarises 
the main findings is  available in all 
11 Community languages.) 
It  is  based,  wherever  possible,  on 
quantitative  information,  drawn  in 
particular from two new sources of 
comparable  data - the  revised 
ESSPROS (the European System of 
Integrated  Social  Protection  Statis-
tics)  on expenditure on the various 
elements of social welfare and their 
financing  and  the  new  European 
Community  Household  Panel 
(ECHP). The latter provides, for the 
first time, a comparable insight into 
income  and  living  conditions  in 
Member States, into the distribution 
of benefits between households and 
the level of income support they pro-
vide.  (Both sources of data are  de-
scribed  in  the  technical  annex  -
Notes and sources - at the back of 
the  full  report and these  should be 
consulted before drawing policy con-
clusions from the findings presented 
here.) 
- 11-Outline of the Report 
T
he Report begins by examining 
the  changing context in  which 
social  protection  systems  in  the 
Union are operating, focusing on the 
main demographic, social and econ-
omic  developments  affecting  the 
need for  support.  Secondly,  it  ana-
lyses the scale of expenditure on so-
cial protection in Member States, its 
division between different functions 
and  the  relative  importance  of 
various sources of finance.  Thirdly, 
it  considers  the  weight  of social 
transfers  in  household  income  and 
their  contribution  to  reducing  dis-
parities  in  income  between  house-
holds. Fourthly, it reviews the major 
changes  which have  been made to 
social  welfare  systems  across  the 
Union in  recent years,  focusing  on 
the period since 1995. 
Four aspects of  particular policy con-
cern are analysed in some detail: 
•  the  operation of unemployment 
compensation systems which in 
a number of Member States are 
being modified to give a greater 
incentive  for  people  to  find 
work; 
•  policy towards retirement and, in 
particular, towards reversing the 
trend for people to  retire before 
reaching  official  pensionable 
age; 
•  action  to  contain  the  growing 
cost  of health  care  while  safe-
guarding the quality of service; 
•  long-term care for those who are 
infirm  or too  frail  to  look after 
themselves and who  are  impos-
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hile European economies are 
wealthier  than  ever  before 
and real income, apart from brief in-
terruptions,  has  continued to  grow, 
the  demands  on  systems  of social 
protection  have  risen  even  more 
rapidly. In recent years, this has oc-
curred,  moreover,  in  a  macroecon-
omic context in which, in most parts 
of the  Union,  Governments  have 
given priority to limiting expenditure 
growth and consolidating public fin-
ances.  (The analysis in Competitive 
Europe,  benchmarking  the  EU 
against the experience of  Ireland and 
New  Zealand  might  help  Member 
States decide how best to adapt their 
public finances and social protection 
systems to this new context.) Despite 
the  growth  in  wealth,  the  scale  of 
dependency  on  social  transfers  in 
most Union Member States is prob-
ably  greater now  than  at  any  time 
during  the  post-war  years.  This 
seeming paradox is  explained by a 
combination of demographic, social 
and economic developments  which 
have imposed pressure on social wel-
fare systems they were not designed 
to deal with. 
In  the  first  place,  the  population 
above the official age of retirement 
(  65 in most countries) has increased 
in relation to the number of people of 
working  -age and is  set to  rise even 
more  dramatically  in  the  years  to 
come. In 1986, for each person aged 
65  or over in the Union (the present 
15  Member States), there were five 
people  aged  15  to  64.  By  1996, 
growth in the number of  people of  65 
and  over meant that for  every  one 
person in this age group, there were 
only just over 4 people of working 
age.  By 2020,  on the  latest projec-
tions, there will be only just over 3 
people of working age in the Union 
for  every  one  person  aged  65  and 
over. 
At the same time, the number of men 
aged between 55  and 64 no longer 
economically  active  has  increased 
markedly, from 43% of those in this 
age group in 1986 to almost 50% in 
1996  (the proportion of women re-
mained much the same), largely be-
cause of the slow rate of economic 
growth and the inadequate rate of  net 
job creation. If  this upward trend con-
tinues, it will add to the pressure on 
pensions systems in future years as 
the growth in the relative number of 
people of 65 and over accelerates. 
Moreover,  the  average  age  of the 
population of 65 and over is already 
increasing at the present time, inten-
sifying  the  pressure  on health care 
and social services (the average cost 
of providing  health  care  alone  to 
someone aged 65-74 is estimated to 
be 2-21 /2 times higher than for people 
under 65, for someone of 75 or over, 
4-5 times higher).  Whereas around 
40% of those of 65  and over in the 
Union were 75  or over in 1996, by 
2010, this is projected to rise to 47%, 
an increase of 33% in numbers in just 
14 years (an average growth of 2% a 
year).  Although total  population in 
the Union is likely to increase by only 
3%  over this  period,  therefore,  the 
'healthcare-adjusted'  rise  is  almost 
10%  (ie  in  terms of the increase in 
demand for health services implied 
by  the  prospective  demographic change). Beyond 2010, though total 
population  is  unlikely  to  change 
much, the number aged 65  and over 
is  projected to  continue increasing, 
implying  a  'healthcare-adjusted' 
growth in population of around 
1/2% 
a year. 
Secondly,  unemployment has  in-
creased markedly from the rates ex-
perienced  in  the  earlier  post-war 
years. In the Union as  a whole, the 
average rate was consistently below 
3% of  the labour force throughout the 
1950s,  1960s  and  early  1970s, 
whereas  it  has  been  persistently 
above  8%  since  1982 - except in 
1990,  when  it  was  only  slightly 
lower.  A  significant  proportion  of 
people of working age  have, there-
fore,  been unable to  obtain a job to 
contribute  to  the  generation  of in-
come  required  to  support  those  in 
retirement and have instead added to 
the need for social transfers. 
The average duration of unemploy-
ment has also increased considerably 
since  the  mid-1970s.  By  the  mid-
1980s, the number in the Union who 
had been out of work for a year or 
more  had  risen  to  over 5%  of the 
labour force,  over half of the  total 
unemployed. While it fell slightly be-
tween then and the early 1990s, as a 
result of the high rate of job growth, 
by  1996,  the  number  had  risen  to 
around 5% of the labour force once 
more. Over 8
1/2 million people across 
the Union were, therefore, long-term 
unemployed at the last count and of 
these over 60%, almost 5
1/2  million, 
had been out of  work for two years or 
more. 
In consequence, whereas unemploy-
ment compensation systems were de-
signed to provide income support for 
temporary  spells  of joblessness,  in 
practice,  for  the  last  10  years  and 
more,  at  least  half of those  unem-
ployed at any time were in  need of 
longer  term  and,  almost  certainly 
more  extensive,  assistance.  More-
over, the figures for long-term unem-
ployment do not reveal the full extent 
of the  increase  in  dependency.  Up 
until recently, there was also a signi-
ficant rise  in  a number of Member 
States  (in  the  Netherlands  and  the 
UK,  in  particular)  in  men over 50 
classified as disabled largely because 
of their inability to find a job. 
The other major feature of economic 
developments which is  relevant has 
been the substantial and ongoing in-
crease  in the  proportion of women 
pursuing working careers. This trend 
spread first across much of Northern 
Europe in the  1960s and  1970s and 
then,  in  the  1980s,  to  the  Southern 
Member States. In 1970, only around 
40% of women aged 25 to 54 in the 
Union were in work or actively look-
ing for work. By the mid-1980s, this 
figure had increased to 60% and by 
1996,  had reached  almost 70%.  In 
Spain and Ireland, the figure has risen 
from under 40% to 57% during the 
last decade alone. The effect of this 
has been to increase the demand not 
only for  social support to  help take 
care of children and elderly and frail 
parents or grandparents, but also for 
the individualisation of rights under 
the social protection system and for 
due account to be taken of interrup-
tions to paid employment in the cal-
culation of benefit entitlement. 
This  increase  in  demand  has  been 
reinforced by the changing structure 
of households and, in particular, the 
growth of people living alone and of 
lone  parent  families,  coupled  with 
the  decline  in  the  extended family. 
The average household size declined 
by  5%  over  the  10  years  1986  to 
1996.  This decline was common to 
most parts of the Union, though the 
average household size remains sig-
nificantly  larger in  the  Southern 
Member States (i/2 people aged  15 
and over per household) than in the 
Northern ones  (under 2 per house-
hold). It is attributable, in particular, 
to  the  substantial increase in  single 
adult households  (ie  with  only  one 
person aged 15 or over), which rep-
resented  almost  a  quarter of all 
households in the North of  the Union 
in  1996 as opposed to  under 20% a 
decade earlier. 
Some 8% of single adult households 
in 1996 had children, though in Bel-
gium, Austria and the UK, the figure 
was over 12%. The great majority of 
the  adults  concerned were  women, 
many of them in parts of the Union 
not in work and dependent on social 
transfers - in the UK, for example, 
some  two-thirds  of lone-parent 
families receive income support. 
Moreover, in general, if someone is 
unemployed in the Union, there is a 
much  higher  probability  that  they 
live  either alone  or in a household 
where the other members are out of 
work than in one where someone else 
is in paid employment and, therefore, 
bringing in income. In 1996, 15% of 
households in the Union with a work-
ing-age adult had nobody in work. In 
Belgium,  Finland  and  the  UK,  the 
figure  was  20%  or more,  much 
higher than the average rate of  unem-
ployment. In the UK, where unem-
ployment fell  significantly over the 
10 years 1986 to 1996, the proportion 
of households where nobody was in 
work rose,  while  in Ireland,  where 
- 13-unemployment fell by even more, the 
proportion remained unchanged. 
The main 
quantitative findings 
The scale of 
social expenditure 
Any assessment of  the scale of social 
protection  in  European  countries, 
and the associated cost in terms of  the 
transfers involved, can only satisfac-
torily  be  made  by  considering  the 
revenue side of the public sector ac-
counts as well as expenditure. This is, 
first, because social transfers are in-
creasingly  subject  to  tax  or social 
charges  in  a  number of Member 
States  and,  accordingly, part of the 
expenditure incurred by government 
returns as tax or other receipts. Sec-
ondly, effective transfers can, in prin-
ciple,  be  made  through  tax 
concessions or allowances as well as 
through benefit payments and, in this 
case, will show up as lower receipts 
rather than as expenditure. Estimat-
ing  the  scale  of such  so-called tax 
expenditures and the revenue gener-
ated by taxes on benefits is, however, 
fraught with difficulty. 
So far as  expenditure is  concerned, 
social  protection  (as  defined  under 
the new ESSPROS to include social 
transfers, either in cash or in kind for 
welfare  purposes,  and  health  care) 
amounted to 28
1!2% of Union GDP in 
1995.  This  figure,  however,  varied 
markedly  between  Member  States, 
ranging from 20% ofGDP in Ireland, 
21% in Greece and Portugal and 22% 
in Spain, to 30% or more in France, 
the Netherlands and the three Nordic 
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Member States, with Sweden show-
ing  the  highest figure  at just under 
36% of GDP (Graph 1). For the rest, 
in  Belgium,  Germany  and  Austria, 
expenditure was just under 30% of 
GDP, while in the UK, it was around 
2i/2% and in Italy 24
1/2%.  (Because 
of the  newness  of the  system  of 
classification, these figures  are pro-
visional and liable to change as better 
information  becomes  available  -
see  Notes  and  sources  in  the  main 
report.) 
The  variation  in  these  figures  be-
tween Member States are broadly in 
line with relative levels of  prosperity, 
as measured by GDP per head, and, 
therefore, reflect the ability of coun-
tries to support the expenditure con-
cerned.  Nevertheless,  it  is  evident 
that  there  are  differences  between 
countries with similar levels of pros-
perity  in  the  implicit  priority  ac-
corded to social protection. This, in 
tum, partly reflects differences in so-
cial characteristics (in  the  tendency 
for  women  to  pursue  working 
careers, for example, which is high in 
the  Nor  die  countries  and  low  in 
Italy),  in  the  age  structure  of the 
population and  in  the degree of re-
liance on  private provision (private 
pensions are included to varying ex-
tents in the ESSPROS data depend-
ing on the degree of social solidarity 
involved). 
In  a number of the  countries, how-
ever, especially in those where social 
spending is high in relation to GDP, 
benefits are subject to tax and/or so-
cial charges, so that part of  the money 
paid out by government comes back 
as receipts on the revenue side of the 
accounts.  This  part,  moreover,  has 
tended to increase in recent years as 
governments have sought both to tar-
get  protection  more  effectively  on 
those most in need of support and to 
distribute the costs more evenly. 
According  to  a  recent  study  ('Net 
public  social  expenditure',  OECD, 
Labour Market and Social  Policy 
Occasional Papers,  No.  19),  direct 
taxes and social contributions levied 
on benefits amounted to  almost 6% 
of GDP in the Netherlands, over 5% 
in Sweden, 4% in Denmark and 2
1/2% 
in Germany, whereas in the UK, the 
figure was virtually zero. Taking ac-
count also of the revenue from indi-
rect taxes as beneficiaries spend their 
transfers  - which  is  more  similar 
between countries -reduces  expen-
diture  on  social  protection  in  net 
terms  to  around  27%  of GDP  in 
Sweden  and  to  between  23%  and 
25
1/2% ofGDP in the other four. This 
is  much  less  of a  difference  than 
shown by the gross spending figures 
noted above. Moreover, in net terms, 
the UK is estimated to have slightly 
higher expenditure relative to  GDP 
than Germany and the Netherlands. 
These estimates relate  to  only  five 
Member States for a single year (Eu-
rostat plans to  develop special mo-
dules on the effects of  taxes as part of 
ESSPROS) and are somewhat tenta-
tive. A further insight into the relative 
weight  of social  transfers  can  be 
gained from the ECHP data on net 
benefits  received  by  households. 
Benefits in this case are confined to 
cash transfers and exclude benefits in 
kind, such as health care, though they 
include all private pensions. Accord-
ing  to  these  data,  social  transfers 
amounted,  on average,  to  just over 
30% of net household income in the 
Union in  1993  (the  Union here ex-
cludes Austria, Finland and Sweden which were not covered by the first 
wave of the ECHP). 
The  pattern  of variation  between 
Member States  differs  from  that 
shown by the figures for gross expen-
diture relative to GDP. Social trans-
fers  were  highest  in  Belgium  and 
France, at over 36% of  net household 
income (though the figure for France 
is  slightly overstated because trans-
fers  are measured gross of the rela-
tively small amount of  tax payable on 
them),  and  next  highest  in  Italy, 
which is well below the Union aver-
age  in  terms  of the  expenditure 
figures, at just under 33%. They were 
similar to  the  average  in  Denmark 
and the Netherlands, as they were in 
Spain, where, like Italy, the ratio of 
expenditure to GDP is relatively low, 
below average in Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the UK (at around 
27% of net income) and lowest, in 
Greece and Portugal (25% and 22%, 
respectively), in line with the expen-
diture figures. 
So far no reliable estimates are avail-
able for the overall value of tax-ex-
penditures  and  their  exclusion  is 
liable  to  distort  the  comparative 
picture  which emerges  from  the 
ESSPROS  and ECHP data,  though 
the amounts involved seem in most 
cases to be relatively small (though 
there are exceptions, such as the UK 
where tax relief on private pension 
contributions is important). 
The pattern of 
social expenditure 
Old-age pensions are by some way 
the largest item of social protection 
expenditure in the Union, accounting 
for 42
1/2% of the total in 1995, equi-
valent to  12% of GDP. The figure, 
however,  varies  from  over 60% in 
Italy (15
1/2%  of GDP) - far more 
than in any other Member State (but 
include  some  transfers  allocated to 
other items in other countries) - to 
32% in Finland (l0
1/2% of GDP) and 
only 25% in Ireland (5% ofGDP). In 
the latter, this partly reflects the small 
proportion of the  population above 
retirement age, just as the high figure 
in Italy reflects the opposite, though 
here the large numbers retiring early 
reinforces  the  unfavourable  age 
structure. 
While,  in  general,  high  unemploy-
ment is often regarded as a primary 
cause of high levels of social spend-
ing, in reality, transfers to the unem-
ployed accounted for only 8% oftotal 
expenditure  in  the  Union  in  1995 
(just  under 2
1/2%  of GDP)  - less 
than spending on disability benefits 
and only a little higher than that on 
family allowances. Only in Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, was 
expenditure  on  unemployment 
benefits  significantly  above  3% of 
GDP (4-5% in each case). 
At the same time, such expenditure is 
only  a very partial indicator of the 
costs of unemployment for systems 
of social protection. Not only does it 
reduce  the  finance  available  from 
taxes  and  contributions,  but it  also 
adds to spending in other areas. Part 
of  spending under disability benefits, 
housing allowances and social exclu-
sion  is  also,  in practice,  related  to 
unemployment - or,  more  gener-
ally, to job shortages - as is a large 
part of spending on early retirement 
1  Total expenditure on social protection by broad 
function in Member States, 1995 
2  Growth of  social expenditure in real terms in 
Member States, 1990-93 and 1993-95 
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of old-age pensions in about half the 
Member  States  rather  than  unem-
ployment compensation, as required 
under the ESSPROS classification). 
In the Netherlands and the UK, ex-
penditure on disability benefits was 
much higher than on unemployment 
benefits in 1995  (4
1/2%  of GDP and 
3%, respectively), while spending on 
housing  and  social  exclusion 
amounted  to  another  1%  of GDP 
across the Union (over 2% ofGDP in 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK). 
Health care is the second largest item 
of expenditure, amounting to around 
22% of the total in the Union, as well 
as  in  all  Member States, except for 
Denmark (only  14%),  and  to  some 
6%  of GDP,  though  varying  from 
under 5%  in  Denmark and  Italy to 
7
1/2% in France, well above the figure 
in any other Member State. 
The growth of 
social expenditure 
Total spending on social protection 
increased  from  just under  26%  of 
GDP to  28
1/2%  over the  five  years 
1990 to 1995 as compared with a rise 
of around 1% of GDP over the 1980s 
(on  the  previous  ESSPROS  defini-
tion). The increase was common to 
all Member States with the sole ex-
ception  of the  Netherlands,  where 
there  was  a  small  fall.  (Unfortu-
nately, no estimates are available for 
the  change  in  net  terms,  which  is 
likely to have been less.) 
The rise,  however, reflects  in  large 
measure  the  slowdown  in  GDP 
growth itself during the 1990s - to 
under 1
1/2%  a year as against almost 
2
1/2% in the 1980s. Moreover, the rise 
- 16-
was confined to the  period  1990 to 
1993,  the  years  of recession  when 
there was very little growth at all in 
GDP. In the two years 1993 to 1995, 
social spending in the Union declined 
on average  relative  to  GDP,  rising 
only in Belgium, Germany and Aus-
tria and falling elsewhere. While this 
was partly due to some recovery in 
GDP,  it  was  also  the  result  of a 
marked slowdown after 1993 in the 
growth of social protection itself, to 
some extent reflecting the  stabilisa-
tion of unemployment after the large 
rise  which  occurred during  the  re-
cession years. 
In real  terms  (adjusting for general 
inflation),  social  spending  grew  by 
an average of around 4
1/2% a year in 
the Union in the three years 1990 to 
1993, when GDP hardly increased at 
all. In the two years, 1993 to 1995, it 
went up by  1
1/2%  a year (Graph 2). 
Only  in  Belgium  and  in  Ireland 
(where GDP rose by over 9% a year) 
was there no reduction in the rate of 
real  growth  over the  latter  period. 
Even after excluding unemployment 
benefits, which declined in real terms 
between 1993 and 1995, average ex-
penditure growth after 1993 was half 
the rate in the three years before. 
The largest rise in social expenditure 
over the five years 1990 to 1995 (6-
7%  of GDP)  occurred  in  Portugal, 
where  efforts  were  being  made  to 
raise  protection to  the  standards  in 
the North of the Union, and Finland, 
where  unemployment  rose  more 
steeply than anywhere else. By con-
trast, in the Netherlands, expenditure 
fell slightly relative to GDP, while in 
Ireland and Italy, the rise  was  well 
below average (under 1%  of GDP), 
in the former, GDP and social spend-
ing  growing  strongly,  in  the  latter, 
both growing slowly. 
Apart from unemployment benefits, 
old  age  pensions  and  health  care 
showed  the  largest  rise  over  the 
period (up by 1% of Union GDP and 
1/2%  respectively), in part reflecting 
the  ageing  of the  population.  Be-
tween  1993  and  1995,  however, 
spending on health care fell  relative 
to  GDP  in  a  number  of countries, 
while that on old-age pensions rose 
in line with, or less than, the growth 
in GDP in most Member States. 
Sources of finance 
The funding of social protection con-
tinues to be the focus of much policy 
attention.  The emphasis throughout 
the Union, as  part of the attempt to 
increase  job creation,  has  been  on 
reducing  non-wage  labour costs. 
This  objective,  proposed  by  the 
Commission in  its  White Paper on 
Growth,  Competitiveness  and Em-
ployment in 1993, was confirmed by 
several  European  Councils,  espe-
cially in Dublin at the end of 1996, as 
well  as  in  the  Employment Gui-
delines adopted at the end of 1997. 
However,  so  far  there  is  little  sign 
that  the  level  of charges  levied on 
labour  (taxes  and  social  contribu-
tions) has decreased. In fact, the im-
plicit  tax  rate  is  estimated to  have 
increased from 35% in 1981 to 42% 
in 1995. (Improvements in the coor-
dination of taxation policies across 
the  Union to  address  this  issue are 
currently being discussed by the Tax-
ation Policy Group set up be the Eu-
ropean Council in Dublin at the end 
of 1996.) The funding for social protection in 
all Member States comes partly from 
social  contributions,  levied  mostly 
on  income  from  employment,  and 
partly from general taxation, though 
in a few countries (Belgium, France 
and Luxembourg, in particular) 'ear-
marked' taxes have been introduced 
in recent years. On the latest figures 
(for 1995), around 65% of finance in 
the Union still comes from contribu-
tions,  some  60%  of these  paid  by 
employers,  including  voluntary  as 
well  as  statutory  contributions  (ie 
40% of total funding), and 30% from 
taxation,  virtually  all  of this  from 
general taxes. 
The relative weight of the two broad 
sources varies between countries, re-
flecting the historical development of 
the system itself. In Member States 
where the system has its origins in the 
provision  of social  insurance  for 
those in employment (the  so-called 
Bismarkian system)- the Benelux 
countries,  France,  Germany  and 
Austria - social contributions still 
account  for  two-thirds  or  more  of 
funding (as much as 77% in France). 
In the Nordic countries, the UK and 
Ireland,  where  the  system  has  its 
origins in the provision of  social wel-
fare for those in need (the so-called 
Beveridge system),  social contribu-
tions  account  for  less  than  half of 
total finance (  40% or less in the UK 
and Ireland and only 23
1/2%  in Den-
mark).  In  the  South  of the  Union, 
two-thirds or more of revenue comes 
from contributions in Greece, Spain 
and Italy, but just under half in Por-
tugal. 
In all countries, except Denmark and 
the Netherlands, a much larger share 
of contributions  comes  from  em-
ployers than from  those being pro-
tected.  In  line  with  stated  policy 
aims, however, there has been some 
shift  to  other  sources  during  the 
1990s. In the Union as a whole, the 
revenue raised from employers' con-
tributions declined from 43% of the 
total to 39
1/2% in the five years 1990 
to 1995, while that raised from those 
protected rose from 22
1/2% to 23
1/2%. 
This shift was common to all Mem-
ber States, except for Denmark and 
the  Netherlands,  where  employers' 
contributions  are  relatively  small, 
and  Belgium.  It  was  especially 
marked  in  Portugal  and  Finland, 
where revenue from employers' con-
tributions was reduced by some 20% 
in relative terms. 
In relation to labour costs, however, 
the  evidence  suggests  that  em-
ployers'  contributions  increased 
slightly  between  1990  and  1995 
across  the  Union,  while  they  re-
mained virtually unchanged relative 
to  GDP,  despite  their  decline  as  a 
share of total funding for social pro-
tection.  Though  governments  have 
sought to relieve employers of some 
of the costs of financing social pro-
tection, therefore, this aim has gener-
ally been frustrated by the growth of 
expenditure- and funding require-
ments - at a higher rate than GDP 
and,  accordingly,  than the tax  base 
from which revenue has to be raised. 
The increase in employers' contribu-
tions relative to  labour costs (or the 
overall wage bill as measured by the 
compensation  of employees)  was 
common  to  all  Member States  for 
which  data  exist  (ie  excluding 
Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden), 
except Portugal and Ireland. 
The other main development on the 
funding  side,  apart  from  the  emer-
gence of earmarked taxes, which is 
limited  to  a very  few  countries  (in 
France, their share of revenue rose 
from 3
1/2% in 1990 to 8% in 1995), is 
the  increase in  contributions levied 
on old-age  pensioners  and  other 
benefit recipients. This reflects both 
the  growing  real  income  of pen-
sioners and the desire to  spread the 
cost of financing more evenly across 
the population. Nevertheless, only in 
the  Netherlands  (8
1/2%)  and  Ger-
many  (  4%)  are  they  a  significant 
source of funding. 
Levels of 
unemployment benefit 
Data from the ECHP for the first time 
enable the actual level of benefit re-
ceived by  those  out of work to  be 
compared across the Union (whereas 
previously it has been necessary to 
rely on the results of models- see 
Social Protection  in  Europe,  1995, 
Chapter 4  - which  however well 
they  capture  the  features  of the 
benefit and tax systems in operation 
provide no indication of how repre-
sentative the results for hypothetical 
cases  are  in reality).  They  indicate 
that,  in practice, the disincentive to 
look  for  work  associated  with  the 
benefit system seems  to  vary  mar-
kedly across the Union.  In the first 
place, around a quarter of those aged 
25  to  64 in the Union in  1993  who 
were unemployed for at least three 
months  received no unemployment 
benefit at all (though they may have 
received other means of support to 
ensure that their income did not fall 
below a minimum level). This pro-
portion, however, varied from 5% or 
less in Belgium, Denmark, Germany 
and the UK and only slightly more in 
Ireland,  to  around  two-thirds  in 
Greece,  Italy  and  Portugal  (in  the 
- 17-ECHP no comparable data exist for 
the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Finland 
and Sweden and there are insufficient 
observations for Luxembourg). 
Secondly, for those receiving benefit, 
the  monthly payment averaged just 
over  50%  of net  earnings  for  the 
months  that  they  were  employed 
(which,  it  should  be  emphasised, 
could be in the jobs they moved into 
after they were unemployed as  well 
as in the jobs they had before becom-
ing unemployed), but was over 75% 
in Portugal (though only a third of  the 
unemployed received anything) and 
around 60-65% in Denmark, France 
and Ireland, but only 25% in Greece 
and the UK (Graph 3). Benefit levels 
in  Belgium  and  Germany  were 
around the Union average, in Spain 
just above and Italy below. (It should 
be emphasised that these figures re-
late only to benefits linked with un-
employment  and  the  people 
concerned may also be in receipt of 
other transfers which might affect the 
level of benefit relative to earnings 
-see  Chapter 4 of the full report.) 
Thirdly, the proportion of the unem-
ployed receiving benefits of 80% or 
more of their net earnings when in 
work  (assuming  that  their  average 
monthly earnings calculated from the 
ECHP data reflect the  pay they  re-
ceive in the jobs they move into after 
being  unemployed),  was  relatively 
small in most of the Member States 
covered (around 20% or less of men 
in  8 of the  10  countries, all except 
Ireland and Portugal and under 6% in 
Greece, Italy, and around 20% or less 
of women  in  7  of the  countries, 
though  around  a  third  in  Germany 
and France and half in Denmark). 
These figures need to be interpreted 
with some caution, however, since in 
a number of countries where benefit 
levels are  low  (the UK especially), 
various benefits in kind not included 
in  the ECHP data,  such as housing 
allowances, are also payable to those 
unemployed to  supplement their in-
come  (it  is  also  important  to  take 
account  of the  nature  of the  data, 
which is explained in Chapter 4 and 
Notes and sources in the full report). 
Nevertheless,  though  significant, 
these  additional  payments  are  un-
likely  to  alter  the  picture  substan-
tially, partly because in many cases 
they are also payable to those in low-
paid jobs, which most of the unem-
ployed  tend  to  go  into  when  they 
return to work (the ECHP indicates 
that monthly earnings of  those unem-
ployed for part of 1993 were in most 
cases substantially below average-
see Chapter 4 of the full report). 
The relief of poverty 
As constraints on social expenditure 
tighten, the concern  in  all  Member 
States  is  increasingly  to  allocate 
revenue  in  the  most effective way. 
Data on household income from the 
ECHP provide an insight into the ex-
tent to which transfers are targeted on 
the poorest in society and, as a result, 
succeed in alleviating relative depri-
vation and narrowing disparities  in 
income distribution, though it should 
be stressed that this is only one of the 
aims of systems of social protection 
in the Union. 
According to the ECHP, social trans-
fers (including private pensions)  in 
3  Average unemployment compensation relative to 
earnings for men and women aged 25-64 in 
Member States, 1993 
4  Scale of social transfers and effect on households 
with net income below 50% of average, 1993 
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0 the Union accounted for around 30% 
of net household income in 1993, as 
noted above. For some 3  7% or so of 
households,  they  represented  the 
main source of income. In their ab-
sence,  almost  40%  of households 
would have had an income level of 
under 50% of the national average (a 
measure conventionally used as  an 
indicator of relative  poverty  and 
agreed as a working definition by the 
Council  of Ministers  in  December 
1984), many none at all. This propor-
tion varied comparatively little  be-
tween countries. In Belgium, Ireland 
and the UK, it was around 42%, in 
Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Lux-
embourg and the  Netherlands,  36-
37% (Graph 4). 
After transfers, and after tax, an aver-
age of around 17% of households in 
the Union had an income level below 
half the national average. In the UK, 
Ireland  and  Greece,  the  proportion 
was over 20% and in Portugal, some 
29%,  in  Spain, France and Italy, it 
was around the Union average (15 to 
19% ),  in the Benelux countries and 
Germany, 13-14% and in Denmark, 
under 9%. The effect of transfers in 
reducing  the  share  of households 
with income below 50% was greatest 
in Belgium and Denmark, where the 
reduction was around 29 percentage 
points,  though  Denmark  achieved 
this  with  proportionately  smaller 
transfers (30% of net household in-
come) than Belgium (37%). The ef-
fect  was  also  relatively  large  in 
France and the Netherlands (24--25 
percentage points), though in France, 
the scale of transfers was similar to 
that in  Belgium (even allowing for 
the  overstatement of transfers  in 
France  noted  above)  and  in  the 
Netherlands, similar to that in Den-
mark. 
By contrast, the reduction in the share 
in  Greece  was  only  14  percentage 
points and in Portugal, only just over 
10 percentage points. In terms of the 
scale of social transfers (25% of net 
household  income  in  the  former, 
22% in the latter), the effect in reliev-
ing poverty in the two was very simi-
lar and in both transfers appear to be 
less targeted on the poorest than in 
other Member States (around 70% of 
transfers  going  to  households  with 
under half average  income  before 
transfers as against 77% in the Union 
as a whole). 
Over the rest of  the Union, the reduc-
tion in share was 20--23  percentage 
points,  though  again  the  level  of 
transfers involved in achieving this 
differs  between  countries,  being 
higher in Italy, for example, than in 
Germany  (23  percentage  points  as 
against 20). 
The comparatively small effect of  so-
cial transfers on income distribution 
in Greece and Portugal also reflects 
their  uneven  allocation  between 
households,  with  some receiving  a 
substantial amount, others compara-
tively little. This was particularly so 
in the case of  old-age pensions which 
are  the  major element in transfers, 
though it also applied to other trans-
fers (unemployment benefits, family 
allowances and so on),  as  it  did in 
Italy. In the case of these other trans-
fers, over the Union as a whole, 19% 
went to the 17% of households with 
income below 50% of average after 
transfers and 37% to  the  30% with 
income below 65% of average. 
In the case of old-age pensions, on 
the other hand, 19% of  transfers went 
to  the  15%  of households  in  the 
Union with income of over 11 /2 times 
the  average after transfers  (28%  in 
Greece and Portugal to the 16-17% 
of the households  in this  category, 
25% in France to the 13% of house-
holds and 29% in the Netherlands to 
the  15%  of households).  In  four 
countries,  however,  Belgium,  Ire-
land,  Luxembourg and,  most espe-
cially,  Denmark,  pensions  went 





he common response of  govern-
ments across Europe to the ex-
penditure  trends  noted  above,  has 
been to seek ways, on the one hand, 
of containing the growth of spending 
and, on the other, of  activating policy 
to reduce the number of people de-
pendent on social transfers. The acti-
vation of policy has been a central 
theme  underlying  many  recent  re-
forms, the aim being to shift from a 
passive stance of income support to 
an active one of encouraging those 
out of work to take up paid employ-
ment,  by  increasing  incentives  to 
work and helping people to partici-
pate  in  society  and  working  life. 
Measures have, therefore, been im-
plemented  to  improve  the  em-
ployability of those out of work, to 
provide access to training and career 
guidance and to assist them in finding 
a job. 
This approach has not been confined 
to  those  registered  as  unemployed 
but has been extended to other groups 
dependent  on  long-term  state  sup-
port, especially to  people with dis-
abilities  but  potentially  able  and 
wanting  to  work,  lone  parents  and 
- 19-those retiring from work early. The 
aim has been not just to reduce de-
pendency  and  expenditure,  but to 
combat social exclusion by helping 
the  people  concerned  find  a  more 
meaningful  place  in  society  and  a 
chance  to  contribute  to  its  well-
being. 
The  ageing  of the  population has 
added further impetus to these effort-
s. It has also served to focus increased 
attention  on  the  growing  costs  of 
health care,  which  goes  dispropor-
tionately to  the  elderly,  and on the 
need for  new  ways  of catering for 
those requiring long-term care. 
The concern to address this new need 
exemplifies  the  prevailing  attitude 
towards social protection across the 
Union. Although the emphasis is on 
cost containment and  reducing  ex-
penditure  wherever possible,  the 
principle of maintaining a universal 
system which provides protection to 
all  those  in  need  remains  unques-
tioned. Nevertheless, there is increas-
ing  debate  on  how  widely  social 
welfare systems should extend, what 
risks  they  should  cover and,  most 
pertinently,  where  state  responsi-
bility should end and individual re-
sponsibility take  over.  At the  same 
time, there is a growing emphasis on 
the pursuit of  active measures and the 
need to support policies for increas-
ing employment, the main guidelines 
of whrch  were  agreed  by  Member 




In  several  Member  States  (the 
Netherlands and Sweden, in particu-
-20-
lar),  the  qualifying  conditions  for 
benefit  have  been  tightened  since 
1993 (the year to which the analysis 
above  relates),  while  in  others 
(Spain,  Austria  and  Finland),  the 
contributions record required to  be 
eligible  for  benefit has  been leng-
thened.  Rates  of benefit  have  also 
been  reduced,  as  in  Germany  and 
Finland - in the latter by their non-
indexation in 1995 and 1996. On the 
other hand, in Sweden, although the 
rate of  benefit was reduced from 80% 
to 75% in 1996, after being lowered 
from 90% before that, the rate was 
restored to 80% in 1997. 
The period of entitlement to  insur-
ance benefit has also been shortened 
in some Member States-in the UK, 
from one year to only 6 months on the 
introduction  of the  Job  Seeker's 
Allowance in  1996 (payment being 
means-tested after that); in Denmark, 
from 9 years to 7 years in 1995 and 
to 5 years in 1996, though it remains 
among the longest in the Union (but 
for the last 3 years, intensified efforts 
are made to get the unemployed into 
active  programmes).  In  Belgium, 
from  1996,  benefits  can be  with-
drawn if the  person concerned has 
been unemployed for more than 1
1
/ 2 
times the regional average (instead of 
twice as long as before). 
Strengthening 
incentives to work 
Cuts in benefit and a tightening of 
eligibility  criteria provide  in  them-
selves  an  increased  incentive  to 
work. Other measures have also been 
introduced in a number of countries 
to  make  it  more  attractive,  and  in 
some cases more feasible, for people 
to  work  rather than  remain  unem-
ployed. In-work benefits, designed to 
increase  the  take-home  pay  from 
working,  even in  low-paid jobs, 
exist, at present, in only the UK (  eg 
Family Credit) and Ireland (Family 
Income Supplement). Whereas so far 
they have been paid only to people 
with  children,  in  the  UK,  a  pilot 
scheme was introduced in 1996 for 
low-paid workers  without children. 
In  both  countries,  the  number of 
people covered by in-work benefits 
has  increased in  the  recent past as 
qualifying income levels have been 
raised.  Lone  parents  have  been 
targeted  specifically,  with  a  new 
benefit for these being introduced in 
Ireland in 1997. Help with child care 
for  low  income  families,  including 
lone parents, was also introduced re-
cently in the UK.  In the  latter and 
elsewhere, attempts have been made 
to encourage the unemployed to take 
part-time jobs, partly to prepare them 
better for full-time  employment -
through giving them entitlement to 
unemployment benefits (in Belgium, 
or enabling  them  to  keep  some of 
their benefit in the UK). 
Effects similar to those of in work-
benefits  can  be  also  obtained  by 
granting specific tax advantages for 
low-wage  earners  (eg  in  Finland, 
measures have been introduced tore-
duce the income tax paid by those on 
low pay, a concession which is with-
drawn as earnings increase). 
Shifting towards 
more active policies 
Changes in unemployment compen-
sation systems have generally been 
accompanied by measures aimed at 
increasing the  employability of the 
unemployed and helping them find a job, including, for example, training 
to  improve  skill  levels  in  line with 
labour market requirements and ad-
vice  on  job  search  and  interview 
techniques.  Shifting  policy  from 
passive measures of income support 
to active measures, however, is not so 
easy,  especially  during  periods  of 
high  unemployment.  Given  budget 
constraints, it requires a restructuring 
of expenditure  and  a  reform  of 
benefit and tax systems to maximise 
the  return  on existing  outlays.  Al-
though the need to shift expenditure 
from passive to active labour market 
measures was highlighted by Mem-
ber States at the Essen Summit at the 
end  of 1994  and  reiterated  at  suc-
cessive Council meetings since, the 
policy  intention  has  been  slow  to 
show up in the figures on labour mar-
ket expenditure. Between 1990 and 
1996,  there  was  only  a  small  rise 
in the Union as a whole in spending 
on  active  in  relation  to  passive 
measures, all of which has occurred 
since  unemployment  stabilised  in 
1994  (Graph  5).  Member States 
have,  therefore,  reaffirmed  their 
commitment to  bring  about  such  a 
transition  in  the  Employment Gui-
delines  agreed  at  the  Luxembourg 
Jobs Summit. 
In a number of Member States, con-
scious efforts have been made to im-
prove  the  articulation  between  the 
provision of income support and get-
ting  the  unemployed into  work.  In 
Denmark, as noted above, measures 
were  introduced  in  1995  to  ensure 
that  anyone  unemployed  for  two 
years  either receives  a job offer or 
goes  on  a  training  course,  which 
seems to  have been a key factor in 
reducing unemployment to under 6% 
at the last count as against over 8% in 
1994. At the same time, those under 
25  with  insufficient  education  or 
training have a right to education or 
training for at least 18 months if they 
have  been  unemployed  for  six 
months but forfeit the right to receive 
unemployment benefits if  they do not 
take up the offer. In Sweden, a new 
programme was launched in 1996 to 
draw up individual action plans for 
job-seekers, who are  able to  take a 
year off to  study  while  effectively 
receiving unemployment benefit. In 
the  UK,  a key  element of the Job-
seeker's  Allowance,  introduced  in 
1996, is a requirement for the unem-
ployed  to  enter  into  an  agreement 
specifying  the  steps  they  intend  to 
take  to  find  work and  the  services 
available to help them. 
These programmes exemplify the in-
creasing importance attached to pro-
viding  job-search  assistance  to  the 
unemployed  as  well  as  access  to 
training or re-training courses. This 
importance  was  emphasised  at  the 
Luxembourg Jobs Summit and is  a 
prominent  feature  of the  Employ-
ment Guidelines agreed by Member 
States, which specified that: 
•  every unemployed young person 
should be offered a new start be-
fore  reaching six months of un-
employment,  in  the  form  of 
training,  retraining,  work  prac-
tice, a job or other employability 
measure; 
•  unemployed adults should be of-
fered  a fresh  start before reach-
ing  twelve  months  of 
unemployment  through  one  of 
the  above  measures  or,  more 
generally, through individual vo-
cational guidance. 
Despite  the  acknowledged  import-
ance  of training,  however,  only  a 
small minority of the unemployed at 
present receive training in the Union, 
a situation which Member States also 
committed themselves to improving 
in the Employment Guidelines (set-
ting a specific target of  increasing the 
proportion to 20% ). 
Extending job 
creation schemes 
In several Member States, job cre-
ation schemes are under discussion. 
Any  assessment  of the  cost  -effec-
tiveness of these schemes, however, 
has  to  take. account not only of the 
direct effect on jobs of the measures 
introduced but also their substitution 
effects  (employers  dismissing 
workers  and  taking  on  subsidised 
ones in their place) and deadweight 
costs  (employers  recruiting  subsi-
dised workers they would have taken 
on anyway). 
In a number of Member States, job 
creation  has  been  encouraged 
through  selective  reductions  in  the 
social  contributions  levied  on  em-
ployers as well as by direct subsidy. 
In Belgium, employers creating jobs 
for young people and long-term un-
employed  in  socially-useful  acti-
vities  ('Smets jobs') receive both a 
large subsidy for three years and full 
relief from  social  contributions.  In 
the UK, employers taking on people 
unemployed for two  years  or more 
are exempt from social contributions 
for a year, while in  France, recruit-
ment of  the long -term unemployed is 
subsidised both directly and through 
reductions in contributions. The new 
French Government, moreover, is di-
verting the resources at present going 
-21-to a range of job subsidies into plans 
for  creating  700 thousand jobs for 
young people at the minimum wage. 
More generally, Member States rec-
ognised  at  the  Luxembourg  Jobs 
Summit the potential importance of 
job creation at the local level in the 
social economy and in new activities 
where needs are not being satisfied 
by the market (eg in the environmen-
tal  sector). They agreed in the Em-
ployment Guidelines  to  investigate 
measures  to  exploit  these  possi-
bilities  and  to  identify  and,  where 
possible,  remove  obstacles  to  their 
development. 
Reducing dependency 
and social exclusion 
In all Member States, social  assist-
ance is  available to  those unable to 
work  for  one  reason  or  another, 
though  in  some  countries,  in  the 
South of the Union, in particular, a 
minimum  level  of income  has  not 
been universally available. In Italy, 
there is a political discussion whether 
to establish a national (in place of a 
regional) means-tested minimum in-
come scheme, with payments related 
to family  size, as  recommended by 
the  Onofri  Report.  In  Portugal,  a 
minimum-income guarantee scheme 
was  introduced  in  1997,  involving 
not just the provision of income sup-
port but measures to help recipients 
integrate into  society.  This  is  a  re-
sponse  to  the  experience  under 
longer-standing schemes elsewhere, 
where social transfers by themselves 
have not proved sufficient to  over-
come the problem of deprivation and 
social exclusion. 
Indeed,  a  general  tendency  throug-
hout  the  Union is  to  address  the 
underlying causes of poverty and so-
cial exclusion and to avoid systems 
of income  support  becoming  the 
means for entrenching a permanent 
division  in  society  between  those 
who contribute to its well-being and 
those who do  not.  The aim, in par-
ticular, is to help those dependent on 
benefits to become more self-suppor-
ting by giving them an opportunity to 
find a job, which means not just pro-
viding  access  to  training  and  job 
counselling  but  to  accommodation 
and  adequate  levels  of health  care 
and social services, such as child care 
facilities. 
In Denmark, from 1998 on, everyone 
receiving  social  assistance  will  be 
given the chance to  return to educa-
tion or go on to a training scheme. In 
Germany,  increased  efforts  have 
been made to get those on social as-
sistance  into  active  labour  market 
programmes,  while  in  the  UK, the 
new  Government has  announced  a 
'welfare to work' programme aimed 
at reducing the number of people re-
liant on benefits. The latter is particu-
larly  focused  on  the  young,  the 
long-term unemployed, people with 
disabilities  and  lone  parents.  From 
October  1998,  all  lone  parent  who 
wish to work will have access to per-
sonal  advice from  the  employment 
services as  well as  receiving assist-
ance  with  child  care.  At the  same 
time,  however,  additional  benefits 
available to lone parents will be with-
drawn  for  new  claimants  and  the 
same level of benefit will be payable 
to  all  those  with  children.  In  the 
Netherlands,  in  similar  vein,  more 
stringent procedures for claiming so-
5  Expenditure on active and passive labour market 
policies in the Union, 1990-96 
6  Men aged 55-64 no longer in the labour force in 
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10 cial assistance have been introduced, 
requiring  recipients  to  be  actively 
seeking work and to accept any suit-
able job offer they receive, except if 
they  are  lone  parents  with  a  child 
under 5.  In Luxembourg, recipients 
of support are required to have ex-
hausted all other means of  improving 
their situation and be actively seek-
ing employment, unless they are 50 
or over or disabled. 
Helping people 
with disabilities 
Attempts have been made across the 
Union to reduce the number receiving 
disability benefits by introducing more 
stringent tests for assessing incapacity 
for work. In the UK, a tougher medical 
test, which after 28 weeks on benefit is 
designed to assess a person's fitness to 
do any kind of work rather than their 
previous  job,  has  been  introduced, 
much the same as in Germany, where 
benefit entitlement depends on people 
being incapable of working at all.  In 
the Netherlands, the fmancial respon-
sibility for disability benefits has been 
shifted to employers whose contribu-
tion  rates  are  now - partly - dif-
ferentiated according to the number of 
their  employees  claiming  disability 
benefits,  a  measure  which  gives  an 
incentive both to  improve health and 
safety at work and to continue emplo-
ying those with disabilities. This has 
been  coupled  with  greater stress  on 
helping  people  with  disabilities,  but 
able and wanting to work, to find jobs 
through  active  employment pro-
grammes. In Austria and Finland too, 
the emphasis of  policy has shifted from 
income support to rehabilitation, with 
entitlement  to  benefit needing  to  be 
re-established periodically. 
Incentives  for  people  with  disabil-
ities to look for  work and help for 
them to  do so  have generally been 
accompanied by  legislation to  pre-
vent discrimination against them in 
employment and  in  their access  to 
goods,  services  and  facilities  of 
various kinds as well as by enabling 
measures,  especially  in  the  work 
place, to  remove obstacles to  them 
working  - in  1993,  all  Member 
States  adopted  the  UN  Standard 
Rules of  Equality of  Opportunity for 
Disabled People.  Such measures, 
however,  while  increasing  equality 
of  opportunity, will only result in ad-
ditional competition on the job mar-
ket, where those with disabilities will 
always  be  disadvantaged,  unless 
there is, at the same time, sufficient 




The  tougher  stance  on disability 
benefits, which in many cases have 
been  paid  to  those  over 50 losing 
their job, is part of  a reversal of  policy 
towards older workers, towards en-
couraging them to  stay  in employ-
ment rather than retire early (except 
in agriculture where early retirement 
continues  to  be  promoted  under 
Regulation 2079/92) and represents a 
reaction to  the fact that in  1996 al-
most half of  men aged 55 to 64 in the 
Union were no longer economically 
active  (Graph  6).  Because  of job 
shortages, however, there remains an 
awkward  conflict between increas-
ing  the  number of older people  in 
work  and  reducing  unemployment 
(though this conflict disappears once 
the focus of policy is, more satisfac-
torily, on the employment rather than 
on the unemployment rate, as in the 
Employment Guidelines). 
In  addition  to  the  examples  noted 
above, those claiming early retirement 
pensions in Sweden now need to dem-
onstrate  that  they  are  incapable  of 
working,  in  effect,  transforming  the 
payment  into  an  invalidity  benefit, 
while, at the same time, the basic rate 
has  been reduced.  Eligibility  criteria 
have also been tightened and the pen-
sion effectively reduced in Germany 
and Austria, coupled in the latter with 
an increase in  the  required period of 
contributions from 35 years to 371 /2. In 
Belgium, the number of years of con-
tributions  necessary  to  qualify  for  a 
pension is being raised gradually from 
20 to 35 beginning in 1997, while so-
cial contributions on early retirement 
pensions  have  been  increased.  In 
Spain, voluntary retirement before the 
age of 65  is now penalised, while in 
Greece, pensions payable to those re-
tiring early have also been reduced. 
Moreover, in Austria, further encour-
agement  to  employment of older 
workers has been given by a bonus-
malus scheme, reducing social con-
tributions for employers taking them 




One means of diminishing the con-
flict between providing jobs for older 
workers  and  reducing  unemploy-
ment is to encourage people to move 
from full-time to  part-time employ-
ment  as  they  approach  retirement 
age.  This,  moreover,  can  ease  the 
transition  process  for  those  con-
cerned  while  taking  extended  ad-
-23-vantage  of their  experience  and 
know-how.  Partial  pensions  to  this 
effect have been introduced in anum-
ber of  Member States in recent years. 
Elsewhere, however, obstacles exist 
for  older workers  wishing  to  work 
part  -time  (in  the  UK,  for  example, 
they cannot continue to work for the 
same employer if they draw an occu-
pational pension). 
In  Austria,  a  partial  retirement 
scheme has existed since 1993, enab-
ling people to reduce hours of work 
and receive a proportion of the pen-
sion normally  payable,  though few 
people have opted for it,  seemingly 
because  early  retirement  per se  is 
more attractive. In Finland, a similar 
scheme has existed since the end of 
the 1980s, but again the number in-
volved has been small. In Germany, 
partial  retirement  has  been  intro-
duced more recently for those of 55 
and  over,  at the  same time as  their 
eligibility  for  early  retirement  was 
restricted. The possibility of  combin-
ing a partial pension with  a partial 
salary  also  exists  in  Luxembourg, 
though relatively few  fewer people 
have so far taken up the option. More 
success has been achieved in France, 
where partial retirement has been re-
garded since  1993  as  a  solution to 
(full) early retirement and where the 
number opting for the latter has fallen 
while those continuing to work part-




he  reform  of pension  systems, 
aimed at managing the cost of the 
impending  growth  in  population  of 
pensionable  age  - or,  more  accur-
-24-
ately,  the  income  redistribution  en-
tailed - has become a central policy 
aim in all countries. (The pension re-
forms in Italy, Sweden and France in 
particular were described in detail in 
Social  Protection  in  Europe,  1995, 
Chapter 2,  while a general economic 
analysis of pension reform and the fu-
ture of the welfare state was recently 
published in European Economy, Re-
ports and  Studies, 4/1997.) A common 
response has been to raise the official 
retirement age of women to conform 
with  that  of men,  for  both cost  and 
equity  reasons  - as  in  Germany, 
Greece, Portugal, the UK,  and, more 
recently, in Belgium and Austria. In all 
these countries, as in most other parts 
of the  Union,  the  official retirement 
age is being standardised at 65. This, 
however,  is  being  coupled  with  in-
creased emphasis on the contributions 
record of those retiring, so linking the 
pension received more closely with the 
payments made over a person's work-
ing  career and  reinforcing  the  insur-
ance aspect of the system. 
In  addition,  the  effective  pension 
payable relative to past earnings has 
been reduced in a number of coun-
tries by altering the calculation for-
mula.  In  France,  Portugal,  Austria 
and Finland, the number of years of 
earnings  on  which  the  pension  is 
based has been increased, while the 
method of revaluing pensions for in-
flation  has  been  made  less  favour-
able, as  has also occurred in Spain, 
Germany (through a shift in the basis 
from  gross  to  net  earnings)  and 
Sweden  (where  pensions  are  not 
being fully  indexed  so  long  as  the 
budget deficit remains excessive). 
In other countries, the value of pen-
sion has been reduced more directly. 
In Greece, the rate of supplementary 
pension relative to earnings has been 
reduced and limits set on the maxi-
mum payable, resulting in  a rise in 
pensioners  receiving  very  low  in-
comes and prompting the  introduc-
tion  in  1996  of a  means-tested 
allowance. A similar allowance has 
also  been  recently  introduced  in 
Spain,  where  the  number  of years 
needed to  qualify for a full  pension 
has  been raised  and  the coefficient 
applied to earnings reduced. InGer-
many, the new pension reform to take 
effect from 1999 introduces a 'demo-
graphic factor' into the pension for-
mula  to  take  account  of the 
increasing  life  expectancy  of pen-
sioners and accordingly to reduce the 
standard  pension  (Eckrente)  from 
70% of previous net earnings to 64% 
by  2030,  in  addition  to  raising  the 
pensionable age. 
So  far,  however,  there  has  been  no 
general  tendency to  shift away  from 
pay-as-you-go to funded schemes (ie 
from  contributions  covering  present 
pension liabilities  to  covering future 
ones),  though  there  is  a  widespread 
growth in the importance of occupa-
tional and private schemes to supple-
ment basic  pensions  and  relieve  the 
State of part of the future funding lia-
bility.  As  emphasised  in  the  recent 
Commission  Green  Paper  on  Sup-
plementmy  pensions in the single mar-
ket,  (COM(97)  283),  the  growth  of 
such supplementary schemes requires 
an  appropriate  Community-wide 
framework.  The  Green  Paper  also 
notes that the sustainability of pay-as-
you-go  schemes  necessitates  further 
reform of pension systems. Although 
reversing the trend towards early re-
tirement  can  alleviate  funding  prob-
lems,  it  is  unlikely  to  solve  them 
completely. In  this regard, it is relevant 
to  note  that  there  is  a  shift  towards defmed  contribution  systems,  where 
contributions  paid  over  a  person's 
working career determine the amount 
received in pension, so reducing some 
of the difference between pay-as-you-
go and funded systems. 
The only two countries in the Union 
where funded pension systems play a 
major role  are  the  Netherlands and 
the  UK.  In  the  latter,  in particular, 
where the basic state benefit is lower 
than in  most other Member States, 
two-thirds of pensioners have an oc-
cupational  or private  pension.  The 
State concentrates on taking care of 
the less well-off, leaving the manage-
ment of pension funds largely to pri-
vate insurance companies. The main 
recent focus  of policy has  been on 
strengthening  the  regulations  gov-
erning these funds,  to prevent their 
fraudulent  use  and  the  misleading 
selling of private schemes. 
Whether a funded approach is better 
designed  to  overcome  the  transfer 
problem  inherent  in  demographic 
trends  remains  unclear.  Ultimately, 
the ease of securing the transfer of 
income from those in work to those 
in retirement, irrespective of  how it is 
achieved, depends largely on the in-
come available to be distributed and, 
therefore,  on  the  economic  growth 
sustained in the intervening period. 
Containing 
health-care costs 
The  ageing  of the  population, 
together  with constraints  on public 
expenditure, has also focused policy 
attention on health care, the demand 
for which in any event tends to rise 
rapidly as real income increases and 
medical  know-how  expands.  The 
widespread  response  in  Member 
States has been either to limit expen-
diture  directly  where  services  are 
managed by  the  state  or to  impose 
ceilings on spending growth where 
this  is  determined  by  health  insur-
ance funds. While this has generally 
succeeded in holding down spending 
relative to GDP in recent years, it has 
given rise to other policy concerns-
in particular, how best to allocate ex-
penditure to  serve  the  needs  of so-
ciety as  a whole and how to ensure 
that available resources are used effi-
ciently. 
It has,  in  addition,  raised  more  fun-
damental questions about the relation-
ship between public and private health 
sectors,  about  whether  the  former 
should be limited to basic care - and, 
if  so, how this should be defmed-and 
about the implications of this for  the 
overall  pattern of care  in  relation  to 
need (and the possibility of  a shift from 
essential to more cosmetic treatment). 
It has also given rise to questions about 
the justifiability of  limiting the growth 
of  services (and jobs) to below the level 
people seem willing to pay for and, in 
tum, about how far consumers can be 
relied on to make rational choices on 
an  issue  which  is  so  important  but 
about which there is a serious lack of 
information. 
The tendency in most Member States 
has  been to  seek to  exploit the  ad-
vantages of the market while retain-
ing control over supply. In particular, 
people have been encouraged to con-
sume less and choose more rationally 
by making them aware of the costs 
involved, through the imposition and 
extension of charges - or co-pay-
ments - for drugs and certain kinds 
of treatment.  In  Germany,  for 
example,  charges  have  been raised 
significantly  in  order  to  avoid  in-
creases  in  social  contributions  and 
have been explicitly linked to the lat-
ter in an attempt to persuade the in-
surance funds  to  keep contributions 
down, increase efficiency and nego-
tiate  more  effectively  with  service 
providers  (GPs  and  hospitals)  over 
terms. 
The success of such a policy, as  in-
deed of  the introduction of  market, or 
pseudo-market,  mechanisms  in 
countries, depends, in part, on there 
being effective competition between 
insurance funds, in the German case, 
or doctors in countries with national 
health systems, and consumers being 
able to choose between them, other-
wise  prices  cannot  serve  their  in-
tended purpose. It is  also desirable 
for there to be competition between 
service providers to increase the bar-
gaining power of purchasers and to 
stimulate increases in  efficiency. In 
practice,  there  tend  to  be  natural 
limits on competition in both areas, 
because  of the  localised  nature  of 
supply  and  economies  of scale, 
which are  often reinforced by gov-
ernment to  avoid,  for  example,  the 
closure of local treatment centres. 
Accordingly,  attempts  to  introduce 
market  mechanisms  have  not,  in 
general, led to  the increases in effi-
ciency  expected,  and  governments 
throughout the Union have been re-
luctant to relinquish controls on ex-
penditure  and  leave  this  to  market 
forces.  Nevertheless,  in  countries 
where  an  attempt  has  been  made, 
there  appear  to  have  been  some 
gains,  without any  noticeable dete-
rioration  in  service.  These  have 
arisen from  the clearer division be-
tween purchasers and providers, the 
greater weight given to costs in deci-
-25-sion-making, the collection and pro-
vision of more information on costs 
and the drawing up of more detailed 
contracts on service supply. 
In  the UK,  for  example,  indicators 
show  a  small  rise  in  productivity 
since  reforms  were  introduced  in 
1991. In  Italy and Spain, the separ-
ation  of purchasers  from  providers 
and, in the former, the devolution of 
financial as well as organisational re-
sponsibility to the regions, seems to 
have led to improvements in manage-
ment and clearer contractual arrange-
ments between the two sides. In the 
Netherlands, the recent introduction 
of  a system of  per capita payments to 
insurance funds based on a prior as-
sessment of  the costs implied by their 
membership  structure,  in  place  of 
one  where  effectively  costs  were 
covered ex post, has led to competi-
tion over fees and pressure to contain 
costs and might, in  tum, with partial 
removal of  controls, lead to increased 
competition between providers and 
efficiency improvements in this area. 
At the same time, the innovatory step 
has been taken in the Netherlands to 
confine the public health service to 
the  provision  of  'curative  basic 
health care' (as well as of long-term 
care),  and  to  leave  other treatment 
('amenity care') to the private sector 
and  individual  arrangements.  The 
criteria used to  define the latter -
that  it  should  not  be  medically 
necessary and be affordable - has, 
however, led to problems in practical 
application (not least because of the 
inevitably  subjective  nature  of the 
concepts used) and so far very few 





An estimated 10% of people aged 75 
and over in the Union are in need of 
full-time care while another 25% re-
quire  part-time  care.  The  present 
high growth of population in this age 
group  is  focusing  increasing  atten-
tion  in Member States on how this 
expanding  need  should  be  met -
whether through the social protection 
system,  and if so,  whether through 
transfers  or the  direct provision  of 
services,  either  way  implying  in-
creased taxes and/or social charges, 
or through private arrangements, im-
plying the acceptance of an unequal 
burden falling  on different individ-
uals,  whether they  take  out private 
insurance cover or not. 
Debate has  been partly prompted by 
the introduction in Germany in 1995 of 
a  new  social  insurance  scheme  for 
long-term  care  (Pflegeversicherung), 
funded by  social contributions (com-
pensated by the loss of  a day's holiday) 
and payable to both those being cared 
for  at  home  and  those  receiving 
residential care. Allowances for carers 
are of longer-standing in  the UK and 
Ireland, though in the former, they are 
payable at a relatively low flat-rate and 
apply only to those providing care vir-
tually full-time, and in the latter, they 
are  means-tested.  In Austria,  attend-
ance  allowances  (Bundespflegegeld), 
administered by the regions but funded 
from  general  taxation,  have  been 
payable since 1993 to people needing 
care for at least 50 hours a month, at 
rates varying according to the amount 
of care  medically  assessed  to  be  re-
quired. 
Those receiving allowances in Aus-
tria are free to decide how to spend 
them  (most going  to  informal  care 
within the family). Rising unemploy-
ment, however, has  led to  calls for 
payments to be linked with employ-
ment objectives and used directly to 
create demand for formal social ser-
vices. This is, in essence, the option 
chosen  in  the  Nordic  countries, 
where  there  is  little  distinction  be-
tween health care and social services, 
both being freely available to all, and 
where,  in  relation  to  working-age 
population,  these  account  for  sub-
stantially more jobs than in the rest of 
Europe (over twice as many in Den-
mark  and  Sweden).  Nevertheless, 
budget constraints  have  led  to  cut-
backs  in  expenditure  and  growing 
concern about the costs of maintain-
ing extensive social services. 
Elsewhere, a draft bill was published 
in Luxembourg in 1996 for the intro-
duction  of a  compulsory  'depend-
ence  insurance'  scheme  to  cover 
assistance required by  those unable 
to take care of themselves, the fund-
ing  divided  evenly  between  social 
contributions and general taxation. 
Targeting expenditure 
The twin  concern of present policy 
on  social  protection  across  the 
Union,  to  contain costs  and reduce 
dependency, is being achieved in part 
by increasing the effectiveness of  ex-
penditure through the adoption of a 
more active approach and targeting 
resources on those most in  need. In 
Southern Member States, this is com-
bined with efforts to  rectify gaps in 
the protection provided and to  bal-
ance the provision of support more 
equitably.  In  Northern  Member 
States, debate is centred on the scope 
of social protection. While the con-sensus on maintaining the universal 
nature of social protection accessible 
to all holds firm, this does not rule out 
some shift in responsibility from the 
state to the individual or the private 
sector in certain areas. 
Privatisation, however, in the sense of 
the private, profit  -making, sector being 
involved in providing social protection 
has  not  developed  very  far  in most 
countries and there is little sign, outside 
of  the provision of  supplementary pen-
sions, of any significant growth in the 
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, there 
is evidence of increased concentration 
of expenditure on those in need, both 
through  reducing  benefits  going  to 
those on relatively high incomes, by 
setting a ceiling on the amount payable 
or  imposing  taxes  and/or  social 
charges  on  benefits,  and  through 
greater recourse to means-testing. The 
former serves not only to redistribute 
the  net gain from  transfers  from  the 
more wealthy to those further down the 
income scale but also to spread the cost 
of fmancing more widely, an increas-
ingly justifiable aim given the growth 
in wealth of  many pensioners. 
Although spending on benefits sub-
ject to  means-testing  has  generally 
increased in the Union (apart from in 
the  Netherlands),  it  still  accounted 
for only 11% of the total in 1995 as 
against  10%  in  1990,  and  only  in 
Ireland  (where  it  was  34%  of the 
total),  the  UK  (23%)  and  Spain 
(13
1
/ 2%)  was  it  more  than  10%. 
Moreover, much of the rise was due 
to  changes  in  underlying  circum-
stances-in the growth of  long  -term 
unemployment, for example, and in 
the number of people not eligible for 
social  insurance  benefits  - rather 
than a change in policy as such. In the 
case  of unemployment  compensa-
tion, almost 7  5% of transfers in Ire-
land  were  means-tested  in  1995 
(reflecting high levels of youth and 
long-term  unemployment),  50%  in 
the UK, 40% in the Netherlands and 
around 25% in Spain and Portugal. 
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D
espite the unprecedented levels 
of economic prosperity in the 
European Union,  the  demands  im-
posed on systems of  social protection 
are probably greater now than they 
ever have been. At the same time, the 
nature  of those  demands  have 
changed  significantly  over time  as 
the structure of  both the economy and 
society has altered. The aim of this 
chapter is  to describe and quantify 
the main developments which have 
occurred over the past decade or so 
and the trends which seem set to con-
tinue into the future. These determine 
the context in which social protection 
systems have to operate and are key 
elements  in  the  debate  on  reform 
which is now taking place. As such, 
it is intended to serve as background 
analysis to the remainder of this re-
port which is focused on the debate 
and policy developments across the 
Union. 
Three broad aspects of the change in 
underlying circumstances which are 
common to most Member States are 
examined  here  in  particular.  (It 
should be emphasised that the aim is 
not to cover all developments with 
implications  for  systems  of social 
protection but simply to document a 
number of ongoing trends which are 
having a major effect.) The first are 
demographic trends which are alter-
ing the age structure of the popula-
tion  dramatically  and  which  will 
result in a sharp increase in the num-
ber of people above pensionable age 
in the Union in 10-15 years time. The 
second are economic developments 
in the form specifically of  high levels 
of unemployment  and  increasing 
participation of women in the work 
force.  The third are changes in the 
structure  of households  associated 
with the decline in the importance of 
the  traditional family  and with the 
growth in the number of people liv-
ing alone. These developments have 
tended to reinforce each other in ad-
ding to the demands on systems of 
social support. At the same time, they 
have occurred in a context where em-
ployment has become less secure, as 
reflected not only in high unemploy-
ment, but in the growth of part  -time 
and temporary work. 
Demographic trends 
T
he population above retirement 
age  imposes  disproportionate 
demands on social protection, in the 
form not only of old-age pensions, 
which are the largest item in social 
welfare  budgets  across  the  Union, 
but also of health care, a major part 
of  expenditure on which is devoted to 
the elderly. The ageing of the popu-
lation has been a feature  of demo-
graphic  developments  in  most 
Member States in recent years and is 
set to be even more important in the 
coming decades. 
In all  Member States,  as  a  conse-
quence of declining birth rates and 
falling death rates, population below 
working age (under 15) is declining, 
while that above working age (65 and 
over) is  increasing. In the Union as 
whole, the number of young people 
under  15  declined  from  19
1/2%  of 
total population in 1985 to 1  i/2% in 
1995 and, on the latest Eurostat pro-
jections, is expected to fall further to 
16% in 2010 and to only 15% in 2020 
(Graph 7).  By contrast, those of 65 
and over have increased from 13% of 
total  population  in  1985  to  almost 
15
1/2%  in 1995 and are projected to 
rise to 18% in 2010 and 20% in 2020. 
At the same time, the proportion of 
people of working-age, who are pri-
marily responsible for generating the 
income to  support both young and 
old, which rose slightly over the 10 
years  1985  to  1995,  will  begin  to 
decline in future years, at first margi-
nally  and  then  more  significantly 
from 67% in 1995 to 64
1/2% in 2020. 
This implies sharply increasing de-
pendency rates as described below. 
The age structure of  the population in 
1995  was  much the  same  in  most 
Member States, those under 15  ac-
counting for 16 to 19% of  total popu-
lation in all except Italy, where the 
proportion  was  only  15%  and  Ire-
land, where it was almost 25%. The 
share  of those of 65  and over was 
generally around 15 to 16%, though 
it was only 13% in the Netherlands 
-29-and 11
1/2%  in Ireland and as high as 
18% in Sweden, where working-age 
population represented  only 64
1/2% 
of the total as compared with 66 to 
68% in most other countries. 
A shift in age structure from young 
to old occurred throughout the Union 
between 1985 and 1995, the decline 
in the relative number of under 15s 
being especially pronounced in  the 
Southern Member States and Ireland, 
in each of which it fell by between 4 
and 6 percentage points (most mar-
kedly, from 23% to 17% of the total 
in Spain). 
The ageing of the population is pro-
jected to  continue  in  all  Member 
States over the medium and longer-
term. By 2020, those of 65  and over 
are expected to account for  19% or 
more of total population in all coun-
tries, except Luxembourg and Portu-
gal (18%) and Ireland (16%), and for 
as much as 22% in Finland and 23% 
in Italy. The increase is likely to be 
most marked in the latter countries 
together  with  the  Netherlands,  the 
share rising by 6 percentage points, 
though it is also expected to exceed 5 
percentage  points  in  Germany, 
France and Greece. 
Moreover, the average age of  those of 
65  and  over  is  also  set  to  increase 
significantly in the coming years,  so 
putting even greater pressure on health 
and  social  services,  the  demand  for 
which tends to rise dramatically as the 
elderly grow older. Estimates suggest, 
for example, that the average cost of 
providing health care to someone aged 
65-74  is,  on  average,  2-t/2 times 
higher than for people under 65 and for 
someone  of 75  or over,  4--5  times 
higher. The demand for social services 
is  likely  to  show  even  larger  dif-
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ferences,  though  no  estimates  are 
available. In 1995, 41% of  people aged 
65  and over in the Union were 75 or 
over. By 2005, this is projected to in-
crease to 45
1/2%  and in 2010 to 47%, 
an increase of 37% in numbers in just 
. 15  years (an average growth of over 
2% a year). Although total population 
in the  Union is  likely to  increase by 
only 3% over this period, therefore, the 
'healthcare-adjusted'  rise  (ie  the  rise 
calculated by weighting people of dif-
ferent age by the relative cost imposed 
on health services) is almost 10%. Be-
yond 2010, though total population is 
unlikely to change much, the number 
aged 65 and over is projected to con-
tinue increasing, as noted above, im-
plying  a  health-adjusted  growth  m 
population of around 
1/2% a year. 
The projected growth in the number 
of people of 75  and over, however, 
varies  considerably  between Mem-
ber States. In 5 countries - Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy and Luxembourg 
- it  is  expected  to  be  more  than 
50% in the 15 years 1995 to 2010 (in 
Greece,  almost  60% ),  adding 
strongly to demands for health care 
and  social  support,  whereas  in 
Sweden, it is forecast to be only 6% 
and  in  Denmark,  only  2%.  In  the 
following  10  years,  growth is  pro-
jected to slow down in most Member 
States, though still to be significant, 
but to  accelerate  in  the  latter  two 
countries  and  in  Germany,  where 
over the 25 years 1995 to 2020, those 
of 75 and over are likely to increase 
by almost 75% (well over 2% a year). 
Dependency rates 
T
he relative changes in the popu-
lation  of 65  and  over and  in 
people of working age which are in 
prospect have important implications 
for  dependency  rates,  or,  in other 
words, the number in the former age 
group relative to the latter, members 
of  which, as noted above, will for the 
most part  need  to  generate  the  in-
come  required  to  fund  the  social 
transfers and support for those in re-
tirement.  Dependency  rates  have 
changed only slowly in the past, ex-
cept in a few Member States. In 1970, 
for example, the population aged 65 
and over in the Union amounted to 
18
1/2%  of the population of working 
age. In 1980, the figure had risen to 
20% and in 1995 to 23% (Graph 8). 
In  other  words,  on  average,  there 
were less than 4
1/2 people of  working 
age to every one person aged 65 and 
over in 1995, as against over 5 people 
for every one of the latter 25  years 
earlier.  In  Ireland,  Austria  and 
Sweden,  moreover,  the  latter  ratio 
rose slightly rather than falling over 
this period, while in France, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands, there was 
very little change. 
By 2010, those of 65 and over in the 
Union as a whole are projected to be 
27% as numerous as those of work-
ing  age  and  by  2020 almost  32%. 
Instead of 4
1/2 people of working age 
to  every  one  of 65  and  over as  at 
present, therefore, there will be only 
just over three. The forecast rise in 
dependency  is  particularly  large  in 
France, where those of 65  and over 
will increase from 23% of working-
age population to  almost 33% over 
the next 25  years,  the Netherlands, 
where the figure will go up from 19% 
to  30%, Italy, where the increase is 
from  24%  to  35
1/2%  and,  most re-
markably, Finland, where it is from 
21%  to  35%.  As  a  result of these 
increases, by 2020, there will be less 
than three people of of working age for every one person of 65  and over 
in Italy and Finland and the ratio will 
be  significantly  more  than  three  to 
one only in Austria, Luxembourg and 
Portugal (around 3'/2  to one) and Ire-
land (four to one). 
However, while the dependency rate 
as measured above is a useful indica-
tor of the  potential  increase  in  the 
financial  cost of providing  social 
support for the elderly falling on the 
population of working  age,  it  does 
not take account of the proportion of 
those in the latter age group who are 
actually in work and, therefore, con-
tributing to the output and income in 
the economy from which the funding 
for  support  has  to  come.  This,  in 
practice,  varies  significantly  across 
the Union, even as between countries 
where the age structure is similar, not 
only because of varying rates of un-
employment but,  equally importan-
tly, because of  varying rates of  labour 
force  participation,  especially  of 
women,  as  noted  below.  Accord-
ingly, the effective dependency rate 
is higher than the 'hypothetical' one 
described  above  and  differs  much 
more as between Member States. 
In  1995,  the  effective  dependency 
rate was just under 39% (the number 
of those of 65 and over amounted to 
39% of those  in employment), im-
plying that there were only just over 
2'/2 people  in  paid  work  for  every 
person  of 65  and  over  (Graph  9). 
Only in Denmark, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands was the ratio much 
lower than this - less than three to 
one  (around  30%  in  the  graph,  in 
the  first,  largely  because of a  high 
employment  rate;  in  the  second, 
largely because of a high  non-resi-
dent  work  force,  which  effectively 
provides a substantial part of the fin-
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-31-ance for social protection; and in the 
third, largely because of a low ratio 
of people of 65 and over to working-
age population - it should be noted 
that  a  high  proportion  of those  in 
work  in  the  Netherlands  were  em-
ployed part-time, which distorts the 
comparison  a  little).  By  contrast, 
there were less than 21 /2  people em-
ployed for each person of  65 and over 
in Belgium and Greece (because of 
low employment rates) and only just 
over two for everyone of 65 and over 
in Spain and Italy (in both, because 
of low  employment rates,  in  Italy, 
combined with an unfavourable age 
structure). 
Effective dependency rates in most 
Member States  have  risen  much 
more markedly than the hypothetical 
ones examined above over the  past 
25 years. In the Union as a whole, the 
number of people of 65  and over in 
1970 amounted to 29% of employed 
population,  almost  10  percentage 
points lower than in 1995, which rep-
resents  a  rise  of a  third  over  the 
period, the  increase being as  much 
the result of  a reduction in the propor-
tion  of working-age  population  in 
work as of demographic trends. The 
increase  was  particularly  large  in 
Spain and Italy-over 20 percentage 
points - in both of which there are 
relatively high levels of unemploy-
ment combined with low rates of la-
bour force  participation,  primarily 
because  of comparatively  few 
women working and increasing num-
bers of people retiring early. In stark 
contrast,  the  effective  dependency 
rate fell over the 25 years in Luxem-
bourg, Austria and Sweden, though 
in  the  last,  it has  risen appreciably 
since  1980  and  even  more  since 
1990,  when  unemployment has  in-
creased sharply. 
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These developments demonstrate the 
importance of taking account of the 
number of people in work as well as 
the  age  structure  of the  population 
when  assessing  the  implications  of 
future demographic changes and the 
growth  in  the  number of elderly 
people, in particular. They indicate, 
for example, that to keep the effective 
dependency rate from rising by more 
than  10  percentage points  over the 
next 25  years  would require  an  in-
crease in the employment rate in the 
Union  (the  number employed 
relative to  working-age population) 
from 60% to 65%. This is a relatively 
modest target by international stand-
ards (in both the US  and Japan, the 
employment rate is almost 75%), but 
it would mean restoring employment 
to the level it was 25 years ago before 
the  slowdown in  economic  growth 
and the rise in unemployment. On the 
other  hand,  if the  low  growth  and 
poor job creation performance were 
to continue, the rise in the effective 
dependency  ratio  could  be  even 
larger than implied by demographic 
trends  and  the  implicit  problem  of 
providing social  support for the  el-
derly even greater. 
The main conclusions to  be  drawn 
from this are that: 
•  future employment developments 
are at least as important as demo-
graphic trends; 
•  favourable developments in em-
ployment  could  offset  much  of 
the consequences of  the rise in the 
dependency  rate  in  the  coming 
years; 
•  by implication, the trend towards 
early retirement, which has con-
tributed  to  the  rise  in  effective 
dependency, needs to be reversed 
if the  employment rate  is  to  be 
increased,  especially  given  the 
potential importance of growing 
numbers of  young people remain-
ing longer in education and initial 
vocational training to ensure that 
labour force  skills keep up  with 
the  needs  of the  economy  (the 
growth  in  early  retirement  is 
examined in Chapter 5). 




he  ageing of the  population in 
the  Union,  described above,  is 
taking place at the same time as sup-
port for the elderly from  within the 
family is becoming more difficult, as 
the extended family declines in im-
portance, households become smal-
ler,  families  more  dispersed 
geographically  and  more  women, 
still the main carers, pursue working 
careers. The consequence is a grow-
ing demand for support services and, 
in  some  cases,  social  transfers.  In-
deed, there is an interactive relation-
ship  between  the  structure  of 
households  and  systems  of social 
protection,  in  the  sense that just as 
changes in the former have implica-
tions for the latter, the support avail-
able  from  the  latter  can either 
facilitate changes or exercise an im-
portant constraint on them occurring. 
The  trend  towards  smaller  house-
holds-and accordingly an increase 
in the number of households - can 
be illustrated by changes over the 10 
years 1986 to  1996 (as indicated by 
data  from  the  Community  Labour 
Force  Survey,  which  is  household-based). Over this period, the average 
number of people of 15 and over per 
household  declined  from  2.15  to 
2.05, a fall of around 5% (Graph 10). 
(The Union here excludes Denmark 
and Sweden, for which no consistent 
data  are  available,  though  this  is 
likely to affect the figures only mar-
ginally.) Given the growth of popu-
lation in this age group, this implies 
a growth of around 1% a year in the 
number of households in the Union, 
twice the rate of population increase. 
The  decline  in  household  size  was 
common to all Member States except 
Italy,  where  there  was  a  small  in-
crease from  a figure  already above 
the  Union average.  The largest fall 
occurred in the UK and the Nether-
lands (around 8% in each case), and 
the extent of the decline was gener-
ally greater in the North of the Union 
than  in  the  South  (in  Portugal  and 
Spain,  the  fall  was  less  than  2%). 
According!  y, the difference between 
average household size between the 
Northern  and  Southern  Member 
States widened over this  period, so 
that in 1996, whereas the number of 
people of 15 and over per household 
was 2.3  or above in all of the latter 
(and as high as 2.7 in Spain), in most 
of the North, it was below 2 (and as 
low as  1.7 in Finland). 
The reduction in household size has 
been associated, in particular, with a 
growth in  the  number of people of 
working age living alone (ie leaving 
aside the high proportion of those of 
65  and  over who  also  live  alone). 
Over the 10 years 1986 to 1996, one-
person  households  increased  from 
19%  of the  total number of house-
holds  to  24%  (households  are  here 
defined  to  include  only  those  in 
which someone aged 15 to 64 is liv-
ing  so  as  to  focus  on  working-age 
population). The rise was common to 
all  Member  States,  but  was  espe-
cially  pronounced  in  Belgium,  Ire-
land and, most especially, in the UK, 
where the share increased from 17% 
to 28% over the period (Graph 11). 
Despite  the  significant  growth  in 
share in three of the  four  Southern 
Member States-all except Italy-
where the relative number went up in 
each case by over 20%, the propor-
tion of households  consisting  of 
someone  living  alone  is  much less 
(under 15% of the total in  1996) in 
the  South of the  Union than in the 
North, Ireland apart, where the figure 
is over 30% in Germany and almost 
40% in Finland. 
The  number  of one-person  house-
holds  with  children  increased even 
more  markedly,  by  some  64%  be-
tween 1986 and 1996 (an average of 
5% a year), though in relation to the 
total number of households, it is still 
comparatively small Uust over 3% in 
1996, 14% of all lone 'working-age' 
person  households).  Growth  oc-
curred in all Member States, except 
Italy,  where there  was  a slight fall, 
though the rise was relatively small 
in Greece and Portugal (under 10%). 
In the UK, the increase was dramatic 
(averaging  10%  a  year over the 
period),  and  in  1996  lone  parent 
households accounted for almost 7% 
of  all households (25% of  one-person 
households), much more than in any 
other Member State. 
The overwhelming majority of lone 
parents with children throughout the 
Union are women, women account-
10  Average number of people aged 15 and over per 
household in Member States, 1986 and 1996 
11  Share of households with only one person aged 15 
and over in Member States, 1986 and 1996 
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-33-ing for around 90% of the total in all 
Member States, and as much as 95% 
in Austria, with only Italy having a 
figure  below  85%,  and  then  only 
mhrginally  (Graph  12).  Moreover, 
their share increased in most coun-
tries between 1986 and 1996, when 
just under a quarter of all working-
age women living alone in the Union 
had  children,  though  only  11%  in 
Greece and around 16% in Germany, 
Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  Luxem-
bourg, but a third in Ireland and 40% 
in the UK. 
Workless households 
The social protection implications of 
the growth of  one-person households 
are given added significance by the 
fact that people living alone are more 
likely to  be unemployed than those 
living  with  other  people.  This,  at 
least, is true of men and of the North 
of  the Union rather than the South. In 
the Union as a whole, around 16% of 
men aged 15 to 64 who were unem-
ployed in 1995 lived alone (or, more 
precisely,  in  households  with  no 
other person of  working age) as com-
pared with 11% of men in employ-
ment.  This disparity, however, was 
confined to the North of the Union, 
whereas  in  the  South,  men  living 
alone were more likely to be in work 
than  unemployed.  In  Finland,  the 
Netherlands  and  Germany,  25%  or 
more of  men unemployed lived alone 
and  in  Belgium  and  the  UK,  over 
20%, in the latter four cases, around 
twice the proportion of those in em-
ployment living alone (Graph 13). 
In  Greece,  Italy  and  Spain,  on  the 
other hand, proportionately fewer of 
the men unemployed lived alone than 
those with jobs, and the relative num-
bers involved were  small  (4
1
/ 2%  in 
Greece, 4% in Italy and 2% in Spain), 
as was also the case in Portugal (3% ), 
where there was comparatively little 
difference between the proportion of 
men  unemployed  living  alone  and 
those in work. 
For women, the difference between 
the household characteristics of the 
employed and unemployed is  much 
less pronounced than for men, at least 
at the  Union level,  much the  same 
proportion in 1996 living in  house-
holds where they were the only per-
son of working age. The same kind 
of  difference, however, is evident be-
tween the North and the South of the 
Union  as  for  men.  In  all  Northern 
Member  States,  the  proportion  of 
women who  were unemployed and 
living alone was higher or the same 
(France) as  that for women in work 
- the  difference  being  especially 
marked in Finland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, the UK and Austria, where 
in each case, as for men, some 20% 
or more of  women unemployed lived 
alone (Graph 14). In three of  the four 
Southern  Member  States,  by  con-
trast,  proportionately fewer women 
unemployed lived  alone than those 
with jobs, and in the fourth, Portugal, 
the proportion was much the same. 
The  sharp  distinction  between  the 
North and the South of the Union in 
this  regard  emphasises  the  equally 
large differences in the support im-
plications of  unemployment between 
the two. In Southern Member States, 
virtually all the men and women who 
are out of work live in households 
with  other people  of working  age, 
who can potentially provide financial 
12  Lone mothers with children in Member States, 
1986 and 1996 
13  Employed and unemployed men, 15-64, by size of 
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0 support. Many of them, in  practice, 
are  young  people  under  25  living 
with their parents. In Northern Mem-
ber States, on the other hand, signifi-
cant numbers of the unemployed of 
both sexes live in households with no 
other person of working age and, ac-
cordingly, are dependent on financial 
support from  outside.  Though sup-
port may come from other members 
of the  family  living elsewhere,  the 
implication is  that there is a greater 
need  for  income  support  from  the 
State in  these countries than in  the 
South of the Union. 
At the same time, the nature of social 
protection systems in most Northern 
Member States means that people are 
more able  to  live  alone if they  are 
unemployed  than  in  the  South. 
Young people under 25, for example, 
have  no  entitlement  to  unemploy-
ment benefit or social assistance in 
Greece and Portugal if they are not 
working and in Spain and Italy, com-
paratively  few  are  likely  to  be 
eligible for support. In the North of 
the  Union,  there  is  generally  more 
entitlement  to  social  support  for 
people in this age group, though, per-
haps relevantly, less in France, where 
relatively few ofthe unemployed live 
alone, than elsewhere. 
It is  also significant as regards sup-
port that  the  great  majority  of the 
unemployed  in  Southern  Member 
States live in households where there 
are three or more people of working 
age  (around 7  5% of men and two-
thirds of women) and a large propor-
tion in households with four or more 
(40% or over), significantly more in 
each case than for those with jobs. By 
contrast, in the North of the Union, 
with the exception of Ireland, a mi-
nority  of the  unemployed  lived  in 
households  with  three  of more 
people. 
The increase in the relative number 
of people living alone is a major fac-
tor underlying the growth of house-
holds with no-one in work which has 
occurred over the past decade, over 
and above the rise in unemployment 
itself. Indeed, the widening division 
in  European  societies  between 
'workless' households and those in 
which  everyone  of working  age  is 
employed is  a marked feature of re-
cent developments right across  the 
Union, even in the Southern Member 
States  where  comparatively  few 
people live alone. 
In  1996, just under 20%  of house-
holds containing at least one person 
of working age had no-one in work, 
either  because  they  were  unem-
ployed  or economically  inactive. 
This compares with a figure of 18% 
in 1986 (Graph 15). Although the rate 
of unemployment  also  increased 
over these  10  years,  the  rise  (from 
10.3% to  10.7% for the  11  Member 
States for which comparable house-
hold data exist for the two years) was 
less than in  that of workless house-
holds. 
The variation in the relative number 
of workless  households  between 
Member States, moreover, was rela-
tively  small,  far  less  than the  vari-
ation  in  unemployment rates. 
Whereas the latter varied from over 
22% in Spain and 15'/2% in Finland 
to  only  4%  in  Austria  and  3%  in 
Luxembourg in 1996, the proportion 
of workless households with some-
one of working age ranged from 26% 
14  Employed and unemployed women, 15-64, by size 
of household in Member States, 1996 
15  Share of households with nobody in employment 
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-35-in Finland to 12% in Portugal, which 
was the only country where the figure 
was below 15%. Even in Austria and 
Luxembourg, where unemployment 
was low, around 15% of households 
containing someone of working age 
had no-one with a job. 
In most Member States, the relative 
number of workless households in-
creased between 1986 and 1996, the 
rise  being  particularly  marked  in 
Italy and France (3 percentage points 
in both cases), as might be expected 
given the rise in unemployment (by 
over 2% of the labour force in both 
cases) (Graph 16). However, the pro-
portion of workless households also 
increased  significantly  in  the  UK 
(from 18'/2% to 21 %) and here unem-
ployment  fell  even  more  signifi-
cantly (from 11'/2% to just over 8%) 
and the proportion also rose in  Bel-
gium (from  22% to  23'/2%),  where 
unemployment  declined  as  well, 
though  only  slightly,  while  in  Ire-
land,  where  unemployment fell  by 
more than in the UK (by 4'/2% of the 
labour force), it remained much the 
same.  In  these countries,  therefore, 
apparent  improvements  in  the  job 
market have not been accompanied 
by any reduction in households con-
taining someone of working age with 
no-one in paid employment and, in-
deed,  in  Belgium and  the  UK,  the 
relative  number has  risen.  Accord-
ingly,  the  potential  need for  social 
support,  may  also  have  increased 
rather  than  diminished  over  this 
period, contrary to  the  implications 




nemployment  has  remained 
stubbornly high in most parts of 
the Union over the past decade, after 
rising markedly over the  preceding 
decade following the world oil crisis 
in 1973-74. In 1996, the average rate 
in the Union was just under 11% of 
the work force, slightly higher than it 
was 10 years earlier at its peak after 
the recession of the early 1980s and 
only  marginally  below  its  level  in 
1994 after the recession of the early 
1990s. The rate was 12% or over in 
five  Member  States,  including 
France and Italy, and close to 10% in 
another  three.  Moreover,  in  only 
three countries, Ireland, the Nether-
lands and the UK, was the rate signi-
ficantly lower (over 1% of the labour 
force) than 10 years before. 
Almost half of those unemployed in 
the Union in  1996 had  been out of 
work for a year or more, just over 5% 
of  the labour force or nearly 9 million 
people. Almost 5'/2 million of these 
had been out of work for at least two 
years. Although the rate of long-term 
unemployment declined  between 
1986 and 1996, the fall was relatively 
small. In Belgium and Ireland, it was 
still the case that around 60% of the 
unemployed had been jobless for a 
year or more and in Italy, almost two-
thirds  (though a  high proportion of 
the latter were young people under 25 
and, from the above analysis, for the 
most part still living with their par-
ents),  while  in  Greece,  Spain  and 
Pmtugal,  the  figure  was  well  over 
half. 
High levels of unemployment in the 
Union have been accompanied by the 
development  of more  flexible, 
16  Unemployment and long-term unemployment in 
Member States, 1986 and 1996 
17  Participation rates of women aged 25-54 in 
Member States, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1995 
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-36-though  more  precarious,  forms  of 
employment.  Both  part-time  and 
temporary jobs have  become more 
important across the Union, for men 
as well as women, over the past de-
cade, and in many cases represent the 
main jobs open to those who are un-
employed  (see  Employment in  Eu-
rope, 1997, Part I,  Section 3 for an 
account  of recent  developments  in 
respect of the changing nature of  em-
ployment  and  Section  1  for  more 
details  of unemployment  develop-
ments). 




he  increase  in  the  number of 
women  pursuing  working 
careers has been one of the most pro-
nounced features of  economic devel-
opments  in  the  Union  over  the 
post-war years. Much of the increase 
has occurred over the past three de-
cades when the trend towards women 
working spread from the North to the 
South. In 1970, under 40% of  women 
aged  25  to  54  in  the  Union  were 
economically active, in  the sense of 
either  being  in  employment or ac-
tively  seeking a job. By  1980, this 
had increased to 55% and in 1996 to 
70% (Graph 17). 
Activity rates rose continuously and 
significantly  in  all  Member  States 
over these  26  years,  except  in  the 
three Nordic countries, where, partly 
because of economic recession, rates 
have fallen in the  1990s from levels 
which were much  higher than any-
where  else  in  the  Union  (close  to 
90%, not far below those of men in 
the  same age group).  The rise  was 
particularly large in countries where 
the rate  was low at  the  start of the 
period- Spain, Ireland, the Nether-
lands  and  Portugal.  Moreover,  ex-
cept in countries where the rate has 
reached a relatively high level, there 
is  little sign of the increase slowing 
down, once allowance is made for the 
depressed  growth  of employment 
during the 1990s (though the UK is a 
possible exception, the rate showing 
little  tendency  to  rise  from  a  level 
only just above  the  Union  average 
even since the recession of the early 
1990s came to end). 
As a result, in most Member States (9 
of the  15),  around  70%  or more 
women aged 25 to 54 are in the work 
force and only in Italy is the propor-
tion  under 55%.  The effect of this 
increase is that most of the new jobs 
created  since  1970  have  gone  to 
women  and  while  the  number of 
women in  work has risen markedly, 
the number of men has fallen. A fur-
ther  effect  has  been  to  add  to  the 
demand for  support services  in  the 
form of child care facilities and help 
in  caring for the elderly too frail  to 
care for themselves. It has also led to 
growing  calls  for equality of treat-
ment of  men and women under social 
protection systems,  the  individuali-
sation of rights and  interruptions to 
working  careers  because  of caring 
responsibilities, which still fall  pre-
dominant] y  on  women  rather  than 
men, to be taken into explicit account 
in  the  assessment of entitlement to 
benefit, especially as  regards retire-
ment pensions. 
-37--38-Chapter 2  Adapting to change: recent 
reforms and key developments 
A
s  illustrated  in  the  previous 
chapter,  significant social and 
economic changes are  taking place 
across  the  European  Union.  These 
changes are altering both the context 
in which systems of social protection 
operate and the nature and scale of 
the  problems  which  they  have  to 
tackle. In all Member States, the at-
tention of policy-makers has become 
increasingly focused on the capacity 
of systems to cater for new needs and 
to provide adequate levels of support 
to growing numbers requiring assist-
ance without substantially increasing 
expenditure, while at the same time 
shifting to a more active approach of 
getting people into work rather than 
merely supporting their income. 
The common objective is to maintain 
the universal social safety net which 
is  a distinguishing feature  of Euro-
pean models of society rather than to 
dismantle  the  systems  developed, 
often  over  many  decades  (though 
much  more  recently  in  Southern 
European  countries  where  some 
parts of the net are still in the process 
of being constructed).  At the  same 
time, a number of aspects of prevail-
ing  arrangements  are  being  ques-
tioned, especially those which have 
resulted in  large numbers being de-
pendent on state support on a seem-
ingly  permanent  basis  and 
effectively excluded from society. A 
key aim is to ensure that the support 
provided is affordable, in the sense of 
being  accepted  by  the  people  who 
have to  fund it, and that it supports 
rather than  impedes  economic 
growth and job creation, on which the 
well-being of society ultimately de-
pends. 
These twin objectives have been in-
creasing!  y difficult to achieve in re-
cent years.  Economic  growth  has 
been  depressed  (averaging  only 
1
1!2% a year between 1990 and 1997 
over the Union as a whole), so limi-
ting the finance available for social 
protection. Moreover, there has been 
increasing  concern  about  budget 
deficits  and  a  common desire  to 
avoid  any  significant expansion of 
public expenditure or increases in tax 
or  social  contribution  rates,  in  the 
short-term  to  comply  with  the 
Maastricht criteria for  membership 
of monetary union and in the longer-
term to help create the conditions for 
sustained, non-inflationary growth. 
Throughout the Union, the growing 
numbers in need of support coupled 
with tightening constraints on avail-
able  resources  are  prompting 
changes  in  social  welfare  arrange-
ments, in the scale of protection pro-
vided, the people covered and nature 
of  the measures adopted. At the same 
time, the substantial increase in the 
number of  people of  pensionable age, 
which is now clearly in prospect in 
10 to  15  years time as the post-war 
baby-boom generation grows older, 
is  reinforcing  the  pressure  for 
change. 
This pressure extends to  the  provi-
sion  of social  services  and  health 
care,  for  which  the  growing  needs 
implied by an increasing number of 
very elderly people add to the seem-
ingly  limitless  growth  of demand 
emanating from the rest of the popu-
lation,  stimulated  by  advances  in 
know-how and the treatments avail-
able.  For pensions, health care and 
more general care of the elderly, the 
key issue concerns the extent of pro-
tection which the  State should pro-
vide, whether, at one extreme, there 
should  be  universal  coverage  for 
everyone or whether, at the other, it 
should be limited to basic needs only, 
leaving individuals to secure protec-
tion against additional needs them-
selves through private insurance. 
For other areas of social protection, 
the focus of policy is increasingly on 
reducing  the  number  of people  of 
working age dependent on long-term 
support, which insurance-based sys-
tems, developed on the principle of 
contributions  being  paid  when  in 
work  to  finance  temporary  spells 
when  not,  were  never  designed  to 
-39-cater for.  The objective is  to secure 
ways  of getting  such  people  into 
work.  This has  led,  in  tum, to  two 
parallel  developments:  an  attempt, 
on the one hand, to shift expenditure 
from  passive  measures  of income 
support to an active policy aimed at 
increasing employability and helping 
with job search and, on the other, to 
ensure that there are sufficient incen-
tives for people to seek to move from 
reliance on social transfers into em-
ployment. 
Although it is difficult to argue that 
high levels of benefit in  relation to 
potential earnings from  work are  a 
primary  cause  of the  high  rates  of 
unemployment  in  the  Union - or 
more precisely of the large numbers 
out of work  and  living  on  income 
support  - they  might  potentially 
conflict with active measures being 
taken to get them into employment. 
More importantly perhaps, in a con-
text  of resource  constraints,  reduc-
tions in spending on benefits may be 
a  condition  for  increases  in  active 
expenditure. Moreover, the mainten-
ance of social solidarity and the con-
tinued willingness of people to  pay 
the taxes and contributions required 
to fund social transfers may well be 
more difficult to secure if benefits are 
regarded  as  overly  generous,  espe-
cially during periods of low income 
growth. The need to maintain popu-
lar support for systems of social wel-
fare together with budget constraints, 
has led, in addition, to greater efforts 
to  combat fraud  and  abuse  and  to 
tighten up eligibility criteria so as to 
demonstrate that those in receipt of 
transfers are deserving cases. 
While  the  developments  described 
above  and  in  the  previous  chapter 
have  been common to  all  Member 
-40-
States, their scale has varied signifi-
cantly. This has affected the strength 
of the pressure for change to systems 
of social  protection,  as  have  dif-
ferences in their structure (see Social 
Protection in Europe, 1995, Chapter 
1,  for  a description of the  different 
systems in  operation), the effective-
ness of the arrangements in force and 
extent of  popular acceptance of  them. 
These differences mean that,  while 
there are common elements, the scale 
and the precise detail of the problems 
facing  social protection systems are 
by  no  means  uniform  across  the 
Union. The changes in policy which 
have taken place or which are being 
actively  discussed  reflect  such  dif-
ferences. 
For example, while inadequate rates 
of employment  growth  have 
prompted growing policy concern in 
most  parts  of the  Union  about  the 
way in which social protection sys-
tems are financed, this has especially 
been so in countries where the insur-
ance  principle  predominates  and 
finance comes mainly from contribu-
tions  levied  on  earnings  from  em-
ployment  (the  mainland  Member 
States,  excluding  the  three  Nordic 
countries).  In  these countries, there 
has been a common effort to limit the 
charge falling on employers, to lower 
the cost of  employment and so stimu-
late  increased job  creation.  The 
focus, in particular, has been on low-
paid, and less-skilled, workers, espe-
cially the  young  and  the  long-term 
unemployed, for  whom the imposi-
tion  of a  social  charge  is  liable  to 
make it unprofitable for employers to 
take them on. 
In  addition,  in  Southern  European 
Member States,  where  universal 
systems  of social  protection  are  of 
more recent origin,  the  concern re-
mains to fill the gaps in protection-
in guaranteeing a minimum level of 
income, for example - and to pro-
vide more standardised coverage for 
people in different regions or in dif-
ferent occupations (to rationalise the 
highly fragmented nature of pension 
schemes,  unemployment  insurance 
and health care provision, in particu-
lar).  Reformers,  however,  face  the 
same kind of  budgetary constraints as 
in the rest of the Union and the same 
kind of economic and demographic 
pressure  for  expenditure  increases, 
making  it  even  more  difficult  to 
achieve these objectives, while they 
also have to contend with the vested 
interests  which  the  existing  frag-
mented system has created. 
Outline 
T
he concern here is to review the 
changes  in  systems  of social 
protection  which  have  taken  place 
over the past few years or which are 
in prospect, focusing mainly on the 
period  since  1995  (for changes be-
fore  then,  see  Social Protection  in 
Europe, 1995, Chapter 2). The aim is 
not to  present an  exhaustive list of 
such changes (for this, see the MIS-
SOC.  reports  for  1996  and  1997 
which set out in detail the measures 
which have been introduced in each 
Member State), but to concentrate on 
those  which  seem  most significant 
and to analyse the motivation behind 
them and their potential effects. 
The  analysis  is  divided  by  theme 
rather than function.  Specifically, it 
examines, first, the changes made in 
relation to those of working-age who 
are  not  in  work,  whether  they  are 
actively  seeking  employment  (and, therefore, counted as unemployed) or 
not.  Such  changes  have  been  a 
prominent part of  the policy followed 
by  Member States  in  recent  years. 
They have taken two main forms:  a 
reduction in the effective level of in-
come support in relation to earnings 
when in work, aimed at reducing so-
cial expenditure and  increasing the 
financial incentive to find a job, and 
a  shift  in  emphasis  towards  active 
measures  to  increase employability 
and get as  many people as  possible 
into work. 
Secondly, it considers the changing 
policy stance towards older workers, 
from encouraging them to  withdraw 
from the labour force before the offi-
cial age of  retirement, in order to free 
up jobs for others, to increasing the 
financial  incentives  for  them  to  re-
main in work. 
Thirdly,  it  reviews the response by 
Member States to the prospective in-
crease  in  the  number of retirement 
pensioners  in  future  years  and  the 
substantial growth of transfers which 
this is liable to entail. 
Fourthly, it examines the changes to 
systems of health care introduced in 
an  attempt  to  contain  costs,  while 
maintaining or improving  levels  of 
service and access for all, a potential 
conflict in objectives which is likely 
to  become  more  acute  with  the 
ageing of the population. 
Fifthly, it summarises the measures 
being taken in the face of  the growing 
need for long-term care implied by 
the significant increase in the number 
of people living into very old age. 
Sixthly,  it  examines  attempts  in 
Member States to distribute the cost 
of financing social expenditure more 
widely across society and, in particu-
lar, to reduce social charges levied on 
employers  which  could  deter job 
creation. 
Finally,  it  considers  how  far  the 
scope of social protection systems is 
changing in response to the common 
objective of reducing dependency in 
the  context of cost pressures  stem-
ming from budget constraints. 
Reducing the cost 
of unemployment 
T
he  persistence of high rates  of 
unemployment in most parts of 
the Union and,  in  particular, of the 
substantial number of long-term un-
employed, has focused increasing at-
tention on ways of reducing the cost 
involved.  In  a  number of Member 
States, the regulations governing en-
titlement  to  unemployment  insur-
ance benefit have been tightened in 
the past few years and/or the defini-
tion  of what  constitutes  a  suitable 
offer of employment  widened.  In 
the  Netherlands  and  Sweden,  for 
example,  the  qualifying  conditions 
for  unemployment  benefit  were 
made more stringent in  1993, while 
in Spain in the same year, the prior 
contributions  record  required  for 
eligibility for benefits was lengthen-
ed,  as  it  was  in  Austria  in  1995 
(young  people  and  those  unem-
ployed before needing to  have been 
employed for at least 6 months to be 
entitled at all) and in Finland in 1997 
(from 6 to 10 months). 
Rates of benefit have also been re-
duced.  In Germany, both the insur-
ance rate and the rate of  means-tested 
social assistance (which benefit reci-
pients have to fall back on after being 
unemployed for a year) were reduced 
in  1994,  while  in Finland,  the  real 
value of  benefits has been reduced by 
their  non-indexation  in  1995  and 
1996.  In  Sweden,  by  contrast,  the 
benefit rate was increased from 75% 
of previous earnings to 80% in 1997. 
In addition, the period of entitlement 
to insurance benefit has been short-
ened in some Member States. In the 
UK, the period was reduced from one 
year to only 6 months on the intro-
duction  of the  JobSeeker' s  Allow-
ance  in  1996,  benefit  remaining 
flat-rate rather than being related to 
previous  earnings  as  in  all  other 
Member States except Ireland and set 
at a lower level than in most other 
parts of the Union. Thereafter, pay-
ment becomes means-tested. In addi-
tion, insurance benefits were reduced 
for  people  under  25  and  housing 
benefits restricted. 
At  the  other extreme,  the  benefit 
period was reduced in Denmark from 
9  years  before  1995  to  5  years  in 
1996, though it remains among the 
longest  in  the  Union.  At  the  same 
time, for the last 3 years of  the period, 
intensified  efforts  are  made  to  get 
the  unemployed  into  active  pro-
grammes.  Moreover,  in  Belgium, 
where  the  period  of entitlement to 
unemployment benefit is  also  rela-
tively  long,  authorities  were  given 
the  power in  1996 to  suspend pay-
ment  if someone  has  been  unem-
ployed for longer than 11 /2  times the 
regional average instead of twice as 
long (36,000, many of them married 
women,  lost  benefit  as  a  result  in 
1996, 10,000 more than in 1995). 
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incentives to work 
Cuts in benefit and the tightening of 
eligibility  criteria provide  in them-
selves an increased incentive for the 
unemployed  to  find  a  job.  Other 
measures have also been introduced 
in a number of countries to  make it 
more  attractive,  and  in  some cases 
more  feasible,  for  people  to  work 
rather than  remain  unemployed. 
Such  measures  can  take  various 
forms,  though  in  essence  they  in-
volve increasing the take-home pay 
from employment-after taking ac-
count of specific costs, such as pro-
viding for child care-relative to net 
income  from  benefits.  This  means 
ensuring that the combined effect of 
the tax and benefit systems on the net 
income of  people in different circum-
stances accords with government ob-
jectives  regarding  work  incentives, 
something  which  has  not  always 
been· the  case  in  the  past (the  two 
systems often having been developed 
independently of each other). 
Paradoxically,  one potential  source 
of difficulty is targeting, or concen-
trating social transfers on those most 
in need, a difficulty which has tended 
to  become more prevalent with the 
growing  importance  of means-
testing  (documented  below).  If 
benefits are withdrawn once income 
exceeds a given level - as a person 
moves  from  being  unemployed  to 
having a job, in particular-then the 
net gain to  being employed can be 
relatively  small,  or even  in  some 
cases  negative.  This  implies  that 
benefits, such as family allowances, 
housing  benefits  or relief from 
various kinds of charges, which are 
given in  addition to unemployment 
benefits tend to have less of a disin-
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centive effect if they are universal, in 
the sense of  applying to those in work 
as  well as those who are not, and if 
they are invariant to income (though 
this would clearly conflict with other 
aims). It also illustrates the potential 
conflict between major objectives of 
social protection programmes - on 
the one hand, of eliminating poverty, 
which is  likely to  involve increased 
targeting given funding constraints, 
and, on the other, of making systems 
employment-friendly. 
In all Member States, except in Spain 
where there are implicit transfers in 
the form of tax concessions, benefits 
are paid to families with children. In 
most countries,  the  amount paid is 
independent  of income,  though  in 
Germany, Italy and Greece, they are 
reduced when income exceeds a cer-
tain level, so giving rise to possible 
incentive  problems.  This  has  also 
been the case in Portugal since 1997, 
when the system of family  benefits 
was reformed and three levels of  pay-
ment were  introduced according to 
family income (under 11 /2  times the 
minimum wage,  11 /2  to  8 times and 
over 8  times), and in  Greece since 
1997, when benefits were increased 
to families with more than two child-
ren but were limited at the same time 
to families with income of less than 
a given amount (8 million drachmas 
a year, or around 25,500 ECU). The 
effect on incentives  is  likely  to  be 
small  in  the  latter  country,  where 
very  few  households,  especially 
those  vulnerable to  unemployment, 
have incomes above the ceiling. 
The same applies, though to a much 
lesser extent,  in France,  where  the 
new Government has announced its 
intention of  withdrawing child allow-
ances from families whose monthly 
income is higher than 25,000 francs 
a month (around 3,800 ECU, which 
would probably affect some 10% of 
households  according  to  European 
Community Household Panel data). 
In Ireland, there has also been a sub-
stantial  increase  in  family  allow-
ances, as in Portugal and Greece, but 
without any income ceiling being ap-
plied  to  eligibility.  Here,  as  in  the 
other two countries, having children 
was  identified as  a  major cause of 
poverty  (and  the  provision  of free 
services and exemption from charges 
to those dependent on social transfers 
as  a  major  disincentive  to  finding 
employment).  Benefits for the  first 
two children were increased by 45% 
in 1995-96 and for each subsequent 
child by 36% in order to combat the 
problem. 
Nevertheless, although the practical 
effect  in  most  instances  may  be 
limited at present, the potentially ad-
verse consequences for work incen-
tives of income-related benefits need 
to  be explicitly  taken  into  account 
when  systems  are  reformed.  In 
general, it argues for a gradual reduc-
tion of the various benefits, not just 
family-related  ones,  as  income  in-
creases rather than their abrupt elimi-
nation.  Such  a  graduation  may  be 
more readily achieved if benefits are 
subject to tax- or, more precisely, 
treated  as  part of income  which  is 
subject to  tax  in  the  same  way  as 
earnings from employment-than if 
they are not. As noted below, charges 
on benefit recipients have been in-
creased in a number of countries in 
recent years, ostensibly to spread the 
cost  of funding  social  expenditure 
more  equitably  across  the  com-
munity. The potential effect on work incen-
tives  also  argues  for  a  differential 
limit to be fixed when there are two 
(actual or potential) wage-earners in 
a household, otherwise there may be 
little incentive for either one of them 
to work if, for example, the other is 
unemployed  and  receiving  means-
tested  benefits  or earning  a  suffi-
ciently  low  wage  to  qualify  for 
housing  allowances  or  in-work 
benefits. Despite the increased relev-
ance, with the spread of targeting, of 
this possibility, and despite the fact 
that means-testing is everywhere ap-
plied to  household rather than indi-
vidual income, no country has as yet 
introduced such a differentiated sys-
tem, nor is there much sign of  it being 
seriously debated. 
Indeed, in  a few  Member States, it 
remains the case that some benefits 
- though a declining number-are 
paid only if the person unemployed 
lives with a partner who is not in paid 
employment or works for less than a 
maximum number of hours a week. 
This applies, for example, to the pay-
ment  of additional  unemployment 
benefits in Belgium or to  eligibility 
for means-tested income support in 
the UK, where partners have to work 
24 hours a week or less (though this 
was increased from 16 hours with the 
introduction  of the Jobseeker' s 
Allowance  in  1996).  Such  condi-
tional benefits are an obvious cause 
of an 'unemployment trap', reinforc-
ing any effect on relative income le-
vels of targeting. 
In-work benefits are another means 
of increasing net income from  em-
ployment  relative  to  income  when 
unemployed.  However,  since  they 
are confined to those on low wages 
- and,  indeed,  arguably  entrench 
low rates of pay by making the jobs 
to which they apply more attractive 
- and involve a very high marginal 
withdrawal rate as income rises, they 
are similar to other social transfers in 
terms of their potential disincentive 
effect, in this case discouraging those 
in  receipt  from  trying  to  improve 
their employment situation. (Rather 
than giving rise to an 'unemployment 
trap' like benefits targeted on the un-
employed, they are a potential cause 
of a  'poverty trap', insofar as  it is 
difficult  for  recipients  to  increase 
their  net  income  significantly  be-
cause of the high marginal rates of 
deduction  applying  to  any  rise  in 
gross earnings.) 
At  present,  significant in-work 
benefits exist in only  two  Member 
States, the UK (Family Credit, Dis-
ability Working Allowance, Housing 
Benefit  and  Council  Tax  Benefit) 
and, more recently, Ireland (Family 
Income Supplement). So far, they are 
payable  for  the  most  part  only  to 
people with children, though in the 
UK, a pilot scheme was introduced in 
1996 by the previous Government for 
low-paid workers  without children. 
Whether this will be developed into 
a general scheme by the new Govern-
ment  is  so  far  unclear,  though  the 
intended introduction of a minimum 
wage  - which  is  an  alternative 
means of securing higher income for 
those in work and one which does not 
have social expenditure implications 
(though it may affect the jobs on offer 
and so  lead to pressure for job sub-
sidies) - may reduce the  need for 
explicit transfers. 
In  Ireland,  the  number of people 
covered by in-work benefits has in-
creased in the  recent past as  quali-
fying income levels have been raised. 
In  the  UK,  a  child-care  disregard 
allowance (ie  a sum deducted from 
earnings  when  determining  eligi-
bility for benefit) was introduced in 
1994 and increased in 1996 in order 
to  assist  low-paid  workers  with 
families.  Lone  parents  have  been 
targeted specifically of  late in the two 
countries,  with  a  new  one-parent 
benefit being introduced in Ireland in 
1997,  under  which  recipients  are 
allowed  to  earn  up  to  a  certain 
amount before payment is withdrawn 
and through more active measures in 
the UK, as  described below. At the 
same  time,  the  administration  of 
Family Credit in  the  UK  has  been 
speeded up (90% of claims from em-
ployees  being  processed  within  5 
days  rather than  13)  to  ensure that 
those moving into low-paid jobs get 
this sooner rather than later. In addi-
tion,  entitlement to  housing benefit 
and relief from  Council (local) Tax 
has  been extended to  the  first  four 
weeks  of employment and  priority 
given  to  sorting  out  new  housing 
benefit entitlement in order to reduce 
both  the  cost  and  uncertainty  at-
tached to the transition. 
In  a  number of Member States -
Belgium, Germany, Finland, Portu-
gal, Ireland and the UK - attempts 
have also been made in recent years 
to encourage people to take part-time 
jobs, in part to encourage the devel-
opment of  such working and so make 
more jobs available, in part to prepare 
people  better for  full-time  employ-
ment (see Chapter 4 for details). 
The 'activation' 
of policy 
The measures discussed above have 
been accompanied by an intensifica-
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been  aimed  at  increasing  the  em-
ployability  of those  out  of work, 
helping then find a job, encouraging 
employers  to  take  on  more  people 
and providing work directly. Indeed, 
in  many  Member  States,  the  em-
phasis  of policy  has  shifted  in  this 
direction,  away from  a  passive ap-
proach to an active one, very much in 
line  with  the  Commission's  recent 
Communication on Modernising and 
Improving  Social Protection  in  the 
European  Union  (COM(97)  I 02) 
and the conclusions of the Luxem-
bourg Job  Summit.  Measures  have 
increasingly been targeted on the un-
employed who have most difficulty 
in finding work, the long-term unem-
ployed and young people in particu-
lar,  though  they  have  also  been 
extended to people dependent on so-
cial transfers, who may not actively 
be seeking work and so not counted 
as  unemployed, but who,  neverthe-
less, are capable of working - lone 
parents and those with (less severe) 
disabilities, for example. 
The motivation behind this policy is 
both to help people to improve their 
situation,  for  them  to  become  less 
dependent and more integrated into 
society (so combating social exclu-
sion), and to reduce social expendi-
ture. Shifting the emphasis of policy 
from  passive  measures  of income 
support to active measures, however, 
is  not  so  easy,  especially  during 
periods of low growth and high un-
employment.  The  need for  income 
support is not reduced in  the short-
term by a simple desire to spend more 
on active measures. Increased active 
expenditure tends to mean an expan-
sion of  overall spending whatever the 
long-term consequences might be on 
the numbers out of work. This can be 
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difficult to finance when high unem-
ployment is already pushing up out-
lays on social transfers and may well 
require a restructuring of the  latter. 
The limited success of governments 
in shifting the balance of  expenditure 
towards  active  measures,  even  in 
Member States  where  this  is  pro-
claimed policy, is  testimony to  this 
(see Chapter 4). 
In  Germany,  for  example,  Federal 
Employment  Agency  revenue  for 
financing  active  as  well  as  passive 
labour market  measures  comes 
mainly from contributions which are 
divided equally between employers 
and employees. The rate of contribu-
tion required to meet combined ex-
penditure on both types of measure 
rose from 4.3% of gross earnings in 
1991  to  6.8%  in  1993  and  though 
efforts have been made to reduce it 
since,  these have proved only  par-
tially  successful  and  it  remains  at 
6.5%. Partly in response to this, calls 
have intensified to widen the funding 
base  to  include,  in  particular,  civil 
servants  and  the  self-employed  as 
well as  other groups who at present 
do not contribute. 
Active measures can either involve 
more  spending  (on  job placement 
services,  the  provision  of training, 
employment subsidies and so on) or 
less revenue, as  tax concessions are 
given (to fund company-based train-
ing,  for example) or social charges 
reduced (to lower the cost of  employ-
ment in the same way as subsidies). 
There is little material difference be-
tween  these  alternatives,  though 
operating on the revenue side has the 
cosmetic advantage of  both reducing 
the apparent tax burden and limiting 
the  increase  in  public  expenditure. 
Since tax concessions or relief from 
social charges are often not explicitly 
casted, however, it makes for diffi-
culty  in  comparing  levels  of effort 
between countries. 
In  a number of Member States -
Denmark, Sweden and  the  UK, for 
example - conscious  efforts  have 
been made to  increase the articula-
tion between the provision of  income 
support and getting the unemployed 
into work, by giving more individual 
help to the unemployed both to ac-
quire new skills and to search for a 
job and to do so at an early stage in 
their period of unemployment  (see 
Chapter 4  for  details  of active 
measures).  This  contrasts  with  the 
traditional  approach  of leaving  the 
unemployed much to  their own de-
vices,  of providing income support 
so that they have time to look for a 
suitable job and of only taking action 
when  the  person  has  been  unem-
ployed for a long time. In effect, it is 
a response not only to the increased 
pressure on governments to  reduce 
the number unemployed but also to 
the evidence that the longer someone 
has been out of work, the more diffi-





ncreased efforts at getting people 
into work have not been confined 
to  the  unemployed,  in  the  sense of 
those recorded as  actively seeking a 
job. There has been growing concern 
about the kind of support provided to 
those not in the labour force at all. In 
particular, measures have been intro-
duced aimed at both encouraging and 
enabling many people registered as having disabilities and lone parents 
with young children to  work.  In  all 
Member States, social assistance is 
available to those unable to work for 
one  reason  or  another,  though  in 
some countries-in the South of the 
Union, especially, this has tradition-
ally been organised regionally or lo-
cally  - and  a  minimum  level  of 
income  has  not  been  universally 
guaranteed. 
In  Portugal,  however,  a  scheme 
guaranteeing  families  a  sufficient 
level of income to meet basic needs 
came into effect in July 1997, while 
in  Italy,  the  Onofri  Report  recom-
mended  the  establishment  of a 
means-tested  minimum  income 
scheme,  with  payments  related  to 
family  size.  In  addition,  in  Spain, 
where social assistance remains the 
responsibility of  the 17 regional auth-
orities, the automatic revaluation of 
minimum benefit levels has been in-
troduced, and in Sweden, a national 
scale of  assistance, in place of  benefit 
levels  determined  by  the  munici-
palities  responsible  for  support 
(though in the context of a national 
norm), was agreed in 1997 (preceded 
by much debate about how far pay-
ments should vary between different 
localities). 
Both  the  Portuguese  and  Italian 
schemes involve not just the  provi-
sion of income support but measures 
to  help  benefit  recipients  integrate 
into society. This is essentially in re-
sponse to the experience under simi-
lar schemes of much longer standing 
in Northern Member States, where it 
has  been  clearly  demonstrated that 
social transfers by themselves are not 
enough to overcome the problem of 
deprivation  and  exclusion  from  a 
normal  social life  which prolonged 
economic  inactivity  can create.  (In 
France,  for  example,  in  both  1992 
and  1996,  only  a  third  of those 
covered  by  the  minimum  income 
scheme aimed at getting people back 
into  work  - Revenu  Minimum 
d' Insertion- succeeded in finding a 
job.) 
There  is,  therefore,  a general tend-
ency throughout the Union to address 
the underlying causes of poverty and 
social exclusion as well as the symp-
toms and to avoid systems of income 
support becoming the means for en-
trenching a permanent division in so-
ciety between those who contribute 
to  its  well-being and  those who do 
not. The aim, in particular, is to help 
those dependent on social benefits to 
become self-supporting, or at least to 
have  more  control  over their  lives 
and  to  play  a  more  active  role  in 
society. This means giving them the 
opportunity to  find a job, which, in 
tum,  means  not only  helping  them 
increase their employability through 
education and training, but ensuring 
that  they  have  a  place  to  live  and 
access  to  adequate  levels  of health 
care  and  social  services,  such  as 
child-care facilities for lone parents. 
There are many examples of a more 
active  approach being taken  to  en-
courage people on social assistance 
to find employment. In Denmark, for 
instance, from 1998 on, everyone re-
ceiving social transfers will be given 
the chance to return to education or 
go  on to  a training  scheme.  More-
over, they will be expected to take up 
such  opportunities  if they  wish  to 
continue receiving  income support. 
In  Germany  also,  increased efforts 
have been made to get those on social 
assistance into active labour market 
programmes,  while  in  the  UK,  the 
new  Government  has  announced  a 
'welfare to work' programme aimed 
at reducing the number of people re-
liant on benefits. 
In addition toN  ew Deal programmes 
for the young and long-term unem-
ployed  and  disabled  people  who 
want to work, the UK Government is 
in the process of introducing a pack-
age of measures to provide help and 
advice  to  lone  parents  to  make  the 
move into work. In Great Britain, the 
number of lone parents in receipt of 
Income Support has risen from  320 
thousand  in  1979  to  1.1  million  in 
1996. The New Deal for Lone Par-
ents  involves  the  appointment of a 
personal caseworker who offers help 
and advice with the search of a job, 
training  needs,  benefit  advice  and 
child-care information. The service, 
which is offered on a voluntary basis, 
is  primarily  aimed  at  lone  parents 
whose youngest child is at school but 
it  is  also  available  to  lone  parents 
with  younger  children.  Already 
available  in  eight  areas  of the 
country, the service will be available 
to  all  lone parents in  receipts of In-
come Support by October 1998 (see 
Box). There is no plan in the UK to 
make it compulsory for lone parents 
to  try  to  find  a job or to  go  on  a 
training course, though they will be 
encouraged to do so. 
In  the  Netherlands,  more  stringent 
procedures for claiming social assist-
ance have recently been introduced, 
requiring  recipients  to  be  actively 
seeking work and to accept any suit-
able offer they receive, except if they 
are lone parents with a child under 5. 
In  Luxembourg,  where  assistance 
guaranteeing a minimum income has 
been extended to those aged between 
25  and  30  (previously it applied to 
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The 'Welfare to work' policy in the UK 
The new Government announced plans soon after taking office for shifting the focus of policy on social security from 
income support to getting people into work, through the New Deal. The object of reform across the system is to reduce 
poverty and welfare dependency, to promote work incentives and to develop a system that supports work, savings and 
honesty. As a major part of this is to ensure that people are always better off when working than when out of work and, 
in particular, to remove the fear that people will not be able to afford to pay their rent (covered by housing benefits 
when out of work) and travel expenses once they return to work. The specific measures introduced in this regard by the 
previous Government include: 
•  the continued payment of housing benefits at the same rate for the first four weeks of employment for those on 
Income Support or Johseeker' s Allowance for six months or more; 
•  the ability to build up a Back-to-Work bonus of up to£ I ,000 (I ,500 ECU) for those whose benefit has been reduced 
by working part-time while receiving Income Support or Jobseeker' s Allowance if they start a full-time job; 
•  the faster processing of claims for F  amil_v Credit (in-work benefit) for those starting a new low-paid job (within 5 
days for 90% of claims); 
•  the deduction of a child-care disregard from earnings when assessing entitlement to in-work benefits (90 ECU and 
from Summer 1998, !50 ECU for two children). 
The present Government has introduced further measures, according priority to getting young people and the long-term 
unemployed off benefit and into work, though also aimed at lone parents and disabled people who want to work. 
Young people 
The New Deal for 18-24 year olds will be introduced nationally in April 1998, after trails in  12 areas. Under this scheme, 
young people unemployed for over 6 months will be offered a choice between a job with an employer (who will receive 
a £60 (90 ECU) subsidy a week for 6 months, work in the voluntary sector, work for the new Environmental Task Force 
and an opportunity to study on a full-time approved course. Benefit sanctions will be applied to those young people 
who unreasonably refuse to take up a suitable option. 
Long-term unemployed 
The New Deal for the long-term unemployed will be introduced in June 1998, with subsidies to employers of £75 ( 110 
ECU) a week for 6 months recruiting people of 25  or over who have been unemployed for two years or more and 
employment-related courses of education for the older unemployed for up to a year whilst continuing to receive benefit. 
Gateway opportunities for the older long-term unemployed are also planned to be developed to provide more assessment, 
advice and help with basic skills. 
Lone parents 
The New Deal for lone parents involves the appointment of a personal caseworker to offer help and advice with job 
search, training needs, benefits and child-care. The scheme, which will be available to all those in  receipt of Income 
Support from October 1998, is voluntary and is primarily aimed at lone parents whose youngest child is at school but 
is also available to lone parents with younger children. At the same time, the additional benefit payable to lone parents 
not in  work will be withdrawn from October 1998, though this will be accompanied by a significant increase in child 
benefits for everyone, single or married. 
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the invalidity benefit system 
The system of invalidity benefits in the Netherlands was created in 1967 
and was characterised by wide coverage and generous levels of payment 
(70%  of previous  earnings - 80%  before  1987  - up  to  the  age  of 
retirement). Between 1980 and 1990, the number of  beneficiaries increased 
by 34% to reach 14% of the labour force, 80% of them being regarded as 
totally incapable of working, 40% because of psychological problems. In 
practice, the scheme conveniently reduced the number of people classified 
as  unemployed, providing a higher level of income support for a longer 
period with no direct cost for employers. 
In 1993, a number of reforms were introduced to tighten the criteria for 
eligibility, to require those drawing benefit to undergo periodic and more 
systematic medical examinations, to assess capacity for work in terms of 
the ability to do any job rather than what a person was doing before, to 
reduce benefit levels and to transfer the cost onto employers. The latter has 
been achieved by introducing a system under which contribution rates for 
employers are partly differentiated according to the number of their em-
ployees claiming disability benefits. Employers can opt out of the scheme 
by assuming the risk themselves (which they can insure against privately), 
but whether they do so or not, they have a clear incentive to reduce the 
number of workers registering as disabled, by both improving health and 
safety at work and keeping those with disabilities in employment, whereas 
previously there was no  such incentive.·  By these means, it  is  aimed to 
reduce the number of beneficiaries significantly. 
those of  30 and over) and people with 
no fixed abode, this has been accom-
panied by a stipulation that recipients 
have exhausted  all  other means  of 
improving their situation and are ac-
tively  seeking  employment,  unless 
they are 60 or over or disabled. 
In Belgium, a recent measure is  in-
tended to make it easier for homeless 
people to  work by giving those re-
ceiving minimex (minimum income 
support)  a  lump  sum  settlement 
allowance  (of 27,000 BEF,  around 
650 ECU) to assist them find accom-
modation.  At the same time,  it has 
been  made  possible  for  employers 
providing communal, social or cultu-
ral services to take on minimex reci-
pients and obtain relief from  social 
contributions. 
The potential role of communal ser-
vices, and voluntary and non-profit-
making organisations in particular, in 
providing  employment for  those 
either at present excluded from  the 
labour market or difficult to place is 
being actively considered in a num-
ber of Member States, as a means of 
involving them more fully  in econ-
omic and social life while producing 
services for which there is unmet de-
mand  (partly  because  of the  con-
straints  on  public  budgets).  Such 
activities are most developed in the 
Nordic countries, though, as noted in 
Chapter 4,  they  have recently been 
expanded in Belgium. Moreover, in 
Ireland, a Green Paper on the role of 
the voluntary and community sector 
and its relationship with the statutory 
sector was published in  1997 as part 
of a National Anti-Poverty Strategy 
launched  at  the  same  time,  which 
aims  within  a  year  to  identify  the 
structures required for the effective 
implementation of such a policy. 
At the Luxembourg Jobs Summit at 
the  end  of 1997,  national  govern-
ments  recognised  the  potential  im-
portance of the local economy as  a 
source of new jobs, especially in so-
cial  and  environmental  activities 
where apparent needs are not at pres-
ent being  satisfied  by  the  market. 
They agreed in the Employment Gui-
delines to investigate measures to ex-
ploit  these  possibilities  and  to 
identify,  and,  where  possible, 





eople  with  physical  or mental 
impairments pose special prob-
lems for social protection policy in a 
similar way to lone parents. In anum-
ber of Member States,  the  Nether-
lands and the UK being among the 
most prominent examples, both the 
number receiving disability or inva-
lidity  benefits  and  the  expenditure 
involved have risen  markedly over 
the  past 20 years  or so,  coinciding 
with  the  slowdown  in  economic 
growth and large-scale job losses in 
traditional industries. In many cases, 
shifting  people  out  of work  on  to 
disability benefit schemes, especially 
older men who had been unemployed 
-47-for a long time, was a way of reduc-
ing both the demand for the inadequ-
ate number of  jobs available and the 
number  registered  as  unemployed. 
The growth in the number involved 
and in the cost, however, led to in-
creased concern in the early 1990s. 
In  recent years, in both the Nether-
lands and the UK, attempts have been 
made  to  tackle  both aspects  of the 
problem, in particular by introducing 
more stringent tests for assessing in-
capacity for work. In the UK, a new 
Incapacity Benefit came into effect in 
1995  replacing Invalidity and Sick-
ness Benefits, the principal change, 
in addition to a tougher medical test, 
being the introduction after 28 weeks 
on benefit of an assessment relating 
to a person's fitness to do any kind of 
work rather than the work they were 
doing in their previous job (as during 
the first 28 weeks). People failing the 
test have to register as  unemployed 
and actively look for work. The result 
in the first year was a small fall in the 
number claiming benefit in  contrast 
to the previous tendency for the num-
ber to increase. 
In the Netherlands, responsibility for 
policing  benefits  has  been  partly 
shifted  to  employers,  who  have  to 
pay higher contribution rates if more 
of their  employees  register  as  dis-
abled, giving them a clear incentive 
to minimise the numbers opting to do 
so (see Box). This measure has been 
coupled with greater stress on help-
ing people registered as  having dis-
abilities  into  work  through  active 
employment programmes. In Austria 
and Finland too, the emphasis of pol-
icy has shifted from income support 
to  rehabilitation.  In the  latter,  tem-
porary invalidity benefits have been 
renamed rehabilitation benefits, the 
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granting of which requires participa-
tion in a rehabilitation programme. In 
the former, entitlement to disability 
benefit has to be re-established every 
two years and is granted only if it has 
not proved possible to find employ-
ment for the claimant through reha-
bilitation measures. 
Providing  access  to  labour  market 
programmes coupled with incentives 
for them to look for work is, however, 
not sufficient to  bring about a sub-
stantial change in the position of dis-
abled  people  in  the  economy  or 
society.  Such measures  need  to  be 
accompanied  by  legislation  to  pre-
vent discrimination against them in 
employment and  in  their  access  to 
goods,  services  and  facilities  of 
various  kinds,  so  increasing  their 
chances of finding a job and making 
it easier for them to use public trans-
port and buildings, including offices 
and factories.  In  1993,  all  Member 
States  adopted  the  UN Standard 
Rules of  Equality of  Opportunity for 
Disabled People and in most of  them, 
anti-discrimination  legislation  is  in 
force  (see  Employment  in  Europe, 
1997, Part II, Section 2,  for a more 
detailed account of recent policy de-
velopments  across  the  Union  to-
wards people with disabilities). 
Curbing spending 
on sickness benefit 
I
n a number of Member States, at-
tempts  have  also  been  made  to 
reduce  expenditure  on  sickness 
benefits. In the Netherlands, as with 
disability benefits, responsibility for 
curbing spending has been shifted to 
employers,  who  from  March  1996 
have been obliged to continue paying 
salary to employees unable to  work 
for up to 52 weeks, though they can 
take out private insurance against the 
eventuality. As a result, absenteeism 
seems  to  have fallen,  but there  are 
signs  that employers  have  become 
more selective when they initially re-
cruit people (despite legislation pre-
venting  discrimination  on  health 
grounds).  It  is  also  expected  that 
there  will  be  an  increase  in  fixed-
term  contracts  (temporary  workers 
are still covered by the state scheme) 
and in the use of employment agen-
cies. 
In  Portugal,  increased  efforts  have 
been  made  to  reduce  fraudulent 
claims of sickness benefit and there 
is  more frequent  checking of inca-
pacity for work. In consequence, ex-
penditure  has  been  reduced  by  a 
third. In Sweden, sickness and occu-
pational  injury  benefits  have  been 
consolidated  into  a  single  scheme, 
the benefit rate being reduced in the 
case of the latter from  100% of for-
mer earnings  to  80%  at  the  same 
time, though the period over which 






ncreasing  employment,  or  more 
accurately  postponing  the  effec-
tive  age  of retirement,  has  also 
become a more important aim with 
regard to older people. In most Mem-
ber States, the higher levels of unem-
ployment and inadequate rates of  job 
creation from the mid-1970s on led 
to policies encouraging older people 
to  withdraw  from  the  labour force before the official age of retirement. 
Such policies took the form of early 
retirement schemes, with people able 
to receive pensions before the official 
retirement  age,  especially  if they 
were unemployed, or special benefits 
for older workers as well as disability 
benefits, as discussed above. The es-
calating  cost  of early  retirement, 
however, allied to the prospect in 10-
15 years time of a substantial expan-
sion in the number of pensioners as 
the  post-war baby boom generation 
reaches retirement age, has caused a 
radical  rethink  of policy  in  recent 
years (see Chapter 5 for a more de-
tailed account). The only area where 
such  a  rethink has  not  occurred  is 
agriculture,  where  early  retirement 
programmes have continued to oper-
ate  with  Union support in  order to 
reduce the number employed in the 
sector. 
Nevertheless,  low  rates  of employ-
ment growth  have  ensured  that,  in 
most  countries,  there  remains  an 
awkward  conflict  between  increas-
ing  the  number of older  people  in 
work  and  reducing  unemployment. 
Moreover, irrespective of the efforts 
or wishes  of government, if people 
lose  their jobs in  the  later years  of 
their working lives, the lack of alter-
native  employment may  mean that 
they  have little choice but to  retire 
early. This might explain the conti-
nued  increase  in  early  retirement 
among men aged 55 and over in most 
parts of the  Union,  which by  1996 
had resulted in around half of men 
aged 55 to 64 no longer being econ-
omically  active  and  under  30%  of 
women (see Chapter 5 for details). 
The  shift  in  attitude  towards  early 
retirement is  evident in the tougher 
stance  on  disability  benefits  in  a 
number of countries. In addition to 
the examples noted above, tighter re-
strictions on the receipt of early re-
tirement pensions have been applied 
in  Sweden,  where  claimants  now 
need to demonstrate that they are in-
capable of  working, so that, in effect, 
the  payment  has  been  transformed 
into a sickness or invalidity benefit. 
At the same time, the basic pension 
payable  to  those  retiring  early  has 
been reduced by 6%, while there has 
also been a reduction in the pension 
payable to those married to someone 
below  pensionable  age,  which  is 
more likely to apply to those retiring 
early than at the normal age. 
In  both  Germany  and  Austria,  the 
conditions of eligibility for early re-
tirement as well as invalidity benefit 
have also been tightened and the pen-
sion reduced. In Belgium, where re-
tirement is possible for men between 
the ages of 60 and 65 (and will be for 
women  once  their  statutory  retire-
ment age has been increased to 65), 
the number of years of contributions 
necessary to qualify for a pension is 
being  raised  and  the  contributions 
payable on early retirement pensions 
increased. In Spain, voluntary retire-
ment  before  the  age  of 65  is  now 
penalised by a reduced pension even 
if people have the number of years of 
contributions required for a full pen-
sion  (except  when  the  person con-
cerned becomes unemployed), while 
in Greece, entitlement to early retire-
ment pensions have been restricted 
and the overall amount paid reduced. 
Moreover, in a number of countries, 
partial  pension  schemes,  enabling 
people approaching retirement age to 
work part-time rather than full-time 
and  receive  a  pension  at  the  same 
time,  have  been  introduced  or  ex-
tended  with the  primary aim of re-
ducing  the  numbers  retiring  early 
(see Chapter 5 for details of  these and 
the other measures noted above). 
Adapting 
social protection 
to population ageing 
A
s well as addressing the grow-
ing cost of early retirement per 
se, all governments across the Union 
have had to contemplate the implica-
tions  for  social transfers of the im-
pending expansion in the number of 
people of pensionable age in  10-15 
years  time,  in  a context where  the 
population of  working age is likely to 
be  either declining  or  remaining 
largely  unchanged.  The  reform  of 
pension systems aimed at managing 
the cost of this shift in age composi-
tion-or, more accurately, the scale 
of income redistribution which it en-
tails-has, therefore, become a cen-
tral item on the policy agenda in all 
countries. Irrespective of the systems 
in place, increasing efforts are being 
made to identify the changes required 
to contain the growth in expenditure 
implied by  demographic trends and 
to put these into place early enough 
for  them  to  be  both  effective  and 
equitable. This longer-term concern 
has  been  overlain  by  shorter-term 
financing  problems  resulting  from 
the  slowdown in  economic growth 
and fall in employment, which have 
depressed  income  from  both  taxes 
and contributions. 
A common response to  longer-term 
considerations (as described in more 
detail in Social Protection in Europe, 
1995,  Chapter 2  and  in  Chapter  5 
below) has been to raise the official 
-49-retirement age of women to bring it 
into line with that of men, for both 
cost and equity reasons. This is  the 
case  in  Germany  (where  it  will  be 
progressively increased from  63  to 
65  for  men  between January  2000 
and December 2001 and from 60 for 
women to 65 between January 2000 
and December 2004), Greece (from 
60  to  65  for  women  insured  since 
1993), Portugal  (from 62  to  65  for 
women by 1999), the UK (from 60 to 
65 from 2010) and, more recently, in 
Belgium and Austria (from 60 to 65, 
from  1997 on in the former, though 
only from  2019 on in the latter, the 
process  not  being  completed  until 
2033). 
In all these countries, therefore, as in 
most other parts  of the  Union,  the 
official retirement age has been, or 
will be,  standardised at 65  for both 
men and women. This, however, has 
been  coupled  with  increased  em-
phasis on the contributions record of 
those retiring, or, in other words, on 
the number of years they have been 
employed, so linking the pension re-
ceivable more closely with the pay-
ments made over a person's working 
career and reinforcing the insurance 
aspect of the system. As a corollary, 
to avoid discrimination, specific con-
cessions  have  been  introduced  for 
women to  allow for the  years  they 
spend taking care of children or in-
valid  parents,  though  the  precise 
form these take and their scale vary 
between countries. 
Nevertheless,  in  most  Member 
States, the pension receivable on re-
tirement  bears  little  relationship  to 
the amount actually contributed dur-
ing a person's years in employment. 
In all Member States, with the partial 
exception  for  supplementary  pen-
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sions of the UK, the Netherlands and 
Finland, pension systems  are  oper-
ated on a pay-as-you-go basis, so that 
the amounts paid out to those at pres-
ent in retirement are financed  from 
current  contributions  or  revenue 
from taxes, paid largely by those in 
work  or their  employers.  Increas-
ingly, however, the rate of benefit is 
constrained by  the finance received 
and is adjusted in various ways to be 
consistent with this, rather than rates 
of  contribution or tax being modified 
to meet a larger pension bill. 
In addition to raising the age of  retire-
ment,  which will largely  affect ex-
penditure on pensions some time in 
the future,  many governments have 
also reduced the effective rate in re-
lation to past earnings by altering the 
pension  formula.  In  particular,  in 
France,  Portugal,  Austria  and  Fin-
land - in  the  last,  in  the  case  of 
employment rather than basic pen-
sions, which are flat-rate-the num-
ber of years of earnings on which the 
pension is based has been increased 
(from  the  best 10 to  the  best 25  in 
France, to the best 10 of the last 15 
instead of the best 5 of the last 10 in 
Portugal, to the best 15 years instead 
of  the last 10-15 in Austria and to the 
last  10  instead of the last 4 in Fin-
land), so reducing the sum payable in 
most cases. 
Moreover,  adjusting  the  method of 
revaluing pensions for inflation has 
also proved a useful means of reduc-
ing the amount paid out. In France, 
indexation in recent years has been 
based on price rises rather than wage 
increases; in Finland, the index used 
was changed in 1996 to reflect prices 
much more than wages (weights of 
80%  and  20%,  respectively,  being 
used), while in Spain, the method of 
indexing has also been made less fa-
vourable.  In  Germany,  indexing  is 
now based on net rather than gross 
earnings,  which  when  taxes  and 
charges are rising also has the effect 
of reducing the amount paid (though 
equally it maintains the value of pen-
sions constant in relation to  dispos-
able  income  in  employment).  In 
Sweden, more radically, pensions are 
not being fully indexed in line with 
wages so  long as  the budget deficit 
remains excessive. 
In  other  countries,  pensions  have 
been  reduced  by  other means.  In 
Greece,  legislation  passed  in  the 
early 1990s not only discontinued the 
indexing of pensions  to  wages  but 
raised the pensionable age of public 
employees, increased the minimum 
career length for retirement under the 
general  scheme  (KA{fEAM)  and 
limited the pension payable to  new 
entrants into the scheme to  60%  of 
previous  earnings.  As  a  result,  the 
number receiving the minimum pen-
sion has risen (to 71% of those paid 
from the National Insurance Fund-
IKA-in 1996) and the value of  this 
has fallen (from 20% of the average 
wage of unskilled workers in 1990 to 
17%  in  1995).  In  1995,  a  million 
pensioners  received  benefit  of less 
than half average  income  per head 
and 25% of  these had no other means 
of support, prompting the introduc-
tion in 1996 of a means-tested allow-
ance  for  pensioners  over 60  (see 
Chapter 7 for ECHP data on pensions 
in Greece). 
A similar measure has also been re-
cently introduced in Spain, where the 
number of  years needed to qualify for 
a full pension has been increased and 
the  coefficient  applied  to  earnings 
reduced. In both countries, therefore, Chapter 2  Adapting to change: recent reforms and key developments 
The direction of social protection reform in Spain and Italy 
In Spain, following the recommendations of  the 'Pact of  Toledo', an 'Agreement for the consolidation and rationalisation 
of the social security system' between the Government and the two main trade unions was signed in October, 1996. 
This forms the basis of legislation introduced in  1997 to reinforce the contributory nature of the Spanish social security 
system, to split contributions equally between employers and employees and to increase expenditure on social protection 
to the average Union level. A permanent committee of government and the trade union representatives has been set up 
to monitor the implementation of these aims and to present proposals to the parliamentary commission responsible for 
social protection. The first major reforn1  will establish a clear division, by the year 2000, in  the financing of social 
protection,  with  insurance  benefits  financed  by contributions  and  universal  non-contributory  transfers  and  direct 
spending on goods and services financed from general taxation. 
In Italy, at the beginning of 1997, the Government appointed the Onofri Commission, a group of experts, to outline 
broad guidelines for a modernising the social protection system. Its main recommendation was to correct the bias of the 
system towards retirement pensions and certain privileged groups (such as employees of large private enterprises and 
civil servants) and to  increase spending on social assistance, social services and active labour market measures. The 
specific proposals included: 
•  implementing fully the 1995 pension reform, in particular hannonising the different occupational schemes; 
•  distinguishing social insurance benefits from social assistance and financing the former from contributions, the latter 
from general taxation; 
•  introducing more rapidly a 'defined contributions' system for pensions and strengthening its contributory principles; 
•  raising the lower age limit of 57 for flexible retirement; 
•  increasing the incentives for the development of occupational pensions; 
•  establishing a minimum income scheme based on need; 
•  establishing a new fund for those in need of long-term care; 
•  replacing the highly fragmented system of unemployment compensation by two unitary schemes, one for temporary 
lay-offs (70% of previous earnings initially, with a declining rate, for a maximum of 12-18 months in five years), 
the other for unemployment proper (60% initially, with a declining rate, for up to 3 years). 
In June 1997, official negotiations started on the reforms, the two most controversial issues concerning the proposed 
rationalisation of pension arrangements, which means reductions for some groups, and of unemployment benefits. 
In  November  1997, agreement was reached between the Government and trade unions on a small reduction in  the 
transition period and an acceleration of the convergence towards uniform rules for the various schemes (which was 
included in  the 1998 budget law). The same agreement reaffirmed the need to encourage, possibly through financial 
incentives, some form of flexible and gradual retirement. 
-51-a reduction in the level of  pension has 
led to  increased reliance on means-
testing. This has also been the case in 
Sweden as  a result of reductions in 
housing  supplements  paid  to  pen-
sioners, coupled with the partial in-
dexing of pensions, as noted above. 
In  Sweden  as  well,  the  pension 
payable to those married to someone 
below pensionable age has been re-
duced, while widows' (or survivors') 
pensions  were  made  subject  to  an 
income test in 1997, so reducing the 
amount received  by  those  with  in-
come  above  a certain  level.  More-
over both  in  Sweden  and  Finland, 
measures  have  been  introduced  to 
withdraw  the  basic,  flat-rate,  state 
pension from those whose earnings-
related 'employment' pension is con-
sidered  sufficient,  so  effectively 
transforming the basic pension into a 
supplement,  while  in  Finland,  in-
creased  amounts  for  dependent 
spouses and children will no  longer 




hroughout  the  Union,  there  is 
ongoing debate about the need 
for pension reform in the light of the 
future  growth  in  the  number of 
people in retirement and, in particu-
lar,  about  the  respective  roles  of 
basic,  supplementary,  occupational 
and  private  schemes.  So  far,  how-
ever,  there  has  been no  significant 
tendency to shift away from pay-as-
you-go to funded schemes (ie where 
income  is  accumulated  from  con-
tributions to cover future pension lia-
bilities). Nevertheless, in a number of 
Member States, measures to increase 
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the importance of occupational and 
private schemes to supplement basic 
pensions and to relieve the State of 
part of the liability for financing fu-
ture payments have either been intro-
duced or have been proposed. There 
are  also  signs  of a  shift  towards 
defined contribution systems, where 
the pension received on retirement is 
determined  by  contributions  paid 
over a  person's working  career in-
stead  of  earnings  over  a  given 
period, so reducing some of the dif-
ference between pay-as-you-go and 
funded systems. 
Debate is particularly lively in South-
em Member States because of con-
cern  about  features  of existing 
systems. In Spain, following the Pact 
of Toledo between Government and 
the  social partners  (see  Box), there 
are plans to encourage voluntary pri-
vate  schemes  to  supplement  state 
pensions and to give fiscal incentives 
for these to be organised on a collec-
tive rather than individual basis (so 
that premiums  are  the  same  for 
everyone  irrespective  of their  per-
sonal  circumstances).  At  the  same 
time, a reserve fund has been estab-
lished  from  the  annual  surpluses 
generated by pension funds  to  help 
cover  the  future  costs  of demo-
graphic trends. In Greece, where the 
system  is  particularly  fragmented, 
there is ongoing debate aimed at ra-
tionalising the social security system 
as a whole. 
In Portugal, the possibility oflimiting 
the future amount of pension by im-
posing a ceiling on earnings to which 
pensions (and contributions) relate is 
being  debated,  as  is  the  incentive 
which this would give for the devel-
opment of supplementary schemes, 
whether  private  or public.  At  the 
same time, there is concern about the 
need to find finance from elsewhere 
in  the  event of a ceiling being im-
posed, about the increase in  saving 
which the growth of supplementary 
schemes would imply and about the 
importance  of regulating  occupa-
tional schemes to protect workers. In 
addition,  in  Ireland,  a  National 
Pension Policy Initiative was  laun-
ched  in  1996  for  debate  on  future 
policy, and proposals are due  to  be 
published by mid-1998. 
In Italy, the Onofri Report called for 
the more rapid implementation of  the 
proposals put forward in  1995 for a 
unified system (see Social Protection 
in  Europe,  1995, Chapter 2 for de-
tails), under which pensions will be 
based  on  contributions  rather  than 
earnings and the development of vol-
untary supplementary pensions will 
be encouraged (see Box). In Sweden, 
a similar shift towards a defined con-
tributions,  rather  than  defined 
benefits, system was proposed in the 
reform measures announced in 1994. 
Though, like the Italian system, this 
will  remain  largely  pay-as-you-go, 
and will be compulsory, 2% of earn-
ings  will  be  put into a fully-funded 
scheme where individuals decide the 
placement  and  management  (ie  a 
state system with an element of indi-
vidual  choice,  representing  a  com-
promise between opposing political 
viewpoints). 
In  Germany,  the  Federal  Govern-
ment in  1997 put forward proposals 
for further reform of pensions to re-
duce  the  standard  amount payable, 
from 70% of  previous net earnings to 
64% by 2030, with the aim of avoid-
ing increases in contributions. In ad-
dition, funding for pensions from the 
Federal Budget has  been  increased by raising VAT from  15% to  16% 
from  April  1998.  Although  there 
have been some proposals to  limit 
state pensions to a basic amount, the 
consensus among the two main pol-
itical  parties  is  to  retain  the  main 
features  of the  present  system, 
namely,  contributions  and  benefits 
related to earnings and pay-as-you-
go financing. 
The same consensus is also evident in 
Austria,  although here the  insurance 
principle has been strengthened under 
the Pension concept 2000 reform by 
including stronger actuarial factors in 
the calculation formula for early retire-
ment pensions which could encourage 
people to stay longer in employment 
and so raise the actual age of retire-
ment, the aim being to safeguard the 
fmancing  of Austrian pensions  over 
the medium and long-term. 
In France, legislation was introduced 
by the previous Government in 1997 
enabling tax incentives to be given to 
encourage the development of sup-
plementary funded schemes for pri-
vate  sector employees.  The  new 
government,  however,  has  delayed 
its  implementation,  fearing  that  it 
would jeopardise the current pay-as-
you-go  supplementary  schemes 
(ARRCO and AGIRC) managed by 
the social partners. 
The  main  countries  in  the  Union 
where  the  pension  system  has  de-
veloped in a radically different way 
are the UK and Ireland. In the former, 
an  estimated  two-thirds  of pen-
sioners have an occupational or pri-
vate pension and the state benefit is 
relatively low. Accordingly, substan-
tial  numbers,  mainly  the  one-third 
without  a  private  pension,  rely  on 
means-tested income support to sup-
Safeguarding 
supplementary pensions 
As governments across the Union seek to limit 
the  growth  of state  pensions,  supplementary 
schemes, in the form of occupational or private 
pensions, are becoming increasingly important 
as a means of enabling people to maintain their 
income at a satisfactory level when they retire. 
The development of such schemes, which are 
generally on a fully-funded rather than a pay-as-
you-go basis and which serve to take some of  the 
pressure off the State for meeting the aspirations 
of people  for  a decent  income  in  retirement, 
requires, however, a secure environment, which 
only  governments  can  create.  In  particular,  a 
regulatory  framework  is  needed  which  safe-
guards the assets accumulated in a pension fund, 
notably in the event of an employer's insolvency 
or the transfer of  ownership of  a company. These 
principles have been agreed at Community level 
and are laid down in Directives 80/987  /EEC and 
77/187 /EEC. 
They need, moreover, to be accompanied by the 
provision of clear, understandable and unbiased 
information to workers so that they are able to 
choose  between  alternative  schemes,  in  full 
awareness  of the  management costs  involved 
and  the pension they  are  likely to  receive on 
retirement  under  different  assumptions  about 
future developments. 
The regulatory framework must also establish 
the  principle  of equal  treatment for  men  and 
women,  as  set  out  in  the  1996  'Post-Barber' 
Directive  (of  December,  1996,  Directive 
86/378/EEC concerning equality between men 
and  women  in  occupational  social  security 
schemes). 
The growth of supplementary schemes implies 
a concomitant growth of pension funds  which 
has  implications  for  the  development  of the 
European capital market in the context of eco-
nomic and monetary union, as well as for the free 
movement of labour. These implications and the 
potential for investment in  industry and infra-
structure  are  examined  in  the  Commission 
Green  Paper,  Supplementary  Pensions  in  the 
Single Market (COM (97) 283, June 1997. 
-53-plement the basic amount, though it 
is estimated that up to 1 million fail 
to claim (and receive) the supplement 
they are entitled to.  In Ireland, over 
50% of employees at work have oc-
cupational or personal schemes and 
the State provides only basic flat-rate 
cover. A major proportion of future 
pension liabilities in both countries 
is, therefore, fully funded and man-
aged  by  private  insurance  com-
panies, leaving the state to take care 
of the less  well-off and those  who 
have failed to build up an adequate 
pension for their retirement. 
The main focus of policy in the recent 
past  has  been  on strengthening  the 
regulations governing private pension 
funds  to  prevent  a  repetition  of the 
problems experienced in the last few 
years  - specifically,  the  fraudulent 
use  of pension fund  money by  em-
ployers  responsible  for  managing  it 
and the misleading selling of private 
schemes. (1
1/2 million people are esti-
mated to have been wrongly advised to 
switch  from  occupational  to  private 
schemes and, under pressure from the 
Government, restitution by the insur-
ance companies is now gradually tak-
ing  place.) This concern echoes that 
expressed  in  Community  Directives 
aimed at ensuring the establishment of 
a sound regulatory framework for sup-
plementary pensions as they increase 
in importance across  the Union (see 
Box). 
Soon after coming to power in 1997, 
the  new  British  Government  an-
nounced a pension review to examine 
central areas of insecurity for elderly 
people, including the relationship be-
tween basic and second pensions, the 
appropriate  balance  between  public 
and private and the proper regulation 
of the latter, the importance of raising 
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awareness of the need for a pension 
and a narrowing of the pensions gap 
between men and women. It also an-
nounced a pension-sharing plan for di-
vorcing  couples from  the  year 2000 
and the development of 'citizens' pen-
sions' for carers unable to contribute to 
a  pension  scheme  and  'stakeholder 
pensions' for those on low incomes or 
with  changing  patterns  of employ-
ment. 
It  appears, however, that no major shift 
away from the previous Government's 
policy orientation,  with its  emphasis 
on private sector involvement, individ-
ual responsibility and the  accumula-
tion  of savings  in  pension  funds  to 
cover  future  liabilities,  is  planned. 
Whether this  approach  is  better de-
signed to overcome the transfer prob-
lem inherent in the future growth in the 
proportion of people above pension-
able age than that being followed in the 
rest of the Union is by no means clear. 
Ultimately, the effective transfer of  in-
come from those in work to those in 
retirement has to be made, irrespective 
of  the way in which it is achieved, and 
the ease of  doing this-in terms of  the 
avoidance  of social  unrest  and  the 
maintenance of  social cohesion-will 
depend largely on the income available 
to be distributed. It  is a matter of  debate 
which of the two approaches is more 
likely to deliver the economic growth 
required to secure this or which is put-
ting the  greater financing  burden on 
future  generations.  Ultimately  also, 
unless there is a fundamental change in 
philosophy, the State is responsible for 
ensuring an adequate level of pension 
for everyone, irrespective of the role 
played by private insurers and the at-
tempts made to persuade individuals to 
assume  responsibility  for  their  own 
actions. 
Restraining the 
costs of health care 
T
he constraints on public expen-
diture  have  focused  particular 
attention on health care services, the 
demand  for  which  tends  to  rise 
rapidly as real income increases and 
medical  know-how  expands.  The 
growth in demand has been boosted 
further by the increasing number of 
people living into old age. The wide-
spread  response  in  Member States 
has been either to limit expenditure 
directly, where services are managed 
by the State or to impose ceilings on 
spending growth, where this is deter-
mined by health insurance funds. The 
key  issues  in  this  context  then 
become how expenditure is allocated 
between both the services provided 
and  the  people  receiving  care  and 
how efficiency in the use of  available 
resources is assured. The response in 
many countries has been to introduce 
market, or pseudo-market, mechan-
isms, as discussed in some detail in 
Chapter 6 below. 
In a number of Member States, glo-
bal budgeting has been introduced to 
curb the growth of health insurance 
fund expenditure. In Germany, this 
has been the case since 1993 and in 
France,  for  public  sector  hospitals 
since  the  1980s  and  private  ones 
since  the  beginning  of the  1990s, 
though general practitioners remain 
outside the  system of controls  (the 
proposal in the Plan Juppe to include 
them met severe opposition). In Bel-
gium, growth rate norms of 1
1/2%  a 
year were imposed a few years ago 
and have been extended to the year 
2000,  while fees  charged for treat-
ment have been frozen or even re-
duced.  In  other  Member  States, where national health services exist 
which tend to be organised on a re-
gional  basis,  a  common  focus  has 
been on limiting the  budgets of re-
gional authorities and making them 
more  accountable  for  any  'excess' 
expenditure incurred. 
At the same time, in many Member 
States, charges for drugs and certain 
kinds of treatment- 'co-payment' 
- have  been  increased and/or ex-
tended.  This has been the  case, for 
example, in France,  where  charges 
for hospital stays went up in 1996, in 
Germany, where the co-payment re-
quired  of patients  has  been  raised 
repeatedly,  and  in the  Netherlands, 
where  since  January  1997,  most 
people pay 20% of the cost of treat-
ment, with certain exceptions, up to 
a maximum annual amount. The ob-
jective of such measures is  both to 
reduce the cost falling  on the  state 
and to make consumers more aware 
of  the cost of  their actions, so encour-
aging  them  to  be  more  rational  in 
their demand behaviour. 
Indeed,  the  general  motivation  for 
introducing market mechanisms into 
health care systems, as has occurred 
most notably  in  the  UK  and  the 
Netherlands, is to increase efficiency 
by forcing people to take account of 
the  cost implications  of their deci-
sions.  This  involves,  of necessity, 
making a clear distinction between 
purchasers and providers-between 
health authorities and general practi-
tioners,  on the one hand,  acting on 
behalf of the  patient,  and  hospitals 
and specialists, on the other-which 
often tends to be blurred, so enabling 
purchasers to exercise financial dis-
cipline over providers, encouraging 
contracts detailing terms, conditions 
and the specific services required to 
be drawn up and opening the way for 
competition on both sides. 
Such  action  also  provides  greater 
scope for the exercise of managerial 
expertise, an objective, for example, 
of the  Italian  reforms  of the  early 
1990s as well as of the draft bill re-
cently  presented in  Greece.  So far, 
however, difficult choices of how to 
determine the allocation of  resources 
between different areas and of how 
far  to  limit  the  care  and  treatment 
freely available within the public sec-
tor-or at least at nominal charge-
remain  largely  unresolved.  More-
over, there is as yet no general solu-
tion to the problem of reducing the 
high  level  of dissatisfaction  with 
public health services, which is evi-
dent in many Member States at pres-
ent,  without adding  significantly to 
expenditure. 
Care of the elderly 
T
he impending growth in the pro-
portion of the population of pen-
sionable age  is  also serving to  focus 
attention on the implications for health 
care  and  support  services.  The  de-
mands imposed on both of these in-
crease considerably as people age, as 
noted in Chapter 1. A significant pro-
portion of the very elderly tend to be 
frail or infirm and accordingly in need 
of  everyday care, and there is little sign 
that this  proportion is  declining over 
time. This care has traditionally been 
provided from within the family.  But 
the  gradual disappearance of the  ex-
tended family, the increased likelihood 
of different  generations  living  some 
distance  apart  and  the  much  greater 
numbers of women in paid employ-
ment have made this less feasible. At 
the same time, there is a common shift 
in policy across the Union away from 
the  provision  of residential  care  to-
wards providing the support and ser-
vices -home-help as well as medical 
care-required for people to continue 
living at home. 
The debate at present in a number of 
Member States, partly prompted by 
the introduction in  Austria in  1993 
and in Germany in 1995 of a scheme 
for long-term care, is over the extent 
to  which the provision of such care 
should be part of  the social protection 
system rather than being left to indi-
viduals to organise themselves. This 
comes down essentially to  a choice 
between increases in social charges 
and/or taxes to fund the social trans-
fers and/or direct expenditure on ser-
vices  required  and  accepting  the 
consequences of relying on personal 
responsibility. The latter consist not 
only of  the distributional effects of  an 
unequal cost falling on different indi-
viduals, and, specifically the poorer 
rather than the richer sections of the 
community,  whether  they  take  out 
private insurance cover or not,  but 
also of  the response of  the State to the 
possibility of increasing numbers of 
people being driven into poverty by 
having to meet the costs of care. 
A  further  issue  concerns  whether 
protection  should  take  the  form  of 
direct services - the option chosen 
in the Nordic countries, in particular 
- or transfers,  as  in Germany and 
Austria,  giving  the  beneficiary  a 
choice  over how  to  spend  these. 
Though the latter opens up the possi-
bility of competition in service pro-
vision,  it  also  encourages  the 
development of informal as opposed 
to  formal  arrangements  and,  there-
fore,  is  likely to  give rise  to  fewer 
jobs. In either case, additional issues 
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are allocated and, accordingly, how 
the  need for care is  evaluated,  and 
how far  social  services or transfers 
should be targeted on those with in-
come below a certain level. 
In Member States, there have been 
concrete developments in this area as 
well  as  discussion  of options  (see 
Chapter 7 for more details). InGer-
many, benefits for care at home under 
the  new  social  insurance  scheme 
(Pjlegeversicherung),  began  to  be 
paid in April 1995, and in July 1996 
benefits for residential care were in-
troduced,  both  financed  by  social 
contributions  levied  on  employers 
and employees (though with a loss of 
one day's holiday to compensate for 
the effect on labour costs). In Austria, 
a new attendance allowance, Bundes-
pjlegegeld, was introduced in  1993, 
payable to all those with disabilities 
and/or chronic illnesses in need of at 
least 50 hours of attendance or care a 
month and administered by the social 
insurance  institutions,  the  Federal 
Government  and  the  9  Lander, 
though funded from general taxation. 
Elsewhere, a draft bill was published 
in Luxembourg in 1996 for the intro-
duction  of a  compulsory  'depend-
ence insurance' scheme to cover care 
and assistance required by those un-
able  to  take care of themselves.  In 
Italy, the Onofri Report called for a 
new fund to be established for long-
term  care,  while  in  Ireland,  the 
means-tested Carer's allowance (for 
those looking after elderly relatives) 
was extended and the conditions for 
eligibility eased. 
In  the  Nordic  countries,  increasing 
constraints on expenditure on social 
services and support facilities  have 
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been imposed, leading to a growing 
concern over the under-provision of 
services, though there has been little 
questioning of the role of the State in 
this  area.  In  the  UK,  with  the  im-
plementation of the Care in the com-
munity  programme,  responsibility 
for providing long-term care has ef-
fectively  shifted  from  the  National 
Health  Service  to  local  authorities, 
whose budgets have also been tight-
ened, as well as to families and vol-
untary organisations, which have to 
contend  with  the  consequences  of 
under-provision. 
Shifts in sources 
of finance 
T
he  concern on the  expenditure 
side  to  reduce  the  number  of 
people dependent on social transfers 
and  to  encourage  them  to  become 
employed has been accompanied on 
the  financing  side by  a widespread 
policy  of reducing  social  contribu-
tions  levied  on  employers  and 
broadening sources of revenue. The 
motivation is both to spread the cost 
of social  protection  more  evenly 
across  society - and the economy 
(ie away from employment) - and 
to encourage job creation. 
While in  all  Member States,  social 
protection systems are funded partly 
by contributions and partly from tax-
ation, the relative weight of the two 
differs substantially (see Chapter 3). 
Irrespective of the weight, however, 
there has been a general attempt to 
stabilise or reduce rates on employers 
in  order  to  contain  labour costs, 
though  this  has  not  always  been 
successful  in  a  context  of slowly 
growing  real  income  and  rising 
unemployment  (in  Germany,  for 
example,  the  rate  of pension  con-
tributions  on  earnings  rose  from 
17.5% in 1993 to 20.3% in 1997 pri-
marily because of this rather than a 
growth in expenditure on pensions). 
The aim of cutting charges levied on 
employers has been coupled with a 
concern to retain and even strengthen 
the contributory aspect of  the system, 
in  part  to  emphasise  the  insurance 
dimension and the link between paid 
employment and access to  benefits, 
in part to limit eligibility for benefits 
and so reduce expenditure. Indeed, in 
Denmark, where social expenditure 
has historically been funded almost 
entirely  from  taxes,  contributions 
have been recently introduced with 
precisely these aims.  By  1997, em-
ployees' contributions had been in-
creased to 8% of gross earnings with 
a compensating reduction in income 
tax. In Spain, a major objective of  the 
'Pact of Toledo', ratified by Parlia-
ment in  1995,  was  to  reinforce the 
contributory nature of the social pro-
tection  system  and  to  reaffirm  the 
principle  of an  equal  division  of 
charges between employers and em-
ployees,  while  in  Austria,  compul-
sory  social  insurance  contributions 
were recently extended to new forms 
of atypical employment. 
In the latter two countries, however, 
as well as elsewhere, there have been 
increasing attempts to distinguish be-
tween  benefits  paid  to  those  pre-
viously  in  employment,  which  are 
generally related to earnings (  eg un-
employment benefits),  and benefits 
payable to all (eg health care or fam-
ily benefits), the idea being to reduce 
the use of  contributions as a source of 
finance for the  latter and,  so far as 
possible, to confine them to funding the former. Such attempts have been 
accompanied  in  some  countries  by 
greater (if limited)  use  of 'earmar-
ked' taxes in order to emphasise the 
link  between  taxation  and  benefits 
and,  accordingly,  to  reduce  resist-
ance to the introduction of new taxes 
and engender solidarity. 
In  Belgium,  the  attempt  to  reduce 
reliance  on  contributions  has  been 
accompanied by an increase in VAT, 
especially on fuel-as it has in Lux-
embourg - though  the  amount  of 
revenue raised from new alternative 
sources is still relatively small (only 
5% or so in 1996). At the same time, 
there has been an extension of social 
contributions  to  cover  students  for 
the first time (with a charge of 5% on 
earnings for employers and 2.5% for 
employees) and the use of company 
cars (33% of the value of the benefit 
in kind). In addition, employers' con-
tributions  have  been  increased  by 
10%  to  fund special unemployment 
schemes. 
In  France,  the  CSG  (Contribution 
Sociale Generalisee), the  'solidarity 
tax'  introduced  in  1989  to  replace 
part of contributions for old-age and 
family benefits, was raised to 3.4% in 
1995. A proposal made at the same 
time  to  extend the charge to  health 
care in place of  health insurance con-
tributions  levied  on  earnings  has 
been taken up  by  the  new Govern-
ment. A new charge to help pay off 
accumulated debt on social expendi-
ture - Contribution pour le  Rem-
boursement de  Ia  Dette Sociale -
was also announced in 1995 at a rate 
of  0.5% on earnings and social insur-
ance benefits. 
In  Portugal,  employers'  contribu-
tions  were  recently  reduced  by 
0.75% of earnings. At the same time, 
a new 'social' VAT of 1% was cre-
ated  to  make  good  the  loss  of 
revenue. In  addition, there is  active 
consideration of the possibility of  re-
ducing  employers'  contribution  on 
part  -time work as  well as of cutting 
them further relative to the rate levied 
on employees generally, a course of 
action which has  already  been fol-
lowed in a number of countries, par-
ticularly Sweden. 
In  Germany,  despite  the  growing 
emphasis on the need to keep down 
contributions  on  employers,  the 
new  long-term  care  benefit  was 
funded by an increase in contribu-
tions (divided equally between em-
ployers and employees), though the 
effect on labour costs was offset by 
reducing paid holidays by one day 
a year, the rate being raised further 
in  1996  when  benefits  were  ex-
tended  to  cover residential  care. 
However,  the  Employment  Pro-
motion  Act  has  been  repeatedly 
amended with a view to stabilising 
contribution rates, which has led to 
a number of cuts in  benefit levels 
and a tightening of eligibility crite-
ria in recent years. 
At the same time, selective reduc-
tions  in  employers'  contributions 
have been used as  a means of en-
couraging the employment of those 
who have difficulty in finding jobs, 
especially  young  people  and  the 
long-term  unemployed.  These, 
however,  are  equivalent  to  direct 
subsidies  and  should  be  regarded 
as  part of active  labour market 
measures rather than as  part of the 
general attempt to  alter sources of 
finance, especially since they have 
been  associated  in  some  Member 
States with upward pressure on the 
general rate of social contribution 
rather than with an increase in other 
forms of funding. 
In  Belgium,  for  example,  reduc-
tions  in  contributions  have  been 
combined with direct subsidy as  a 
means of stimulating job creation. 
Employers creating socially-useful 
jobs,  for  instance,  receive  both  a 
large  subsidy  for  three  years  and 
full relief from social contributions. 
In  the  UK,  employers  taking  on 
people unemployed for two years or 
more  are  also exempt from  social 
contributions,  in  this  case,  for  a 
year, while in France, the previous 
Government  subsidised  recruit-
ment of the long-term unemployed, 
both  directly  and  through  reduc-
tions in contributions, and also lo-
wered contributions for employers 
taking  on  lower-paid  workers 
(those  with  earnings  at  the  same 
level as  the  SMIC and up  to  20% 
more than this). 
Indeed, in France, the cost of  various 
measures  to  subsidise  employment 
was estimated at4% ofGDP in 1995, 
which,  because  of the  seemingly 
small impact on unemployment, has 
led the present Government to divert 
the resources involved into plans for 
creating 700 thousand jobs for young 
people at the SMIC rate of  pay. At the 
same time, it has announced plans to 
repeal  the  cut  in  social  charges  to 
employers  reducing  working  time 
and  taking  on  new  workers  (  40% 
initially for  those reducing average 
hours worked by  1  0%  and 50% for 
those reducing them by 15%) and to 
replace the scheme with a general cut 
in working hours from 39 to 35 hours 
a week. 
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remarks: the scope 
of social protection 
and targeting 
As  indicated in  the  above analysis, 
the  focus  of most of the  recent 
changes in systems of social protec-
tion across the Union has been on the 
twin  aims  of containing  costs  and 
reducing  dependency  by  getting 
people into work. The latter objective 
has been emphasised in recent Com-
mission declarations, particularly in 
the Communication on Modernising 
and Improving Social Protection in 
the  European  Union  and  was  re-
cently taken up  at the Luxembourg 
Job Summit, where Member States 
reaffirmed the importance of  moving 
from  passive  measures  of income 
support to active policies for improv-
ing employability. 
In Southern Member States, this has 
gone  along  with  efforts  to  rectify 
gaps  in  the  protection provided,  to 
balance  the  provision  of support 
more equitably and to move closer to 
Northern  European  social  welfare 
standards.  At the  same  time,  in 
Northern Member States, the univer-
sal  systems  established  have  come 
under increasing scrutiny, prompted 
by  cost  and  dependency  consider-
ations.  Debate has  centred on both 
the scope of  social protection, and the 
role of government within this, and, 
with  tightening  budget  constraints, 
on the way that available finance is 
allocated  between functions  and 
people. 
So far, in general, the consensus on 
the  desirability  of maintaining  the 
universal nature of social protection 
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accessible to all has held firm. Never-
theless, there is evidence of a shift in 
responsibility  from  the  state  to  the 
individual in certain areas, which in 
some degree goes along with the aim 
of reducing dependency, and accom-
panying  this,  a  shift  from  state  to 
private  sector  provision.  Examples 
are the effective privatisation of  sick-
ness  and  invalidity  benefits  in  the 
Netherlands  and the  growth of pri-
vate  pensions  in  the  UK.  In  both 
cases, a primary aim was to reduce 
public expenditure, or the liability of 
the state for future spending, though 
in  each case government has main-
tained  responsibility  for  managing 
the system and for acting as provider 
of last resort for those not adequately 
protected.  Another  example  is  the 
contracting out of certain social ser-
vices, such as cleaning for the elderly 
and nurseries, in Denmark, a country 
where the notion of public provision 
of welfare services is deeply entren-
ched. 
Privatisation, however, in the sense 
of the private, profit-making, sector 
being  involved  in  providing  social 
protection has not developed very far 
in most countries, and there is  little 
sign, outside of the provision of sup-
plementary pensions, that any signi-
ficant  growth  is  likely  in  the 
foreseeable  future.  Much  the  same 
can be said of  targeting, at least in the 
sense  of means-testing.  Outside  of 
Ireland,  the  UK and Spain,  means-
tested  social  transfers  account  for 
only a very small part of  the total paid 
and  in  most countries have  not in-
creased significantly in relative terms 
(see Chapter 3, though the data avail-
able extend only to 1995). 
There are, however, exceptions, such 
as  the  greater  reliance  on  means-
testing for pensions in Greece with 
the reduction in the real value of old-
age  pensions, the  linking of family 
benefits to income in Greece and Por-
tugal, or the introduction of  a guaran-
teed minimum level of income for all 
in the latter, though this represents an 
addition to expenditure rather than a 
shift in the type of support given. In 
addition,  in  some  countries,  Ger-
many in particular, the prevalence of 
means-testing  has  increased  in  the 
recent past as  a result of economic 
developments, in the form especially 
of a growth in long-term unemploy-
ment,  rather  than  because  of any 
change in philosophy concerning the 
provision of support. 
This  lack of change may reflect in 
part  a  recognition  of the  problems 
associated  with  means-testing, 
which relate to the difficulties of en-
suring that all those who need sup-
port  actually  receive  it  and  the 
disincentive  effects  on  work  effort 
and job search  associated  with  the 
withdrawal of benefits as income in-
creases. Although such effects can be 
moderated, in the first case, by pro-
viding  sufficient  information about 
the  scheme  and  helping  people  to 
claim  the  benefits  for  which  they 
qualify and, in the second, by reduc-
ing  support  gradually  rather  than 
abruptly,  such  measures  can  add 
substantially to costs. 
Targeting, however, does not necess-
arily imply means-testing. In Ireland, 
for example, the  concern to  reduce 
poverty has focused on children since 
these are regarded as a prime source 
of the problem. More generally, tar-
geting has been associated with re-
ducing social transfers made to those 
on  higher  incomes  rather  than  re-
stricting  them  to  those  on low  in-comes. This has been achieved both 
through  setting  a  ceiling  on  the 
amount  of support  receivable  and 
through taxing benefits and/or mak-
ing  them subject to  social contribu-
tions.  The latter serves not only  to 
redistribute the net gain from trans-
fers from those towards the top of the 
income scale to  those further down 
but also to spread the cost of financ-
ing more widely, an increasingly jus-
tifiable  aim  given  the  growth  m 
wealth of many pensioners. 
Moreover, taxing benefits, or rather 
including  them  in  the  income  on 
which tax liability is  assessed, does 
not necessarily give rise to the same 
disincentive effects as means-testing. 
So long as  it is  associated with the 
integration  of tax  and  benefit  sys-
tems, it opens the way for the design 
of a coherent schedule of deduction 
rates  which ensures that the system 
as  a  whole operates as  intended as 
regards incentives to look for work or 
to  seek  to  better  personal  circum-
stances. The desire to move towards 
such an integrated system is  a com-
mon feature of the debate on the re-
form  of social  protection  systems 
which is now being conducted across 
the Union.  At the same time,  how-
ever, the administrative costs of in-
cluding everyone within the ambit of 
the  tax  system represents  a  signifi-
cant obstacle. 
-59--60-Chapter 3  The scale of social protection 
and its effect on income 
T
his  chapter  is  concerned  with 
quantifying the scale of expendi-
ture on social protection in the Union, 
its growth over time and its effect on 
household income.  It  is  divided into 
two  parts.  The  first  part  examines 
trends in social spending and the way 
in which it is fmanced and is based on 
data from the revised ESSPROS (Eu-
ropean  System  of Social  Protection 
Statistics), covering, in particular, the 
period from 1990 to 1995. The second 
part analyses social transfers  in  rela-
tion to household income and focuses, 
in particular, on their effectiveness in 
providing  income  support to  house-
holds with  little or no earnings from 
employment and other sources. This is 
based on data which have only recent! y 
become available from the new Euro-
pean  Community  Household  Panel. 
Whereas  the  first  part,  therefore,  is 
based  on  expenditure  data from  ad-
ministrative  sources  in  the  Member 
States, the second part uses  informa-
tion  from  the  recipients  of social 
benefits themselves, which is the only 
real  basis  for assessing the  extent of 
protection provided by the systems in 
different countries. 
Part 1 Trends in social expenditure and its financing 
E
xpenditure on social protection 
is a major part of  public spending 
in  all  Member States of the Union. 
In  199  5,  according  to  the  new 
ESSPROS  system  of accounts,  it 
amounted to around 28'/2% of GOP 
in the Union as  a whole, equivalent 
to an average of some 4,800 ECU for 
every  person  living  there.  Around 
70%  of this  expenditure,  however, 
consists of  transfers rather than direct 
spending on goods and services (the 
latter mainly comprising expenditure 
on health care) and is, therefore, not 
a component of GOP as such but an 
element in the way that the income 
generated  by  economic  output  is 
used. In other words, just under 20% 
of income  in  the  Union  is  redis-
tributed in order to provide support to 
those who are retired,  unemployed, 
in ill-health or disabled, have child-
ren or have inadequate means of sup-
port from other sources. 
How far such income is redistributed 
from  the  wealthier members of so-
ciety to the poorer members as  op-
posed to  being transferred between 
those with similar levels of income, 
or even  from  the  less  to  the  more 
wealthy, is an issue examined in the 
second part of  this chapter. In the first 
part, the scale of expenditure on so-
cial protection in different parts of  the 
Union is examined as well as its com-
position, the way that it has changed 
over time and the relative importance 
of  the different means of  financing it. 
One major qualification of the ana-
lysis needs to be made at the outset. 
Specifically, the data which are ana-
lysed in the first part relate largely to 
expenditure  on  social  protection, 
measured  as  gross  transfers  from 
government  to  individuals.  They, 
therefore,  leave out of account two 
elements  which  are  potentially  im-
portant and which are liable to distort 
comparisons  between  Member 
States of  the cost imposed by systems 
of social protection. The first are the 
taxes and social charges imposed on 
transfers  in  a  number of countries, 
which reduce both the net income of 
recipients and the net cost to govern-
ment  insofar as  the  revenue  which 
they yield is available to help finance 
expenditure. The second is  the pro-
tection  provided  through  tax  con-
cessions and allowances rather than 
direct transfers which  reduces gov-
ernment revenue rather than increas-
ing spending, though which in terms 
of  the support provided and the effect 
-61-on the need for finance may be ident-
ical. The first element means that the 
gross  expenditure  figures  reported 
here overstate the cost of social pro-
tection and the extent of redistribu-
tion in a number of countries, as well 
as  at  the  Union  level  The  second 
means  that  both  tend  to  be  under-
stated. 
The scale of social 
expenditure 
T
he average level of spending on 
social  protection  across  the 
Union conceals marked differences 
between Member States. In terms of 
a  comparable  unit  of measurement 
- purchasing  power  standards 
(PPS),  which  take  account  of dif-
ferences in price levels as well as in 
exchange rates between countries -
expenditure  in  1995  ranged  from 
under 2,500 PPS in Greece and Por-
tugal  and  just under  3,000 PPS  in 
Spain and just over in Ireland to over 
6,000 PPS in Denmark and Sweden 
and over 7,500 PPS in Luxembourg 
(Graph  18).  In  between  these  ex-
tremes, spending in Italy and the UK 
was just below average and in Fin-
land just above, while in the other 5 
Member  States,  it  was  relatively 
similar at between 5,500 and 5,800 
PPS.  (Social  protection  is  here 
defined as in the ESSPROS core sys-
tem  and  covers the  range of social 
benefits  conventionally  included  in 
the term- see Notes and sources at 
the back of this Report.) 
In relation to GDP, the variation be-
tween  Member States  was  slightly 
narrower, ranging from 20% in Ire-
land and 21-22% in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain to just over 34% in Den-
mark and around 351 /2%  in  Sweden 
(Graph 19). This pattern of variation 
is broadly in line with relative levels 
of prosperity, as  measured by  GDP 
per head, which is generally higher in 
the  countries where expenditure on 
social  protection  is  comparatively 
high relative to GDP (such as  Den-
mark or the Netherlands) and lower 
in the countries where it is less (such 
as  Greece  and  Portugal).  In  other 
words,  there  is  some  tendency  for 
countries  to  spend  more  on  social 
protection- or, more accurately, to 
redistribute a higher proportion of  in-
come in the form of social transfers 
- as  they  become  wealthier  and 
more able to finance it. 
This  tendency,  however,  is  by  no 
means systematic and it is clear that 
there are other factors influencing ex-
penditure on social protection across 
the Union in addition to the level of 
income, quite apart from differences 
in  the  demands  imposed  on  social 
welfare  systems  arising  from  vari-
ations in  the age composition of the 
population and levels of unemploy-
ment,  for  example,  as  indicated  in 
Chapter 1. In particular, it is evident 
that  social  expenditure is  higher in 
the three Nordic countries, especially 
in Finland and Sweden, than in other 
Member States with similar levels of 
prosperity (such as the UK in the case 
of Finland and Sweden) and lower in 
Italy (which has a level of GDP per 
head  only  slightly  lower  than  the 
Netherlands or France) and Ireland. 
In the Nordic countries, a large part 
of the difference lies  in greater ex-
penditure on benefits in kind rather 
than cash transfers (which amounted 
18  Social protection expenditure and GDP per head 
in Member States, 1995 
19  Social protection expenditure in relation to GDP 
in Member States, 1990, 1993 and 1995 
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0 to  almost 14%  of GDP in Sweden, 
just over  11%  in  Denmark  almost 
10%  in  Finland,  well  above  the 
Union  average  - 8%  - in  each 
case),  which,  in  tum,  reflects  the 
more extensive nature of social ser-
vices in these three countries than in 
the rest of the Union. In Italy, on the 
other hand,  less  expenditure  than 
elsewhere goes  on benefits  in kind 
(only 5
1/z% ofGDP), partly reflecting 
the fact that the activities performed 
by social services in the Nordic coun-
tries tend to be carried out within the 
family, which is also the case in Ire-
land  as  well  as  in  other  Southern 
Member States. These differences, in 
tum, reflect the differences (as noted 
in Chapter 1) in both the structure of 
households-in particular, the much 
larger  proportion  of people  living 
alone in the Nordic countries than in 
Italy or Ireland-and in the relative 
numbers of women in employment, 
which are still comparatively low in 
the latter two countries. 
The  differences  in  levels  of social 
expenditure,  however,  also  arise 
from differential rates of  taxation and 
social  charges  levied  on  transfers, 
which, as  noted at the outset, mean 
that the figures for gross expenditure 
described above are liable to  give a 
misleading impression of  the relative 
cost of social protection across  the 
Union.  Tax  and  social  charges  on 
transfers tend, in practice, to be rela-
tively  high  in  the  countries  where 
expenditure is highest, specifically in 
the  three  Nordic  countries  and  the 
Netherlands, where they are used as 
a means of reducing the benefit from 
transfers  going  to  wealthier house-
holds and, therefore, of  targeting sup-
port  on  those  most  in  need,  and 
relatively  low  or  zero  in  countries 
where it is lowest. Accordingly, it is 
safe to conclude that differences be-
tween Member States in the level of 
spending  measured  net  of such 
charges are less than in gross expen-
diture. 
Estimating the  scale of the revenue 
involved and the extent to which net 
government spending is correspond-
ingly reduced in the Member States 
in which charges are levied on social 
transfers  is,  however,  fraught  with 
difficulty  and  inevitably  subject  to 
some  uncertainty.  Estimates  pro-
duced in a recent OECD study ('Net 
public  social  expenditure',  OECD, 
Labour Market and Social  Policy 
Occasional Papers, No.l9) put the 
revenue yielded by direct taxes and 
social contributions on benefits at al-
most 6% of GDP in the Netherlands, 
over 5% in Sweden, 4% in Denmark 
and 2
1/z% in Germany, whereas in the 
UK,  the  figure  was  virtually  zero. 
Taking account also of the revenue 
from  indirect taxes  as  beneficiaries 
spend  their  transfers  - which  is 
more  similar between countries -
would reduce expenditure on social 
protection in net terms to around 27% 
of GDP in Sweden in  1995  and to 
between 23% and 25
1/z% of GDP in 
the other four countries (if the OECD 
estimates of revenue yielded by so-
cial  transfers  are  applied  to  the 
ESSPROS  data  on  gross  expendi-
ture). The difference between these 
countries is, therefore, narrowed sig-
nificantly. 
Moreover, measuring spending in net 
terms  also  affects  the  ranking  of 
countries as  regards expenditure on 
social protection.  For example,  the 
cost of the system in the UK in these 
terms  seems  to  have  been  slightly 
higher in 1995 relative to GDP than 
in  Germany  or the  Netherlands, 
whereas in gross terms it was lower. 
Unfortunately, the OECD estimates 
relate only to the five Member States 
listed  above  and  then  solely  for  a 
single year. The latter is particularly 
unfortunate since it would seem from 
policy  developments  across  the 
Union that charges imposed on social 
benefit recipients have tended to in-
crease in recent years, in part to curb 
costs, in part to distribute the cost of 
financing  systems  more  evenly 
across  society.  This  means that the 
changes  in  expenditure  examined 
below are likely in certain countries 
to overstate the changes in net terms 
which  have  occurred  and,  accord-
ingly, to exaggerate the financing im-
plications.  Until further  research  is 
carried out to produce a complete set 
of  estimates for net expenditure in all 
Union countries, for at least the most 
recent years, the extent of exaggera-
tion, however, will remain unknown. 
(In this regard, it should be noted that 
it is the intention of Eurostat to  de-
velop  a  special module to  take ex-
plicit account of the effects of taxes 
and  other  charges  as  part  of the 
ESSPROS system.) 
A further insight into the relative im-
portance of social transfers in differ-
ent  Member  States  can  be  gained 
from  the  European  Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) data which 
are analysed in Part 2 of the chapter 
and  which  show  some  differences 
from the figures on expenditure. 
The other potential source of distor-
tion is the exclusion from the analysis 
of tax  concessions, allowances  and 
rebates which serve a similar func-
tion to transfers in redistributing in-
come  towards  particular groups 
-63-considered to merit support, such as 
families with children or people tak-
ing  out private  pensions  or private 
medical insurance.  (Relief from so-
cial  contributions  is  also  excluded, 
though this is generally used to en-
courage employers to take on people 
who have difficulty in finding work 
and so is part of active labour market 
measures rather than  social  protec-
tion  as  defined  here.)  Like  the 
revenue  collected  from  social 
benefits, the value of these so-called 
tax expenditures is difficult to assess 
- as  well as  sometimes being hard 
to  define - and,  though  estimates 
are made in a number of countries of 
the  budgetary  implications  of par-
ticular measures when they are intro-
duced, no complete and coherent set 
of estimates is available for Member 
States. At the same time, the indica-
tions are that the amounts involved in 
most countries tend to be relatively 
small-though there are exceptions, 
such as in the UK where tax relief on 
private pension contributions is  im-
portant and ought to be included in 
the overall cost of pension provision 
-and  do not appear to be systemati-
cally  related  to  the  level  of direct 
expenditure on social protection. Ac-
cordingly, their inclusion might not 
change the conclusions reached from 
the  expenditure  figures  too  much 
(though inevitably there is some un-
certainty about this). 
The pattern of 
social expenditure 
T
here  is  some  variation  in  the 
composition of expenditure on 
social  protection  across  the  Union, 
which partly reflects differing needs, 
such  as  differential rates  of unem-
-64-
ployment  or  vanatwns  in  the  age 
structure of  the population, partly dif-
fering  priorities  and  partly  dif-
ferences  in  the  organisation of the 
system or differing ways of provid-
ing support (such as to those out of 
work).  There  are,  however,  broad 
similarities  between most countries 
as  well  as  distinct  differences.  (It 
should  be  emphasised that,  though 
the  data  broadly  conform  to  the 
ESSPROS  system of classification, 
there are divergences from this in a 
number of cases;  these are listed in 
Notes and sources at the back of this 
Report and should be borne in mind 
when  interpreting  the  figures 
presented here. Moreover, no data on 
the structure of expenditire are as yet 
available for Greece.) 
In all Member States, except Ireland, 
old-age pensions (including survivors' 
benefits) are by some way the largest 
item of social protection expenditure, 
accounting for42'/2% of  the total in the 
Union as a whole in 1995, equivalent 
to  12%  of GDP  (Table  1).  In  most 
countries, the share of  pensions was in 
the range of 35 to 45%, with only two 
countries,  Finland  (32%)  as  well  as 
Ireland  (25%)  having a share below 
this and only one country, Italy, having 
a share much above. Indeed, in Italy, 
pensions  represented almost 63%  of 
total social spending, or 15% ofGDP, 
substantially higher than in any other 
country, though part of this  is  due to 
the allocation of some transfers to this 
category  which  in  other  Member 
States  are  included elsewhere  (early 
retirement pensions,  for  example -
see Notes and sources). The high fig-
ure,  however,  also  reflects  the  large 
proportion of  the population above the 
official retirement age (62 for men, 57 
for  women)  as  well  as  the  relatively 
large numbers below this age who are 
retired (  40% of  men in the 55 to 59 age 
group were not part of  the labour force 
in  1996 and 20% of those aged 50 to 
54; see Chapter 6 below). By contrast, 
in  Ireland,  the  proportion  of older 
people was much less than anywhere 
else in the Union (11'/2%  were 65  or 
over in 1995 as opposed to  16'/2% in 
Italy). 
The second largest item of expendi-
ture in the Union is health care, ac-
counting for 22% of the total in 1995 
(some 6% of GDP), so that with old-
age  pensions,  it  represents  almost 
two-thirds  of the  social  protection 
budget. Since a large part of health 
care goes to older people, support for 
the elderly in various forms underlies 
much of the effort devoted to social 
protection in the Union. Only in the 
three Nordic countries did health care 
account  for  a  significantly  lower 
share of spending than 20%, though 
of these only in Denmark (where it 
was lowest of all at only 14% of the 
total)  was  expenditure  markedly 
below the Union average in relation 
to  GDP  (under  5% ).  At  the  same 
time, only in Ireland was the share of 
spending on health care significantly 
higher  than  the  Union  average 
(around 28'/2% of the total), but this 
reflects a low level of overall spend-
ing rather than high expenditure on 
health  (which  was  slightly  below 
average in relation to GDP). 
Spending on income transfers to the 
unemployed, which is often regarded 
as  a primary cause of high levels of 
social spending, in practice, accounts 
for only a minor part of spending in 
all  Member States.  In  1995,  it  ab-
sorbed  only  8%  of the  total  social 
protection  budget  in  the  Union 
(under 2'/2%  of GDP), the  same as 
disability  benefits  and  only  a  little Table 1 - Division of current expenditure on social protection by function, 1995 
B  OK  D  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL 
% total expenditure 
Sickness  4.6  3.5  6.9  5.5  3.0  5.6  0.9  2.9  7.1 
Health  19.6  13.8  22.9  23.7  24.4  28.3  19.6  20.6  20.4 
Disability  6.1  10.3  6.7  7.5  5.6  4.5  6.9  12.7  14.7 
Old-age and survivors  39.8  36.6  40.8  44.1  40.7  24.9  62.7  43.2  35.5 
Family and children  7.7  12.0  7.2  1.8  8.5  11.2  3.4  12.8  4.4 
Unemployment  13.4  14.3  8.8  13.9  7.8  16.6  2.1  2.9  9.6 
Housing  0.0  2.4  0.6  0.4  3.0  2.9  0.0  0.2  1.0 
Social exclusion  2.5  4.3  2.1  0.4  1.6  1.8  0.0  1.4  2.2 
Administration  4.5  2.8  3.7  2.5  3.8  4.1  3.1  2.8  3.8 
Other  1.8  0.0  0.2  0.3  1.5  0.1  1.5  0.6  1.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
%GOP 
Sickness  1.4  1.2  2.0  1.2  0.9  1  .1  0.2  0.7  2.2 
Health  5.8  4.8  6.7  5.2  7.5  5.6  4.8  5.2  6.4 
Disability  1.8  3.5  2.0  1.6  1.7  0.9  1.7  3.2  4.7 
Old-age and survivors  11.8  12.6  12.0  9.6  12.5  5.0  15.4  10.9  11.2 
Family and children  2.3  4.1  2.1  0.4  2.6  2.2  0.8  3.2  1.4 
Unemployment  4.0  4.9  2.6  3.0  2.4  3.3  0.5  0.7  3.0 
Housing  0.0  0.8  0.2  0.1  0.9  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.3 
Social exclusion  0.7  1.5  0.6  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.7 
Administration  1.3  1.0  1.1  0.6  1.2  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.2 
Other  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.4 
Total  29.7  34.3  29.4  21.8  30.6  19.9  24.6  25.3  31.6 
Note: E14 excludes GR for which there is no breakdown by function 
more than family  allowances. Only 
in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland, 
Sweden and Ireland did expenditure 
on unemployment benefits  account 
for  significantly more than  10%  of 
the total and only in the first four of 
these did  it amount to  much above 
3%  of GDP  (4-5%  in  each  case). 
Moreover,  of these  four  countries, 
only Finland had an unemployment 
rate above the Union average (over 
16% as against just under 11% ), the 
high spending in the other three being 
the  result  of relatively  generous 
benefits levels combined with high 
rates of coverage (see Chapter 4). 
As also mentioned above, however, 
spending on unemployment benefits 
as  such covers only  part of overall 
social  expenditure  on  those  out  of 
work, which also, in practice, comes 
from  disability  benefits,  housing 
allowances and social exclusion, as 
well  as  early  retirement  pensions 
(which,  in  principle,  are  included 
under unemployment benefits in the 
ESSPROS classification, but which 
are not separately distinguished from 
old-age pensions in some countries). 
In the  Netherlands  and  the  UK,  in 
particular, as noted in Chapter 2 and 
elaborated  in  Chapter  4,  disability 
benefits in the  1970s and 1980s be-
came a means of  providing long-term 
support to those unable to find a job, 
especially  older  workers,  and, 
though  the  systems  have  been  re-
formed of late, in 1995 they still ac-
counted for a much higher share of 
social  expenditure  than  unemploy-
ment  benefits  (50%  higher  in  the 
Netherlands, almost twice as high in 
the UK). 
A  p  FIN  s  UK  E14 
3.9  2.9  4.0  4.9  3.7  4.6 
20.9  26.3  16.7  16.5  21.2  21.8 
7.5  10.7  14.4  12.1  11.4  8.0 
46.7  38.6  31.8  36.6  38.0  42.4 
11.0  5.1  12.9  11.2  8.7  7.3 
5.4  4.9  13.9  11.0  5.7  8.1 
0.3  0.0  1.5  3.4  6.8  1.9 
1.1  0.4  2.0  3.0  1.0  1.6 
2.0  4.8  2.8  1.4  3.5  3.4 
1.3  6.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1.2  0.6  1.3  1.7  1.0  1.3 
6.2  5.4  5.5  5.9  5.8  6.2 
2.2  2.2  4.7  4.3  3.1  2.3 
13.9  8.0  10.4  13.0  10.4  12.1 
3.3  1.1  4.2  4.0  2.4  2.1 
1.6  1.0  4.6  3.9  1.5  2.3 
0.1  0.0  0.5  1.2  1.9  0.6 
0.3  0.1  0.7  1.1  0.3  0.5 
0.6  1.0  0.9  0.5  1.0  1.0 
0.4  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
29.7  20.7  32.8  35.6  27.3  28.5 
Nevertheless,  in  relation  to  GDP, 
spending on disability benefits was 
equally  high  in  the  three  Nordic 
countries - 3
1/2%  of GDP in Den-
mark,  around 4
1/2%  in Finland and 
Sweden - where  unemployment 
benefits were also higher than else-
where. In these cases, this partly re-
flects  the  larger expenditure  on 
benefits in kind than elsewhere-on 
the  provision  of social  services -
which was 3--4 times more than the 
Union average. This is also the case 
as regards family benefits, on which 
expenditure  in  the  these  Member 
States was twice as  high relative to 
GDP than  in the  rest of the  Union 
(around 4% in each case, with only 
Austria of the other Member States 
having a figure of over 3%) and for 
which  benefits  in  kind  represented 
around half of total spending in Den-
-65-Table 2 - Growth of expenditure on social protection, 1990-95 
% change per year 
B  OK  WG  D  GR  E  F  IRL  L  NL  A  P  FIN  S  UK  E13 
Total expenditure on social protection 
Expenditure in real terms (ie adjusted by GOP deflator) 
1990-93  3.5  5.6  2.9  4.2  na  6.4  4.0 
1.8 
6.5  2.8  8.9  2.8  4.5  11.9  7.3  na  7.6  4.6 
1993-95 
1990-95 
3.5  0.5  2.8  2.9  3.4  -1.4  7.0  -0.2  4.2  -0.5  3.6  2.1  0.7  -0.5  2.0  1.6 
3.5  4.5  2.9  3.7  na  3.2  3.1  6.7  1.6  7.0  1.5  4.1  7.9  4.6  na  5.3  3.4 
Change in relative prices (consumer prices relative to GOP deflator) 
1990-93  -0.8  0.1  -0.1  0.0  na  -0.6  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  1.1  0.9  0.0  -0.7  1.3  na  -0.9  -0.2 
1993-95  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.2  1.7  0.4  -1.1  0.4  0.2  -0.7  -0.8  -0.7  0.7  0.2 
1990-95  -0.5  0.1  0.1  0.0  na  -0.3  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.7  0.1  -0.7  0.4  na  -0.3  0.0 
Expenditure in purchasing power terms (ie adjusted by consumer prices) 
1990-93  4.4  5.5  2.9  4.2  na  7.1  4.1  6.7  3.0  7.7  1.9 
1993-95  3.6  0.5  2.6  2.8  3.0  -1 .6  1.6  5.2  -0.5  5.3  -0.9 
1990-95  4.1  4.5  2.8  3. 7  na  3.5  3.1  6.1  1.6  6.8  0.8 
Expenditure, excluding unemployment benefits 
Expenditure in real terms (ie adjusted by GOP deflator) 
1990-93  3.3  5.3  2.6  3.8  na  5.1  3.7  5.6  2.6  8.9  2.5 
1993-95  3.7  2.4  3  3.7  na  1.3  2.3  6.7  -0.1  4.0  -0.9 
1990-95  3.5  4.7  2.8  3.7  na  3.6  3.1  6.0  1.5  6.9  1.1 
Change in relative prices (consumer prices relative to GOP deflator) 
1990-93  -0.8  0.1  -0.1  0.0  na  -0.6  -0.1  -0.2 
1993-95 
1990-95 
0.0  0.1 
-0.5  0.1 
0.2  0.1  na  0.2  0.2  1.7 




Expenditure in purchasing power terms (ie adjusted by consumer prices) 






1990-93  4.2  5.2  2.7  3.8  na  5.7  3.7  5.7  2.8  7.7  1.6 
1993-95  3. 7  2.3  2.8  3.6  na  1.1  2.1  4.9  -0.5  5.2  -1.3 
1990-95  4.0  4.6  2. 7  3. 7  na  3.8  3.1  5.4  1.5  6.7  0.4 
Note: OK 1990-94 and 1994-95; GR,  S no data before 1993; E13 excludes GRandS 
mark and Sweden and over a third in 
Finland. 
For the rest, expenditure on sickness 
benefits was around 1%  of GDP or 
less in all countries except Sweden, 
where it was 11 /2%, and Germany and 
the Netherlands, where it was 2%, as 
was spending on housing in all coun-
tries  except the  UK  (2%  of GDP), 
reflecting  its  importance as  an  ele-
ment in means-testing and the target-
ing of  benefits on those in need (those 
receiving social transfers having all 
-66-
or part of their housing costs paid if 
household income falls below a mini-
mum level). Spending on social ex-
clusion  was  also  relatively  low  in 
most countries, zero or close to zero 
in the Southern Member States and 
only over 1%  of GDP in  Denmark 
and Sweden- though in this case 
there may be classification problems, 
insofar  as  expenditure  on  ensuring 
that nobody' s standard of living falls 
below a minimum level can poten-
tially be met through other elements. 
4.4  12.7 
3.4  2.9 
4.0  8.7 
4.1  11.1 
3.6  1.9 







4.1  11.9 
3.5  2.6 










3.5  na  7.0 
1.7  -0.2  2.7 













na  8.0 
0.5  2.0 













Finally,  administrative  costs  ac-
counted for 5% or less of total social 
spending in 1995 in all countries (  1% 
of GDP or less). 
Growth of social 
expenditure 
T
otal spending on social protec-
tion  in  the  Union,  taking  the 
ESSPROS definition of  gross expen-
diture,  increased  from  just under 26% of GDP to 28
1/2%  over the five 
years  1990 to  1995.  This compares 
with a rise of  around 1% of  GDP over 
the  1980s  (on  the  previous  ES-
SPROS  system  of classification). 
The  increase  was  common  to  all 
Member States, with the sole excep-
tion of the Netherlands where there 
was a small fall. (As noted above, the 
change in net terms is likely to have 
been less.) 
The rise,  however, was confined to 
the period 1990 to 1993, the years of 
recession when there was very little 
growth at all  in  GDP in  real  terms 
(growth  averaged  only 
1/2%  a  year 
over these  three  years).  All  of the 
Member States showed an  increase 
over  this  period  (leaving  aside 
Greece  and  Sweden  for  which  no 
data  are  available),  especially  Fin-
land and the UK, where the recession 
was  associated  with  a  decline  in 
GDP, though also Portugal, where, as 
noted below, spending rose particu-
larly sharply. 
In the two years 1993 to  1995, after 
the recession came to an end (growth 
averaging 2
1/2% a year), expenditure 
on social protection in the Union de-
clined slightly relative  to  GDP (by 
almost 
1/2  percentage point).  It rose 
only in  Belgium, Germany, Greece 
and Austria, falling in all other Mem-
ber States. The fall was particularly 
marked  in  the  Netherlands  (2  per-
centage points) and Sweden (3  per-
centage points),  where  the  level  of 
spending was among the highest in 
the Union, though it was also signifi-
cant  in  Spain  and  Italy,  where  the 
level was comparatively low. 
The increase in the underlying rate of 
GDP growth, however, was not the 
only reason for the difference in ex-
perience during the two parts of the 
period. Just as importantly, expendi-
ture on social protection increased by 
considerably less in the last two years 
of the period than in the first three 
(indeed, expenditure would still have 
risen  significantly  relative  to  GDP 
across the Union between 1990 and 
1993 even if GDP growth had been 
the same in the two sub-periods). In 
the three years 1990 to 1993, the real 
value of social  spending to  benefi-
ciaries (ie adjusting for the increase 
in consumer prices) rose by an aver-
age of  almost 5% a year in the Union, 
whereas in the subsequent two years, 
it  went  up  by  only  l
1/2%  a  year 
(Graph 20). 
The decline in real growth was espe-
cially marked in Spain, Portugal and 
the UK, where growth between 1990 
and  1993  had  been  higher  than  in 
other Member States, at over 6%  a 
year (over 12%  in Portugal, though 
there are doubts about the figures)-
a rate also reached in Ireland, where 
GDP increased by  much more than 
elsewhere (by 3
1/2%  a year). Indeed 
in Spain, as  well as  in Italy and the 
Netherlands, the real value of expen-
diture  declined  over the  two  years 
1993 to  1995, while in Sweden (for 
which no comparable data exist for 
the earlier period),  it remained vir-
tually  unchanged  (though  it  fell  in 
terms of GDP prices as a whole in-
stead of  consumer prices, while in the 
former three countries, the fall  was 
less  in  terms  of GDP  prices~  see 
Table 2). 
To  some  extent,  this  slowdown  in 
expenditure growth is a consequence 
of the stabilisation of unemployment 
in 1994 and 199 5 after the large rise 
which occurred during the recession 
years.  Excluding  unemployment 
benefits from the calculation reduces 
the  difference  in  growth  rates  be-
tween the two sub-periods by around 
1%  a  year  on  average  (reducing 
growth in the first period by 
1
/2% a 
year and increasing it in the second 
by a similar amount). The reduction, 
however, was much more in Spain, 
where the number unemployed rose 
by over 40% between 1990 and 1993 
and  remained  constant  in  the  sub-
sequent two  years,  and  in  Finland, 
where the number unemployed went 
up  by  almost  5-fold  in  the  earlier 
period. In Spain, social spending ex-
cluding unemployment benefits rose 
by  1%  a year in real terms between 
1993 and 1995 instead of falling by 
1
1/2% and in Finland, it rose by 2% a 
year in the earlier period instead of 
by 6% and by 2
1/z% a year after 1993 
instead  of by  1
1/z%.  For the  latter 
country, therefore, the relative rates 
of spending  growth  are  reversed if 
unemployment  benefits  are  ex-
cluded. 
Nevertheless,  for  most  Member 
States,  the  effect  on  the  pattern  of 
social  expenditure  growth  of dif-
ferential  changes in  unemployment 
seems to be relatively small. This is 
largely  because  unemployment 
benefits per se represent a compara-
tively small element of spending on 
social protection, as noted above. On 
the other hand, there are other means 
of providing income support to  the 
unemployed,  as  also  noted  above, 
and any full assessment of the impli-
cations of large numbers out of work 
for social spending has also to  take 
account  of these  (in  addition,  of 
course,  to  the effects on finance of 
high unemployment). 
Apart from unemployment benefits, 
old  age  pensions  and  health  care 
-67-shpwed  the  largest  rise  over  the 
period (up by 1% of Union GDP and 
1
/ 2% respectively), in part reflecting 
thr  ageing of the population, though 
in the case of health care, spending 
fe 1 relative to GDP in a number of 
countries between 1993 and 1995. 
Means-testing 
A
lthough  attempts  have  been 
made in most Member States to 
target social protection on those most 
in need,  benefits subject to  means-
testing,  one  of the  main  ways  of 
achieving this, still account for only 
a small proportion of  spending across 
the Union. In  1995, they accounted 
for  11%  of total  expenditure  on 
benefits in the Union, just under half 
of this comprising benefits in  kind, 
especially in the form of assistance 
with housing and support for families 
with children, which together repre-
sented  over  two-thirds  of this  ele-
ment. 
The scale of  means-testing, however, 
varies significantly between Member 
States. It is most important in Ireland, 
where it accounted for 34% of  overall 
spending on social benefits in 1995, 
and the  UK,  where  it  amounted to 
almost 23% of the total (Graph 21). 
In the rest of the Union, apart from 
Spain (and conceivably Greece, for 
which  there  are  no data),  where  it 
accounted for 131 /2%  of the total, it 
represented less than 10% of overall 
spending  in  each  Member  State, 
though  only marginally  so  in  Ger-
many and France. 
There is  also some difference in the 
division of means-tested benefits be-
tween cash transfers and benefits in 
kind.  In  Ireland  and  Spain,  three-
quarters of the spending was on the 
former, in the UK, more than half on 
the  latter - indeed,  cash benefits 
subject to  means-testing  accounted 
for as much of  total transfers in Spain 
as in the UK. The significance of this 
distinction, however, is  in some de-
gree open to question, since in some 
countries,  means-tested  transfers 
might be set at a level to cover rent, 
for example, whereas in others it is 
covered directly. 
The  importance of means-testing, 
though relatively modest overall, is, 
nevertheless,  tending  to  increase, 
though this is as much due to changes 
in underlying circumstances-in the 
rise in long-term unemployment, for 
example-as to changes in policy as 
such.  In  most  Member  States,  its 
share in total spending went up be-
tween  1990 and  199  5,  the  Nether-
lands, being the only country where 
the share declined. The rise was par-
ticularly  marked  in  Finland  (from 
t/2% to 61 /2%) and the UK (from just 
under 20% to just under 23%). 
Indeed,  means-testing  now  affects 
most broad areas of social protection 
in most countries, if only to a small 
extent.  In  the  case of housing  and 
social  exclusion,  most  expenditure 
- all in  the case of housing - was 
subject to means-testing in  1995  in 
all  countries, though these  together 
accounted  for  under  30%  of total 
means-tested spending in the Union 
(but  three-quarters  in  Sweden) 
(Table 3).  Support for children and 
families accounted for over 20% of 
means-tested spending (this was the 
only element of spending which was 
20  Growth of expenditure on social protection in 
real terms in Member States, 1990-95 
21  Means-tested benefits in relation to total 
expenditure on benefits in Member States, 1990 
and 1995 
10 
Average growth in real terms (relative to 
consumer prices, annual % change) 
0  1990-93 
•  1993-95 
•  I  ~  II  I  .  I 
12.7 
10 
I - I I 
-2  ~-----------------~  -2 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  A  P  FIN  S  UK  EU 
DK 1990-94 and 1994-95, GR, S no data before 1993 
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D Means-tested benefits in  kind 
•  Means-tested cash benefits 
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5 Table 3 - Expenditure on means-tested benefits, 1990 and 1995 
Family  1990 
% spending on family 
% total means-tested spending 
1995 
% spending on family 
% total means-tested spending 
Unemployed  1990 
% spending on unemployed 
%total means-tested spending 
1995 
% spending on unemployed 
%total means-tested spending 
Old-age  1990 
% spending on old-age 
% total means-tested spending 
1995 
% spending on old-age 
% total means-tested spending 
Housing  1990 
% spending on housing 
% total means-tested spending 
1995 
% spending on housing 
%total means-tested spending 
Social exclusion  1990 
% spending on social exclusion 
%total means-tested spending 
1995 
%spending on social exclusion 
% total means-tested spending 
Disability  1990 
%spending on disability 
% total means-tested spending 
1995 
%spending on disability 
% total means-tested spending 
Health care  1990 
%spending on health care 
% total means-tested spending 
1995 
% spending on health care 
% total means-tested spending 
Sickness  1990 
% spending on sickness 
% total means-tested spending 
1995 
% spending on sickness 
% total means-tested spending 
8  OK  0  E  F  IRL  NL  A  P  FIN  S  UK 
0.0  2.0  29.5  14.5  23.8  34.9  36.4  ; 3.3 
0.0  9.;  29.;  ; .9  24.0  ; 2.3  23.5  7.8 
0.0 
0.0 
2.7  37.2  34.7  24.6 
; ; .9  28.2  4.7  23.0 
40.4  46.7 
13.8  22.0 
4.6 
2.8 
; .5  25.3 









O.i  48.9 
0.2  22.4 
O.i  . 55.7 





8.2  27.3 
9.5  31.9 
8.2  68.6  4.4  56.0  ; 9.4  26.3  ; ; .4  0.0  43.7 
0.0  ; 2.7  7.3  31 .0  ; .0  48.6  22.3  9.7  23.4 
0.0  0.0  ; 3.9  27.3  7.5  73.;  3.8  38.5  20.6  24.2  ; 6.4  0.0  48.9 
0.0  0.0  12.7  29.0  6.4  36.9  i.i  50.2  27.8  18.9  37.2  0.0  12.7 
; .4  0.0  2.6  ; ; .7  4.0  26.7  2.9  0.0  2.8  6.8  0.8  3.;  9.2 
; 00.0  0.0  ; 3.7  38.4  ; 8.3  25.4  22.5  0.;  35.;  43.;  9.;  ; 7.2  20.0 
; .0 
100.0 
0.0  2.5  ; ; .  ;  3.;  25.;  2.2 
0.0  10.5  37.2  13.9  19.0  19.7 
0.0  3.1  5.7 
0.;  35.9  35.2 
; . ;  2.6  ; 0.5 
5.6  ; 4.2  ; 8.3 
0.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0 
0.0  90.9  7.9  4.4  30.9  ; ; .0  0.2  1; .5  ; 2.2  0.7  25.3  48.9  30.4 
0.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  100.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  ; 00.0  100.0 
0.0  88.;  6.;  2.9  33.0  8.9  0.2  14.2  7.6  0.4  23.7  49.3  31.; 
0.0  0.0  90.0  97.5  39.0  92.7  0.0  ; 00.0  68.5  78.8  46.5  51.4  100.0 
0.0  0.0  21.3  2.3  5.2  4.7  0.0  29.0  22.0  3.7  29.4  25.8  4.0 
0.0  0.0  95.;  98.4  53.3  98.2  0.0  ; 00.0  67.7  88.;  69.4  65.6  100.0 
0.0  0.0  21 .2  3.;  9.4  5.3  0.0  29.5  ; 9.0  5.2  23.0  29.0  4.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0  24.3 
0.0  ; 8.2 
15.1  21.9  31.5  51.7 







0.0  0.0  25.9  15.7  23.2  32.6  58.2  ; .6  2.5  7.9 
0.0  0.0  ; 8.1  8.9  ; 4.2  4.5  55.9  3.1  4.6  ; 3.3 
0.9 
4.8 
4.9  22.1 
7.9  ; 0.0 
1.6  4.1  ; 9.4 
3.7  7.3  ; 0.2 
0.0  0.0  1 .3  6.7  0.0  ; 2.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.; 
0.0  0.0  3.  7  12.2  0.0  ; ; .2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.;  0.0  0.0  0.2 
0.0  0.0  1.3  7.8  0.0  ; 3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2 
0.0  0.0  3.2  ; 4.1  0.0  ; 1 .6  0.0  0.0  0.0  ; . ;  0.0  0.0  0.; 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  2.5  0.;  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.;  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  ; 0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.8 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  ; .2  0.;  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  ; .2 
Note: GR,  L no breakdown available; S 1993 and 1995 
-69-means-tested  in  Denmark)  and 
around 40% of  such support was sub-
ject to  means-testing  - up  in  all 
countries,  except  the  Netherlands, 
between 1990 and 1995. Unemploy-
ment was a major element of means-
tested  expenditure  in  a  number of 
Member States, being responsible for 
over a third of all such spending in 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland 
and for over a quarter in Spain and 
Austria,  though  only  in  Ireland 
(73%) and the UK (49%) was a sub-
stantial  part  of benefits  subject  to 
means-testing. Assistance to  the el-
derly also represented an  important 
part of overall means-tested spend-
ing in some countries, over a third of 
the total in Spain, Austria and Portu-
gal,  but  in these  countries  as  else-
where, only a very small proportion 
of old-age  benefits  were  means-
tested (10% or less in most cases). In 
Ireland, however, the figure was as 
high as 25%. 
Growth of spending 
by function, 1990-95 
A
lthough  the  continued  expan-
sion  of spending  on  old-age 
pensions  and  health  care  was  the 
main  contributor  to  the  growth  of 
expenditure which has occurred over 
the  1990s, simply because these are 
the  two  largest  elements  of social 
protection,  they  were  not  the  areas 
where  the  largest proportionate  in-
crease has taken place. Both housing 
and social exclusion showed average 
rises  in  spending  in  real  terms 
(relative to consumer price inflation) 
of around 5% a year in the Union as 
a  whole  between  1990  and  1995, 
compared  with  2
1/2-3%  growth  in 
pensions  and  health  care,  though 
- 70-
since one country, the UK, accounts 
for around half of all expenditure on 
housing  benefits  in  the  Union,  the 
overall rise is dominated by what oc-
curs in this country, which was some-
what out of line with developments 
elsewhere. (Real spending increased 
by 9% a year in the UK, reflecting in 
part the growing reliance on means-
testing, but declined significantly in 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Portugal.) By contrast, expendi-
ture  on  social  exclusion rose  mar-
kedly in most Member States - the 
only exception being the Netherlands 
- reflecting  not only  the  added 
weight given to combating this prob-
lem,  but also the growing numbers 
not adequately covered by the 'core' 
elements  of social  protection 
(Table 4). 
Growth in  the latter was more than 
that of spending on  unemployment 
benefits, despite the large increase in 
the numbers out of work which oc-
curred over the period (though in Fin-
land,  where  the  biggest  rise  took 
place, and in Portugal, where spend-
ing was very small, expenditure rose 
sharply). The increase in expenditure 
on unemployment benefits, however, 
as noted above, was wholly concen-
trated  in  the  recession  in  the  first 
three years of  the period, when it rose 
by 9% in real terms in the Union as a 
whole (and by over 40% in Finland 
and Portugal. In the two years 1993 
to  1995,  it  fell  significantly in real 
terms,  as  explored  further  below, 
with  most  countries,  even  those 
where the number out of work conti-
nued to  rise, albeit at a slower rate, 
showing a decline. 
The decline in real expenditure in the 
latter period was common to all ele-
ments of social protection, at least at 
the  Union  level,  except  sickness 
benefits, which rose only marginally 
in the earlier years, and social exclu-
sion,  where  spending  went  up  by 
much the same in both periods, with 
even administration costs rising only 
slightly after 1993 (though partly due 
to a large reduction in Italy, which 
was concentrated in 1995 and which 
may be a result of some reclassifica-
tion of expenditure). Apart from so-
cial exclusion and housing (which, as 
noted above is dominated by events 
in  the  UK),  only  old-age  pensions 
and  disability  benefits  showed  a 
growth of more than 2% a year be-
tween 1993 and 1995. The growth in 
spending  on  disability  benefits, 
moreover, was due to a large extent 
to an expansion of almost 6% a year 
over this period in Germany (which 
accounts for almost half of  the rise in 
the Union as a whole) and, to a lesser 
extent, to an increase of 4
1/2% a year 
in  the UK (since when, as  noted in 
Chapter 2, the system has been tight-
ened considerably). 
Growth of spending on old-age,  in 
contrast, continued in most Member 
States between 1993 and 1995 if at a 
lower rate than before, with only the 
Netherlands  showing a fall,  though 
only  in  Portugal  (7
1/2%),  Luxem-
bourg  (4
1/2%),  Belgium  and  Ger-
many (both 3
1/2%)  was it more than 
3% a year and in Ireland, Sweden and 
the UK, growth was only around 1% 
a  year.  Expenditure  on  this  item 
together with that on unemployment 
benefits is  examined in more detail 
below,  since  for  these  elements  at 
least there are indicators of the num-
ber of potential beneficiaries, if not 
the actual number. Table 4 - Growth of social expenditure by function in purchasing power terms, 
1990-95 
% change per year 













0.4  -3.4 
0.2  21.0 
0.4  1.0 
7.1  3.4 
1.5  -2.1 
3.7  2.3 
-0.3  6.0 
1.9  5.9 
0.6  6.0 
Old-age and survivors 
1990-93  5.5 
1993-95  3.5 
1990-95  4.7 
Family and children 
1990-93  1.2 
1993-95  0.3 








1990-93  5.3  7.2 
1993-95  2.8  -9.5 



















1.9  2.8 
1.9  3.6 
1.9  3.1 
4.3  4.6 
0.0  -1.1 




0.5  1.6  -5.1  8.3 
3.5 
7.0 






-7.2  na  -1.3 
-1.7  16.5  -9.5  -8.2  0.2  -10.4  -2.4 













5.2  3.6 
2.7  2.3 
4.2  3.1 
6.2  2.6 
1.8  1.4 
4.4  2.1 
8.5  0.0  8.3  5.9  4.5  18.7  -2.0  na  8.4 
5.0  -4.9  7.0  0.7  3.4  2.0  0.6  0.9  3.2 
7.1  -2.0  8.0  3.8  4.0  11 .8  -0.9  na  6.3 
5.6  1.6  4.8  0.1  4.1  6.3  5.9  na  17.4 
9.4  -1.5  12.3  -1.3  9.0  -3.5  0.7  7.2  4.4 
7.1  0.3  6.7  -0.4  6.0  2.3  3.8  na  12.0 
3. 7  4.8  7.5  1.8  3.4  10.3  4.2  na  6.3 
1.2  2.0  9.5  -0.7  3.0  7.6  2.4  0.9  0.9 
2. 7  3. 7  8.0  0.8  3.2  9.2  3.5  na  4.1 
6.2  -5.8  12.6  -2.8  7.2  6.9  2.3  na  8.2 
7.7  -3.3  19.1  -3.1  3.5  1.1  6.6  -1.6  2.1 
















7.0  8.4  14.0  7.6  12.4  14.3  9.0  5.5  11.9  42.2  46.5  na  17.5  1  0.4 
0.2  -4.8  -14.5  -4.1  6.4  -4.1  22.1  3.4  2. 7  8.6  -3.9  -1.5  -8.3  -5.3 








6.6  -1.7  9.4  -0.7  5.8 
3.7 
5.0 
2.1  -3.1  3.4 
2.6 
3.2 
0.0  -7.6  -11.8  21.9  na  12.5  8.9 
2.7 
6.4 
0.7  5.9  -7.5  -10.5  4.8  -5.3  1.7  0.0  7.1  16.3  2.1  4.6 
5.4  1.3  2.3  -4.8  3.1  -4.0  0. 7  -4.6  -4.6  19.6  na  9.3 
Social exclusion 
1990-93  24.4  9.8 
3.7 
8.6 
4.7  4.0  18.3  10.6  10.6  10.9  4.9  -2.9  8.9  26.6  9.7  na  16.3  7.2 
6.4 
6.9 
1993-95  4.6  9.5  10.7  -1.3  8.4  7.2  12.4  8.4  -3.5  -7.6  -0.5  1.8  -4.6  4.6 
1990-95  16.1  6.6  6.6  10.0  9.7  9.2  11.5  6.3  -3.1  1  .9  14.9  6.5  na  11.5 
Note:  Growth is measured in relation to consumer price inflation; 8  1990-92 and 1992-95 for health; OK 1990-94 and 1994-95; GR no 
data; S no data before 1993; E13 excludes GRandS 
Growth in old-age 
pensions 
A
s yet the ESSPROS data do not 
include figures  of the number 
of people receiving old-age pensions 
or other kinds of benefit (though a 
module  is  planned for  these  in the 
future),  which  would  make  it 
possible  to  examine  the  average 
amount received and to  distinguish 
the  effect  on  expenditure  of the 
changing numbers of recipients from 
that of changes in the average level 
of benefit. Some estimates, however, 
can be made of  the potential numbers 
drawing  old-age  pensions  from 
demographic data, which indicate for 
each Member  State,  the  numbers 
above the official age of retirement. 
These can be combined with Labour 
Force Survey data on those retiring 
before they reach this age to give an 
estimate  of the  total  number  who 
might be  eligible to  receive a pen-
sion.  (Although early retirement for 
labour market reasons is, in principle, 
included  under unemployment 
benefit,  in  practice,  about  half the 
Member  States  include  nothing 
under this head and in the others, only 
part of such retirement is for labour 
market reasons.) This, of  course, may 
differ significantly from the number 
who  are  actually  in receipt,  which 
will  depend  on  the  regulations  in 
force in the country in question. Be-
cause of this, the estimates produced 
- 71-by this kind of exercise give at best a 
very approximate indication of aver-
age benefit levels and how these are 
tending to  change over time.  (Data 
from the ECHP, which are based on 
what people actually receive, should 
give a better guide to pension levels; 
these data are examined in Chapter 7 
below.) 
Nevertheless, at present, though un-
satisfactory, they are the only means 
of assessing the relative importance 
of the  main  factors  underlying 
changes  in  expenditure.  Between 
1990 and 1995, the number of  people 
above official retirement age in the 
Union (which differs between Mem-
ber States)  increased by  just under 
1%  a  year,  though  the  rise  varied 
from over 2% a year in Belgium and 
Spain (where it was  almost 3%) to 
under 1 /2% a year in Denmark, Aus-
tria, Sweden and the UK. Growth of 
the elderly population was also rela-
tively high in Italy, though here the 
potential effect on expenditure was 
moderated by an increase in the offi-
cial retirement age (from 60 to 62 for 
men and from 55  to 57 for women) 
over the period. As a result, the num-
ber  above  this  age  declined.  This, 
however, was accompanied by a sig-
nificant increase in early retirement, 
which offset much of  the effect of  the 
rise in the official retirement age (in 
practice, the increase in the latter was 
not matched by an equivalent rise in 
the  actual  age  at  which  people  re-
tired). 
Elsewhere the  continuing reduction 
in  the  effective  age  of retirement, 
despite a shift in government policy 
in the opposite direction, reinforced 
demographic trends and added to the 
growth  in  the  number  potentially 
eligible for an old-age pension- to 
just over 1% a year in the Union as a 
whole. In consequence, around 30% 
of  the overall increase in expenditure 
on pensions can be attributed to  the 
growth  in  the  number  of potential 
recipients,  implying a rise  of some 
2
1
/ 2% a year between 1990 and 1995 
in the average value of  pensions. The 
growth in the latter and its contribu-
tion to the increase in real spending 
relative  to  that  in  the  number  of 
potential recipients, however, varies 
markedly between Member States. In 
Spain,  where  expenditure  growth 
was  above  the  Union  average,  the 
increase  in  estimated  numbers  ex-
plains most of the rise, as  it does in 
the Netherlands and Finland (Graph 
22). Indeed, in Spain, the increase in 
the average pension was only around 
half of that in the rest of the Union, 
while in the Netherlands, the average 
pension seems to  have declined by 
over 1% a year in real terms. On the 
other hand, in Denmark and Portugal, 
where  the  growth of spending was 
also well above the Union average, 
the  number  of potential  recipients 
hardly changed at all in the former 
and rose  by  no  more  than  in  other 
countries  in  the  latter,  implying  a 
substantial  increase  in  the  average 





similar division  between 
changes  in  the  number of 
people qualifying for social support 
and the average amount paid can also 
be made in respect of unemployment 
22  Change in expenditure on old-age pensions and 
estimated number of people eligible, 1990-95 
23  Change in expenditure on unemployment and 
number of unemployed, 1990-95 
10 
Average change (annual% change) 
10 
•  Expenditure on old-age 
8  •  Estimated number eligible  8 
•  Estimated average pension per person 
6  6 
4  4 
2  2 
0  0 
-2  '---------------------~  -2 
B  OK  0  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  A  P  FIN  UK  EU 
GR, S no data 
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Average change (annual% change) 
•  Expenditure on unemployment 
35  •  Number of people unemployed 
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B  OK  0  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  A  P  FIN  UK  EU 
GR. S no data benefits, in this case based on those 
classified as  being unemployed ac-
cording  to  the  internationally-ac-
cepted definition (those available for 
work and actively seeking it).  This 
definition, however, differs from that 
used  to  determine  eligibility  for 
benefit  in  Member  States,  each  of 
which has a slightly different method 
and,  even more than  in  the case of 
pensions,  therefore,  estimates  of 
benefit recipients might diverge sig-
nificantly from the actual number in 
receipt,  though  the  divergence  is 
likely to  be  less as  regards changes 
over time. 
In the Union as a whole, the number 
unemployed increased by 8% a year 
over the 5 years 1990 to 1995, about 
the same as the rise in real expendi-
ture on unemployment benefits. The 
average amount paid per person un-
employed, therefore, appears to have 
remained  much  the  same  in  real 
terms over this period. In 5 Member 
States, however - Belgium, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg and Finland -
the  average  benefit  seems  to  have 
declined,  especially  in  Finland, 
where the growth in real expenditure 
was higher than in all Member States, 
but  where  the  number unemployed 
also  increased  by  much more  than 
anywhere else (Graph 23).  In Den-
mark, Ireland and, above all, Portu-
gal,  in  contrast,  average  benefit  is 
estimated to have risen markedly (in 
Portugal, by over 15% a year). 
These estimates, however, could re-
flect not only the divergence of na-
tional definitions  of unemployment 
from the international convention but 
also changes in coverage as much as 
changes  in  average  benefit  levels. 
This is  especially the  case in coun-
tries, such as Spain, Italy and Portu-
gal,  where a minority of the unem-
ployed, even on national definitions, 
qualify  for  benefit  (see  Chapter 4 
below). A change in coverage, more-
over, need not necessarily be a result 
of a change in the conditions govern-
ing  entitlement to  benefit.  It could 
equally result from  a change in  the 
characteristics of the unemployed, in 
particular from an increase in the pro-
portion who have been out of work 
for a long period of time, who tend in 
many countries to  receive less than 
those  joining  the  register more  re-
cently.  Nevertheless,  it  is  evident 
from Chapter 2 above and Chapter 4 
below, that the criteria for eligibility 
for  benefit  were  tightened  in  most 
Member  States  between  1990  and 
1995,  in  addition to  a reduction  in 
benefit levels in some cases, and this 
is reflected in the falls or modest rises 
in estimated average payments in real 
terms  in  the  majority  of countries 
(only 6 Member States showing an 
increase in the latter of  more than 1  % 
a year over this period). 
Sources of funding 
T
he finance for systems of social 
protection in all Member States 
comes  partly  from  social  contribu-
tions, levied mostly on income from 
employment  and  divided  between 
employers and those being protected 
(ie  employees  and  the  self-em-
ployed), and partly from general tax-
ation.  In  a  number  of countries, 
however, as  mentioned above, con-
tributions are also levied on benefit 
recipients. Moreover, in some Mem-
ber States,  'earmarked'  taxes  have 
been  introduced in  recent years  (in 
Belgium,  France  and  Luxembourg, 
in particular), with the aim largely of 
shifting the cost from employment to 
the population in general, or to spe-
cific sections of  it, such as consumers 
of energy.  The same aim  has  been 
common to most Member States, the 
concern  being  to  reduce  contribu-
tions  levied  on  employers,  which 
may add to labour costs and so both 
discourage job creation  and  adver-
sely affect competitiveness, compen-
sating  for  this  by  raising  either 
employees'  contributions  or  taxes, 
though  not  necessarily  earmarked 
ones. 
Nevertheless, according to  the new 
ESSPROS  data, just under 40%  of 
finance  for  social  protection  in  the 
Union still came from contributions 
levied on employers in 1995, a fur-
ther  24%  or  so  from  contributions 
paid by those protected (mainly em-
ployees,  the  self-employed  and 
benefit  recipients  accounting  for 
under 5% of total revenue) and most 
of the  rest  from  general  taxation 
(some  30%),  with  earmarked taxes 
accounting for under 2%.  (It should 
be  emphasised  in  this  context that 
employers'  contributions  include 
voluntary amounts paid to  fund  so-
cial  benefits  granted  to  their  em-
ployees as well as statutory amounts 
imposed by government-seeN  otes 
and sources.) 
Although  these different sources of 
finance are common to  all  Member 
States,  their  relative  weight varies, 
largely  reflecting  the  historical  de-
velopment  of the  social  protection 
system itself. In most of  the countries 
where the system has its origins in the 
provision  of social  insurance  for 
those  in  employment (the  so-called 
Bismarkian system) ---:- the Benelux 
countries,  France,  Germany  and 
Austria - social contributions still 
accounted  for  around two-thirds or 
-73-more of funding in 1995 (as much as 
77% in France, though only 63% in 
Austria),  except  in  Luxembourg 
(where  the  data  available  show  a 
share of only just over half). Within 
this,  charges  on  employers  are  re-
sponsible for the largest share, except 
in the Netherlands (where their share 
of total  funding  amounted  to  22% 
as  compared  with  just over 49% 
in  France,  almost  15%  of GDP) 
(Graph 24). 
In the Nordic countries, the UK and 
Ireland,  where  the  system  has  its 
origins in the provision of social wel-
fare for those in need (the so-called 
Beveridge system), social contribu-
tions accounted for less than half of 
total finance in 1995 (  40% or less in 
the UK and Ireland and only 23
1/2% 
in Denmark), with employers again 
responsible for most of the finance 
raised  by  this  means  in  all  of the 
countries.  Indeed,  in  Sweden,  they 
provided almost 40% of  total revenue 
for social protection and in Finland, 
35%, much the  same  as  in  Austria 
and  only  slightly  less  than  in  Ger-
many. Moreover, in relation to GDP, 
social  charges  on employers  in 
Sweden were the same as in France 
and higher than in any other Member 
State,  while  in  Finland,  they  were 
higher than in Germany. 
In the South of the Union, in Spain 
and  Italy  (there  are  no  data  for 
Greece),  the  financing  system  is 
similar  to  that  in  the  Bismarkian 
countries, with just over two-thirds of 
revenue  coming  from  social  con-
tributions, again mostly from charges 
on employers. Indeed, in  Spain and 
Italy, around half of all funding for 
social protection comes from the lat-
ter. In Portugal, on the other hand, the 
pattern of funding is more similar to 
-74-
that in  the  other Northern Member 
States, with just under half  of  revenue 
coming from contributions and those 
on employers accounting for 30% of 
all finance for social protection. 
In line with stated policy aims, there 
is evidence of some shift in funding 
from  contributions  levied  on  em-
ployers  to  other  sources  over  the 
1990s. Between 1990 and  1995, the 
share  of revenue  raised  from  em-
ployers' contributions declined from 
42%  to  39
1/2%  in  the  Union  as  a 
whole.  At the same time, the  share 
raised from  contributions from  em-
ployees  and  other people  protected 
increased  from  just over  22%  to 
23
1/2%,  while,  more  significantly, 
revenue  from  taxation  rose  from 
29
1/2% of the total to 32% (there was 
some  fall  in  the  share  raised  from 
other sources). This shift in funding 
sources was common to all Member 
States,  except  Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands, where employers' con-
tributions  are  relatively  small,  and 
Belgium. It was especially marked in 
Portugal and Finland, where revenue 
from  employers'  contributions  was 
reduced  by  some  20%  in  relative 
terms. 
The shift, however, was concentrated 
in the first three years of the period, 
in the recession years between 1990 
and  1993.  In the two years  1993 to 
1995, the share of revenue from em-
ployers'  contributions  in  the  Union 
as  whole  increased  rather  than  de-
clined, even if only slightly. Leaving 
aside Denmark and the Netherlands, 
where  the  employers'  share  rose 
throughout the period, this pattern of 
change was common to most coun-
tries in the Union, including Finland, 
where the  marked fall  noted  above 
occurred in the first three years of the 
period,  since  when  the  share  has 
edged up (though the fall in Portugal 
continued  after  1993,  it  was  much 
less  than  before).  The  only  excep-
tions were France, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg and Sweden, where the share 
of employers's contributions  conti-
nued to decline after 1993. 
At  the  same  time,  the  share  of 
revenue  from  employees' contribu-
tions  also  went  up  over  the  latter 
period, so that the share from taxation 
fell  (from  almost  33%  to  32%), 
though within this, there was a conti-
nued rise  in  the  importance of ear-
marked taxes, especially in France, 
where  their  share  of total  revenue 
rose from just under 6%  in  1993 to 
almost 8% in 1995, having been only 
3
1/2% in 1990. 
In general, therefore, the stated pol-
icy objective of shifting the funding 
of social protection from employers 
to other sources was not in evidence 
in the two years 1993 to 1995. More-
over, even in the previous three years 
when  the  revenue  raised  from 
charges on employers fell relative to 
that from other sources, this does not 
appear to have been translated into a 
reduction in the costs falling on em-
ployers,  which  is  the  main  aim  of 
policy (though it should be reiterated 
that part of the costs  are  voluntary 
rather than statutory; over the period 
1990 to  1995, there was some tend-
ency for the voluntary - or imputed 
-element to increase in relative im-
portance).  During  this  period,  em-
ployers'  contributions  increased  in 
most Member States in relation both 
to  GDP and,  more relevantly given 
the concern of relieving the cost fall-
ing  on  employment,  to  the  overall 
wage bill (the share of which in GDP 
rose  marginally  between  1990  and 1993  but fell in the subsequent two 
years with economic recovery). 
In  the  Union  as  a  whole,  revenue 
from  employers'  contributions rose 
marginally in relation to  the overall 
wage bill (as measured by the com-
pensation  of employees)  over  the 
three years 1990 to 1993, despite the 
fall in its share of total receipts, and 
only in Germany, Luxembourg (both 
marginally) and Portugal, did it de-
cline  (Graph  25).  Even in  Finland, 
where it fell markedly as  a share of 
total receipts, it increased relative to 
total labour costs. Between 1993 and 
1995, revenue from employers rose 
by slightly more across the Union in 
relation to labour costs, from 22% of 
the  wage  bill  to  2i/2%,  with  only 
Spain,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and 
Sweden registering a decline. 
The  funding  obtained  from  em-
ployees' contributions increased by 
even more in relation to labour costs 
over the 5 years as  a whole. In this 
case, the rise occurred more evenly 
over the period, with the three Nordic 
countries as  well as the Netherlands 
showing  a  particularly  marked  in-
crease, reflecting in Sweden a direct 
shift from  employers to  employees 
between 1993  and  1995.  In Ireland 
and the UK, on the other hand, there 
was  a  slight  fall  as  funding  was 
shifted to general taxation. 
The increase in employees' contribu-
tions was accompanied by an expan-
sion  of contributions  levied  on 
old-age pensioners and other benefit 
recipients,  which  reflects  both  a 
growing recognition of the increas-
ing  prosperity  of pensioners  as  a 
group-though not of  all individuals 
- and a desire to spread the cost of 
financing  more  evenly  across  the 
population. In most countries where 
these are levied, their share of total 
funding increased between 1990 and 
1995, especially in the later years of 
the period, especially in the Nether-
lands  and  Germany.  Nevertheless, 
they  are  levied  in  only  8  Member 
States and only in the latter two coun-
tries are they a significant source of 
funding (accounting for 8
1/2% of the 
total  in the  Netherlands  and 4%  in 
Germany).  At  the  same  time,  it 
should  be  recalled,  as  noted at  the 
outset, that taxes imposed on benefit 
recipients  are  also  a  source  of 
revenue in both these two countries 
and the three Nordic Member States, 
though,  in most cases, they are  not 
earmarked for social expenditure and 
are  not  separately  distinguished  m 





he cost of social protection was 
examined earlier in this chapter 
in  terms  of expenditure  on  social 
transfers and other outlays. It  is, how-
ever, equally relevant to consider the 
issue in terms of the revenue raised 
to  fund  social  spending,  since  this 
will determine the taxes or contribu-
tions  which  individuals  and  com-
panies need to pay. If  revenue were 
set  to  match  expenditure,  then,  of 
course,  the  matter would not arise, 
but,  in  practice,  for  a  number  of 
Member States there is a significant 
difference between the two. In most 
cases,  receipts  exceed  expenditure, 
reflecting, in particular, the accumu-
24  Financing of social protection expenditure by 
source in Member States, 1990, 1993 and 1995 
25  Employers' and employees' contributions in 
relation to labour costs in Member States, 1990, 
1993 and 1995 
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-75-lation of reserves to cover both unex-
pected  contingencies,  such  as  in-
creased  demands  on  the  system 
resulting  from  economic  recession, 
and projected liabilities, such as fu-
ture pension commitments. By con-
trast, in a few cases, receipts fall short 
of expenditure giving rise to a deficit 
covered  initially  by  borrowing  but 
implying  a  possible  need  for  in-
creased taxes and/or contributions in 
future years. 
Over the Union as a whole, the fund-
ing  raised  for  social  protection  in 
1995 was around 1% of GOP higher 
than  the  expenditure  incurred  (ie 
some  29
1/2%  of GOP  as  against 
28
1/2%), and much the same was the 
case  in  earlier  years  (no  data  on 
revenue  are  at  the  time  of writing 
available for Greece). In France, ex-
penditure exceeded receipts, as it had 
done  in  each  year since  1992, and 
there was consequently a deficit on 
social  protection  spending  (which 
reached 1% of GOP in 1993). In four 
other Member States, Spain, Ireland, 
Austria  and  Portugal,  receipts 
broadly matched expenditure, which 
again  was  true  for  earlier  years, 
though in Portugal, there was a small 
deficit  in  both  1993  and  1994  (of 
around 
1/2% of GOP). 
In the rest of the Union, receipts ex-
ceeded expenditure in 1995, as  also 
in  earlier  years,  most  markedly  in 
Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  the  UK 
and the three Nordic countries, at be-
tween 2
1/2% (in the UK) and just over 
4%  of GOP  (in  the  Netherlands) 
(Graph 26). In each case, the gap was 
similar in the earlier years of the de-
cade,  even  during  the  worst  of the 
recession when the tax base was de-
pressed  and  the  demand  for  added 
spending  relatively  high.  It  would, 
therefore, appear that in these coun-
tries,  at least,  sizeable reserves  are 
being built up to meet possible future 
liabilities,  despite  the  fact  that  in 
most cases, only part of social expen-
diture is  funded rather than pay-as-
you go. 
These  significant differences  in 
revenue relative to expenditure mean 
that  a  slightly  different  picture 
emerges of the cost of social protec-
tion in Member States if the former 
rather than the latter is  taken as  the 
26  Total social protection expenditure and receipts 
in relation to GDP in Member States, 1995 
%GOP 
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basis  of comparison.  In  particular, 
the level of costs (gross rather than 
net, ie again ignoring the taxes and 
contributions levied on benefits,  as 
well as tax expenditures) in the three 
Nordic  countries  together  with  the 
Netherlands  is  even higher than in 
other Member  States  in  terms  of 
revenue than in terms of  expenditure. 
Accordingly, there is  a distinct gap 
between these four countries, where 
the lowest level of  funding amounted 
to  35
1/2%  of GOP  in  1995  (in  the 
Nether  lands)  and  the  rest  of the 
Union,  where the  next highest pro-
portion was 32%, in Belgium, though 
around  30%  in  Germany,  France, 
Austria and  the  UK.  Moreover, 
whereas expenditure on social pro-
tection  in  the  UK  is  significantly 
lower in relation to GOP than in any 
of  these countries, the revenue raised 
to fund it is much the same. There is 
an  even  larger  gap  between  these 
countries  and  Spain,  Portugal  and 
Ireland,  where  revenue  was  only 
around 20% of GOP (22% in Spain), 
with  Italy  and  Luxembourg  in  be-
tween. Chapter 3  The scale of social protection and its effect on income 
Part 2 The incidence of social transfers 
A 
major objective of systems of 
social  protection  is  to  relieve 
poverty, alleviate deprivation andre-
duce the most extreme disparities in 
the distribution of income. This is by 
no means the only set of objectives. 
Social protection is equally intended 
to provide a  replacement income to 
those  unable  to  work,  because,  for 
example, of sickness or inability to 
find a job, or who have reached the 
end of their working careers and to 
provide  access  to  health  care  and 
other  basic  services  to  those  who 
need them rather than simply to those 
who can afford to pay. Ensuring that 
people do not have to live on unac-
ceptably low levels of income, how-
ever,  is  usually  regarded  as  the 
central aim.  It  has historically been 
the  motivating force behind the de-
velopment of the arrangements now 
in  place across the Union and tends 
to be how systems are judged. More-
over,  with  the  tight  constraints  on 
social  expenditure  evident  in  all 
Member States, which are being ac-
companied by greater efforts to target 
spending on those most in need, it is 
one which is of growing importance 
and of increasing relevance to  both 
the  assessment  and  formulation  of 
policy. 
At the same time, assessing the effect 
of social protection in  these tenns is 
by  no  means straightforward.  Even 
leaving aside data problems, there is 
a  lack of agreement  on  what  con-
stitutes an unacceptable level of in-
come  and  how  much  is  needed  to 
avoid poverty and deprivation. The 
intention  here  is  to  set  definitional 
issues to one side for the most part 
and to focus mainly on the incidence 
The Household Panel data used in the analysis 
The data used in  this section come from  the first  wave of the  European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) conducted in  1994, which covered 
all Member States except Austria, Finland and Sweden, these three conse-
quently being excluded from  the analysis. The data relate to household 
income in 1993 and to the various sources from which this arises, including 
the  different  kinds  of social  transfer.  Income  is  measured  in  terms of 
purchasing power standards (PPS) to adjust for differences in price levels 
between Member States- ie  in  the purchasing power of a given unit of 
cuiTency- as well as converting to a common currency (for the Union as 
a whole, PPS values are equivalent to  ECU values).  It includes income 
received from all  sources, including from capital as well as employment 
and social protection schemes, but also transfers between households. The 
latter item gives rise to a minor inconsistency insofar as receipts of private 
transfers are included but not payments of  these, though they are very small, 
amounting to only around I% of income overall. Moreover, since they are 
slightly more important for poorer households than richer ones (amounting 
to around  2
1 /~% of total  income for households with  under half average 
income in  the Union), they serve to give a more complete estimate of the 
income of these. 
Households  are  converted to  an  equivalent  basis  by  adjusting  for  dif-
ferences in  size and composition (specifically, by attaching the following 
weights to each member- 1.0 to heads of  household, 0.5 to each additional 
adult and 0.3  to every child under  16),  so as to allow for economies in 
purchases of goods and services. 
All  income - ie  both  the  total  and each  individual component - is 
measured net of all direct taxes and social charges (but not indirect taxes). 
For France, however, where taxes are assessed on total income on an annual 
basis rather than being deducted at source, only total income is  measured 
net of estimated taxes and income from different sources is measured gross 
of tax, though net of social contributions which are deducted at source. The 
figures for social transfers are, therefore, not strictly comparable with those 
for other countries, to the extent that they include an element of tax payable 
on these, even though this is relatively small. The effect is to overstate their 
value slightly relative to total household income, which is measured in net 
terms (by perhaps 1-2 percentage points), and this needs to be taken into 
account when interpreting the comparisons presented in the text. 
Social transfers cover all cash benefits and allowances received by house-
holds,  including private pensions, but exclude benefits  in  kind,  such as 
health care (though they include housing benefits paid as cash, which are 
classified by ESSPROS as benefits in kind). 
- 77-of social transfers on those with dif-
ferent levels of income, to  examine 
their effect in  lifting the income of 
those who would have little or noth-
ing without it and in  narrowing the 
gap  between the  poorest in  society 
and  the  rest.  As  such,  the  analysis 
indicates  how  far  social  protection 
across the Union is targeted on those 
who  appear to  be  most  in  need  of 
support,  and  so  by  implication  it 
bears  on  the  issue  of poverty  and 
deprivation. 
The analysis is based on the results of 
the first wave of the new European 
Community  Household  Panel 
(ECHP)  carried out  in  1994 which 
provides details of both the income 
received by  individuals  and house-
holds  in  1993  and  the  different 
sources from  which this  arises  (see 
Box).  These data for  the  first  time 
enable the  scale  of social  transfers 
and their distributional incidence to 
be  analysed on  a comparable basis 
for all the Member States covered (all 
except  Austria,  Finland  and 
Sweden). It should be  emphasised, 
however, that though the  data have 
been subject to a thorough process of 
checking and verification, because of 
the  innovatory nature of the survey 
itself and the inherent difficulties in 
collecting reliable information on in-
come,  the  findings  are  inevitably 
subject to a measure of uncertainty. 
This  should become less  as  results 
from  the  second  and  third  waves 
(conducted  in  1995  and  1996)  are 
processed  and  data  from  the  first 
wave can be checked against these, 
which will happen during 1998. Until 
then,  the  results  presented  below 
should  be  regarded  as  tentative, 
though they ought to give a reason-
able indication of the true situation. 
The analysis is conducted in terms of 
households,  which are  the  ultimate 
focus of systems of social protection 
and the most relevant basis of  assess-
ment given the economies achieved 
by people living together and given 
also the fact that certain benefits, par-
ticularly means-tested ones, apply to 
households  rather  than  individuals. 
These are standardised to  ad  just for 
differences in size and composition 
(ie  the  number of people  living  in 
them  and  how  many  of them  are 
children rather than adults), both of 
which affect the effective value of a 
given amount of income (see Box). 
All sources of income are taken into 
account, except benefits in kind, and 
income  is  measured  net  of direct 
taxes and social contributions so in-
dicating the amount that households 
have available to spend. 
The scale of social 
transfers 
S
ocial benefits account for a sig-
nificant  part  of household  in-
come in  all  Member States.  Social 
transfers, defined to  include private 
pensions, represented around 30% of 
net household income in the Union in 
1993 (excluding Austria, Finland and 
Sweden, as  noted above). Their im-
portance, however, varied markedly 
between countries from around 37% 
of  net income in Belgium and France 
(though for  the  latter this  figure  is 
likely to be overstated, even if only 
slightly, by the fact that transfers in-
clude  direct  taxes  not  deducted  at 
source-see Box) to 25% in Greece 
and only 22% in Portugal (Graph 27). 
27  Average household net income in Member States, 
1993 
28  Households with transfers as the main source of 
income in Member States, 1993 
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B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  NL  p  UK  E12 In  between,  the  share  in  ltal  y,  the 
Netherlands,  Denmark and  Spain 
was between 30% and 33%, in Ger-
many, Ireland, the UK, and Luxem-
bourg, 27-28%. 
The  pattern  of variation  between 
Member States in these figures dif-
fers somewhat from that for expendi-
ture on social protection examined in 
the  previous  section.  In  particular, 
the relative scale of  social transfers in 
both Belgium and Italy is higher than 
indicated by the  social expenditure 
figures, as it is in Ireland, where the 
latter figures are substantially lower, 
relative to  GDP, than in the UK or 
Germany. These differences reflect a 
number of  factors, not least the exclu-
sion of benefits in  kind  (which, for 
example, are low in Italy), the inclu-
sion of all  private pensions and the 
difference between net household in-
come and GDP (which is significant 
for Ireland, in particular, where some 
13-14% of income goes abroad re-
flecting  the  importance of multina-
tional  companies  in  the  economy). 
They also reflect the fact that trans-
fers  are  measured net of taxes  and 
other charges in the ECHP data but 
inclusive of these in the expenditure 
data, a difference which, as noted in 
the previous section, tends to reduce 
the gap in expenditure levels between 
countries  (especially  between Den-
mark and the other Member States). 
Transfers as a 
source of income 
T
he variation in the scale of  social 
transfers across the Union is re-
flected  in  their importance  as  a 
source of household income, though 
this is  also affected by the extent to 
which  they  are  concentrated  on 
households  with relatively  little  in-
come  from  other  sources  and  the 
relative  numbers  of these.  In  the 
Union  as  a  whole,  social  transfers 
were the main source of income for 
some 37% of households in 1993. In 
Belgium and France, as might be ex-
pected from their scale, social trans-
fers  represented the main source of 
income  for  a  larger  proportion  of 
households  than  in  the  rest  of the 
Union,  over 40%,  in  each  case 
(Graph  28).  The figure  for  Ireland 
and  the  UK,  however,  where  the 
scale of transfers was much less, was 
only  slightly  lower,  reflecting  the 
relatively uneven distribution of in-
come  before  transfers,  as  noted 
below, and the correspondingly large 
number of households which are re-
liant on  transfers  to  bring  their  in-
come up to a reasonable level. In  both 
cases,  transfers  were  the  main  in-
come  source  for  proportionately 
more households than in Denmark or 
the  Netherlands,  where  the  overall 
amount transferred was much larger 
but where  the  pre-transfer distribu-
tion of income was more even. 
The large number of households in 
the  Union  which  appear  to  be  de-
pendent on social transfers reflects to 
a major extent,  the  relatively  large 
number of people above retirement 
age. In  1993, the main source of in-
come for some 28%  of households 
was  old-age  pensions  (including 
those  paid to  widows  or widowers 
and  from  private  as  well  as  state 
schemes), higher than the proportion 
of the  population above  retirement 
age, partly because of the significant 
numbers  retiring  early,  partly  be-
cause  of elderly  people  tending  to 
live  in  smaller households,  often 
alone.  The  fact  that  both  of these 
factors vary between Member States, 
together  with  differences  in  the 
relative importance of other sources 
of  income, leads to considerable vari-
ation in the proportion of  households 
for  which  pensions  are  the  main 
means of support. In Italy, where the 
relative number of people in retire-
ment is higher than in other Member 
States,  old-age  pensions  were  the 
main  source  of income  for  around 
34% of all households as opposed to 
only 23% in Ireland, where the pro-
portion above retirement age is lower 
than  anywhere  else,  and  Denmark, 
where  it  is  much  the  same  as  the 
Union average. 
The  variation in  the  importance  of 
transfers other than pensions is even 
wider, though some caution needs to 
be  exercised in  attaching too  much 
significance to such a division, since 
in  some  countries  the  support  of 
those  in  retirement  might  come 
wholly from pensions, in others from 
other kinds of benefit as well. In Ire-
land,  transfers  other  than  pensions 
are the main income source for just 
under  18%  of households,  in  Den-
mark  for  13%.  In  the  former,  this 
partly reflects the high level of  unem-
ployment  in  1993  (1S1 /2%),  in  the 
latter, the relative scale of a range of 
benefits, including for sickness, dis-
ability and family support as well as 
unemployment. A similar proportion 
of households  in  the  UK were  de-
pendent on other transfers as in Den-
mark,  though,  since the  relative 
amount transferred was much less, as 
indicated  below,  this  again reflects 
the  comparatively  large  number of 
households with little or no income 
from other sources (many consisting 
of only one person of working age as 
indicated in Chapter 1). 
-79-By contrast, very few households in 
Greece  and  Italy  obtained  most  of 
their  income  from  transfers  other 
than  pensions  - only  1'/2%  and 
3'/2%, respectively - reflecting the 
limited  extent of social  benefits 
available in both countries  (though 
there may be a classification problem 
in  the  way  that  some  transfers  are 
recorded in  the  ECHP,  such as  the 
Cassa  Integrazione  Guadagni  in 
Italy, under which transfers are made 
to companies which then pass these 




s implied above, old-age pen-
sions are the largest element of 
transfers in all Member States, repre-
senting an average of75% ofthe total 
in  the  Union in  1993.  In Denmark, 
however,  they  accounted  for  only 
just over 50%, whereas in Italy and 
Greece,  they  accounted  for  around 
90%  and  in  Luxembourg and Ger-
many, almost 80% (Graph 29). Else-
where,  they  represented  around 
70-75% of the  amount  transferred 
except in Ireland and the UK, where 
the figure was around 60%. 
Of the  other  transfers,  unemploy-
ment benefits accounted for 20% of 
the total in Denmark and Ireland, and 
just over 10% in Spain, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, but for less than 3% 
in Italy, Greece and Luxembourg as 
well as the UK. 
For the  first  three of the  latter four 
countries, the small amount involved 
is understandable in view of the low 
rate  of unemployment  in  Luxem-
bourg and the nature of  the unemploy-
ment  compensation  system  in  Italy 
and Greece. For the UK, on the other 
hand, where the system is  similar to 
that in Ireland and where unemploy-
ment was around the Union average 
in 1993, it suggests that a large part of 
transfers  to  the  unemployed  are 
classified under a different head, spe-
cifically  as  social  assistance  (this 
seems  to  be  confirmed by  the  rela-
tively large amount of such transfers 
recorded by the ECHP). 
For the rest, the figures  are broadly 
in  line  with the 
ESSPROS  data 
29  Composition of social transfers in Member States, 
1993 
analysed above, 
so  that,  for 
example,  dis-
ability and sick-
ness benefits are 
relatively  im-
portant  in  the 
Netherlands, the 
UK  and  Den-
mark,  while 
family  benefits 
are more signifi-
cant in Belgium 
and Ireland. 
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hile the data compiled by the 
ECHP should give reasonable 
estimates  of net,  or disposable, 
household income, they do not pro-
vide  a  reliable  indication  of gross 
income before any taxes or charges 
are  deducted  (because  these  are 
mostly  deducted  at  source,  people 
often have only a vague idea of their 
gross earnings).  Consequently, it is 
not possible to analyse the combined 
effect on the distribution of income 
between households of the  tax  and 
benefit systems, but only the effect of 
transfers in relation to  income after 
direct taxes and social contributions 
have  been deducted.  The approach 
adopted below is to begin by exam-
ining  the  distribution  of household 
income in each Member State before 
social transfers (by deducting the lat-
ter from  reported  income)  - to 
identify the ex ante position - and 
then  to  compare  this  with  the  dis-
tribution  which  actually  prevails 
after transfers are made. 
This, of course, provides only a par-
tial indication of  the extent of  income 
redistribution brought about by gov-
ernment.  Since,  however,  the  main 
concern here is with the distribution 
of social  transfers  between  house-
holds, rather than with the effect of 
the fiscal system as such, the lack of 
data on gross income is not so much 
of a problem, though it prevents an 
analysis of the way in which the fin-
ancing  of social  transfers  is  dis-
tributed between income groups.  It 
should also  be noted that since the 
distribution  of income  tends  to 
change only very slowly over time, because of the rigidities built into it 
(people tend to stay in the same job 
for  fairly  long  periods of time,  for 
example and,  therefore, have much 
the  same  relative  level  of earnings 
year after year), the position in 1993, 
to  which  the  ECHP  data  relate,  is 
unlikely to be very different from that 
in 1997 or 1998. 
Income distribution 
before transfers 
The distribution of income between 
households  before  social  transfers 
does not vary a great deal between 
Member States. This can be shown 
in  a  number  of different  ways.  A 
standard graphical means is through 
what are  known as  Lorenz curves, 
which show the proportion of total 
households in a country (ranked ac-
cording  to  their  income  along  the 
vertical axis) receiving different pro-
portions of total income (along the 
horizontal  axis).  The  shape  of the 
curve then indicates how evenly or 
unevenly  income  is  distributed.  If 
income were equally distributed be-
tween households, with 10% receiv-
ing  10% of income, 20% receiving 
20% and so on, the relationship be-
tween the two would then be repre-
sented by a straight line at 45 degrees 
to each axis. The more the distribu-
tion varies from this - ie the more 
unequal it is-the more concave the 
curve  (Graphs  30-41  show  the 
curves  for  each Member  State 
covered  by  the  ECHP  before  and 
after transfers). 
For all Member States, a significant 
proportion of households have little 
or no  income  at  all  without  social 
transfers,  reflecting  predominantly 
the large number of people in retire-
ment with no other source of income 
apart from old-age pensions, though 
also the  relatively  large  number of 
unemployed in some cases (Ireland, 
in particular). The proportion in 1993 
varied  from  35%  in  Belgium  and 
over 30% in Ireland, Italy and the UK 
to under 25% in Greece and Luxem-
bourg. 
A summary measure of  the concavity 
of  the Lorenz curves for each country 
- ie the evenness, or unevenness, of 
income distribution-is given by the 
Gini coefficient (which is calculated 
as the ratio between the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree 
line in  the graph and the total area 
above the 45 degree line). The value 
of this varies between 0, where there 
is a perfectly equal of distribution of 
income (ie the Lorenz curve is the 45 
degree  line),  and  1 where  there  is 
perfect inequality,  with  one  house-
hold  receiving  all  the  income.  The 
higher the  value of the Gini coeffi-
cient, therefore, the more uneven the 
dispersion of  income between house-
holds. 
In the Union in 1993, for 7 of the 12 
Member States, the Gini was much 
the  same  before  transfers,  varying 
only between 0.54 and 0.56, with the 
UK having the highest value, and the 
most  uneven  income  distribution, 
Spain, France, Ireland and Italy, only 
a  slightly  less  uneven  distribution 
and  Belgium  and  Portugal,  one 
which was only a little less uneven 
than for these four. The least uneven 
distribution of income was  in  Den-
mark (with a Gini of 0.48), with that 
in Germany being only a little more 
uneven (0.49), while in Greece, Lux-
em bourg and the Netherlands, the de-
gree  of dispersion  was  midway 
between that in Denmark and that in 
Belgium or Portugal. 
The distribution in each case reflects, 
it should be recalled, both the initial 
pre-tax  distribution  of earnings  -
returns from financial assets as well 
as wages and salaries- and the in-
cidence  of direct  taxes  and  social 
charges. In the UK, it would, there-
fore,  appear that either earnings are 
more dispersed than in other Member 
States or the direct tax system is less 
progressive or some combination of 
the two is at work, while in Denmark, 
the reverse is the case. 
The  Gini  coefficient,  however, 
summarises  only  the  overall  dis-
tribution  of income  and  does  not 
necessarily  indicate  the  relative 
shares going to those at the bottom 
end of the income scale, which is 
the  main  concern  here.  In  other 
words,  a high value of the coeffi-
cient  might reflect a  very  uneven 
distribution of  income at the top end 
of the scale rather than among low 
income  earners.  Nevertheless,  in 
practice,  the  proportion of house-
holds  in  the  different  Member 
States with less than 50% of aver-
age  income  before  transfers  and 
with less than 65%-the two main 
groups on which the analysis here 
is focused -is  broadly in line with 
the differences in Gini values. The 
proportion  is  highest  in  the  UK, 
where  just under  43%  of house-
holds  had  income  below  half the 
average  before transfers  and  47% 
less than 65% of average, and only 
slightly less in Ireland, and lowest 
in Denmark and  Germany (where 
the  figures  are  36-37% for  under 
half the  average  and  41-42%  for 
under 65% of the average), as well 
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-83-Table 5 - Social transfers and the distribution of household income, 1993 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  L  NL  p  UK  E12 
Transfers as % net household 
income  36.5  30.5  27.9  24.8  29.7  37.4  27.8  32.7  27.0  30.2  22.1  27.3  30.4 
Gini coefficient before transfers 
Gini coefficient after transfers 
Change 
0.544  0.485  0.490  0.511  0.540  0.554  0.553  0.546  0.511  0.512  0.543  0.558  0.532 
0.281  0.246  0.286  0.368  0.340  0.312  0.333  0.330  0.318  0.315  0.405  0.357  0.319 
0.26  0.24  0.20  0.14  0.20  0.24  0.22  0.22  0.19  0.20  0.14  0.20  0.21 
Before transfers 
Households 
< 50% average income (%) 
Households 
42.5  37.1  36.0  37.4  39.6  40.6  42.0  40.5  35.9  37.7  39.0  42.6  39.4 
< 65% average income(%)  45.5  42.5  41.1  44.2  45.6  46.2  46.4  45.0  42.7  41.9  46.3  47.2  44.5 
After transfers 
Households 
< 50% average income (%) 
Households 
13.0  8.5  12.8  23.7  19.1  15.7  21.2  17.7  14.5  13.6  28.8  22.8  17.1 
< 65% average income(%)  26.9  22.9  24.8  35.5  34.1  29.3  38.1  30.6  31.9  29.6  40.3  37.7  30.6 
Change(% point) 
Households 
<50% average income 
Households 
29.5  28.6  23.2  13.7  20.5  24.9  20.8  22.7  21.5  24.1  10.3  19.8  22.3 
< 65% average income  18.6  19.6  16.3  8.7  11.5  16.9  8.2  14.4  10.8  12.3  6.0  9.5  13.9 
Income distribution 
after transfers 
Social transfers have the effect of re-
ducing the dispersion of income be-
tween households  markedly  in  all 
countries, which, of course, is only to 
be expected, the largest reduction oc-
curring at the bottom end of  the income 
scale for households which have little 
or no other source of income but the 
social  protection system.  They also, 
however, have the effect of widening 
the difference in income disparities be-
tween Member States, partly because 
of  the differing scale of  transfers noted 
above, partly because of  differences in 
the way they are distributed between 
income groups. 
After transfers, income remained more 
evenly distributed in Denmark in 1993 
than in any other Member State (the 
Gini coefficient being 0.25), with the 
distribution  in  Germany  (0.29)  also 
being more even than in  most other 
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countries, though slightly below that in 
Belgium (0.28), which had the second 
most even distribution.  At the other 
end of the  scale,  income  was  least 
evenly distributed in Portugal (where 
the Gini was 0.41 ), with Greece having 
the  next  most  uneven  distribution 
(0.37), followed by the UK (0.36). In 
between, the distribution in Spain, Ire-
land and Italy was similar in each case 
and slightly more uneven than average 
(with  the  Gini  being  around  0.33-
0.34  ), and in France, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands,  a  little  less  uneven 
than average (0.31--0.32). 
The  narrowing  of disparities 
achieved  by  social  transfers  was, 
therefore, greatest in Belgium, which 
had a wider than average dispersion 
of income before transfers  and the 
second narrowest after, followed by 
France,  where  the  dispersion  was 
also wider than average before trans-
fers but narrower afterwards. In both 
cases, the effect of transfers on in-
come distribution reflects the scale of 
these, which was larger than in other 
Member States  (Graph 42).  At the 
same time, the reduction in income 
disparities in Denmark was similar to 
that in France, but the relative scale 
of  transfers was much less. Similarly, 
the reduction in Ireland was much the 
same as in Italy, but the amount trans-
ferred was significantly greater in the 
latter than the former, implying that 
transfers were more effective in nar-
rowing income disparities in Ireland 
than in Italy. Much the same is true 
of Germany and the UK, on the one 
hand, and Spain and the Netherlands, 
on the other, a  similar reduction in 
disparities  resulting  from  larger 
transfers in the latter two countries 
than in the former two. 
The effect of social transfers  on in-
come distribution was least evident in 
Greece  and  Portugal,  where  the 
amount transferred was less than in the 
rest of  the Union, though in Greece, the 
scale of transfers was greater than in Portugal, implying that they were less 
effective in these terms. 
The effect of transfers 
on low income 
households 
Nevertheless, as noted above, changes 
in  the  value  of Gini  coefficients  are 
summary measures of changes in the 
overall distribution of income and do 
not necessarily  indicate what is  hap-
pening at the lower end of the distribu-
tion which is of greatest relevance in 
the present context. In practice, there 
are  some differences in the effect of 
social transfers on households with the 
lowest levels of income fTom that im-
plied by changes in the Ginis. In par-
ticular, the reduction in the proportion 
of households with less than half aver-
age income and with less than 65% of 
the average  was  greater in Denmark 
(by 28
1
/ 2 percentage points in the for-
mer case) than in France (25 percent-
age points), even though the reduction 
in the Gini was much the same, while, 
similarly in Germany and the Nether-
lands, the reduction (of 23 and 24 per-
centage  points,  respectively)  was 
greater than in the  UK or Spain (20 
percentage  points),  where  again  the 
Gini was reduced by the same amount 
(Graph  43).  In addition,  in  Greece, 
where the reduction in the Gini was the 
same as in Pmtugal, the proportion of 
households with income of under half 
the average was reduced by more than 
in the latter (131 /2  percentage points as 
against 1  01 /2 ). 
These comparisons reflect in some de-
gree the extent to  which social trans-
fers were concentrated on low income 
households.  They  also  reflect,  how-
ever, the underlying, pre-transfer, dis-
tribution of income, which was more 
even in Denmark than France (or any-
where  else),  in  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands than in the UK or Spain 
and in Greece than in Portugal. The 
amount of transfers required to  bring 
households with below 50% of aver-
age income up to this level was, there-
fore,  less  in  the  fonner countries  in 
each pairing than in the latter. 
Even after social transfers,  a signifi-
cant proportion of households in most 
countries remain with income of less 
than  50%  of the  national  average, 
which is  the  measure of the poverty 
level of income conventionally used 
(and which, moreover, was agreed as 
a working definition by the Council of 
Ministers  in  December  1984).  This 
proportion, as indicated above, is grea-
test in Portugal, where around 29% of 
households had a poverty level of in-
come  in  1993  according  to  this 
mea ure,  and  second  highest  in 
Greece,  where  the  figure  was  just 
under 24%. The propmtion was only 
slightly lower in the UK (23%), though 
given the much higher level of  average 
income here than in either of the other 
two  countries,  the  absolute  level  of 
income received even by households 
below the poverty line so defmed was 
markedly higher. 
Since  the  countries  with  the  next 
highest  propmtions  are  Ireland  and 
Spain  (21%  and  19%,  respectively), 
which are also countJ.ies with income 
per head- or per household- below 
the  nion average, there is some asso-
ciation between low income and the 
relative  number  of households  with 
income below the poverty level. Simi-
larly, in high income Member States, a 
42  Social transfers as a share of household income 
and reduction in income inequality in Member 
43  Households with less than half average net 
income, before and after social transfers in 
Member States, 1993  States, 1993 
% net household income  % total households  D Before transfers 
• After transfers 
Reduction in Gini coefficient  .  ------~- - 0.30  40  50  50 
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- 85 -relatively  low  proportion  of house-
holds tend to have poverty-levels of 
income-only 81 /2% in Denmark and 
13%  in  Belgium and Germany.  The 
association,  however,  is  not  syste-
matic, in the sense that Luxembourg, 
the  country with the highest income 
per head in the Union by some way, 
has proportionately more households 
with  income below  the  poverty  line 
than in these three countries, while, as 
noted above, the UK, has a higher pro-
portion than either Spain or Ireland. 
To some extent, this relationship re-
flects the greater ability of the more 
prosperous Member States to finance 
social transfers and, accordingly, to 
provide  assistance  to  households 
with little or  no income from employ-
ment or financial assets, the relative 
number of  which, as indicated above, 
was much the same in most Member 
States. At the same time, as also in-
dicated above, there is by no means a 
perfect association between the scale 
of transfers and the amount of these 
that are distributed to the lowest in-
come  households  or,  as  shown 
below, the allocation of the amount 
which  is  transferred  between  the 
households concerned. 
The scale of poverty 
T
he  relative  number of house-
holds with below 50% of aver-
age income is only a partial indicator 
of  the scale of  the poverty problem in 
different  Member States,  defining 
poverty in this sense. The extent to 
which  households  fall  below  this 
level  is  also  of relevance.  If, for 
example, households below the pov-
erty line had an  income level only 
slightly below half the national aver-
age  this  would  lead  to  a  different 
assessment of the scale of the prob-
lem-and the effectiveness of  social 
protection systems - than if it were 
substantially below. 
One way of measuring this is to esti-
mate the amount of  additional transfers 
that  would  be  necessary  in  each 
country to bring all households below 
half average income up  to this level, 
assuming, of  course, that it were appro-
priately allocated between them  (not 
an easy matter in 
reality given the 
44  Increase in social transfers needed to raise all 
households above the poverty line (after 
transfers) in Member States, 1993 
difficulty  of 
identifying  such 
households  and 
the lack of infor-
mation  about 
their  income). 
This  also,  of 
course, gives  an 
indication of 
how much extra 
expenditure  on 
social  protec-
tion  would  be 
required  to  era-
dicate  this  par-
25 
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given the (relatively narrow) way it is 
being defined. 
The calculation shows that over the 
Union as a whole, an increase in so-
cial  transfers  of just under 10%  in 
1993  would have been sufficient to 
bring the income of  all households up 
to  at  least  half the  average  in  the 
countries where they are located, as-
suming  this  additional  sum  was 
transferred from those well above the 
poverty line  to  avoid them  sinking 
below it when the counterpart taxes 
or contributions are levied. (Alterna-
tively, an equivalent amount of  trans-
fer  could  have  been diverted from 
those  well  above  the  poverty  line, 
who received a significant proportion 
of the total as indicated below, with-
out any overall increase in total trans-
fers.) In Denmark, it could have been 
achieved with a rise of under 3% in 
transfers and in Belgium and Luxem-
• 
bourg, one of around 6% (Graph 44  ). 
On the other hand, in Portugal, trans-
fers  would have needed to increase 
by  almost  25%  and  in  Greece,  by 
around 19%, significantly more than 
in the UK (12%), despite the share of 
households with below half average 
income being only slightly higher. 
Indeed, there are some revealing dif-
ferences between the extra transfers 
required and the share of households 
with  income  less  than half the  na-
tional  average.  In  Ire1and,  for 
example, where this share was above 
that in most other countries, the addi-
tional  transfers  amount  to  around 
7%,  lower than  in  most countries, 
including Germany and the Nether-
lands  (around 81 /2%  in both cases), 
where the share was much less. This 
implies  that  the  extent  to  which 
households  fell  below  the  poverty 
line was,  on average, much less  in Ireland than in these two countries -
as,  indeed, in the UK as  compared 
with Greece. To a smaller extent, the 
same  is  true  of France,  where  the 
required  rise  in  transfers  is  only 
around 6
1/z%, again less than in Ger-
many or the Netherlands, where the 
share of households with below half 
average income was lower. 




n practice, households with income 
below half the average level before 
transfers receive most of the amount 
that is transferred in all Member States. 
Over the Union as a whole, over three-
quarters  of social  transfers  went  to 
such households  in  1993.  However, 
whereas  the  proportion  was  around 
75% in most countries- and almost 
as  high as  80% in France - it  was 
significantly  below  this  in  Portugal 
(  69%) and Greece (70% ), the countries 
with the lowest overall scale of trans-
fers in the Union. The relatively large 
number of households in these Mem-
ber States with income below half the 
average after transfers, therefore, re-
flects not only the smaller amount of 
income which is transferred than else-
where but also the smaller share which 
goes to the poorest households. 
The counterpart of  this is the relatively 
large  share  of transfers  in these two 
countries going to households with in-
come above average before transfers. 
In 1993, 16% of the total went to such 
households, a higher proportion than 
anywhere else in the Union, and given 
that under 40% of households are in-
cluded in this income group, the aver-
age amount received was significant. 
The proportion of transfers  going to 
households in this group was the same 
in Belgium, though their relative num-
ber was higher,  and only marginally 
lower in Spain and Italy. By contrast, 
only 9% of transfers went to house-
holds with above average income in 
Germany and France (though the aver-
age amount received was much more 
in the latter than the former) and only 
10% in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Most of the  households  on which 
transfers are concentrated had little 
or no other source of  income. Indeed, 
over 60% of transfers in most coun-
tries went to households with income 
of under 20% of the average before 
transfers in 1993. The figure for pen-
sions alone was even higher at over 
70% in the majority of countries, im-
plying  that  most  pensioner  house-
holds  were  solely  reliant  on  the 
income received from these. Over the 
Union as a whole, over 80% of pen-
sions  went  to  households  with  in-
come of less  than half the average 
before transfers, and in Germany and 
France,  over  85%.  The  proportion 
was less than elsewhere in the four 
Southern Member States, at around 
75%,  reflecting  the  greater pre-
valence  of the  extended  family, 
though it was also around this level 
in the UK, where income from capi-
tal was relatively important. 
As might be expected, transfers other 
than pensions are less concentrated 
on the poorest households, partly be-
cause  in  many  cases  they  are  in-
tended  to  provide  replacement 
income for a temporary period, partly 
because they include family or child 
benefits  payable  to  everyone.  Just 
over half of unemployment benefits 
in 1993 were paid to households with 
income of less than 50% of average 
before transfers, the proportion being 
as high as 7  5% in Ireland and Lux-
embourg. The proportion, however, 
was less than half  in all four Southern 
Member States,  and  only  around 
40% in Italy and as low as 22% in 
Greece, reflecting in part the fact that 
more  of the  unemployed  live  in 
households with other people in work 
than in Northern Member States, as 
noted in Chapter 1, in part the relative 
concentration of benefits on the bet-
ter paid members of the work force. 
Other  benefits,  including  those  for 
sickness, disability and children, were 
more  concentrated  on the  poorest 
households, just over 60% of the total 
amount transferred in the Union going 
to households with income below half 
the  average.  For these  transfers,  the 
concentration on such households was 
greatest in Denmark and the UK, their 
share  being just under 75%  in  both 
cases (in the UK, partly because of  the 
inclusion of income support to the un-
employed, especially long-term unem-
ployed, in these),  while again it was 
relatively low in Greece and Portugal, 
the share being only around 50%. This, 
however, was more than in Belgium or 
Luxembourg, where households with 
under half average  income  received 
under 45% of the total transferred. 
This, however, is only part of the pic-
ture.  While  most transfers  go  to  the 
lowest income households, they are by 
no means evenly distributed between 
them in any of the countries. If they 
were,  then  poverty  as  defmed  here 
would be eliminated. This can be illus-
trated by the simple exercise of  adding 
the  average  transfer  per  household 
going to those below the poverty line 
before transfers  (ie  the total  amount 
transferred divided by the number of 
-87-households  with  income  from  other 
sources  ~f less than half the average) 
to  the  average  income  from  other 
sources. The result is a level of  income 
well above the poverty line (after trans-
fers)  in all  Member States, including 
Greece and Portugal. 
A further exercise,  which is  instruc-
tive, is to calculate the total amount of 
transfers which would be required to 
lift the income of all households from 
below the poverty line-defmed after 
transfers  - to  the  line  itself (ie  to 
transfer just enough to each household 
with income of  less than half the aver-
age to bring its income up precisely to 
this level, which by defmition would 
eliminate poverty). In the Union as a 
whole, this aim could be achieved with 
58% of  the total amount actually trans-
ferred in 1993, the proportion varying 
from around 50% in Denmark (where 
pre-transfer  income  is  more  evenly 
distributed than elsewhere) and France 
(where the  scale of total  transfers  is 
large)  and  around  55%  in  Northern 
mainland Member States to just over 
70% in Portugal (where transfers are 
relatively small) and just under 70% in 
Ireland  and  the  UK  (where  income 
before transfers is relatively unevenly 
distributed  and  where,  therefore,  for 
many  households,  the  income  from 
other sources falls substantially below 
the poverty line) (Graph 45). 
The clear implication is that the trans-
fers  going to households with the lo-
west  levels  of income  from  other 
sources  are  relatively  unevenly  dis-
tributed between them, with some re-
ceiving inadequate amounts to  bring 
their total income up to the poverty line 
and others receiving much more than 
this, so having their income raised to 
well above the line and, in a number of 
cases, to  well above the average.  As 
indicated below, this is predominantly 
explained by the uneven distribution of 
old-age pensions,  which  account for 




hereas the distribution of  trans-
fers  other than pensions tends 
to  be  slanted  towards  low  income 
households,  measuring  income  here 
after rather than 
45  Social transfers needed to raise all households 
above the poverty line if appropriately 
redistributed in Member States, 1993 
before  transfers, 
this  is  not  the 
case for pensions 
in  many  Mem-
ber  States.  In 
other  words, 
though  most  of 
households  who 
received  pen-
sions had little or 
no income com-
ing  from  other 
sources,  for  a 
significant  pro-
portion,  the 
80 
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resulted in their net income being in-
creased considerably in relation to that 
of households in general. 
Indeed,  the  only  Member States 
where pensions went disproportion-
ately to households with below aver-
age income after transfers rather than 
above  were  Belgium,  Ireland  and, 
most especially, Denmark. In three 
other Member States - Germany, 
the UK and Luxembourg - the dis-
tribution  of pensions  between  in-
come  groups  was  broadly 
proportionate, while in the other six 
(the  four  Southern  Member  States 
plus  France  and  the  Netherlands), 
households  in  the  upper  income 
groups  received  a  disproportionate 
amount of the total transferred in the 
form of old-age pensions. (The dis-
tribution of pensions as well as other 
transfers between households ranked 
according to post-transfer income is 
shown  in  Graphs  30--41  above;  in 
these  cases,  the  more  convex  the 
curve, the greater the amount going 
to lower income households.) 
In terms of the households with the 
lowest income levels, in none of the 
Member States did households with 
under  half average  income  after 
transfers  receive a  disproportionate 
share of  old-age pensions and only in 
Denmark was their share proportion-
ate. In France, for example, the 16% 
of households  with  income  of this 
level received only 7% of total pen-
sions and in Italy, the 18% of house-
holds in question received only 8% 
of total pensions (Table 6). 
By contrast, the 13% of households 
with income of 11 /2 times the average 
or more in France received 25% of 
total pensions, in Portugal, the  17% 
of households  in  this  category  re-Table 6 - Distribution of transfers, households and income by broad income 
group, 1993 
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Unemployment benefits  18 
Other social  12 
Household numbers  13 
Total income  4  4  7  7  5  9 




















ceived 28%  and  in  Greece and the 
Netherlands,  the  15-16%  received 
26%  of the  total,  implying  that  in 
these countries, pensions were rela-
tively unevenly distributed between 
households - indeed, in France and 
the  Netherlands,  not  much  less  so 
than total income. 
Social transfers other than pensions 
were, as  might be expected, slanted 
more towards lower income house-
holds. Nevertheless, in Greece, Por-
tugal  and  Italy,  these  too  were 
disproportionately  paid  to  house-
holds  with  above  average  income 













































































































































below the average, though it should 
be borne  in mind that  the  scale  of 
such transfers was much less than in 
other countries and the coverage nar-
rower.  For example,  in  all  three 
cases, even unemployment benefits 
went more to  the richer households 
than  the  poorer  ones,  29%  of the 
amount paid in  Italy,  for  example, 
going to the 17% of  households with 
income of 11 /2  times the average or 
more  and  in  Portugal,  only  10% 
going to the 29% of households with 
income  of under  half the  average, 
again partly reflecting the relatively 
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%total 
19  9 
32  17 
29  19 
23  17 









































living in  households with people in 
work. 
By contrast, in Ireland, where unem-
ployment  benefits  are  flat -rate  and 
relatively low, 42% of  the total trans-
ferred went to the 21% of  households 
with income of under half the aver-
age and in the UK, which has a simi-
lar system, 32% went to the 23% of 
households in this category. On the 
other hand,  in  the  other  Member 
States,  though  households  with 
below average income received a dis-
proportionate  share  of unemploy-
ment  benefits  and  other  social 
transfers, this was not so in all cases 
-89-Table 7 - Characteristics of households with low income and share of 
household types with low income, 1993 
B 
Composition of households (% total) 
Pensioner  23 
Couples with children  21 
Lone parents  3 


























Composition of households with income < 50% average (%) 
Pensioner  29  42  29  39 
Couples with children  18  6  13  14 
Lone parents  6  3  7  1 
Childless households  27  45  38  17 
Other  20  3  13  29 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Households with income < 50% average (% household type) 
Pensioner  17  15  18  44 
Couples with children  11  4  9  16 
Lone parents  23  8  34  27 
Childless households  12  8  12  19 
Other  12  2  1  0  19 
All households  13  9  13  24 
Households with income < 65% average (% household type) 
Pensioner  41  44  36  61 
Couples with children  19  1  0  19  26 
Lone parents  50  29  51  33 
Childless households  23  18  21  29 
Other  22  12  22  31 











































































of households with the lowest levels 
· of income. Indeed, in Denmark, the 
23%  of households with income of 
less than 65% of  the average received 
only 18% of unemployment benefits 
and 17% of other transfers, which in 
this  case,  reflects  the  relatively 
generous level of payment, while in 
the Netherlands, they received a pro-
portionate amount. 
Who are the poor? 
T
he final step in the analysis is to 
examine  the  characteristics  of 
households with low income, espe-
cially  those  with  levels  below  the 
poverty  line  even  after  transfers, 
since these represent the households 
which merit the closest consideration 
in any reform of  the social protection 
system. They are also the ones which 
existing social welfare arrangements 
have, in some sense, failed to assist 
sufficiently to lift their income above 
the poverty level, though it should be 
emphasised that social policy in the 
Member States concerned is not spe-
cifically aimed at achieving this ob-
jective defined in this particular way. 
In other words,  while  the  relief of 
poverty is  a major aim in all coun-
tries, the precise interpretation of  this 





















































































































































For purposes of analysis, households 
can be divided into five groups: 
•  pensioner  households,  or  those 
with a single person or a couple 
of 65  or over, which accounted 
for  some  22%  of  total  house-
holds  in  the Union in  1993, the 
proportion ranging from 25% in 
Denmark and 24% in the UK to 
18%  in  Portugal  and  17%  in 
Spain and Ireland; 
•  lone parents, or households with 
someone  of  16  or  over  living 
with  a  child  or  children  under 
16,  which  accounted  for  just 
21 /2%  of total households in  the Union, though 4% in the UK and 
1%  in  Greece,  Spain,  Italy  and 
Luxembourg; 
•  couples under 65  with children, 
which represented  20% of total 
households  in  the  Union,  but 
27% in Ireland, 26% in Portugal 
and 25% in Spain, though only 
15%  in  Denmark  and  18%  in 
Italy; 
•  couples  or  people  living  alone 
without  children,  which  ac-
counted for  30% of households 
in  the  Union,  but 46% in  Den-
mark  and  42%  in  the  Nether-
lands, though only 14% in Spain 
and Portugal and 18% in Ireland; 
•  other  households,  which  are 
those  whose  members  are  both 
over 65 and under 65, those with 
more than  two people of 16  or 
over and so on (ie in many cases, 
extended  households),  which 
represented 25%  of the  total  in 
the  Union,  but  44%  in  Spain, 
41%  in  Portugal  and  38%  in 
Italy and only 10% in Denmark, 
16% in the Netherlands and 17% 
in Germany. 
Pensioner households,  as  defined 
above,  accounted  for  30%  of all 
households  with  income  of under 
half the average in the Union in 1993, 
proportionately more than their share 
of  the total (22%). In Denmark, how-
ever,  42%  of households  with this 
level of income consisted of people 
of 65 or over (though since very few 
households overall had income this 
low,  the  relative  number involved 
was also low, as indicated below), in 
Greece,  39% and in  the  UK,  38% 
(Table  7).  On the  other  hand,  in 
Spain,  pensioner households repre-
sented only 18% of those in this in-
come  group,  which,  nevertheless, 
was slightly higher than their share of 
all households. Moreover, Spain was 
the only country where the propor-
tion  was less  than 24%, and in  all 
Member States, the figure was higher 
than the  overall proportion of pen-
sioner households. In general, there-
fore,  pensioner households  were 
more likely to have a poverty level of 
income than other types. 
Lone parents with at least one child 
under 16 were also in most countries 
much more likely than other house-
holds to have income below the pov-
erty line.  In the Union as  a  whole, 
they accounted for 5'/2% of  all house-
holds in this category in 1993, though 
for 11% in Ireland and 1  0% in the UK 
and  only  1%  in  all  four  Southern 
Member States. 
Each of the three other types house-
hold were, in general, less likely than 
these two kinds to  have income of 
under half the average - the main 
exception being couples with child-
ren in Luxembourg- though in all 
Member States, they represented the 
largest number of households  with 
poverty levels of income. 
Low income by 
household type 
T
he chances of  a particular house-
hold type having income below 
the poverty line can be inferred from 
the  above figures.  They can,  how-
ever,  be  calculated  more  directly. 
Such a calculation shows that some 
36%  of lone  parents  in  the  Union 
with a child under 16 had a level of 
income  which  was  under  half the 
average in 1993, and 55% income of 
below 65% of average. Almost all of 
the  people concerned were women 
(as  indicated in  Chapter 1).  In Ire-
land, the proportion of lone parents 
with a poverty level of  income was as 
high as  65%  and in the  UK,  53%, 
while in both countries, over three-
quarters of lone parents had income 
under 65% of  average. These figures 
are by some way higher than in the 
rest of the Union- the Netherlands 
apart, where 73% of  lone parents had 
an income of under 65% of average 
- and  contrast  markedly  with  the 
position in Denmark, where only 8% 
of lone parents households had in-
come  of under half the  average. 
Moreover, in Spain, Italy and Lux-
embourg, lone parents  were hardly 
any  more likely to  have income of 
under 65% of the average than other 
households. Nevertheless, except for 
these three countries, in all Member 
States,  people  living  alone  with  a 
child  under  16  were  significantly 
more  likely  to  have  a  low  income 
level than households in general. 
For pensioner households, there is an 
equally  marked  variation  between 
countries. In the Union as  a whole, 
24%  of households consisting of a 
single person or a  couple of 65  or 
over had an income level below half 
the  average  and 46% - ie  almost 
half-one of under 65% of average. 
In  Portugal,  however,  over half 
(55%) of pensioner households had 
income of under half the average and 
71% one of under 65% of average, 
while  in  Greece, 44% fell  into  the 
former  category  and  61%  into  the 
latter, less than in Ireland (67%) and 
the UK (62%). In these four coun-
tries, therefore, retirement from paid 
employment tends to lead to low le-
vels of income for most households. 
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are  much  lower,  with  only  around 
20% or less of pensioner households 
having income below half the aver-
age in each case and under half hav-
ing income of 65% or less. (It should 
be noted that although 42% of house-
holds  with  half average  income  in 
Denmark were pensioner ones, only 
15% of pensioner households had an 
income this low.) However, as in the 
case  of lone  parents,  these  propor-
tions are, in all countries, higher than 
for other types of household. 
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systems more employment-friendly 
S
ystems of unemployment benefit 
have become an increasingly im-
portant  focus  of policy  concern 
throughout the Union as  the number 
out of  work and receiving income sup-
port has risen. Although the expendi-
ture to which they give rise is,  in  all 
Member States, a relatively small pro-
portion of  total spending on social pro-
tection,  as  noted  in  the  previous 
chapter, the tendency for it to increase 
during  periods  of increasing  unem-
ployment when budget deficits are also 
usually widening because of  depressed 
levels  of tax  revenue gives  it  added 
significance. Moreover, the growth of 
expenditure has been accompanied by 
growing concern about the  potential 
effect of benefit levels on incentives to 
look for work and, related to this, about 
the persistently large numbers of  long-
term unemployed among those being 
supported. 
In most Member States, changes have 
been made to benefit systems in recent 
years  with the  twin aims of curbing 
expenditure and of reducing the num-
bers  dependent  on  income  support. 
This approach has been endorsed by 
the  Commission  in  its  recent  Com-
munication, Modernising and improv-
ing social protection in the European 
Union as well as by Member States at 
the Luxembourg Job Summit, both of 
which advocated a more employment-
friendly  stance  by  shifting  from 
passive  measures  to  more  active 
policies designed to  increase the em-
ployability of  those out of work and to 
help them fmd jobs. 
The  concern  of this  chapter  is  to 
examine specific policy developments 
in Member States in  the light of this 
Communication,  the  guidelines  con-
tained in it and the European Council 
conclusions  at Luxembourg.  In  par-
ticular, it considers the extent to which 
there  has  been  to  move  towards  an 
'activation' of policy and the relative 
emphasis placed on measures to limit 
entitlement to benefit and the amount 
received as opposed to more positive 
action  to  help  the  unemployed  into 
work  and  increase  their  chances  of 
fmding a job. It begins, however, by 
examining the philosophy underlying 
the shift in policy stance towards ac-
cording more weight to  incentive ef-
fects  and  the justification for this  in 
terms of the actual level of unemploy-
ment benefits relative to earnings from 
work. 
Shifts in policy 
emphasis 
S
ince they were first introduced, at 
the end of  the 19th century, unem-
ployment benefits have had two main 
aims:  providing replacement income 
for workers losing their jobs and help-
ing to regulate the functioning of the 
labour market. As the number out of 
work has risen, the increasing cost of 
providing  support  has  put  growing 
pressure  on  sources  of finance, 
whether these consist mainly of social 
contributions or general taxation. It has 
also prompted, along with the rise in 
dependency and concern about the so-
cial  exclusion  of those  affected,  a 
growing interest in a reorientation of 
policy  effort  away  from  passive  to-
wards active measures. Indeed, from 
both an economic and a social perspec-
tive, it is undeniably more efficient to 
devote resources to getting the unem-
ployed back to work ratherthan simply 
supporting their income. 
Although  the  principle  is  indisput-
able,  the  policy  can be  interpreted 
and put into effect in very different 
ways.  On the  one  hand,  it can  be 
achieved  through  reducing  unem-
ployment  compensation,  or tighte-
ning the conditions for entitlement to 
support, so encouraging, or 'activat-
ing',  the  unemployed  to  intensify 
their efforts to find a job. On the other 
hand,  it  can  be  conceived  of as 
strengthening the assistance given to 
the  unemployed  to  get  back  into 
work, through such measures as the 
provision of training, or re-training, 
counselling,  career guidance  and 
help with job search, which can be 
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come  support to  enable  the  unem-
ployed to  spend time  finding  a job 
best suited to their skills and qualifi-
cations. 
These are not mutually contradictory 
approaches.  Indeed, in many Mem-
ber States, the two have been pursued 
in  parallel,  income  support  being 
made less generous, especially as the 
period spent out of work lengthens, 
with  the  aim  of accelerating  job 
search, at the same time as more ef-
fort has been put into active measures 
to  help the unemployed find  a job. 
The relative  weight attached to  the 
two  has,  however,  varied  between 
countries  and  has  been  very  much 
influenced  by  prevailing  economic 
conditions and budget constraints on 
expenditure growth. This has tended 
to  increase the attraction of the first 
approach, since it serves to curb ex-
penditure at the same time as  it in-
creases incentives to  look for work, 
while the second involves adding to 
expenditure  rather  than  subtracting 
from it,  unless there is a parallel re-
stiucturing of spending, at least until 
the measures concerned begin to re-
duce  the  number of benefit  claim-
ants. 
The activation of  policy has extended 
beyond the unemployment compen-
sation  system  alone  to  encompass 
other areas  of social  protection, 
disability  benefits,  early  retirement 
pensions  and  minimum  income 
guarantee  schemes,  in  particular, 
partly  because  these  are,  in  effect, 
alternative ways of  providing income 
support.  Indeed,  the  significant 
growth  in  the  past in  the  numbers 
being supported by these means has 
byen  partly  due  to  their politically 
attractive effect of  reducing the num-
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ber registered as unemployed. More 
fundamentally, however, they serve 
to take the people concerned off the 
labour market, so relieving competi-
tion  for  scarce  jobs  and  making  it 
easier for others, younger people in 
particular, to find work. It is as much 
the expansion of recipients of these 
kinds  of benefit  as  unemployment 
compensation  which  has  increased 
the number dependent on social wel-
fare in Member States and prompted 
a  reassessment  of policy.  This  has 
been reinforced by the growing rec-
ognition  of the  problems  of social 
exclusion suffered by such people. 
Moreover, there are signs of increas-
ing concern about the complexity of 
systems of social protection in rela-
tion to those out of work which has 
resulted  from  the  often  piecemeal 
changes made in response to  rising 
unemployment  and  labour  market 
imbalances.  Compensation systems 
in most countries now  consist of a 
combination of: 
•  insurance-based  benefits,  which 
are payable for a fixed period of 
time  according  to  the  employ-
ment record and age of  the person 
concerned; 
•  social assistance, which is usually 
means-tested and comes into ef-
fect if there is  no  entitlement to 
insurance benefits  or if this  has 
elapsed; 
•  the other income support schemes 
listed above, which may or may 
not be means-tested; 
•  benefits  in  kind,  such as  assist-
ance  with  housing  costs  which 
may  be  linked to  the  receipt of 
income support. 
The general effect is a lack of trans-
parency  for  beneficiaries,  and 
accordingly  a  high  degree  of 
uncertainty about the consequences 
of any  changes  in  their circum-
stances, which is liable to discourage 
them  from  trying  to  improve  their 
position  and  from  actively  looking 
for a job, quite apart from any disin-
centives  created  by  the  level  of 
benefits in relation to potential earn-
ings from work. An additional effect 
is that it makes it difficult to describe 
the systems in operation in Member 
States  and  to  assess  the  relative 
amounts received by those being sup-
ported. 




he general re-assessment of le-
vels of unemployment compen-
sation which has occurred across the 
Union reflects a combination of con-
cerns. Not only is it aimed at curbing 
expenditure, but, as noted above, it is 
designed  to  increase  the  financial 
pressure on the unemployed to find a 
job. It is also a response to changing 
attitudes  towards  redistributive 
policies in economies where real in-
come growth has been depressed for 
some time and where a growing re-
luctance to accept large-scale social 
transfers  and  the  high  tax  regimes 
which they imply is evident in many 
Member States (in changing political 
philosophies,  in  particular).  While 
popular support for systems of social 
protection remains strong, it is clear 
that  such  support is  conditional on 
both the level of benefits being per-
ceived as fair and reasonable in rela-
tion to the income earned by those in work and on entitlement to  benefit 
being properly controlled. 
At the same time, Governments have 
to  strike a balance between curbing 
expenditure and increasing the finan-
cial pressure on the unemployed to 
look for work, on the one hand, and 
providing  acceptable  levels  of in-
come support,  on the  other.  In  this 
regard, it is apparent that the balance 
has shifted, in part because interpre-
tations of the level of transfer which 
is  considered  as  acceptable  have 
changed.  Moreover,  whereas  pre-
viously there was some emphasis on 
the  need for  income  support  to  be 
high enough to give the unemployed 
sufficient time to find a suitable job, 
which was regarded as  not only in 
their interests but also in the interests 
of improving the functioning of the 
labour market and increasing macro-
economic efficiency,  the  main  aim 
now is to accelerate job search activ-
ity and get people back into work as 
soon as possible. This reflects not just 
a concern to keep expenditure down 
but also a recognition of the change 
in  economic  circumstances,  of the 
reduction in jobs on offer and of the 
possible need for the unemployed to 
seek a different kind of job than the 
one held before, combined with the 
evidence that the chances of finding 
work diminish as the spell of unem-
ployment lengthens. 
In practice, the conflicting objectives 
in this regard,  of providing accept-
able  levels  of compensation  while 
encouraging job search activity and 
curbing expenditure, have  been re-
conciled  in  a  number  of Member 
States by  tightening the criteria for 
eligibility for unemployment benefit 
and broadening the definition of  what 
is  deemed to  be  a  suitable job.  In 
particular, recipients have to demon-
strate that they are both actively seek-
ing work and, after a time, are willing 
to accept any reasonable offer of  em-
ployment if  they are capable of  doing 
the job, irrespective of how it com-
pares to what they were doing before. 
This kind of solution makes it diffi-
cult to evaluate the incentives to find 
a job implied by unemployment com-
pensation systems in different coun-
tries or how they have changed over 
time - or,  from  the  opposite  per-
spective, the incentive to remain out 
of work  or deliberately  to  become 
unemployed - since their strength 
will depend not only on the level of 
benefits payable in relation to poten-
tial earnings from work but also on 
the conditions imposed on receiving 
benefit.  Moreover,  the  difficulty  is 
further complicated by the fact that 
what matters in the latter regard is not 
the  statutory  instruments  in  force, 
which can readily be examined and 
compared between countries, but the 
way  these  are  interpreted  and  en-
forced, which is much more difficult 
to assess. 
Accordingly, it is equally hard to pre-
dict the effect on unemployment, or on 
the number of  people receiving income 
support,  of the  changes  to  systems 
which have been made in recent years 
and which are now in the process of 
being  implemented.  Although  they 
might be expected to reduce the aver-
age  duration  of unemployment  as 
people take up jobs more quickly than 
they otherwise might do, if there is no 
increase in the jobs on offer, the fall in 
the numbers unemployed is likely to be 
limited (to the number of vacant jobs 
which  people  are  persuaded  to  take 
up). While there might be a faster tum-
over of  the unemployed, any reduction 
in  the  generosity  of benefits  could 
make people in work more reluctant to 
change their job because of the risk of 
becoming unemployed and more pre-
pared to remain in a job they are not 
suited for,  so  increasing job mismat-
ches  and  reducing  economic  effi-
ciency. 
The question of the effect on unem-
ployment  of the  benefit  systems  in 
operation is  one which has exercised 
economists for some time, particularly 
as the number of people out of work 
has risen. Though much research effort 
has been devoted to assessing the na-
ture and scale of  the effect, no satisfac-
tory  estimates  have  been  produced, 
largely  because  of the  difficulties 
noted above. Indeed, these difficulties 
have  led to  the  conclusion  that it  is 
much too simplistic to consider benefit 
levels alone and that it is essential to 
consider the compensation system as a 
whole, including the various controls 
and  restrictions  which  operate.  The 
widespread view across the Union is 
that while benefit systems may, in a 
number of countries, have contributed 
to  the  high  rates  of unemployment 
which now prevail and, in particular, 
to  the  substantial  numbers  of long-
term unemployed, they cannot plaus-
ibly  be  regarded  as  the  main  factor 
underlying  either.  Accordingly,  the 
measures now being taken to modify 
their operation might help to  reduce 
both, but they cannot be expected to 
represent the major part of  the solution 
to the problem. 
Benefit levels relative 
to earnings 
In practice, it is difficult to estimate 
levels of benefit in meaningful terms 
across the Union, ie in relation to the 
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Data from the ECHP give an insight into the wages which those experien-
cing a spell of unemployment were earning when employed or were paid 
when they returned to work.  Specifically, the data relate to the average 
monthly earnings from employment of those who were unemployed for at 
least three months during 1993, and drawing benefits, and in a full-time job 
for  at  least one month.  Although they  do not enable earnings received 
before becoming unemployed to be distinguished from those received from 
a job obtained after a person was unemployed, they, nevertheless, provide 
an  indication  of the  wage  which  the  men  and  women  concerned can 
command.  (In  this  sense, they are different from  'replacement rates' as 
nomally defined, which relate to benefits in relation to previous earnings 
from work.) 
The benefits included in the analysis are those linked to unemployment and 
cover social assistance as well as social insurance benefits. They exclude, 
however, transfers which are paid specifically to households, such as  to 
cover housing costs. They are measured net of any direct taxes or social 
contributions payable on them, except in France, where they include direct 
taxes not deducted at source. The average monthly amounts are calculated 
as  the  sum of benefits received during  1993  divided by  the  number of 
months of  unemployment. Earnings from employment are also net of  direct 
taxes and social contributions, except in France where they are gross of 
taxes not deducted at source, and are calculated in a similar way by taking 
the sum of earnings during 1993 and dividing by the number of months of 
employment. Those employed part-time are excluded from the analysis. 
earnings  which  someone  unem-
ployed  could  obtain  if they  were 
working, let alone to assess the effect 
of the various kinds of  restrictions on 
eligibility. Up to now, the only feas-
ible means of making estimates has 
been to construct models of replace-
ment rates-benefits relative to dis-
posable  income  when  in  work  -
containing details of the unemploy-
ment compensation system,  on the 
one hand, and of the tax system, on 
the other, and feeding into these as-
sumptions about the earnings and the 
personal characteristics of  the person 
unemployed (age, marital status and 
so  on).  The  new  European  Com-
munity  Household  Panel  (ECHP), 
however, gives for the first time an 
insight into the amounts actually re-
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ceived by those who are unemployed 
in  the  different  Member  States. 
Eventually, as the annual surveys of 
the panel (or 'waves') are carried out, 
it ought to be possible to  refine the 
analysis  and  to  indicate  how  these 
amounts are tending to  change over 
time. At present, data from the first 
wave only,  conducted  in  1994,  are 
available which relate to amounts re-
ceived from both benefits and earn-
ings during  1993. The data exclude 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, which 
did not participate, as well as, in part, 
the Netherlands, for which there are 
incomplete figures for 1993. 
In order to estimate the relationship 
between benefits and earnings from 
the  data,  the  analysis  has  to  be  re-
stricted to those who were both un-
employed and in full-time employ-
ment (defined as 30 hours a week or 
more) for at least part of 1993 (using 
the data from the ECHP on employ-
ment  status  of respondents  during 
each month of  the year). This enables 
the  actual  amount each  person  in-
cluded  in  the  panel received  in  the 
form  of unemployment  compensa-
tion (social assistance as well as in-
surance  benefits)  to  be  compared 
with their net eatnings from work, in 
each case calculated  on  a  monthly 
basis (see Box for details). To avoid 
possible  distortions  arising  from 
cases where the person concerned is 
unemployed  for  only  a  very  short 
period of time and may not have had 
time to claim benefit, the analysis is 
further  confined  to  those  unem-
ployed who were out of work for at 
least three months. 
According  to  the  ECHP,  around  a 
quarter of men aged 25 and over in 
the Union who were unemployed for 
at least three months during 1993 and 
in  full-time  employment  for  one 
month or more  received no  unem-
ployment-related  benefit  at  all 
(though  they  may  have  received 
transfers  not  linked  to  unemploy-
ment,  such  as  minimum  income 
allowances or even disability or sick-
ness benefits). For those aged under 
25, the figure was around a half. The 
proportion receiving benefits, how-
ever, varied markedly between coun-
tries, from virtually all men of 25 and 
over  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ger-
many,  Ireland  and  the  UK  to  only 
around a  third  in  Greece, Italy  and 
Portugal (Graph 46). There was even 
more  variation  for  men  under  25, 
with  under 20%  of these receiving 
benefits in  Greece, Italy and Portu-
gal. On average, a slightly lower propor-
tion of women aged 25 and over who 
were unemployed received compen-
sation than men (just over two-thirds 
overall), though the figure was signi-
ficantly  less  in  Germany,  Greece, 
Spain. Portugal and the UK (for those 
under 25, there are too few observa-
tions for most countries to give re-
liable results) (Graph 47). 
In a number of  Member States, there-
fore,  the  benefit  system  does  not 
seem to represent any disincentive at 
all  for  many of the  unemployed to 
look for work since they are  appar-
ently not entitled to benefit, though it 
should be emphasised that some of 
them may be eligible for other kinds 
of income support not related to un-
employment. The disincentive is par-
ticularly weak as regards those under 
25, who are less likely to qualify for 
either  unemployment-related  com-
pensation or other kinds of support. 
In terms of the amount received by 
the  unemployed entitled to  benefit, 
the monthly payment to men aged 25 
and  over averaged  around  45%  of 
their net monthly earnings when they 
were  working,  which,  it  should  be 
stressed can be in the job they moved 
into after being unemployed as well 
as the one they were in before becom-
ing  unemployed.  This figure,  how-
ever,  ranged from  77% in  Portugal 
(though the relatively small propor-
tion receiving benefit should be kept 
in  mind)  and  over 60%  in  Ireland, 
Denmark and France to only around 
25% in Greece and the UK, with the 
rate  in  Italy  being  just  below  the 
Union average, that in Belgium and 
Germany being just above (at around 
50%) and that in Spain, much further 
above (at 57%) (Graph 48). For those 
under  25,  the  number  of people 
covered is in most countries too small 
to give reliable estimates, though in 
Denmark, Spain, France and Ireland, 
where  the  number  is  sufficiently 
large, the replacement rate was simi-
lar to that for the older age group. 
For women, benefit levels in relation 
to  earnings  were,  for  the  most  part, 
slightly higher than those for men (at 
just under  60%  for  the  Union  as  a 
whole),  though  not  in  Belgium,  the 
UK, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. This 
may to some extent be a consequence 
of  the fact that women earned less than 
men when working (about 25% less so 
far as the total sample was concerned) 
and though in many cases the rate of 
benefit is related to previous earnings, 
payments to women may be less likely 
to be subject to a ceiling. It could also 
be  that the jobs taken up by women 
after  being  unemployed  had  lower 
rates of  pay in relation to benefit levels 
than those taken up by men. 
These figures need to be interpreted 
with some caution, not only because 
the people concerned may be receiv-
ing other transfers which are not spe-
cified and because the earnings from 
employment with which benefits are 
being compared can be either before 
or after the spell of unemployment, 
but  also  because  they  leave  out of 
account  benefits  in  kind,  such  as 
housing  allowances.  These are  im-
portant in some countries, such as the 
UK, where for some recipients they 
increase  significantly  the  effective 
amount  paid  (since  those  drawing 
benefits are eligible to have at least 
an average amount of  rent paid by the 
state in the UK, in addition to  local 
taxes, this can sometimes double the 
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effective  net  income  received). 
Since, however, such benefits relate 
to households rather than individuals 
(payment  depending  on  household 
rather  than  personal  income),  they 
are  difficult  to  take  into  account. 
Moreover,  since  they  are  also 
payable in many cases  to  those  on 
low incomes who are working (along 
with other in-work benefits for those 
with children in the UK and Ireland), 
they have a relatively small effect on 
the  comparison  of relative  income 
levels in the case of  low paid workers 
(or  those  whose  potential  earnings 
from  employment  are  relatively 
low), who account for a high propor-
tion of the unemployed (in the Union 
as a whole, average wages of those 
unemployed for at least three months 
during 1993 were around 20% lower 
than those of  all workers-see Box). 
Nevertheless, while the average level 
of benefits relative to earnings might 
indicate that overall the financial in-
centive to be unemployed rather than 
in  work  is  relatively  small  in  all 
Member  States,  the  average  could 
potentially  conceal  wide  variations 
between people. In other words, the 
distribution of benefit levels is as im-
portant in this context as the average. 
In practice, however, in most Mem-
ber States, there seem to be compara-
tively few  instances where benefits 
are so high that they might represent 
a  substantial  financial  disincentive 
for those concerned to be in employ-
ment.  Only in Ireland and Portugal 
was the proportion of transfer reci-
pients with benefits of 80% or more 
of net earnings from work over 40%, 
which in the case of Portugal, given 
the small numbers receiving benefit, 
implies that only  some  14%  of the 
unemployed  fell  into  this  category 
(Graph 49). In Denmark and France, ju t under a third of  benefit recipients 
had transfers of 80% or more of  earn-
ings,  while  in  all  other  Member 
States,  the  figure  was  less  than  a 
quarter, and in Greece, Italy and the 
UK,  under  1  0%  (zero  in  Greece). 
Moreover, in all countries, apart from 
Portugal,  Denmark and France, for 
over half of benefit  recipient ,  the 
amount received in tran fers relative 
to earnings was less than 65%. 
Much the  same is  true  for  women, 
though in thi  case,  there  are  three 
countries -Denmark, Germany and 
France - where  for  over  40% of 
those  receiving  benefit  the  amount 
obtained was  80% or more of earn-
ings (in Denmark,  orne 60% of reci-
pients), and two - Italy and Portugal 
- where around a third did (Graph 
50). In Greece  and  the  UK,  as  for 
men,  the  great  majority  of women 
had benefit levels of under 65% of 
earnings  and  in  all  countries,  apart 
from  Denmark,  Germany  and 
France, over half did. 
Furthermore, in all  Member States, 
the dominant cause of high benefit 
levels relative  to  earnings  was  low 
wages  when in  work.  Not only did 
those who experienced a spell of un-
employment in  1993  have  lower 
wages  on  average  than  those  who 
were employed throughout the year, 
but  the  wages  of tho  e  with  high 
benefit levels in relation to earnings 
were  particularly  low.  Denmark 
apart,  in  all  countries  the  average 
earnings of  men with benefits of 80% 
or more of earnings were under 60% 
of the  average  for  all  men,  and  in 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the UK, 
well  under  50%  of the  average 
(Graph  52).  For  women,  average 
earnings of those with high benefits 
in relation to earnings were less than 
The pay levels of those experiencing 
a spell of unemployment 
For the Union as a whole, the monthly net earnings of 
both men and women aged 25 to 64 experiencing a spell 
of unemployment in 19~3 were significantly lower than 
those ofall employees (25% lower for men and around 
17% lower for women). This is broadly con istent with 
the evidence (from the Community Labour Force Sur-
vey) that the educational attainment level  of the unem-
ployed tend to be significantly lower than for the rest of 
the work force. (In terms of gross earnings, moreover, 
the difference is likely to be wider given the progressive 
nature of the tax system in most countries.) 
In the case of  men, only in Greece, did those unemployed 
for part of the year have higher monthly earnings in the 
pe1iod when they were working than men as a whole, 
though in Portugal, their earnings were much the same 
(Graph 51). This perhaps retlects the narrow coverage 
of unemployment benefits in the two countries, as well 
as the fact that educational levels of the unemployed are 
less  different from others in the labour force  in  both 
countries than in.  other.  parts of the Union. These two 
countries  apart,  except  in  Denmark  (where  the  dif-
ference was only around 10%), the net earnings of men 
experiencing unemployment were at least 20% lower 
than average earnings (in Belgium and Germany) and 
some 30% or more lower in France, the UK, Ireland and 
Italy (50% lower in Luxembourg, though the sample size 
is  relatively small).  This  pattern  reflects  perhaps  the 
relatively wide dispersion of earnings in France, the UK 
and  Ireland and, seemingly, the relatively low skilllevels 
of thosereceiving unemployment benefits in Italy. 
In the case of women, average monthly earnings during 
the time they were in work of those unemployed for at 
least three month  and drawing benefit were closer to 
average earnings of women employees as a whole in all 
Member States except France and Portugal. In Belgium 
and Greece, they were higher- which in the fom1er 
case, is (:iifficult to explain given the much lower educa-
tional  attainment  levels  of women  unemployed  than 
those of the rest of the work force. In Denmark and the 
UK, as well as Luxembourg, they were under 5% lower 
than for.  all women, which in the UK, at least, might 
reflect the relatively small difference in education levels 
between  the  unemployed  and  other  members  of the 
labour force. 
-99-51  Relative wages of men and women unemployed 
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60% of average in all countries ex-
cept the UK (where for only 8% of 
benefit  recipients,  the  amount  re-
ceived was 80% or more of  earnings) 
and  in  all  others  except  Germany, 
France  and  Italy,  well  under  50% 
(Graph 53). 
In sum, the evidence does not suggest 
that benefit levels are especially high 
in relation to earnings from employ-
ment across the Union for most of  the 
unemployed and where they are, the 
cause  lies in the  low  wages  which 
those  experiencing  unemployment 
tend  to  be  paid  rather  than  in 
generous levels of benefit. Indeed, in 
most Member States, for those whose 
earnings are close to the average, the 
benefits  they  receive  when  out  of 
work are likely to be only around half 
of their net pay when in work. 
Finally, in most Member States, as 
noted above and as described in more 
detail  below,  changes  have  been 
made  to  unemployment compensa-
tion systems since 1993 which have 
had  the  effect  either of reducing 
benefit  levels  further  or  restricting 
entitlement, so that levels in relation 
to earnings and the proportion receiv-
ing payment may well be lower now 
than indicated here. 
Disincentive effects 
A
ny  assessment of the  scale of 
disincentive effects on employ-
ment  associated  with  particular 
benefit  systems  needs  to  recognise 
that  financial  considerations  alone 
are  not the only factor determining 
whether or not a person chooses un-
employment  over working.  Quite 
apart from  the  various  controls  re-
stricting  eligibility  for  benefit -stipulating, in particular, that the per-
son  concerned must have left their 
previous job involuntarily, must be 
actively looking for work and, before 
too long, must accept any reasonable 
job offer-there are a range of non-
financial  advantages  from  working 
which can mean that someone will 
prefer to have a job rather than be 
unemployed for much the same in-
come. These advantages have been 
emphasised in the debate on social 
exclusion, which has drawn attention 
to the problems of lack of self-fulfil-
ment and marginalisation, or a sense 
of not belonging, which comes from 
being out of work. 
At the same time, it is far too simplis-
tic to reduce the effect of  benefit sys-
tems  on  the  labour  market  to  a 
question  of incentives  to  look  for 
work. In particular, the nature of sys-
tems is likely to influence: 
•  the extent of labour mobility be-
tween jobs, as noted above, inso-
far  as  it  provides  more  or less 
protection against the risks of be-
coming  unemployed  associated 
with such moves; 
•  the willingness of people to take 
jobs with fixed-term contracts; 
•  negotiations  between employers 
and employees over possible re-
dundancies  and  the  ease  with 
which workers can be dismissed; 
•  the willingness of people, espe-
cially women who have stopped 
working to take care of children, 
actively to look for work and to 
retrain. 
As such, effectively designed benefit 
systems can improve rather than ob-
struct the functioning of labour mar-
kets and can increase the  competi-
tiveness of the economy rather than 
damage it. 
Main reforms: the 
shift from passive 
to active policies 
I
n principle, the distinction between 
passive measures of  income support 
and active measures to help people fmd 
a job is  clear, and there is a growing 
consensus across the Union about the 
desirability of  shifting from the former 
to the latter. In practice, however, the 
distinction is often blurred. Training or 
socially-useful employment schemes 
can, for example, sometimes be aimed 
primarily at providing income support 
- and  perhaps  reducing  the  unem-
ployment figures  - rather  than 
improving  the  employability  of 
participants, while subsidised employ-
ment can  be  a  means of supporting 
firms in decline rather than of increas-
ing net job creation. At the same time, 
income support can become an integral 
part of  an active programme for getting 
people into work. 
The  relationship  between passive 
and active measures can take three 
forms: 
•  active  measures  are  aimed  at 
establishing  individual  pro-
grammes  to  help  benefit  reci-
pients get back into work; 
•  unemployment  compensation  is 
used to provide financial support 
for access to employment; 
•  unemployment compensation  is 
conditional on the recipient tak-
ing up a specially created job out-
side  the  normal  labour  market 
(workfare). 
These are analysed in tum below. 
Active measures to 
support job search 
Increased efforts have been made in 
many parts of the Union to help the 
unemployed find a job, though this 
has  been  coupled  with  increased 
pressure on them to do all they can 
themselves. On the one hand, public 
employment offices have improved 
their  placement  services  and  the 
counselling  and  guidance  given  to 
the  unemployed,  which  now  often 
include  assessment  of skills  and 
identification  of suitable  training 
courses  to  enhance  these.  On  the 
other hand, continued payment of  un-
employment benefits has been made 
conditional on participation in active 
labour market programmes or the ac-
ceptance of a suitable job offer. 
In Denmark, for example, the period 
of entitlement  to  benefit  has  been 
divided into two phases, the second 
of which is  focused on active pro-
grammes  which  the  person  con-
cerned is  required  to  participate  in 
(see Box on Denmark). In the UK, 
since  the  introduction  of the  Job-
seeker's Allowance, the unemployed 
are  required to  enter into an agree-
ment with the employment services, 
detailing  the  steps  to  be  taken for 
them to get back into work (see Box 
on the UK).  Similarly, in Belgium, 
the unemployed over 46 and with low 
skills are  obliged to  sign much the 
same kind of contract with the  re-
gional  employment  services,  com-
mitting themselves to participate in 
- 101-active  programmes  or have  their 
benefits withdrawn. 
Active programmes, however, tend 
to  be  costly  and  when  faced  with 
sharp rises in unemployment, it can 
be  difficult  to  maintain  adequate 
numbers  of places.  In  Sweden, for 
example, while in principle, all the 
unemployed are entitled to  training 
or to  a  socially-useful  job  after  a 
given period out of work, the extent 
of the economic recession at the be-
ginning  of the  1990s  made  it  im-
possible,  in  practice,  to  do  this. 
Expenditure on passive measures of 
income support, therefore, rose from 
under 30% of  the total in 198 9 to over 
50% in 1996. In the latter year, a new 
programme was introduced aimed at 
halving unemployment by the year 
2000 (from 8% to 4%  ),  while a de-
bate was initiated on whether those 
on training courses or in socially-use-
ful employment should any longer be 
entitled to  insurance benefit, bring-
ing  the  Government  into  conflict 
with trade unions. 
The cost of active measures  is  the 
main reason why, despite the increas-
ing importance attached in Member 
States to the provision of training to 
improve the employability of those 
out of  work, comparatively few of  the 
unemployed at present receive trai-
ning, which tends to be provided in 
most cases only after they have been 
Denmark:the.activation of policy 
The relatively generous  unemployment compensation system has been. 
modified since  ·1993 in a series steps aimed at tightening eligibility criteria 
and reducing the duration of  benefits, while giving more help to recipiepts 
to find  work and so·  strengthening the. articulation.  between  passiy~ and 
active measures. 
Specifically,  the  minimum employment. record required  to qualify for 
unemployment benefit has been raised from 26 to 52 weeks over preceding 
three years, while the maximum duration of payment has been reduced 
progressively from 9 years to 7 and then to 5 -though those oVer50can, 
under certain circumstances, continue to receive benefits until they are 60. 
During the last three years of  this period, efforts to  get the personcqncemed 
into work are intensified and they have a right to tnt.ining or subsidisedjobs, 
though they also have an obligation to accept wha! is offered in this regard· 
Even over the firsttwo years, however, a substantiala~ountofassistance 
is  provided to  help  with job search and to improve employability;·  a~ 
individual plan tailored to their needs being drawn  up after three months 
to define the action to be taken; 
In 1995, the definition of  what constitutes asuitablejol) offerwas e,xte11ded 
to cover any type of work which the person is capable ofdoing.  with a 
minimal  amount  of training  and .  sanctions  were  introduced for  those 
refusing such an offer. 
Those who have particular difficulty in finding work,  B(lll•csi~ce 1996, be 
offered part-time jobs in  s?c~ally·useful . activities for uptothree years; 
while effectiveJy.gqptinl1ing to receive unetnploymynt benefit. 
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unemployed for some time. The Eu-
ropean Council in the conclusions to 
the Luxembourg Job Summit at the 
end of 1997 emphasised the impor-
tance of improving the  situation in 
this  respect  and  the  Employment 
Guidelines agreed by the Council at 
the beginning of 1998 set the objec-
tive of doubling the proportion of the 
unemployed receiving training over 
the next few years. 
Unemployment 
compensation to 
support access to 
employment 
In  virtually  all  Member  States, 
various  schemes  exist  to  subsidise 
the employment of someone who is 
unemployed, either by providing di-
rect grants to companies taking them 
on or relieving them of some or all of 
the  social  contributions  normally 
payable.  More  recently,  a  slightly 
different form  of scheme has  been 
introduced in some countries involv-
ing  the  transfer  of unemployment 
benefits to employers as  an induce-
ment to recruitment. 
In France, businesses which employ 
a benefit recipient who has been out 
of work for more than 8 months re-
ceive a  subsidy equal to,  or higher 
than,  the  total  amount  the  person 
would have received in benefits up 
until  the  end of their entitlement 
period. 
In Italy, workers made redundant by 
businesses subsidised through the C/G 
(see below) receive mobility benefits 
for between 12 and 48 months (accord-
ing to age and region). Firms recruiting 
these  people to  a permanent job are then eligible for a  ubsidy equal to half 
the mobility benefit which is  till out-
standing. 
In Germany, 'productive salary  ub-
ventions', introduced in 1993 in the 
new  East  German Lander and  ex-
tended  in  1994  to  the  rest  of the 
country,  are  payable  to  employers 
who take on people unemployed with 
special problems, the amount being 
determined by the average value of 
benefits which they receive. 
In Austria, a special subsidy was in-
troduced in 1997 to employer  taking 
on tho e who have been out of work 
for over 6 months and who cannot get 
a normal job. Thi  la ts for up to  a 
year and is equivalent in value to the 
unemployment benefit plus the pen-
ion  and  health  contributions 
payable. 
At the  arne time, measures have also 
been  introduced  in  a  number  of 
Member States to encourage the un-
employed to accept low-paid or part-
time  jobs  by  allowing  them  to 
continue receiving benefit, so, inter 
alia, alleviating any 'unemployment 
trap'  which might e  ist because of 
potential earning  being little or no 
higher than unemployment benefit. 
In Belgium, benefit recipients  who 
accept a part-time job receive an ad-
ditional amount to ensure that their 
total income when working i  higher 
than  the  normal  (full-time)  unem-
ployment benefit. 
In Germany,  anyone  who  is  unem-
ployed and receiving benefit can have 
an allowance added to  their  alary if 
they accept a fixed-term  (of up  to  3 
months), low-paid job. In Finland, tax 
incentives were introduced in 1997 to 
encourage the unemployed in receipt 
of benefits  to  take  up  part-time  or 
short-term jobs  (by  reducing  the 
amount of tax payable  on the  com-
bined income). In  Portugal, a recently-
introduced  measure  allows  the 
unemployed to work part-time and to 
receive a partial benefit (rather than no 
benefit at all).  In Ireland,  a Back-to-
W ark-Allowance is  payable for three 
years (at a declining rate of 75%, 50% 
and 25% of their benefit) to tho e who 
are unemployed and 23  or over who 
take a job of 20 hours a week a more. 
(In 60% of  cases, thi  has been used by 
the  recipient  to  set  up  as  self-em-
ployed.)  In the  UK,  people  unem-
ployed for over 3 n1onths who accept 
a pm1-time job are entitled to a Back-
to-Work Bonus,  while  a Jobfinder' s 
Grant is payable to tho e unemployed 
for over two years  who accept a job 
paying less than a given amount. 
In both the latter two countrie , in-
work  benefits  are  also  payable  to 
The UK: the actiyation of policy 
In the UK, the articulation between income support for the unemployed 
and active policie  to get them back into work has been taken further than 
anyWhere else in the Union. Since 1982, unemployment beJ:lefit  ha  v~  been 
flat-rate and payable for one year, up to the introduction of the Jobseeker' 
Allowance in 1996 and 6 months thereafter.  After this petiod, payment 
remain  at the same rate but becomes means-tested (in relation to household 
income). 
During  the 1990s,  a numb r  of measures  were  intrqduced  to  restrict 
entitlement to benefit,<  including the. exclusion of young people under 17, 
a tightening of  eligibil~tyeriteria and the  g~a~ual ero  i0£1 of the valuy of 
benefits in relation to earnings, before the introduction of the Job  eeker's 
Allowance to encompas both unemployment insurance benefits and social 
assistance. In addition to halving the benefit petiod to  6 months - the 
shortest in the Union - and thereby increasing the number dependent on 
means-testing, the new system require  everyone claiming benefits to enter 
into a Jobseeker'  Agreement with Job Centres (the employment services), 
defining their right  and obligations and  etting out the steps to be taken to 
find  a job. The  employrn~nt services havy  developed a  range of  pro-
grammes which apply after  omeone ha  been unemployedfor 13 weeks, 
6 months, a year  18  month  and 2 year , and which con ist of variou 
mea ures  including guidance on job seeking technique , evaluation of 
skills, training,.  work eipetierice and, for thost- under 25,  ocially-,tl$eful 
jobs. 
Although participation in programmes i  oluntary. entitlement to benefit 
can be suspended if itthe per pn 99ncerned is not suffici~ntly cooperative 
or considered not to be making sufficient effort to look f6rwork or improve 
their skills. In addition, while job seekers can tum downjob offers during 
the  first  13  weeks  of anemployment if the  qualification  required  are 
~ignificantly .different  or  lower than tho einyolved in what  they were d()ing 
before or if.  the  salary ·is  less, after  13  week , the  e may  no  longer be 
regarded as just cause for refusal and after 6 months, they are obliged to 
accept anyjob they are capable of doing, irrespective of  the level of pay. 
- 103-people employed in  low-paid jobs, 
the purpose being to increase the fin-
ancial gain from taking up such a job 
as  compared with remaining unem-
ployed. In Ireland, a Family Income 
Supplement was introduced in 1984 
with the aim of compensating some-
one moving into a low-paid job after 
being  unemployed  for  the  loss  of 
child allowances included in unem-
ployment benefit,  the  amount 
payable varying inversely with earn-
ings. From 1996, it has also become 
payable to single people and couples 
with no children. 
In the UK, Family Credit, was intro-
duced in 1988, to provide additional 
income to people with children work-
ing in low-paid jobs for at least 16 
hours  a  week.  As  in  Ireland,  the 
amount varies  inversely  with earn-
ings  and  for  the  large  majority  of 
people  ensures  that  disposable  in-
come from working is higher than the 
amount  receivable  when  unem-
ployed. As such, it helps to avoid the 
interaction of the benefit system and 
the  wages  on offer to  those  out of 
work creating a so-called unemploy-
ment trap, where there is little or no 
financial  gain  from  working.  The 
cost,  however,  is  the  creation of a 
poverty trap, where those receiving 
in-work benefits find  it difficult to 
improve their position because of  the 
withdrawal of benefits as their earn-
ings increase (the benefits withdrawn 
include not only Family Credit but 
also housing benefits and council tax 
relief). Since October 1996, a similar 
allowance,  Earnings  Top-Up,  has 
become payable on a  trial  basis  to 




n  recent years,  a  new debate on 
'workfare'  has  taken  place,  the 
case in favour essentially being that 
those  receiving  unemployment 
benefit should do something in re-
turn, or at least accept some obliga-
tion towards society for what they are 
being paid. An element of workfare 
is evident in the increased obligation 
imposed on the unemployed in many 
countries to accept jobs that they are 
offered and in the broader interpreta-
tion attached to the suitability of  such 
jobs. It  is also evident in the increased 
obligation on them to participate in 
active  labour  market  programmes, 
such as  vocational training courses. 
In  general,  however,  workfare  is 
usually interpreted more narrowly to 
mean a  requirement to  work,  typi-
cally on socially-useful projects, in 
order to continue to receive benefits. 
Workfare  programmes  can  be 
beneficial  for  participants,  in  that 
they enable them to have a job and to 
maintain or develop new skills and so 
improve their chances of  getting back 
into normal work. On the other hand, 
they also risk institutionalising infe-
rior forms of employment. Whether 
the former or latter view is the more 
valid depends on the content of the 
jobs concerned, on the way they are 
organised and on what subsequently 
happens  to  participants.  In  most 
cases, the schemes now operational 
in Member States are of too recent 
origin  to  allow  a judgement to  be 
made one way or the other. 
In Belgium, a scheme to provide so-
cially-useful work to  the  long-term 
unemployed has existed since 1987, 
though it was modified considerably 
in 1994. It is organised by local em-
ployment agencies  set  up  by com-
munes and is  at present targeted on 
those  out  of work  for  over three 
years,  or two  years  in  the  case  of 
school-leavers, who have 'aright and 
duty to participate', who can be em-
ployed for up  to 45  hours a month 
without a work contract and who re-
ceive an additional allowance on top 
of their unemployment benefit. 
In the Netherlands, as part of the re-
form of the minimum income guar-
antee system in 1995, municipalities 
were  charged  with  introducing  a 
scheme to provide socially-useful ac-
tivities for benefit recipients, who are 
not paid any extra for participating 
but  who  can  have  their  assistance 
reduced or suspended if they refuse 
to do so. Pilot schemes are currently 
being tested in 25  cities, and up  to 
now, instead of sanctions being ap-
plied to those refusing to join, there 
have been financial incentives to par-
ticipate. 
In Sweden, as a temporary measure 
in  1997 and 1998, the public sector 
has  been  allowed  to  offer jobs  of 
limited duration (9 months at most) 
to unemployment benefit recipients, 
who receive a supplement of 10% to 
their benefit and  are  able  to  spend 
10% of their time looking for a nor-
mal job. 
In Ireland, a scheme was launched in 
1997 to enable those out of work for 
more than 6  months and  at risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed to 
work  in  a  company  for  5  weeks, 
while retaining their benefit and re-
ceiving an allowance to cover their 
travel costs to and from work. 
Similarly, in the UK, those under 25 
and  unemployed  for  more  than  6 months  are  eligible  for  the  Work 
Trials programme, which gives them 
a job for 3 weeks and continued en-
titlement to benefit. 
At present, refusing to participate in 
these kinds of programme does not 
seem, in general, to_invoke sanctions, 
though in most cases, the possibility 
exists  of withdrawing  income  sup-
port. Whether participation serves to 
increase the employability of  the per-
son concerned, however, is so far an 
open question, since there is as yet no 
systematic  evidence  available  on 
what happens  to  them  after  they 
come off the scheme. 
It is also open to question how much 
of a shift from passive income support 
to  these  and  other  kinds  of active 
measure can be achieved without ad-
ding to overall expenditure. The provi-
sion  of socially-useful  jobs  is  not 
costless, despite the fact  that partici-
pants in many cases receive no more, 
or not much more,  than their unem-
ployment benefit. This also holds for 
the provision of  training courses, coun-
selling, guidance and other help with 
job  search  which  may  increase  the 
chances of those out of work fmding 
employment, but until  they do,  such 
measures  add  to  the  cost of income 
support.  Measures  to  subsidise  em-
ployment, on the other hand, seem at 
first  sight  to  offer the  possibility  of 
keeping down expenditure, especially 
where subsidies are being paid out of 
benefits. This assumes, however, that 
the jobs being created are entirely ad-
ditional, that those filling them add to 
the numbers in employment, and that 
there  is  no  displacement  of existing 
jobs or existing workers.  In practice, 
this  is  a  very  strong  assumption  to 
make and, on past evidence, one which 
is not realistic. 
Subsidies to take on particular groups 
of  workers are almost certain to result 
in the displacement of others, how-
ever the scheme is organised, and the 
net effect in increasing employment 
is  likely  to  be  much  less  than  the 
number of  jobs, or people, being sup-
ported. Nevertheless, even if the net 
effect were to be zero, it would still 
mean  that  the  average  duration  of 
unemployment  among  the  targeted 
groups  were reduced  and  that they 
have an opportunity to gain work ex-
perience,  which  is  arguably prefer-
able  to  leaving  them  to  suffer 
prolonged unemployment and social 
exclusion. 
In practice, the expenditure implica-
tions of shifting from passive to ac-
tive measures, especially in a context 
of rising unemployment, has tended 
to limit the change which has taken 
place. Over the Union as a whole, as 
detailed below, the share of expendi-
ture going to active measures in 1996 
was marginally lower than in 1990, 
though slightly higher than in 1993 at 
the  end of the  period of economic 
recession.  At  the  same  time,  the 
greater  weight  given  to  active 
measures, allied to the rise in unem-
ployment during the recession years, 
has tended to reinforce efforts to curb 
expenditure  on  income  support,  if 
only to  prevent the overall share of 
resources going to  the  unemployed 
from increasing. In a context of con-
straints  on  social  expenditure,  in 
other words, it is likely to be difficult 
politically to  justify spending more 
on  active  programmes  to  help  the 
unemployed without reducing what 
they  receive  in  other  ways,  quite 
apart from  the  desire  to  strengthen 
the financial pressure on them to find 
a job. 
Accordingly,  Governments  across 
the Union have sought means of re-
ducing  expenditure  on  passive 
measures,  without  cutting  income 
support  to  unacceptable  levels.  In 
many cases, this has led to a focus on 
tightening eligibility and shortening 
the duration of benefits as well as on 





ualifying conditions for entitle-
ment  to  benefit have  been 
tightened  in  most  Member States 
over recent years, in some cases as  a 
means  of supporting  relatively 
generous benefit levels, and, in anum-
ber of countries, the employment rec-
ord required for eligibility for benefit 
has  also  been  extended.  Moreover, 
there has also been a tendency to short-
en the period of entitlement to benefit 
and to reduce the amount received as 
the  duration  of unemployment 
lengthens.  The  only  exception  is  in 
Italy, where after the reform of  the CIG 
(the  system  of income  transfers  to 
workers on lay-off which had become 
the main means of paying unemploy-
ment compensation-see below), the 
standard unemployment, benefit was 
raised from 7
1/z%  of previous earnings 
in 1988 to 30% in 1994 and, prospec-
tively, to 40%, though the agreement 
on this reached in 1995 has still to be 
implemented. 
In two  other Member States, how-
ever, France and Sweden, there has 
been some recent relaxation of the 
restrictive  measures  implemented 
during  the  recession  of the  early 
1990s.  Before then,  the  unemploy-
- 105-ment benefit system in Sweden had 
been the most generous in the Union, 
with a benefit rate of90% of  previous 
earnings. This was reduced to 80% in 
1993  and  to  75%  in  1996  before 
being increased again to 80% in Sep-
tember  1997,  while  the  minimum 
employment record for eligibility has 
been increased twice over the 1990s. 
Moreover,  in  Italy,  where expendi-
ture  on unemployment benefits per 
se is among the lowest in the Union, 
recommendations were made in the 
Onofri Report, published in February 
1997,  for  the  consolidation  of the 
present fragmented  arrangements 
into  two  unified schemes, one pro-
viding  insurance  benefits  for  three 
years to the 'fully' unemployed at an 
initial rate of 60% of previous earn-
ings,  but declining as  the  period of 
unemployment goes on, and the other 
providing benefits to those on lay-off 
for  12-18  months  in  any  5  year 
period,  also  at  a  declining  rate, 
though  starting at  70%  of previous 
earnings. 
Nevertheless, in general, the restrictive 
measures  adopted  during  the  econ-
omic recession have been maintained 
in  Member  States.  In  Germany, 
measures introduced in 1994, and sub-
sequently modified in 1997, as part of 
legislation for promoting employment 
(Arbeitsforderungsgesetz)  have  re-
stricted entitlement to benefit and re-
duced the  rate  from  63%  to  60%  of 
previous net earnings (for those with 
no children and from 68% to 67% for 
those with children). In  addition, social 
assistance, payable after one year and 
the expiry of the period of eligibility 
for  insurance  benefits,  was  reduced 
from 56% of previous net earnings to 
53% (and from 58% to 57% for those 
with children). The tightening of  eligi-
bility  conditions  coupled  with  the 
- 106-
increasing number oflong-term unem-
ployed has led to fewer people receiv-
ing insurance benefits since 1993 and 
more receiving social assistance. 
In  Belgium,  where  because  of lax 
eligibility  criteria,  virtually  all  the 
unemployed used to  qualify for  in-
surance  benefits  and  often  for  un-
limited  periods  of time,  conditions 
for entitlement have been tightened 
during the  1990s, mainly for young 
people  of 25  and  under,  while  the 
waiting period for benefit has been 
lengthened considerably. Moreover, 
attempts have been made to limit the 
duration of  entitlement to benefit, es-
pecially in the case of those living in 
the same house as someone in work, 
by  introducing  the  possibility  of 
withdrawing  benefit  if the  person 
concerned has been out of work for 
1
1
/2  times the average duration in the 
region  where  they  live.  (In  1996, 
some 61% of the unemployed in Bel-
gium had been out of work for a year 
or more, 40% for two years or more 
and 22% for at least 4 years, all the 
figures  being  significantly  higher 
than the Union average and the last 
figure, almost twice as high.) In ad-
dition,  the  level of benefit has also 
been reduced, though the minimum 
amount has been maintained. 
In  Spain,  the  unemployment  com-
pensation  system  was  tightened  in 
1992, the period of contributions re-
quired for eligibility for benefit being 
increased from 6 to  12 months, the 
duration of entitlement (proportional 
to  the  contributions paid) being re-
duced by a third, on average, and the 
level of benefit being cut by 10% of 
previous earnings (from 80% for the 
first 6 months to 70% and from 70% 
for the next 18 months to 60% ). As a 
result,  expenditure  on  income  sup-
port of  the unemployed fell by a third 
in real terms between 1993 and 1996 
while  the  number  unemployed  re-
mained much the same (this is con-
sistent  with  the  ESSPROS  data 
analysed in Chapter 3). Nevertheless, 
expenditure on active measures ac-
counted  for  only  just over 
1/2%  of 
GDP  in  1996,  less  than  in  1990. 
Moreover,  no direct link exists be-
tween  active  programmes  and  the 
system of income support. 
In Greece, the system of unemploy-
ment  compensation  was  already 
among  the  least  generous  in  the 
Union  before  1996,  when  the  pre-
vious scheme, under which benefits 
payable for up to a year at a rate of 
50% of previous earnings in the case 
of industrial  employees  and  man-
agers  and 40% in the case of other 
workers,  but  up  to  a  maximum  of 
only  two-thirds  of the  minimum 
wage, was replaced by a lump-sum 
of half the minimum wage. 
In Finland, where a universal system 
of unemployment compensation 
combining  insurance  benefits 
payable  for  a  fixed  period  with  a 
basic allowance payable indefinitely 
had been developed over the  1970s 
and 1980s, restrictive measures were 
introduced in  1994, requiring a per-
son  to  have  been  employed  for  at 
least 6 months during the  previous 
two years to  be eligible for benefit 
and limiting payment of benefits to 
500  days  in  4  years.  In  1997,  the 
period of employment was increased 
to 10 months and benefits were made 
proportional to earnings during these 
10 months, so reducing the amount 
payable  significantly.  In  addition, 
benefit  amounts  have  been  further 
reduced  by  their non-indexation  in 
1995 and 1996. Maintaining the 
right to benefit 
I
n most Member States, the condi-
tions governing entitlement to un-
employment benefit have also been 
tightened.  Not  only  have  controls 
against  unjustified  claims  been 
strengthened in many cases, but the 
unemployed  have  also  been put 
under increased  pressure  to  accept 
suitable job offers. 
In many countries, the fight against 
abuse of the system has been intensi-
fied  by  establishing  or  reinforcing 
specialised agencies and by improv-
ing the exchange of information be-
tween the organisations involved in 
benefit payment. In the Netherlands, 
legislation  was  introduced  in  1997 
enabling transfers to  be suspended, 
fines  imposed  and  repayment  of 
benefits required in cases of wrong-
ful claims. In Denmark, a special unit 
was established in  1996 to  monitor 
the action taken by insurance funds 
in relation to those turning down jobs 
or refusing  to  participate  in  active 
labour  market  programmes.  In  the 
UK, control of abuse has been rein-
forced by requiring the unemployed 
to have closer contact with the em-
ployment  services  and  to  demon-
strate that they are taking steps to find 
a job. 
At the  same time,  the  definition of 
what constitutes a suitable job offer 
has  been  widened  in  a  number of 
Member States. In the UK, the con-
cept of a 'suitable' job offer was re-
placed in 1989 by a requirement that, 
after the first 13  weeks of being un-
employed, the person concerned had 
to  accept  an  offer  unless  they  had 
'good cause' to refuse it. Whereas for 
the first  13  weeks,  they are able to 
tum down a job if it does not corre-
spond to  their qualifications or pre-
vious earnings, after this period, this 
ceases to be regarded as being 'good 
cause' for refusal. 
In  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands, 
after someone has been out of work 
for  6  months,  they  are  required  to 
accept  a  job even  if it  involves  a 
lower skill  level  than  the  one  they 
were doing before. In Germany, the 
unemployed are classified according 
to their qualifications and can refuse 
a job if it does not correspond to their 
classification. As their spell of unem-
ployment lengthens,  however,  they 
are  reclassified  to  a  lower level  of 
qualifications.  Legislation  intro-
duced in 1997 specifies that it is ac-
ceptable,  during  the  first  three 
months of unemployment, for earn-
ings to be reduced by 20% in relation 
to what they were previously receiv-
ing and by 30% during the following 
three months. After 6 months, people 
are required to accept any job offer, 
even at a wage lower than the level 
of unemployment benefit. 
In  Austria,  a  new  interpretation  of 
'suitability' was introduced in  1993 
to cover any job which does not en-
danger the chances of  the person con-
cemed being able to resume the type 
of work they were doing before. For 
those  on  social  assistance,  a job is 
regarded as suitable if  it is considered 
that nothing more suitable is likely to 
emerge in the near future. 
The  effect  of all  these  measures 
should  be  to  increase  the  flow  of 
people out of  unemployment and into 
work  or  into  active  labour  market 
programmes  and,  therefore,  to  re-
duce the average duration of unem-
ployment, though not necessarily the 
number unemployed at any point in 
time,  as  noted above.  However, al-
though  long-term  unemployment 
seems  to  have  fallen  in  relation  to 
overall  unemployment,  it  remains 
high and it is difficult to ascribe all of 
the fall to these kinds of measure. (In 
1996, some 48% of the unemployed 
in the Union had been out of  work for 
a year or more, slightly down from 
49%  in  1995,  but up  from  43%  in 
1993. The proportion in 1996, how-
ever,  was  lower  than  in  the  mid-
1980s, when it was as  high as  55% 
and  when  it  was  associated  with  a 
slightly lower overall rate of unem-
ployment. The relationship between 
long-term  and  overall  unemploy-
ment,  therefore,  seems  to  have im-
proved  over this  10  year  period, 
though  how  much  this  is  due  to 
changes in compensation systems as 
opposed to  active measures, or,  in-




s noted above, there are other 
means  than  unemployment 
benefits  to  support  the  income  of 
the  unemployed.  As  also  noted, 
there  was  tendency  up  until  re-
cently  to  shift  people  from  unem-
ployment  benefit  to  other types  of 
support,  early  retirement  schemes 
and disability benefits, in particular. 
In some countries, moreover, special 
measures  were  introduced  to  com-
pensate people who were on lay-off 
- ie temporarily unemployed- or 
working  short-time.  These  various 
kinds  of scheme  are  considered 
below, beginning with the latter type 
of arrangement. 
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The most  significant example of a 
partial unemployment scheme is the 
CIG (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) 
in Italy, which, in principle, provides 
compensation to those who remain in 
employment but who are on lay-off 
for a temporary period.  In  practice, 
however, until recently at least, this 
period could extend for  number of 
years and the scheme effectively as-
sumed the role of normal unemploy-
ment  benefit  systems  in  other 
countries (see Box on Italy). 
In France, under the 5-year Employ-
ment Act of 1993, companies are able 
to  receive  compensation for  part-
time or temporary unemployment for 
up to a maximum of 1200 hours over 
an 18 month period (ie for just under 
half-time working). In Germany, the 
partial unemployment compensation 
scheme  (Kurzarbeitgeld)  was  ex-
tended from 6 months to 24 months 
to assist industrial restructuring in the 
new Lander after unification and has 
subsequently been widened to cover 
the whole country. 
Early retirement 
As  noted  in  Chapter  2,  policy  to-
wards  early  retirement  has  been 
modified in a number of countries in 
recent years in response to both the 
growing  cost  and  demographic 
trends.  In  many cases, it is  still the 
case  that  older  people  (especially 
those aged 55 and over) who are un-
Italy: the reform of Cassa lntegrazione Guadagni 
{CIG) 
The CIG, created soon after World War II, consists of two  schemes-the 
ordinary< scheme (CIGO) to provide assistance in  the event of partial or 
temporary  redundancies  and  the  special  scheme  (CIGS)  for  industrial 
restructuring.  Compensation in both cases amounts to 80%  of previous 
earnings up to a maximum sum and initially could be paid for indefinite 
period,  though in  1991  it was  limited to  two  years.  Since the workers 
concerned continue to have a formal contract of employment, they are not 
classified as  unemployed (under the ILO definition, they are neither ac-
tively seeking work nor available for work). 
At the end of  the 1980s, the schemes were heavily criticised for maintaining 
fictitious jobs to the benefit of certain workers - those in industry - at 
the expense of others-those in SMEs. In 1991, the system was reformed, 
not only by limiting the duration of benefits, but also by imposing some of 
the  cost of financing  it on  to employers, making  a clearer distinction 
betwe(!l1 those supported by the;  sc;p~me and redundant workers and intr?-
ducing a mobility allowance fqr tpe latter to give emp!oyers a financial 
incentive to take them·  on, and stipulating that those on CIG must rotate 
(though firms seem to prefer paying fines than to comply with this require-
ment). 
Nevertheless, because of recession, the CIGS was extended in 1993 and 
1994 to SMEs and certain services. 
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employed and drawing benefits are 
treated differently than younger ones 
in the sense that they are under less 
obligation, or no obligation at all, to 
look for work. Nevertheless, in some 
countries,  special  early  retirement 
schemes  have  been  withdrawn, 
people are being encouraged to  re-
main  in  work rather than  leave the 
labour force prematurely and, if they 
do, attempts are being made to ensure 
that they are at least replaced in their 
job by someone else. 
In Austria, older workers (women of 
54 and over and men of 59 and over) 
used to be able to  receive a special 
allowance (Sonderunterstutzung) of 
80% of previous salary under the un-
employment benefit scheme if they 
took early retirement. This provision, 
however, was withdrawn in 1996 and 
replaced with a bonus-malus scheme, 
with penalties on companies for the 
dismissal of  older workers and reduc-
tions in social contributions for those 
taking them on, encouraging the con-
tinued  employment  of those  ap-
proaching retirement age. 
In Germany,  extensive  use  of early 
retirement schemes was made in  the 
past as a means of softening the effect 
of  redundancies. Until1996, a full pen-
sion was payable to those over 60 who 
had been unemployed for at least a year 
during the preceding 18 months, those 
of 55 and over were entitled to unem-
ployment  benefits  for  a  32  month-
period instead of a year and anyone 
unemployed over the age of 58 could 
receive benefits without having to look 
for work. Since then, in addition to the 
gradual raising of  the retirement age to 
65 for everyone, those who leave their 
job before  they  reach  this  age  have 
their benefit reduced  (by  an  amount 
proportional  to  the  number of years required to reach the official retirement 
age). At the same time, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, a part-time unemployment 
scheme  for  older  workers  has  been 
introduced which provides compensa-
tion so long as the person concerned is 
replaced by an apprentice or someone 
previously unemployed. 
In  France,  where  various  schemes 
encouraging  early  retirement  have 
been in  operation for  some time,  a 
new arrangement, financed from the 
unemployment insurance fund,  was 
introduced  in  1995,  enabling those 
under 60, the official retirement age, 
to stop working so long as they have 
paid  contributions  for  at  least  40 
years and so  long as  their employer 
undertakes to replace them within 3 
months by  someone previously un-
employed.  They  then  receive  a 
benefit  equivalent to  65%  of their 
previous earnings until they reach 60. 
In Sweden,  where the  emphasis of 
policy  is  on  reducing  early  retire-
ment,  measures were  introduced in 
1997, first, to enable those aged be-
tween 60 and 65 who have been un-
employed for over a year to  receive 
unemployment  benefit  until  retire-
ment without needing to  look for a 
job and,  secondly,  to  allow  older 
workers  to  receive  unemployment 
benefit if they leave their job volun-
tarily  and  are replaced  by  a  young 
person  previously  unemployed  or 
looking for their first job. 
Invalidity benefits 
Granting entitlement to  invalidity, or 
disability, benefit was a common way 
in the past of  providing income support 
over the long-term to those unable to 
find a job, particularly manual workers 
in  their 50s  previously  employed  in 
heavy industries, such as iron and steel, 
ship-building  or mining,  which  de-
clined dramatically during the  1970s 
and 1980s. While, in  principle, eligi-
bility for such benefits was conditional 
on  suffering  a  disability  which  re-
stricted the ability to work, in practice, 
this  was often interpreted liberally to 
include,  relatively  minor  ailments, 
psychological problems and consider-
ation  of local  labour  market  condi-
tions.  The  result  was  a  significant 
growth in the number of people draw-
ing invalidity benefits in a number of 
countries and an escalation of expen-
diture on these. 
The  general  concern  during  the 
1990s across the Union has been to 
try to reduce expenditure in this area 
by  making  eligibility  criteria more 
stringent. This is has been especially 
so in the two countries where growth 
had  been  particularly  marked,  the 
Netherlands  and  the  UK.  In  both 
countries,  medical  examinations  of 
those claiming entitlement have been 
made  more  stringent  and,  to  be 
eligible for  benefit,  people have to 
demonstrate that they are incapable 
of doing any kind of work rather than 
just the job they were doing before. 
Moreover,  in  the Netherlands,  as  a 
further  means  of control,  responsi-
bility  for  payment  has  been  trans-
ferred to employers (see Chapter 2, 
Box on the Netherlands). 
Similarly,  in  Italy,  where invalidity 
benefits  were  used  as  a  means  of 
providing  income  support  for  the 
long-term unemployed, especially in 
regions  where  unemployment rates 
were high, more stringent conditions 
on eligibility have been applied du-
ring  the  1990s  and  the  number of 
people receiving benefit has declined 
(by 14% between 1990 and 1994). 
The effect of these changes on social 
protection expenditure is hard to judge. 
The main consequence may have been 
to  shift people from disability benefit 
schemes to unemployment benefit or 
to  social assistance rather than to  re-
duce the overall number dependent on 
social transfers.  Although some may 
have been able to fmd work, the rela-
tively low rate of employment growth 
which has obtained across much of  the 
Union since the recession of the early 
1990s suggests that job shortages still 
represent a formidable obstacle to the 
ability of  the people concerned to make 
the  transition  from  welfare  depend-
ency to paid employment. 
Changes 
in expenditure 
on passive and 
active measures 
I
t remains to examine the effect of 
these  changes  in policy  on  actual 
expenditure  on  passive  measures  of 
income support for the unemployed as 
opposed to that on active programmes 
to help them into work. According to 
OECD data (on labour market policy 
- the ESSPROS module on this has 
yet to be developed), expenditure in the 
Union on passive and active measures 
combined  in  relation  to  GDP  has 
closely followed the change in unem-
ployment, or in those needing support. 
Between  1990 and  1996, overall ex-
penditure went by from 2'/2% of GDP 
to  just under 3'/2%  (a rise  of 39%), 
while unemployment increased from 
7'!2% of the labour force to just under 
11% (a rise of 44% in the number out 
- 109-of  work) (Graph 54). After 1993, how-
ever, there was a slight fall in spending 
relative to unemployment. Within total 
expenditure,  the  share  of resources 
going to active as opposed to passive 
measures,  remained  fairly  constant 
over the 6 years as a whole, at just over 
a third, though there was some reduc-
tion in share in the earlier years when 
unemployment  was  rising,  followed 
by  some  increase  as  unemployment 
stabilised. 
This pattern of  change in expenditure 
during the 1990s has been similar to 
that which occurred before.  In par-
ticular,  between  1985  and  1990, 
when unemployment fell, overall ex-
penditure declined by around 1 /2% of 
GDP, slightly less than the reduction 
in the number unemployed as the op-
portunity  was  taken  of expanding 
spending  on  active  measures  (this 
rose slightly in relation to GDP as the 
number requiring support was falling 
while spending on passive measures 
declined  broadly  in  line  with  this 
fall). 
Although there is  a broad similarity 
in the changes in expenditure which 
have occurred in individual Member 
States, insofar as  changes in  unem-
ployment have been the major factor 
underlying not only the development 
of spending as  a whole but its divi-
sion  between  active  and  passive 
measures,  there  are  also  some  im-
portant differences which reflect dif-
ferential  policy  efforts.  In  most 
Member States, total labour market 
spending was higher in  1996 than in 
1990, reflecting the fact that unem-
ployment was also higher (the only 
exceptions being Denmark and Ire-
land  where  unemployment  was 
lower in the later year) (Table 8). In 
Greece, Spain and Ireland, however, 
spending  was  lower,  in  Ireland 
largely  because  of a  lower  rate  of 
unemployment, in Greece and Spain, 
because oflower spending per person 
unemployed- in  Spain, especially 
in  the  latter  part  of the  period  -
largely  on  passive  measures  of in-
come support in  both cases (Graph 
55,  where  expenditure  relative  to 
GDP is expressed in terms of a con-
stant rate of unemployment). Expen-
diture on passive measures relative to 
unemployment  was  also  down  in 
France and Belgium, while on active 
measures, it was down in Finland and 
Sweden as  well as  in Germany and 
Belgium. 
The only Member States where overall 
expenditure  per  person  unemployed 
increased  relative  to  GDP  over  the 
1990s were Portugal, the Netherlands 
and Denmark, in  the former two be-
cause of higher spending on passive 
measures, in the last, largely because 
of increased  spending  on  active 
policies.  Indeed,  Denmark  was  the 
only country in the  Union to  show a 
significant increase in expenditure in 
relation  to  GDP  over  this  period 
(Graph 56). It was, moreover, one of 
only three countries where the share of 
expenditure  devoted  to  active 
measures was higher in  1  996 than in 
1990,  the  other two  being  France, 
where  this  was  partly  a  result  of a 
reduction in passive spending per per-
son unemployed (Graph 57) and Ire-
land,  where,  as  in  Denmark, 
unemployment fell, as noted above. 
In contrast, in Germany (Graph 58), 
Finland, Sweden (Graph 59) and the 
UK (Graph 60), the share of expendi-
ture going to active measures declined 
54  Public expenditure on active and passive labour 
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- 111-Table 8 - Expenditure on active and passive labour market measures, 1985-96 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  L 
1985 
Total expenditure  4.7  5.1  2.4  0.5  3.2  3.1  5.0  1.5 
Active measures  1.3  1.2  0.8  0.2  0.3  0.7  1.5  0.5 
Passive measures  3.4  3.9  1.4  0.4  2.9  2.4  3.5  1.0 
of which: early retirement  0.9  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.7 
1990 
Total expenditure  3.8  5.7  2.1  0.8  3.2  2.7  4.1  0.9 
Active measures  1.2  1.3  1.0  0.4  0.8  0.8  1.4  0.3 
Passive measures  2.6  4.4  1.1  0.5  2.4  1.9  2.7  0.6 
of which: early retirement  0.7  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.1  0.5 
1993 
Total expenditure  4.2  7.5  4.2  0.7  4.0  3.4  4.5  0.9 
Active measures  1.2  2.0  1.6  0.3  0.5  1.3  1.6  0.2 
Passive measures  3.0  5.5  2.6  0.4  3.4  2.1  2.9  0.7 
of which: early retirement  0.7  1.4  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.4 
1996 
Total expenditure  4.2  6.6  3.8  0.8  2.8  3.1  4.1  0.9 
Active measures  1.4  2.3  1.4  0.3  0.7  1.3  1.7  0.3 
Passive measures  2.8  4.3  2.4  0.4  2.1  1.8  2.4  0.7 
of which: early retirement  0.7  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.3 
Note: OK,  P 1985=1986, IRL  1993=1994, B,  GR,  F,  S 1996=1995, I data not available 
markedly over the  1990s, though the 
fall  was  largely  concentrated  in  the 
early years of the period when unem-
ployment went up sharply in all four 
countries.  Indeed,  since  unemploy-
ment has stabilised, as it has in most 
countries since 1993 or 1994, spending 
on active measures has risen relative to 
that on passive measures in a number 
of Member States, most especially in 
Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Finland  and 
Spain, in  the  last of which the  share 
almost doubled (Graph 61). 
In general, therefore, there is some evi-
dence  that  expenditure  on  passive 
measures of income support was suc-
cessfully reduced in the period 1993 to 
1996 in most Member States after the 
recession came to  an end and unem-
ployment stabilised, in line with Gov-
ernment policy aims across the Union, 
and that the share of spending devoted 
to active measures has risen in anum-
ber of countries, even if only slightly. 
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The commitment  made  by  Member 
States at the Luxembourg Job Summit 
to increasing employment and improv-
ing the employability of  the work force 
should  lead  to  a  more  marked  shift 
towards active measures in the future. 
NL  0  p  SF  s  UK 
4.7  1.2  0.8  2.3  3.0  2.8 
1.3  0.3  0.4  0.9  2.2  0.7 
3.4  0.9  0.4  1.3  0.9  2.1 
0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.1 
3.9  1.3  1.0  2.2  2.4  1.5 
1.2  0.3  0.6  1.0  1.6  0.6 
2.6  1.0  0.4  1  .1  0.8  0.9 
0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.0 
4.4  1.8  1.8  6.7  5.8  2.2 
1.4  0.3  0.9  1.7  3.0  0.6 
3.0  1.4  0.9  5.0  2.8  1.6 
0.0  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.0 
4.7  1.8  2.1  5.4  6.1  1.6 
1.4  0.4  1  .1  1.7  3.2  0.4 
3.4  1.4  1.0  3.7  3.0  1.2 

















0.2 Chapter 5  Reforming the transition from 
work to retirement 
F
or many years,  there  has  been a 
significant upward trend in most 
parts of the  Union in  the  number of 
people  retiring  from  work  before 
reaching the official age of retirement. 
During the latter part of the 1970s and 
over the 1980s, in particular, as unem-
ployment  increased  and  remained 
high,  early retirement was either ac-
tively encouraged or tacitly accepted in 
order  to  reduce  both  the  registered 
figures and the number actually look-
ing for jobs. In more recent years, the 
prevailing attitude has changed, in re-
sponse partly to  the  growing cost of 
early retirement schemes, partly to the 
large increase in the number of  people 
above the official retirement age and 
the  relative  decline  in  working-age 
population  which  is  set  to  occur  in 
10-15 years time in all Member States 
(see Chapter 1 above). 
Policy attention across the Union has, 
therefore, focused on modifying social 
protection systems to deter rather than 
encourage early retirement. As part of 
this, consideration is  being given not 
just to the removal of measures which 
provide income support to those retir-
ing early but also to more imaginative 
schemes of partial retirement,  which 
achieve the aim of reducing costs but 
which,  at  the  same  time,  help  the 
people concerned make the transition 
to full retirement, while enabling em-
ployers  to  benefit from  their experi-
ence and expertise for longer. At the 
same time, from the employers' per-
spective,  partial  retirement  can  be 
seen, not as an alternative to early re-
tirement, but as a means of having the 
government pay  part of the  costs of 
keeping  people  in  work  until  they 
reach official retirement age. 
The concern here  is  to  examine  the 
changes which have occurred in gov-
ernment policy across  the  Union to-
wards retirement in recent years, the 
objectives  which  they  have  been 
aimed at achieving and their effects so 
far. The focus, in particular, is on the 
more innovative schemes which have 
been introduced to encourage people 
to remain in work longer on a part  -time 
basis. First, however, the trend towards 
early retirement in different Member 
States is examined in  some detail on 
the basis of data from the Community 
Labour Force Survey, which are also 
used to throw light on the relative num-
ber of people nearing retirement age 
working  part  -time  and  the  extent to 
which this has changed in recent years. 
The growth of early 
retirement 
I
n most Member States, the official 
age of retirement is 65 for men -
with only a few exceptions, such as 
France where it is 60 and Denmark 
where  it  is  67  - and,  with  more 
exceptions (Germany, Portugal and 
the UK, for example, where it is 60), 
the same for  women.  The effective 
age of retirement is, however, signi-
ficantly  below  this  in  all  Member 
States. In no country in the Union are 
more than half of men aged 60 to 64 
still  in  employment  and  in  every 
country  apart  from  Sweden,  fewer 
than 30% of  women in this age group 
are still working. The effective age of 
retirement  for  men,  moreover,  has 
come  down  throughout  the  Union 
over the  past decade.  For women, 
there  has  been  comparatively little 
change in general, though the strong 
upward trend in the participation of 
women in the work force, which is 
evident for  younger  age  groups, 
serves to  conceal any  tendency for 
the increasing number in work to re-
tire early. 
Men 
The  growth  of early  retirement 
among men is most evident for those 
aged 55  to 64. For the younger age 
group,  50  to  54,  though  there  has 
been some rise in the proportion who 
are  'permanently' economically in-
active (the measure chosen of those 
who have retired- see Box), it was 
relatively  small  between  1986  and 
- 113-Data on early retirement 
The  Community Labour Force Survey is  the  main com-
parable ~ource  of  data on early  r~tir~ment  in Member States. 
Identifying the number of people who have retired before 
they  reach  the  official  age  from  this,  however,  is  not 
straight-forward. While the LFS  gives details·  of the em-
ploymentstatus of  men and women by age group, including 
of those  who  report  themselves  as  being  economically 
inactive because they are retired, not all people who have 
effectively  stopped working  will be  included in  this  ca-
tegory. Others who class themselves as be!ng inactive be-
cause of disabilities<)r for  other reason may  equally be 
retired in practice (especially since in some Member States 
disability benefits haye been us~? as a Il1~~ns of providing 
income support t() those who are unable t() find a job and 
are close to retirement age). Equally, some of those classed 
as  unemployed  in  the  older age  groups  will never  work 
again, especially those who have been out of work for a long 
time. 
The data used here to  indicate trends  in early retirement 
relate to those in the older age groups who (lfe wholly and 
permanently economically inactive for whatever reason, so 
that they include those with disabilities, for example, but 
exclude those on short-term layoff or temporarily ill. They 
also  exclude  those  Classed  as  unemployed.  Though,  as 
noted, many of  these in the age groups concerned may never 
return to work, they should, nevertheless, still be actively 
looking  for  a job,  otherwise  under  the  ILO  convention 
adopted by the LFS, they ought not to be classified in this 
category. Accordingly, they cannot be regarded as retired 
in the true sense of  the word. Although this argument should 
not be pushed too far, because it may well be that many of 
the  long-term  unemployed,  in  particular,  are  not  really 
actively  involved  in job search,  in  practice  the  number 
unemployed in the older age groups tends to be compara-
tively small and, with a few exceptions (Germany being the 
main one), has not changed much over the past decade or 
so.  The  results  of the  analysis,  therefore,  would  not  be 
greatly altered if the  unemployed were  counted as  being 
retired, though it would add a few percentage points to the 
proportion no longer in the work force. 
These arguments relate largely to men. For women, it is still 
the case over much of the Union that comparatively few in 
the older age groups have pursued working careers so that 
a high proportion of them were economically inactive even 
when they were younger. 
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1996 and,  in  the Union as  a whole, 
only some 12% fell into this category 
in the latter year (Graph 62). There 
are,  however,  some  exceptions.  In 
particular, in Belgium and Finland, 
the proportion was over 17% in 1996 
-though in the former, it has fallen 
from  over 20%  in  1990 - and  in 
Italy, it was just over 20%, the only 
country  to  show  a  marked  upward 
trend over the past decade, apart from 
the UK. Nevertheless, in most Mem-
ber States,  the  proportion  who  are 
economically  inactive  is  not  much 
higher than for younger age groups. 
For men aged 55  to 59, by contrast, 
the proportion still in the work force 
is much lower throughout the Union 
and in most countries there has been 
a  significant increase  over the  past 
decade in those who are retired. In the 
Union as a whole, some 30% of men 
in this age group were economically 
inactive in  1996, in most cases, well 
before they had reached the official 
retirement  age.  In  Italy  (where  the 
official age for men was 62) and Fin-
land, just over 40% were no longer in 
the work force, in Luxembourg, over 
45%  and  in  Belgium  (where  men 
could retire from 60 on), 50% (Graph 
63). Only in Denmark, Germany and, 
above all,  Sweden, was the propor-
tion below 25%. 
Over the 10 years, 1986 to 1996, the 
proportion  not  in  the  labour  force 
increased in all Member States, ex-
cept  Finland,  though  the  rise  was 
small in Greece, France and Portugal, 
and  in  Luxembourg  and  Austria 
(though there is some doubt about the 
consistency of the data in the  latter 
because  of the  lack of an  LFS  for 
earlier years) as well as Greece, the 
proportion  declined  between  1990 
and  1996.  The  increase  was  espe-cially marked, as  for the 50-54 age 
groups, in  Italy and the UK (where 
the proportion rose by almost 10 per-
centage points and by almost 7 per-
centage points respectively). 
Of men aged between 60 to 64, two-
thirds  were  no  longer  in  the  work 
force in the Union in 1996, over 75% 
in Finland, almost 80% in the Nether-
lands, over 80% in Belgium and Lux-
embourg and almost 90% in  France 
(Graph 64). While the high figure in 
France  might  be  expected  because 
the official age of retirement is 60, in 
all the other countries listed, with the 
partial exception of Belgium, where 
it  is  possible for men  to  retire  any 
time between 60 and 65, the official 
retirement age  is  set at 65.  In only 
three Member States, Ireland, Portu-
gal and Sweden, were more than half 
of men in  this age group either still 
working or actively seeking work. 
In all countries, apart from  Luxem-
bourg and Austria, the proportion of 
men  aged  60  to  64  who  were  no 
longer in the labour force increased 
between 1986 and 1996 and in all of 
these,  except Greece and  Belgium, 
there was a rise during the 1990s. In 
this  case,  the  largest  increases  (all 
over 1  0 percentage points) occurred 
in Denmark, Spain, France and Ire-
land. 
From the above, for both the 55 to 59 
and 60 to 64 age groups, the increase 
in  the  relative  number of men  no 
longer economically active appears 
to have been greater during the 1990s 
than over the latter part of the 1980s 
- in  other words,  over the  period 
when  policy  towards  early  retire-
ment,  as  documented  below,  had 
supposedly  been  reversed  towards 
discouraging  rather  than  encoura-
62  Inactivity rates of men, aged 50-54, in Member 
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- 115-ging men to  stop work before they 
reached the  official  retirement age. 
This observation, however, needs to 
be  qualified.  The  changes  which 
have occurred over the past decade 
reflect the influence not only of pol-
icy  but,  arguably  even more,  of 
changes in underlying economic cir-
cumstances.  Between  1986  and 
1991, there was a general upturn in 
the European economies, accompa-
nied by an unprecedented rate of  em-
ployment  growth.  In  a  number  of 
Member  States,  the  proportion  of 
men  aged  between  55  and  64  no 
longer in the work force, especially 
towards the younger end of the age 
group,  declined  or remained  much 
the same rather than increased. After 
1991, the European economies went 
into  recession,  depressing  employ-
ment  growth,  and  inactivity  rates 
rose in nearly all countries. 
Moreover,  examining  the  changes 
which  occurred  between  1991  and 
1996 in more detail reveals that much 
of the  rise  in  economic  inactivity 
took place in the earlier years of re-
cession between 1991 and 1994 and 
since  then the  increase has  slowed 
down.  Nevertheless,  over  the  two 
years,  1994 to  1996, the proportion 
of men aged 55 to 59 no longer in the 
work force fell in only five Member 
States (Greece, France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands  and  Austria)  and  then 
only marginally. Similarly, the pro-
portion for those aged 60 to 64 also 
fell  in  only five  cases - the three 
Nordic  countries  together with 
Greece and Germany- again only 
slightly in the last two, but more sig-
nificantly in the other three following 
a large rise in the recession years. 
In addition, though the rise in early 
retirement may  have  slowed  down 
- 116-
since 1994, coinciding with the shift 
of emphasis  in  government  policy 
across the Union, on the experience 
of the 1980s, some slowdown would 
be expected after the recession came 
to an end and job shortages became 
less  acute.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  the  recent  slowdown  sig-
nifies an end to the upward trend and 
whether the policy change will prove 
effective, not just in slowing the in-
crease in the number of people retir-
ing early, but in reversing it. 
Women 
In the case of  women, as noted above, 
any  trend  towards  early  retirement 
has  been concealed by  the  marked 
tendency for increasing numbers to 
pursue working careers right across 
the  Union.  Accordingly,  a  trend  is 
apparent only among women close to 
the  official  age  of retirement.  (In 
practice,  the  data  on  changes  over 
time  in  labour force  participation 
among older women reflect the ef-
fect, in large measure, of  younger age 
groups with higher participation le-
vels becoming older-the so-called 
cohort effect - rather than of more 
women  deciding  to  enter the  work 
force at a comparatively old age.) For 
those aged 50 to 54, the rate of par-
ticipation  of women  in  the  labour 
force went up markedly from around 
40% in  1986 to 50% in  1996 in the 
Union as a whole, the rate increasing 
in all Member States, except Greece, 
where  participation  remained  low, 
and Denmark and Sweden, where it 
fell  from  a high  level  (75%  in  the 
former and almost 90% in the latter) 
(Graph 65). 
For  women  aged  55  to  59,  labour 
force participation also rose over the 
10 years 1986 to 1996 in most Mem-
ber  States  but  less  markedly.  The 
proportion of those wholly inactive 
in  the Union declined from  65% to 
58% over the period, with only Den-
mark, Greece (as for the 50 to 54 age 
group) and Luxembourg showing an 
increase, though the fall in Italy, Aus-
tria,  Sweden and the  UK  was  only 
small (Graph 66). The fall in the pro-
portion was particularly large  (over 
10  percentage  points)  in  Germany 
and  the  Netherlands,  in both cases 
concentrated in the 1990s. 
These changes have had some effect 
in reducing  the  difference  between 
Member States in the relative number 
of women in this age group who are 
permanently economically inactive. 
Nevertheless, this remains extremely 
wide, ranging from over 85% in Lux-
embourg and just under 80% in Bel-
gium  and  Italy  to  around  45%  in 
Denmark, Finland and  the  UK and 
only 20% in Sweden. 
For women aged 60 to 64, there was 
virtually no change at the Union level 
between 1986 and  1996 in the pro-
portion who were economically inac-
tive, the upward trend in participation 
being cancelled out by the trend to-
wards  early  retirement.  Only  three 
Member  States,  Portugal,  Sweden 
and  the  UK,  showed  a  significant 
reduction (over 5 percentage points) 
over  the  10  years,  with  Denmark, 
Luxembourg  and  Finland  showing 
even  larger  increases  (Graph  67). 
Moreover, in the former three coun-
tries, almost all of  the fall occurred in 
the first five years of the period, with 
virtually  no  change  between  1991 
and 1996. Indeed, only in Denmark 
and Luxembourg, where it rose, and 
in Greece, Ireland and Austria, where 
it fell, was there more than a marginal change in the proportion who  were 
inactive during the 1990s. 
Differences between Member States 
in the relative number of  women who 
are  inactive are much narrower for 
this age group than for the younger 
one, with the proportion in  5 coun-
tries  being  over 90%  and  80%  or 
higher  in  7  others,  only  the  UK 
(75%), Portugal (70%) and Sweden 
(only 45%) having a figure less than 
this.  The great majority of women 
aged 60 to 64, therefore, are not in the 
labour force in the Union. Nor does 
it seem that the official age of retire-
ment has much effect on this. In the 
UK, for example, the official age is 
60 and in Portugal, 62, lower than in 
most other Member States where it is 
65, yet the relative number of  women 
still in the work force is higher than 
in  all  other  countries,  apart  from 
Sweden. In the light of this, it is open 
to question how far the present policy 
in a number of Member States, in-
cluding Portugal and the UK, of in-
creasing the official retirement age of 
women  will  reduce  the  number in 
their early 60s no longer in the work 
force. 
Reasons for inactivity 
Data from  the  Community  Labour 
Force Survey throw some light on the 
reasons for early withdrawal from the 
work force across the Union, which, 
in  turn,  seem  to  reflect  some  dif-
ferences in the approach to providing 
income support to  the  people con-
cerned  in  different Member States. 
Whereas most of the men aged 60 to 
64 in the Union who were no longer 
economically active in  1996 classed 
themselves as  being retired, signifi-
cant  proportions  in  a  number of 
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- 117-countries gave other reasons for no 
longer being in the work force, espe-
cially being disabled. Indeed, in the 
UK, more men in this age group not 
in  the  work  force  classified  them-
selves  as  disabled  than  as  retired, 
some 25% of all men aged 60 to 64, 
the same proportion as in Finland and 
only slightly more than in the Nether-
lands (20%  ), though in both the latter 
countries, the relative number of  men 
classed as  retired was much greater 
(Graph 68).  By contrast,  in  Greece 
and Italy, under 5% of  men of  this age 
classed  themselves  as  disabled  (in 
France,  Austria,  Portugal  and 
Sweden, this was not even included 
as an option in the survey). 
Much the same pattern of  differences 
is evident for the 55 to 59 age group. 
In the UK, again most of the men not 
in the work force classed themselves 
as disabled and very few as retired, in 
Finland  and  Denmark,  more  were 
also  classified  as  disabled than  re-
tired and in the Netherlands and Ire-
land, the numbers were similar, while 
in Greece and Italy, there were very 
few men not working because of  dis-
abilities. 
For the 50-54 age group, there were 
smaller  differences  between  coun-
tries in the relative importance of  dis-
ability  as  a  cause  of inactivity, 
excluding those where the option was 
not included in  the  survey.  It was, 
nevertheless,  much  greater  in  the 
UK,  Finland  and  the  Netherlands 
than in Germany, Greece, Spain and 
Italy. 
It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  these 
differences  reflect actual  variations 
in the incidence of disability across 
the Union, rather than the differential 
use of disability benefits as a means 
of providing income support for men 
no longer in the work force. 
For women, the proportion classing 
themselves as  retired was relatively 
small for those in their 50s in most 
Member States,  exceeding  20%  of 
the 55 to 59 age group only in Italy, 
Austria and Portugal and being less 
than  5%  in  Spain,  Ireland  and  the 
Netherlands, all countries where the 
proportion of women of this age not 
working was higher than the Union 
average (Graph 69). The figures for 
economic inactivity reported above, 
therefore, may be poor indicators of 
the extent of early retirement among 
women, though in  the UK, Finland 
and Denmark, the number of women 
not  working  because  of disability, 
some of whom might effectively be 
retired,  is  relatively high,  as  in  the 
case of men. 
Policies to reduce 
early retirement 
T
he  greatest efforts  in  recent 
years  to  reduce  the  extent  of 
early  retirement and  encourage 
people to remain longer in work have 
been made in Member States where 
rates of economic inactivity among 
men in their late 50s and early 60s 
have  risen  to  high  levels.  Indeed, 
measures  have  been  introduced  to 
change pension systems in all 9 coun-
tries with the highest inactivity rates 
for  men in  this  age group,  as  indi-
cated above. It should be recognised, 
however, that a major aim of these 
policies is  to reduce the cost falling 
on systems of social protection, inde-
pendently of their effect on early re-
68  Inactivity rates of men by age group in Member 
States,1996 
69  Inactivity rates of women by age group in 
Member States, 1996 
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- 118-tirement per se. These measures are 
described below. 
Increases in the 
retirement age 
All governments in the above coun-
tries have increased the official age 
of retirement  and/or  extended  the 
contribution period required for a full 
pension. In Germany, the retirement 
age will be progressively increased to 
65 for both men and women between 
2001  and 2012, even in  the case of 
men, for those who have paid con-
tributions for 35  years or more who 
at present are able to retire once they 
reach 63.  From 2002, if they retire 
they will suffer a reduction of 18% in 
pension. Equally, the retirement age 
has also been increased for the unem-
ployed, who at present can draw a full 
pension at 60 if they have received 
unemployment benefit for at least 52 
weeks. Though they will be allowed 
to retire up to three years earlier, they 
will also have their benefit reduced if 
they do so (by 3.6% a year). 
In France, while the age of  retirement 
has not been increased since it was 
fixed at  60 in  1982, from  1994, the 
period  of contributions  required  to 
qualify for a full pension was raised 
progressively from 3i/2 to 40 years 
(6  additional  months  being  added 
each year). This was coupled with a 
change  in  the  reference  salary  for 
calculating  the  pension  payable, 
from the average of the last 10 years 
of a person's working careers to the 
average of  the best 25 (one year being 
added each year up until2008). 
In Italy,  the  pension system is  per-
haps the one which most encourages 
early  retirement  in  Europe,  in  that 
workers can retire after 35  years of 
work once they have reached 52, or 
if they have accumulated 36 years of 
contributions  irrespective  of their 
age.  For civil servants, the require-
ments  are  even  less  stringent. 
Though the new system being phased 
in following the 1995 pension reform 
will continue to allow both men and 
women to retire any time between 57 
and 65, the pension payable will be 
based more on contributions paid and 
less  on  previous salary.  The transi-
tion  period,  however,  is  extremely 
lengthy, extending to 2030, and will 
involve  a  substantial  financial 
deficit, which may prove difficult to 
sustain. (At the end of 1997, the gov-
ernment and unions agreed to a small 
reduction in the transition period and 
faster convergence of  the rules for the 
various present schemes, in line with 
the recommendations of the  Onofri 
Report.) 
In  Spain,  the  Toledo  Pact  (of 
February  1995)  attempted  to  im-
prove  the  financial  viability  of the 
pension system by increasing the age 
at  which  people  retire.  It  recom-
mended that early retirement should 
be  penalised  and  that  the  Govern-
ment  should  encourage  people  to 
remain in work longer through reduc-
tions in social contributions. (Legis-
lation  was  passed  in  July  1997  to 
rationalise the social protection sys-
tem and to  implement many of the 
recommendations of  the Toledo Pact, 
though  it  remains  to  be  seen  how 
effective this will be. It might also be 
noted that according to a survey car-
ried out in  1995, a large majority of 
Spaniards  were  against  raising  the 
retirement age but in favour of more 
flexible  arrangements  under  which 
partial retirement could be combined 
with part-time employment.) 
In  Belgium,  the  retirement  age  of 
women is being increased progress-
ively from 60 to 65, the same as for 
men,  by  2009,  and  the  number  of 
years  of contributions  necessary  to 
qualify for a pension is being raised 
gradually from 20 to 35 beginning in 
1997  (the  process  being completed 
by  2005).  In  addition,  social  con-
tributions  on  early  retirement  pen-
sions have been raised from 4.5% to 
6.5%. In Finland, the Pension Com-
mittee  in  1990  set the  objective of 
raising the official age of retirement 
from 65 to 68 by the year 2020 and a 
number of amendments to  the pen-
sion system were introduced in 1994 
to  deter early retirement,  including 
increasing pensions for those conti-
nuing  to  work after 60,  raising the 
qualifying  age  for  early  retirement 
from 55  to 58  and reducing that for 
partial retirement from 60 to 58 and 
increasing the official retirement age 
for public sector workers from 63 to 
65. 
In Austria, as noted above, the actual 
age of retirement is  well below the 
official  age  (  60 for  women,  65  for 
men)  and  since  1996,  a number of 
measures  have  been  introduced  to 
contain  costs.  In  particular,  the 
period of contributions has been in-
creased from 35 to 37'/2 years (which 
is likely to  affect women more than 
men),  while for those retiring early 
because of being unemployed, it was 
increased from  15 to 20 years in the 
last  30.  In  addition,  the  formula 
determining the  amount of pension 
receivable  was  modified  giving  an 
additional disincentive to retire early 
(specifically, the percentage applied 
to  earnings for the first 30 years of 
employment  was  reduced  slightly 
and that applied to the following 15 
years  increased,  so  reducing  the 
- 119-amount"'foFthose retiring before com-
pleting 45 years). In the Netherlands, 
where  the  effective  age  at  which 
people retire is also one of the lowest 
in Europe, however, the emphasis of 
policy reform has been more on com-
bating  discrimination  against  older 
workers in the labour market. 
From early retirement 
to partial retirement 
The  second set of policy measures 
has been aimed at reducing outflows 
of older  workers  from  the  labour 
market, both by limiting the number 
who qualify for early retirement and 
by  encouraging,  and  making  it 
possible for,  those  approaching  re-
tirement age to work part-time rather 
than to  stop work completely.  In a 
context where job shortages remain a 
major problem, the latter type of ar-
rangement is, in some sense, a com-
promise  between  combating 
unemployment  and  keeping  older 
workers in employment and, indeed, 
in a number of  countries has included 
an obligation for companies to  take 
on other people at the same time. 
In  Belgium, flexible  retirement be-
tween 60 and 65 has been possible for 
all male employees since 1990 (and 
will be possible for women once their 
retirement age has been increased to 
65), the pension payable varying ac-
cording to the employment record of 
the person concerned. A total or par-
tial career break scheme has been in 
place  since  1985,  entitling  em-
ployees aged 50 to opt for part-time 
work for a maximum of three years, 
until they reach the age of 60, when 
they are  able to  retire.  The number 
doing so, however, is limited to  1% 
of the work force and companies are 
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required to take on new employees to 
replace  those  opting  for  part-time 
work. A new measure, introduced in 
1993,  enables  people  to  continue 
working  part-time  once  they  reach 
55,  those  concerned  receiving  an 
allowance paid partly from the unem-
ployment insurance fund and partly 
by  employers on top of their wage, 
employers  being obliged to  offer a 
job to  someone unemployed  at  the 
same  time.  These  measures,  how-
ever, have not had a perceptible ef-
fect on the number of older workers 
in employment, as  indicated above, 
and, by September 1997, only a few 
hundred people had opted for part-
time early retirement. 
In Austria, qualifying conditions for 
early retirement have also been tight-
ened,  while  gradual  retirement has 
been encouraged by the introduction, 
in  1993,  of a  partial early  pension 
scheme, under which women aged 55 
to 60 and men of 60 to 65 can reduce 
their hours of work by 50% and re-
ceive 70% of the full  pension or by 
70% and receive 50% of  the pension. 
Although the  option appears finan-
cially attractive,  in  practice, almost 
nobody has  taken advantage of the 
option,  possibly  because  those 
eligible also qualify for full early re-
tirement and a full rather than partial 
pension. 
In Finland, partial pension schemes 
were introduced at the end of 1980s 
with the intention of smoothing the 
transition to retirement and reducing 
the number retiring early. According 
to  recent  studies,  however,  such 
schemes are  more an  alternative to 
full-time  work than  to  full-time  re-
tirement and have reduced the num-
ber of full time workers rather than of 
pensioners.  Two  other measures, 
Part-time  Work  Supplementary 
Benefits and Job Rotation Compen-
sation, have been subsequently intro-
duced to reduce hours of work. Both 
are  payable  to  those  working  full-
time  for  the  same  employer for  at 
least a year and require that the em-
ployer take on someone unemployed 
to  compensate,  though  so  far  they 
seem to have had little effect. 
In Germany, as well as the criteria for 
eligibility for early retirement being 
tightened,  a  partial  retirement 
scheme was introduced in 1996 for a 
limited  period of 5 years,  enabling 
those over 55 to work part-time, the 
reduction in their income being com-
pensated from the unemployment in-
surance  fund  (30%  for  a  50% 
reduction in working time). As else-
where,  employers  are  required  to 
take on either people unemployed or 
trainees to fill the part-time jobs so 
created. So far, however, the number 
of such  jobs  has  been  relatively 
small. 
In  Denmark,  a  partial  retirement 
scheme  (Early  Partial  Retirement 
Pay)  was  introduced  in  January 
1995, with the  same conditions ap-
plying as for full early retirement and 
open to people in the same age group, 
60 to  67.  By September 1996, just 
under 900 people had opted for this 
scheme. 
In Italy,  it  has  been  possible  since 
October 1996 for employees eligible 
for a seniority pension to work part-
time, enabling a job to be created for 
someone younger,  though,  in  prac-
tice,  the  option has  not been much 
exploited, while in Spain, the Pact of 
Toledo  included  a  reference  to  the 
case for introducing measures to fa-cilitate flexible retirement, but so far 
no action has been taken. 
In  France,  partial  retirement  has 
probably been more developed dur-
ing the 1990s than in any other Union 
country, in an attempt to reduce the 
scale of  early retirement and the costs 
involved,  as  well  as  keeping  older 
workers in employment and so main-
taining  the  payment of social  con-
tributions.  Measures  to  encourage 
employers to keep on older workers 
date back to  1985  when they  were 
introduced to enable employees over 
55  to  work  part-time,  the  reduced 
wage being topped up by an allow-
ance (of 20-30% of previous salary) 
from  the  Unemployment Insurance 
Fund and employers being required 
to take on new workers for the part-
time jobs so created. The scheme was 
amended in 1992, giving employers 
the option of paying a financial con-
tribution  instead  of hiring  new 
workers - so catering for declining 
firms  for  which  part-time  working 
was a means of avoiding redundan-
cies - and easing the constraint on 
them  to  take  on  those  in  priority 
groups  (to  a  third  of,  for  example, 
young people under 26 with low edu-
cational  qualifications,  people with 
disabilities,  unemployed  over 50 
and/or the long-term unemployed). 
The scheme was  further relaxed  in 
1994, under the 5-year Employment 
Act, enabling the reduction in hours 
of work to  be varied between 20% 
and 80% of annual full-time  hours 
worked in the preceding year, so long 
as  it  averages  50% over the  whole 
gradual  retirement period.  In  1995, 
the number opting for gradual retire-
ment increased by 20% after doub-
ling the year before and, for the first 
time, exceeded the number opting for 
full early retirement. 
In the  Netherlands, the  'older wor-
kers' directive', which allowed firms 
to dismiss older workers first in the 
event of  redundancies, was abolished 
in  1994. In addition, measures were 
introduced to limit access to the three 
early retirement schemes: disability, 
for long the main pathway into early 
retirement,  unemployment  and  the 
VUT (voluntary  pre-retirement) 
scheme, the latter originating from a 
collective  agreement  between  em-
ployers and employees and financed 
mostly  by  business.  This  contrasts 
with  the  other  schemes  which  are 
funded  partly  by  the  beneficiaries 
themselves,  which  is  likely  to  dis-
courage them from opting for early 
retirement and is  a  reason  why  the 
Government is trying to encourage a 
shift from V UT towards these. 
As  noted  in  Chapters  2  and 4,  the 
disability  benefit  system  has  been 
tightened  considerably  in  recent 
years,  those  claiming  benefit  now 
needing  to  satisfy  more  stringent 
medical examinations of their ability 
to work. At the same time, responsi-
bility  for  funding  has  been  shifted 
more  on  to  employers  whose con-
tribution rates vary partly according 
to the number of claimants they em-
ploy (see Chapter 4). 
The criteria determining entitlement 
to disability benefits have also been 
tightened in the UK, where they have 
also been used in the past to support 
effective early  retirement,  while  in 
Sweden-where, like the UK, with-
drawal of workers from  the  labour 
market is less of a feature than in the 
rest of the  Union - receipt of an 
early  retirement  pension  now  de-
pends on establishing incapacity for 
work. 
In Sweden also,  the  minimum  age 
for entitlement to partial pension was 
raised from 60 to 61  in 1994, accom-
panied by a reduction in the rate of 
pension from 65% of previous earn-
ings to 55% and a limitation on the 
maximum  reduction  in  working 
hours of 25%. These changes have 
led to a significant fall in the number 
of  people opting for a partial pension. 
Keeping older workers 
in employment 
The third aspect of  policy has been to 
encourage businesses to retain older 
employees in work. 
Increases in the official age of retire-
ment  are  likely  to  have  very  little 
effect in  this  regard if they  are not 
accompanied by measures to protect 
older workers. Government policies, 
however, have not changed signifi-
cantly over the past few years in this 
area and have generally not been very 
successful in persuading employers 
to change their policy in this respect. 
In Germany, in particular, long-term 
unemployment  has  risen  signifi-
cantly  among  older  workers  since 
unification and, unlike in other Mem-
ber States, the rate for these is higher 
than for their younger counterparts. 
Nevertheless,  under employment 
promotion legislation, older workers 
are treated as a priority group and a 
number of measures exist to encour-
age their employment, the most im-
portant of which are age-dependent 
wage subsidies offered to  firms  re-
cruiting those of 50 or over and who 
have been unemployed for at least 18 
- 121-months to part-time jobs. This, how-
ever, as noted, does not seem to have 
had  much  effect  in  increasing  the 
number of older workers  taken on, 
though it is always difficult to know 
what  would  have  happened  in  the 
absence of the measure. A possible 
unfortunate effect of this kind of tar-
geting,  which  is  often  difficult  to 
avoid,  is  to  reinforce  prejudices 
against employing the group in ques-
tion simply because they are targeted 
which is liable to give the impression 
that  they  are  somehow  inferior 
workers. 
In  France,  active  labour market 
policies  in favour of older workers 
were  introduced  at  the  end  of the 
1980s,  as  part  of a  programme  to 
combat  long-term  unemployment. 
As in Germany, these were aimed at 
encouraging  businesses  to  take  on 
those over 50 who were unemployed, 
taking the form of  wage subsides and 
exemptions  from  social  contribu-
tions. They were replaced, in  1995, 
by  a new  measure in  a similar but 
slightly more extended form (contrat 
initiative emploi), which has mainly 
benefited those under 45 rather than 
those over 50. 
Other measures, however, have also 
been  introduced,  including  one  re-
quiring employers to pay additional 
contributions if they dismiss anyone 
over 50 and, perhaps most importan-
tly,  another,  implemented  in  1994, 
encouraging them to continue to train 
older workers and to enable them to 
participate in company training pro-
grammes so that they can extend and 
improve  their  skills  and  qualifica-
tions. A further measure, moreover, 
concerned with increasing working-
time  flexibility,  enables  workers  to 
accumulate entitlement to paid leave, 
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which inter alia gives businesses a 
greater opportunity to manage leave 
for older workers nearing retirement. 
Nevertheless, so far, as in Germany, 
these  various  measures  have  not 
proved  very  effective  in  keeping 
older workers in employment. 
In Finland, there seems to be a greater 
commitment than in most other parts 
of the  Union  to  establishing  an 
integrated  programme  of active 
measures  for  those  over 45.  Since 
1990, the measures implemented in-
clude: 
•  the  FinnAge  programme  estab-
lished in the Finnish Institute of 
Occupational Health to promote 
the  health,  employability  and 
well-being of  those over45 which 
involves research and other acti-
vities in firms, training organisa-
tions and expert services; 
•  the Small Workplace programme, 
a cooperation programme of the 
Finnish Institute of Occupational 
Health with small firms, aimed at 
encouraging them  to  adopt  best 
practices  in  the  interests  of the 
welfare of  their employees as well 
as themselves; 
•  the Employability for Tomorrow 
programme, implemented by the 
Federation of Employment Pen-
sions Institutes, aimed at fostering 
education and the dissemination 
of  information to improve the em-
ployability of older workers; 
•  the  National  Programme  for 
Older Workers,  launched by the 
Government at  the  beginning of 
1997 for a 5-year period for im-
proving  the  job  opportunities 
open to  older workers  and con-
sisting of changes in legislation, 
the  provision  of  information, 
training  and  research  and  the 
general promotion of activities to 
help older workers improve their 
skills. 
At  the  same  time,  these  active 
measures co-exist with passive ones 
which  provide  income  support  to 
older workers losing their job, in the 
form  of unemployment  allowances 
or pensions payable until the official 
age of retirement as well as disability 
benefits, which are the most common 
means of  supporting those who effec-
tively retire early. Nevertheless, the 
various  programmes  listed  above 
seem  to  have  reduced  the  number 
claiming the latter benefit in the re-
cent past, though it remains high as 
compared with other Member States 
(see Chapter 4). 
Other measures 
In all the Member States cited above, 
the possibility exists for people to opt 
for  partial  retirement  in  the  later 
stages  of their  working  careers.  In 
some  countries,  however,  pension 
regulations make this difficult. In the 
UK, for example, where early retire-
ment per se has so far been less of an 
issue - though it has surfaced in the 
form  of growing concern about the 
number of people drawing disability 
benefit - the rules governing occu-
pational pensions prohibit someone 
receiving  a  pension  to  continue  to 
work  part-time  for  the  same  em-
ployer as before. The development of 
partial retirement, therefore, requires 
the removal of obstacles as  well as 
the  implementation  of positive 
measures. There is also a potentially important 
role  for  information  and  anti-dis-
crimination  measures,  which  draw 
attention to the advantages of hiring 
or continuing  to  employ  older 
workers  and which discourage em-
ployers  from  regarding  age  as  an 




t remains to examine the relative 
scale of part-time working across 
the Union and whether it has tended 
to increase in recent years in response 
to the measures listed above, though 
since in a number of  cases these have 
been introduced only very recently, 
any effect may not as yet be evident. 
Nevertheless, even in these cases, the 
prevailing  level  relative  to  that  in 
other Member States as well as past 
changes  are  relevant  to  an  assess-
ment of  their possible effect in future. 
Only a comparatively small number 
of men in the Union work part-time, 
though the proportion has risen sig-
nificantly over the 1990s. In the 25 to 
49 age group, which is  the relevant 
basis  for  comparison,  just under 
3
1/2% of men employed in the Union 
worked in part-time jobs in 1996, and 
only in the Netherlands (9
1/2% ), was 
the  proportion  over  5%.  For men 
aged 50 to 54, the proportion working 
part-time is much the same as for the 
younger  age  group  in  all  Member 
States-the biggest difference being 
in the UK, where it is 1'/2 percentage 
points higher, and Denmark, where it 
is lower by a similar amount. 
For men aged 55  to 59, the relative 
number of those employed working 
part-time  is  generally  higher,  but 
only to a comparatively small extent 
in  most  cases.  In  the  Union  as  a 
whole, just over 5'/2% of men in this 
age  group  were  employed  in  part-
time  jobs  in  1996  as  against just 
under 3'/2% for those aged 50 to 54, 
and in 9 of  the 15 Member States, the 
difference was less than 2 percentage 
points  (Graph 70).  The 6 countries 
where it was greater are the Nether-
lands (where the share working part-
time  in  the  older  age  group  was 
almost  10  percentage points higher 
than in the younger group), France (  6 
points higher), Sweden and the UK 
(4
1/2 points higher) and Portugal and 
Finland (3  points higher). Of these, 
only France and Finland had partial 
retirement  schemes  in  operation, 
though  in  the  Netherlands,  much 
more than in any other country, pol-
icy  generally  is  to  encourage part-
time  working.  In  the  other three 
countries, it is  perhaps relevant that 
the extent of labour force participa-
tion of men aged 55  to 59 is among 
the highest in the Union, which may 
owe something to the relative import-
ance of part-time working. 
Among men aged 60 to 64, the pro-
portion  of those  in  employment 
working  part-time  in  the  Union  is 
over twice that for the 55  to 59 age 
group,  but  was  still  under  12%  in 
1996.  While  in  all  Member States, 
the proportion was higher than for the 
younger  age  group,  the  difference 
was  small  (2  percentage  points  or 
less) in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, in all of 
which  men  of between  60  and  64 
working  part-time  accounted  for 
5
1/2%  or less of all those in employ-
ment. Nevertheless, in the first three 
of these countries, a higher propor-
tion of men in this age group remain 
in the work force than in the Union 
as a whole. In the latter two, by con-
trast, the proportion is among the lo-
west  in  the  Union.  In  Belgium, 
measures have been introduced to in-
crease  partial  retirement,  as  they 
have also been in Italy, though too 
recently  to  affect  the  position  in 
1996. 
Of  the remaining countries, in four-
the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Finland 
and Sweden-the proportion work-
ing part-time in 1996 was over 25% 
of men in this age group in employ-
ment. In the first three, labour force 
participation was below average, in 
the fourth, Sweden, the highest in the 
Union.  In  addition,  in  two  of the 
countries,  measures  are  in force  to 
encourage part-time working among 
employees  approaching  retirement 
age, in two not.  There is, therefore, 
little sign of  any relationship between 
the importance of part-time working 
and either labour force participation 
among  older  workers  or  measures 
operating to increase this. 
For men of 65  and over,  part-time 
working  is  much  more  important, 
around 40% of all those in employ-
ment  being  in  part-time  jobs.  The 
number of  this age still in work, how-
ever, is very small-only some 6% 
of  the 65 to 69 age group in the Union 
in  1996.  Moreover,  in  countries 
where the latter proportion was rela-
tively high-Greece (14% ), Ireland 
(15%)  and  Portugal  (24%)  - the 
relative  number  working  part-time 
was below rather than above average, 
though this  in some degree reflects 
the high proportion of  men in this age 
group employed in agriculture. 
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Changes in part-time 
working of men 
As noted above, the relative number 
of men working part-time has risen 
significantly over the 1990s, and this 
has  been  true  even  more for  older 
workers than their younger counter-
parts.  For men  aged  50 to  54,  the 
proportion  in  work  employed  part-
time in the Union increased from 2% 
in  1991, the same as in  1986, to just 
over 3% in 1996. A similar increase 
occurred for those aged 25 to 49. 
For men aged 55 to 59, the proportion 
in part-time jobs rose from just under 
4% in 1991 to just over 5'/2% in 1996, 
with all Member States except Italy 
and  Luxembourg  recording  an  in-
crease (Graph 71 ). The rise exceeded 
4 percentage points in France and 6 
percentage points in the Netherlands, 
both  countries  in  which  measures 
have been taken to increase the num-
bers  opting  for  partial  retirement, 
though in the latter, as part of a more 
general policy of encouraging part-
time  working.  Over  the  10  years 
1986 to  1996 as  a whole, however, 
the  rise  in France was  slightly less 
than in the UK, where there were no 
special  measures  for  encouraging 
part-time working, though the almost 
complete absence of restrictions en-
abled part-time working to develop. 
For men aged 60 to 64, there was a 
similarly large rise in part-time work-
ing  over  the  1990s,  from  8%  to 
I0'/2% in the Union as a whole, with 
again most Member States showing 
an increase except Italy and Luxem-
bourg  and,  in  this  case,  Denmark, 
where  there  had  been  a  large  rise 
during  the  1980s  (Graph  72).  The 
increase was particularly marked in 
the UK, where it went up from  11% to  almost  18
1/z%,  while  in  France, 
where men tend to  retire at 60 and 
very few in this age group are still in 





or women,  the  relative  number 
working part-time also increases 
with age, though the tendency is less 
general than for men. Over the Union 
as a whole, just under 31% of  women 
aged 25 to 49 in work were employed 
part-time in 1996, the proportion va-
rying from under 10% in Greece and 
Portugal  to  almost  70%  in  the 
Netherlands. For women aged 50 to 
54,  almost 35%  of those employed 
worked part-time. In three countries, 
however,  France,  Austria  and 
Sweden, the proportion was less than 
for the  younger age  group.  In four 
countries, on the other hand, Ireland, 
the  Netherlands,  Portugal  and  the 
UK,  it  was  at  least  7  percentage 
points higher. 
For women aged 55 to 59, the propor-
tion  of those  in  employment  with 
part  -time jobs was just under 40% in 
the Union in  1996, some 5 percent-
age points above that for the younger 
age group, but again in a number of 
Member States - Belgium, Spain, 
Italy and Finland - the proportion 
was lower rather than higher, while 
in Ireland,  it was  the  same  (Graph 
73 ).  In  Denmark,  France  and 
Sweden, by contrast, it was  over 8 
percentage points higher. 
For  women,  unlike  for  men,  part-
time working does seem to contribute 
to high levels of labour force partici-
pation  among  those  in  older  age 
groups, as,  indeed, it does for those 
younger. Leaving aside the Nether-
lands, where relatively low levels of 
participation are combined with very 
high rates of  part-time working, all of 
the Member States in which the pro-
portion of women aged 55  to  59 in 
employment working part-time was 
above the Union average also had an 
above average proportion of women 
in work. 
For those aged 60 to 64, only in Bel-
gium and Ireland was the proportion 
of women working part-time lower 
than for 55 to 59 year olds, and again 
the overall figure for the Union as a 
whole was 5 percentage points higher 
(at 44%). In 6 Member States, it was 
at least 8 percentage points higher, in 
four  of these  - Austria,  Finland, 
Sweden and the UK- over 11  per-
centage points higher. Indeed, in the 
last  two  countries,  over 60%  of 
women  in  this  age  group  in  work 
were employed part-time, as was the 
case in the Netherlands, while in Ger-
many, the figure was over 55%. For 
this age group, however, the relation-
ship between part-time working and 
labour  force  participation  is  less 
clear-cut, with Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal  and  Finland,  all  combining 
above  average  participation with  a 
below average proportion of women 
working part  -time. 
As for men, it is  difficult to discern 
the  effect  of partial  retirement 
measures  on the  scale  of part-time 
working among women, though as is 
generally the case, it is impossible to 
know what this would be in the ab-
sence of such measures. 
Changes in part-time 
working of women 
Forwomenaged55 to 59, the propor-
tion in work employed in  part-time 
jobs  in  the  Union  increased  from 
36% to 40% between 1991 and 1996, 
more  than  for  younger age  groups 
and more than in the preceding five 
years. Apart from Italy and Luxem-
bourg, as  for men, Denmark, where 
there was a general fall in the extent 
of part-time  working,  and  Greece, 
where there was  little change, both 
for this age group and younger ones, 
all Member States recorded signifi-
cant  increases,  except  for  the  UK, 
where already in  1991, around 55% 
of women of this  age  worked part-
time (Graph 74). It would appear that 
the growth of  part-time working may 
have contributed to more women of 
this age working. All of  the countries 
where  part-time  working  went  up 
also experienced an increase in par-
ticipation among women in this age 
group. Of those where it declined or 
remained much the  same (the UK), 
only Greece showed a rise in partici-
pation over the 1990s. 
For women aged 60 to 64, there was 
a similar increase in the Union during 
the 1990s in the proportion working 
part-time as for the 55 to 59 year olds. 
The rise was general to all Member 
States, except Italy, the Netherlands 
and the UK (in the latter two of  which 
the  figure  was  already  well  above 
that in other parts of the Union) and, 
apart  from  Spain  and  Ireland,  ex-
ceeded 5 percentage points  (Graph 
75). Moreover, as for the younger age 
group, all of the countries in which 
part-time working increased signifi-
cantly,  Luxembourg  apart,  showed 
some rise in participation of women 
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of  this age, though in most cases from 
a very low level. 
Concluding remarks 
0 
n  the  above  evidence,  there 
does seem to have been a rela-
tively  widespread  growth  in  part-
time working among older workers 
over recent years, though it is also the 
case that this has been true as well of 
those in younger age groups and it is 
difficult to attribute much of this to 
partial  retirement  policies  per se. 
Moreover, much of the growth may 
have been at the expense of full-time 
jobs rather than increased numbers 
leaving the work force completely. 
It remains the case, irrespective of  the 
shift in the emphasis of policy, that 
there  is  a  widespread  tendency 
among companies, forced to  reduce 
employment,  to  concentrate  redun-
dancies on older workers, often with 
the agreement of trade unions. This 
is  understandable  given  the  larger 
severance payments which they are 
frequently entitled to and their often 
more favourable treatment under the 
social protection system, in the sense 
that they  are  better placed to  claim 
disability  benefits  or to  qualify  for 
various early retirement schemes. At 
the  same  time,  from  the  govern-
ment's perspective, it may be prefer-
able to accept paying larger transfers 
to  these,  especially  if they  are  not 
counted  among  the  unemployed, 
rather  than  to  pay  unemployment 
benefits to younger workers. 
Moreover, there remains an awkward 
question about the returns from pro-
viding  training  or subsidising  em-
ployers  to  do  so  when  the  people 
concerned may  be  approaching the end of their working careers, espe-
cially in the context of constraints on 
expenditure  where  to  do  so  may 
mean cutbacks in other areas. Never-
theless,  the  case for  a  more  active 
approach, as for labour market policy 
in general, remains strong if the wel-
fare of the people concerned and the 
potential  benefits  of exploiting  the 
know-how and  experience of older 
workers in the productive process are 
given  adequate  weight.  It  is  even 
stronger in  a  context where  demo-
graphic trends are set to increase the 
number  of people  reaching  retire-
ment age significantly throughout the 
Union and to reduce the number of 
young  people joining  the  labour 
force. 
- 127-- 128-Chapter 6 Health-care: containing costs and 
improving services 
G
rowth  of demand  for  health 
care  poses  a  common  policy 
dilemma for  governments  through-
out the European Union, as  indeed, 
for those in other parts of the world. 
As their real income increases, there 
is  a general tendency for people to 
want a higher standard of care and to 
have access to  more and better ser-
vices should they need treatment. At 
the  same  time,  the  ageing  of the 
population in European countries is 
itself increasing  the  need  for  care, 
while, on the supply side, advances 
in medical science and in technology 
are  expanding  and  improving  the 
treatments available. The issue fac-
ing  governments  is  how  far  they 
should respond to growing demand, 
and  the  pressure  from  health  care 
providers  for  the  delivery  of more 
services, by allowing expenditure on 
health to rise and, if  they seek to limit 
this, how the limits should be chosen. 
Since  most  expenditure  on  health 
care in Europe is part of  public sector 
spending and financed from taxes or 
social charges, growth tends to con-
flict  with  the  overall  objectives  of 
fiscal  policy  and  with  budget con-
straints, which have generally tight-
ened in recent years. Leaving health 
care to private sector provision, how-
ever, does not resolve the dilemma or 
absolve government from  responsi-
bility for expenditure growth. In the 
US, where services are mostly pro-
vided by the private sector, inflation 
of health care costs and the  associ-
ated  rise  in  insurance  premiums, 
which to  a large  extent are  met by 
employers, as well as in the costs of 
Medicaid which is  publicly funded, 
is an ongoing source of difficulty for 
government. 
Whereas most other services can be 
left to market forces to determine the 
level and pattern of provision and to 
competition  between  suppliers  to 
contain costs,  the  special nature of 
health care and the priority attached 
to it by consumers, allied to the diffi-
culty for them of judging quality of 
service  independently  of price,  are 
always  likely  to  lead  to  excessive 
demand  and  over-inflated  prices. 
Equally, the free operation of market 
forces  will not necessarily result in 
those on low incomes receiving the 
treatment they require, and the pat-
tern of resource allocation may tend 
to reflect the preferences of  those that 
can afford to pay rather than the true 
needs of society. In view of this, and 
in view ofthe externalities associated 
with the non-provision of treatment 
- in the form of exposure to conta-
gious diseases, for example- gov-
ernments cannot avoid involvement 
in health care issues and ensuring the 
provision of at least a basic level of 
care,  though  what  such  basic  care 
should consist of is  open to  widely 
different interpretations. 
The wide consensus on the need for 
government  involvement  in  health 
care provision and  on the justifica-
tion  for  a  measure of control  over 
expenditure  growth  has  not  so  far, 
however,  led to  any  general agree-
ment on how the level of provision 
should be determined.  In the Euro-
pean Union,  where there is  a com-
mon commitment to the provision of 
a high level of essential care avail-
able  to  all  irrespective  of their  in-
come,  most  governments  have,  in 
practice,  applied  relatively  crude 
criteria  to  determine  how  much 
should be spent-that, for example, 
expenditure should  not increase  by 
more than GDP or that the share of 
finance  going  to  health  services 
should be kept constant. They have, 
moreover,  generally  succeeded  in 
achieving  such objectives.  Accord-
ing  to  the  latest  figures,  in  most 
Member States, public spending on 
health care,  and  indeed total  social 
spending,  has  remained largely un-
changed  in  relation  to  GOP  since 
1993 and the end of the recession of 
the early 1990s. 
The key issues relate not so much to 
how costs have been contained - it 
is  not so difficult to keep down ex-
penditure  if governments  control 
- 129-health service budgets either directly, 
where the service is part of  the public 
sector, or indirectly, where it is pro-
vided via insurance funds whose in-
come is state controlled - but to the 
effects on the standard of service and 
on the universal availability of care 
or treatment required. In other words, 
in a context where health services are 
rationed, as they are in all countries, 
the important questions concern the 
way  that  the  limited  resources  are 
allocated,  both  between  different 
kinds of  service and between individ-
uals, how the maximum output from 
the  resources  available  is  obtained 
and how the system of control - or 
rationing  - applied  interacts  with 
these issues. 
In practice, governments have tried 
to deploy market forces to help both 
to  contain costs  and  to  allocate re-
sources  more  effectively,  while, 
nevertheless,  retaining  a  large 
measure of  control. Most commonly, 
direct charges have been imposed, or 
increased,  on  pharmaceuticals  and 
certain kinds of treatment to reduce 
the  cost falling  on  the  state  and to 
curb demand.  In addition,  in many 
countries, efforts have been made to 
distinguish  more  clearly  between 
demand  and  supply,  between  pur-
chasers of services (private individ-
uals, insurance funds  and GPs) and 
providers (hospitals,  specialists and 
analysts) in order to create the condi-
tions  for  market forces  to  operate. 
These  include  efforts  to  break  the 
link between treatment and remuner-
ation and to reduce the possibility of 
practitioners being able to over-pre-
scribe treatment in order to increase 
their income (which remains a prob-
lem where fees are paid on a case-by-
case basis).  Such efforts have been 
accompanied  by  attempts  to  intro-
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duce  the  possibility  of competition 
between  both  purchasers  and  pro-
viders so as to realise the potentially 
beneficial effects of  market forces on 
efficiency. 
In all cases, however, such attempts 
have run up against the limitations to 
competition  inherent in  a managed 
market  for  health  care,  where  the 
maintenance of local centres of  treat-
ment is  important and  where  there 
can be significant economies of scale 
(in hospitals providing a full range of 
specialist  services  or  in  insurance 
funds  with  subscribers  who  have  a 
wide  range  of characteristics,  for 
example).  In practice, governments 
have  generally  been  unwilling  to 
allow competitive forces to have full 
reign and  their effect on efficiency 
has,  therefore,  been extremely 
muted. 
Nevertheless, there have been appar-
ent gains to the introduction of mar-
ket, or pseudo-market, mechanisms, 
as  indicated  below,  though  these 
largely seem to have come from the 
reorganisation  itself,  the  measures 
taken as  a corollary of this and the 
disturbance of cosy bureaucratic re-
lations  between  the  main  protago-
nists,  which  tended  to  distort 
priorities and objectives. In particu-
lar, the division between purchasers 
and providers, allied to the specifica-
tion  of precise  budgets,  opens  the 
way  for  the  establishment of more 
commercially  -oriented relationships 
between the  two  sides  and  for  the 
formulation of contracts defining the 
services to be supplied over specific 
periods  of time  and  the  terms  and 
conditions to be applied. It also pro-
vides greater scope for the exercise 
of managerial responsibility and in-
creases the importance both of good 
management and of  systematic in for-
mation  about  the  costs  associated 
with different kinds of treatment or 
service.  Moreover,  it tends  to  shift 
the balance of power from providers 
to  purchasers,  so  giving  a  greater 
voice  to  consumers  and  according 
more weight to their interests. 
By increasing cost effectiveness, the 
introduction of these  kinds  of 
measure in  some countries seem to 
some extent to have offset the effect 
on service provision of  the increasing 
restraint  of expenditure  on  health 
care. There are signs in a number of 
Member States, however, of a rela-
tively  high  level  of dissatisfaction 
with  public  health  services  and  a 
widespread desire for improvements 
and extended types of treatment and 
preventative measures. It is  open to 
question  whether  these  can  be  re-
alised  by  efficiency  gains  alone 
within  the  constraints  which  have 
been  imposed  on  expenditure,  or 
funding, growth. 
Outline of analysis 
T
he concern in this chapter is not 
to review the changes in systems 
of  health care which have occurred in 
all  the Member States in the recent 
past but to  focus  on selected coun-
tries where substantive reforms have 
been  attempted  or contemplated. 
These are intended to be illustrative 
of the direction of change across the 
Union and the implications of this. 
The countries chosen for study are: 
•  the  UK,  where  the  changes  im-
plemented by  the  previous  gov-
ernment  have  attracted  much 
attention  in  other  parts  of the 
Union because of the attempt to introduce  pseudo-market  mech-
anisms  into  a  publicly-operated 
service; 
•  the Netherlands, where extensive 
market  -based reforms  were pro-
posed  some years  ago  but have 
been  implemented  only  very 
gradually and where a more con-
scious effort than elsewhere in the 
Union has  been made to  define 
the services which should be pub-
licly  provided  and  those  which 
can be left to the private sector to 
supply; 
•  Germany,  where  significant  di-
rect charges have been imposed 
on patients in an attempt to curb 
the rise in social contributions; 
•  France,  where  expenditure  on 
health care is  among the highest 
in the Union in relation to GDP 
and  where  efficiency  in  service 
prov1s10n  has  been  tackled 
through  regulation  rather  than 
competition; 
•  Italy and Spain, which have simi-
lar regional  structures  of health 
service  organisation  and  where 
similar kinds of  change have been 
introduced to overcome problems 
of inefficiency. 
These countries are examined in tum 
below. First, however, trends in ex-
penditure  on  health  care  in  recent 
years are reviewed in order to  pro-
vide  a quantititative background to 
the analysis. This is based on OECD 
data rather than on ESSPROS figures 
as deployed elsewhere in this Report, 
since  these  cover developments  in 
the private as well as the public sec-
tor.  In  practice,  however,  for  most 
countries,  although  there  are  some 
differences because of differing de-
finitions used in the scale of  expendi-
ture,  the  changes  shown  by  the 
ESSPROS data are similar to those 
shown by the OECD figures for pub-
lic spending on health. 
Trends in health 
expenditure 
T
otal expenditure on health care in 
the Union amounted to just under 
9% of  GDP in 1996, the figure varying 
from 6% in Greece and Ireland to just 
under  10%  in  France  and  10
1H1'o  in 
Germany  (Graph  76).  These  figures 
are substantially below that in the US, 
where spending was equivalent to 14% 
of GDP, though mostly above that in 
Japan, where it was just over 7%. Over 
the  1990s,  expenditure  in the  Union 
has risen by almost 1% of  GDP -less 
than in the US or Japan-and, as for 
total spending on social protection, all 
of the rise occurred in the three years 
of recession  at  the  beginning  of the 
period, reflecting in large measure the 
lack of growth in GDP. 
Indeed,  spending in  real terms (ad-
justed for  general  inflation)  in  the 
Union  grew  by  only  around  2%  a 
year per head of population between 
1990 and 1996 (and by less in volume 
terms - ie adjusting for the rise in 
health costs), half the  rate over the 
preceding five  years (and about the 
rate  required  simply  to  keep  pace 
with the ageing of the population -
see Chapter 1  ). Growth in Greece and 
Portugal, however, where the service 
is less developed than elsewhere, was 
significantly  higher  than  average 
76  Total and public expenditure on health in 
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- 131-(over 6%  a year in real terms), as  it 
was  in  Ireland  and  Luxembourg, 
while  at  the  opposite extreme, real 
spending  declined  slightly  in  Italy, 
Finland and Sweden (Graph 77). 
Public expenditure on health in the 
Union accounts for just under 80% of 
total spending, much the same as in 
Japan, but considerably higher than 
in the US (around 45%). Perhaps sur-
prisingly, however, public expendi-
ture on health in the Union in relation 
to GDP is not significantly different 
from  that in the US  (around 6
1/2%). 
In most Member States, the relative 
scale of public spending is close to 
the Union average, the only excep-
tions  being  Belgium  and  Luxem-
bourg, where it is around 90% of the 
total and Italy and Portugal, where it 
is  around  70%  and  60%,  respec-
tively.  There  has,  moreover,  been 
very  little  change  in  the  relative 
weight of the public sector during the 
1990s, except in France, Ireland and 
Portugal, where it has risen, and Italy, 
Finland and Sweden, where has fal-
len (though since for some countries 
the OECD data fluctuate alarmingly 
from year to year, trends can be dif-
ficult to discern). Except in the latter 
three  countries,  there  is  little  sign, 
therefore,  that  the  constraints  im-
posed on the growth of public spend-
ing on health care across the Union 
have led to any significant increase in 
private expenditure. 
Health care reform 
UK 
Up  until  1991  when significant re-
•  forms  were introduced, the  national 
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health service in the UK can be char-
acterised as a 'command and control' 
bureaucracy,  where  hospitals  were 
owned  and  operated  by  the  State, 
which also employed the  staff,  and 
though  general  practitioners  (GPs) 
were self-employed, they contracted 
most of their services to the NHS. In 
macro-terms, the system had cost-ef-
fective features- in particular, gov-
ernments could exercise firm control 
over expenditure and, unlike in most 
other countries, doctors and special-
ists were not paid on a fee-for-service 
basis  and  so  had  no  incentive  to 
under-treat and artificially boost de-
mand-and spending was compara-
tively  small  in  relation to  GDP (in 
1990, public expenditure was around 
5% of GDP, lower than in all other 
Member States, apart from  Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal). 
At the  same time, however,  an ab-
sence  of costing  mechanisms 
together with clinical freedom meant 
that, in micro-terms, resources were 
not necessarily used in the most cost-
effective way and their allocation be-
tween  different  types  of care  or 
treatment  was  largely  historically 
determined and unresponsive to the 
interests of patients. Moreover, wait-
ing lists were the primary means of 
rationing  available  resources  be-
tween patients and these lengthened 
as  restraints  on expenditure  were 
tightened, so reinforcing the pressure 
for change. 
The reforms introduced in 1991 were 
designed to tackle the latter kinds of 
defect, while maintaining the essen-
tial principle of the NHS, that it be 
available  for  all  regardless  of in-
come, and retaining the same means 
of centralised control over expendi-
ture and the same method of funding 
from  general  taxation.  Their  main 
feature  was  the  introduction  of a 
quasi  internal  market,  with  separ-
ation  between  purchasers  (District 
Health  Authorities  and  GP fund-
holders) and providers (hospitals and 
other service centres)  and  with  the 
latter  competing  for  shares  of the 
budgets controlled by the former. 
District Health Authorities  (DHAs) 
were  allocated budgets to  purchase 
services based on the size and char-
acteristics  of population  in  their 
areas;  while  GPs  with  practices 
above a certain size were given the 
option  of becoming  fund-holders 
with  budgets  to  purchase  a  more 
limited range of secondary care for 
their  patients.  Hospitals  and  other 
providers could opt for a more inde-
pendent status and were given more 
discretion over pay, skill-mix and the 
delivery  of services,  the  intention 
being that they should contract with 
purchasers over supply (with anum-
ber  of different  types  of contract 
being possible, ranging from agree-
ments to pay a fixed sum for a spe-
cific period irrespective of volume to 
those specifying a fee per patient). By 
April  1996,  almost  all  health  care 
providers  had  become  independent 
trusts and 50% of  GPs, covering 52% 
of the population, had become fund-
holders. 
Before the present Government took 
office in 1997, the principal develop-
ment since 1991 had been the exten-
sion of GP fund-holdings to smaller 
practices and an increase in the range 
of services they were allowed to pur-
chase,  with  the  largest  practices 
(around  80  altogether)  being given 
budgets  to  cover  all  hospital  and 
community services. The effects of the reforms are diffi-
cult  to  evaluate  because  of other 
changes introduced during the period 
and the expansion of the health care 
budget  (from  5%  to  around  6%  of 
GDP).  Nevertheless,  the  evidence 
available  suggests  that  there  have 
been  some  gains  in  efficiency, 
though less than the advocates of the 
reforms had hoped for,  without any 
discernible  deterioration  in  the 
quality of service. 
A marked feature of the changes in-
troduced has been the large growth in 
managers and administrators (though 
the precise figure is difficult to esti-
mate because of the reclassification 
of staff),  which has  resulted in  the 
cost of administration rising from an 
estimated 8% of  total expenditure be-
fore the reforms to 11% or so at pres-
ent. The Department of Health index 
of health service activity (or output), 
however,  has  risen  by  more  since 
1991/92 than before (by some 4
1/z% 
between  the  1991/92  and  1995/96 
financial  years  as  against just over 
2% between 1979/80 and  1990/91), 
while  costs  have  increased by  less 
than in proportion (by just over 2% 
in the  second period as  against just 
over 
1/2% in the first). Estimated pro-
ductivity  growth  on  this  measure 
(which,  it  should  be  emphasised, 
takes no account of service quality) 
has, therefore, been higher since the 
reforms than before (by almost 1 per-
centage point a year). 
At the same time, information flows, 
especially on costs of different kinds 
of treatment or care, have improved 
dramatically and, as a result, there is 
undoubtedly more awareness of the 
expenditure implications, and oppor-
tunity  costs,  of medical  decisions, 
which has almost certainly led to im-
provements in resource allocation. 
The effect on access to treatment is 
more uncertain.  Although the num-
ber of people waiting for admission 
to  hospital  or out-patient treatment 
was  higher in  March  1997  than  in 
March 1991 (some 1,164 thousand as 
against  948  thousand),  the  average 
waiting  time  was  significantly  less 
(1
1/2% had been waiting for over one 
year in September 1996 as opposed 
to  16
1/2%  five  years earlier, though 
average waiting  time has  increased 
since then).  The latter,  however,  is 
the result of policy initiatives speci-
fically  aimed  at  reducing  waiting 
time as  well as,  possibly, of the re-
forms.  Equally, there  is  mixed evi-
dence  on  inequalities  in  access  to 
treatment between those living in dif-
ferent parts of the country or regis-
tered  with  fund-holder  GPs  as 
opposed to others. 
In terms of quality of service, public 
surveys indicate an increase in satis-
faction with the NHS as a whole dur-
ing  the  early  1990s,  following  a 
significant decline during the 1980s, 
but  a  renewed  decline  since  1993, 
virtually back to  the  1990 level by 
1995.  This  seems  to  centre  very 
much on inpatient care in hospitals, 
whereas there has been a rise in sat-
isfaction  with  outpatient  treatment 
and a consistently high level of satis-
faction  with  GPs.  Moreover,  there 
appears  to  be  a  wide  consensus 
among analysts that the  shift in  the 
balance  of influence  over  service 
provision to GPs has had a beneficial 
effect on quality and that these have 
proved to  be more effective in pur-
chasing  secondary  treatment  than 
DHAs, partly because of their smal-
ler size and the more personal service 
they  can  provide.  Indeed,  DHAs 
have not been able to use their larger 
size  effectively  to  elicit  improved 
services  from  providers  - which 
was  an  important  objective  of the 
reforms - either because many of 
these are in practice local monopolies 
or because of  the political difficulties 
of shifting from one supplier to  an-
other,  especially  where  this  would 
create financial problems for the pro-
vider losing business. 
The present Government in the UK, 
which  was  critical  of the  internal 
market  when  in  opposition,  an-
nounced its  intention, at the end of 
1997, to reform the system further by 
effectively abolishing the - limited 
- competition which exists and in-
troducing  cooperation  in  its  place, 
though while retaining the division 
between purchasers and providers. It 
is  planned to give responsibility for 
purchasing  secondary  care  in  local 
areas to new primary care groups in 
place  of fund-holding  GPs  and 
DHAs, which will have the  task of 
setting three-year strategic plans and 
of monitoring  standards.  These 
groups  will  be  composed  of GPs, 
nurses and other local professionals 
and each will cover around 100 thou-
sand patients, a major aim being to 
encourage GPs to treat more patients 
themselves,  so  taking  pressure  off 
over-crowded hospitals and reducing 
costs.  Instead of competing for  pa-
tients, hospital trusts will be required 
to  meet unit-cost 'benchmarks' and 
those that fail to do so may lose con-
trol over their affairs either to  their 
NHS region or to a new Commission 
for  Health  Improvement  set  up  to 
carry out cost and clinical audits. 
The  potential  dangers  of such 
changes are, first, that the balance of 
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viders because of  the inability of  pur-
chasers to  shift between alternative 
suppliers  and,  second,  that the  pri-
mary care groups will be too big to 
provide  the  same  kind  of personal 
service as fund-holding GPs but too 
small to influence providers. 
Netherlands 
Reform of the Dutch health care has 
occurred in a more gradual and piece-
meal way, with similar objectives to 
those in the UK but from a different 
starting position (ie one where there 
was  no  national  health  service  as 
such but where the purchase of care, 
though  predominantly  state-fin-
anced, was organised through insur-
ance funds). The initial proposals for 
change  were  made  by  the  Dekker 
Commission in 1987. These were re-
vised slightly by a new Government 
in 1989 in what became known as the 
Simons Plan and then modified more 
substantially by the present Govern-
ment  from  1994  on.  The  Dekker-
Simons  proposals  had  two  main 
components:  first,  a  compulsory 
comprehensive national health insur-
ance scheme in place of the existing 
segmented financing system to guar-
antee universal access  to  basic ser-
vices  and,  secondly,  managed  or 
regulated competition between both 
health  insurers  (ie  purchasers)  and 
providers to stimulate improvements 
in efficiency. 
Under the proposals, national health 
insurance was to be financed by in-
come-related contributions, adminis-
tered  by  a  statutory  body  and 
distributed to health insurance funds 
according to both the numbers regis-
tered with them and their average risk 
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of requiring treatment so  as  to pre-
vent  'cream-skimming'  (ie  funds 
concentrating on the healthiest sec-
tions  of the  population).  Accord-
ingly,  retrospective  reimbursement 
of the expenditure incurred by indi-
vidual funds  was  to  be replaced by 
prospective budgeting, with a fixed 
fee per 'standard' person insured pro-
viding an incentive to  contain costs 
and improve efficiency as the means 
of increasing profit. In addition, the 
fee  was to be set below the average 
expected costs and supplemented by 
a flat-rate premium paid directly by 
the person insured, so as to provide a 
further stimulus to  efficiency, since 
the  more  successful  a  fund  was  in 
containing costs, the lower it  could 
set this premium and the more clients 
it would attract. 
Insurance  funds  were  to  be  given 
freedom  to  contract  with  approved 
providers and to negotiate terms with 
them, while regulation of prices and 
of hospital capacity was to  be less-
ened to  give funds  more  scope  for 
influencing costs. Providers were to 
be free to compete for contracts, just 
as insurance funds were free to com-
pete for subscribers, with consumers 
being able periodically to switch be-
tween  funds,  which,  in  tum,  were 
obliged to  accept any  applicant.  At 
the same time, the strict division be-
tween purchasers and providers was 
to  be relaxed to  allow the  develop-
ment of alternative delivery systems. 
In practice, the two main components 
were far from being implemented in 
full,  though there  was  a significant 
shift towards managed competition. 
Insurance funds were able to contract 
selectively  with health-care  profes-
sionals and compete for subscribers, 
as  well as  to  charge a premium ac-
cording to the community they were 
serving, enrol subscribers from out-
side their region and negotiate fees 
with providers below those officially 
approved.  From  1993  on,  funds  re-
ceived a prospective budget based on 
the number of subscribers, but only 
very partially adjusted for the risk of 
them requiring treatment- specifi-
cally only for age and sex. This was 
considered too crude to make funds 
fully liable for the expenses incurred 
and  they  were,  therefore,  compen-
sated  for  97%  of any  losses  they 
made, while being required to refund 
97% of any surpluses, so effectively 
removing both any risk and any in-
centive to contain costs. 
In  1995,  the  effects  of the  system 
were assessed by the Sickness Fund 
Council,  which  found  that  funds 
were  not exercising their option to 
contract  selectively  with  providers 
or  to  negotiate  lower fees.  It con-
cluded that the main effect of  reform 
was  to  encourage mergers  between 
insurance funds and hospitals and to 
reinforce collaboration between pro-
viders. It attributed the lack of com-
petition  to  an  absence  of adequate 
financial  incentives  for  insurance 
funds and to collusion between pro-
viders and purchasers, induced partly 
by successive reductions in Govern-
ment  -approved fees. 
The present Government's response 
was the publication of plans in 1995, 
abandoning the goal of comprehens-
ive basic health insurance and retain-
ing a segmented system but aiming 
to reform the incentive structure. The 
financing  system  was  divided  into 
three components covering different 
types of service and each with their 
own regulatory regime: •  long-term and mental health care, 
financed by national health insur-
ance (A WBZ), with a single pur-
chaser  in  each  region  and  with 
regulation of  prices and supply by 
Government; 
•  basic curative care,  financed  by 
mandatory health insurance, with 
sickness funds and private health 
insurers  being  responsible  for 
purchasing  treatment  and  with 
managed  competition  between 
both these and providers; 
•  amenities  and  inexpensive  care, 
financed by voluntary health in-
surance, with sickness funds and 
private  health  insurers  again 
being  the  main  purchasers  and 
with  a  free  market  on  both  the 
demand and supply side. 
In practice, as regards the first com-
ponent,  administration  of care  is 
planned to  pass from  the  insurance 
funds to a single purchasing authority 
in  each  of the  27  health  regions, 
which is likely to be the largest sick-
ness fund in each case.  There will, 
therefore, be no possibility of  compe-
tition  between  insurers,  while  the 
control of expenditure exercised by 
regulation  of prices  and  supply  of 
services  will  leave  little  scope  for 
competition between providers, with 
two  exceptions.  First,  as  noted  in 
Chapter 7, very limited funds (3% of 
the total budget for home care) have 
been allocated since  1995 to people 
requiring care at home to  purchase 
care from relatives or friends rather 
than professionals if they wish. Sec-
ondly, 5%  of the home-care budget 
has been set aside for traditional re-
gional organisations and other offi-
cially-recognised  agencies  to 
compete for. The initial plan was that 
this  should  increase  to  35%,  but a 
lack  of adequate  rules  to  manage 
competition  and  the  prospective 
large-scale entry of commercial or-
ganisations have caused a postpone-
ment of any  increase  until  2001 
(there  is,  nevertheless,  some  evi-
dence  that  the  limited  competition 
has  already  stimulated  higher  pro-
ductivity among traditional carers). 
For the  second  component,  basic 
curative care, the changes are in line 
with the initial Dekker-Simons pro-
posals. Within a few years, insurance 
funds  are  to  be  paid prospectively, 
rather than retrospectively, for all the 
medical  care  they  purchase  - by 
1997, the prospective proportion had 
been raised from  3%  to 27%- in 
order to increase their financial risk 
and  encourage  them  to  purchase 
more  cost-effective  care.  This  has 
been accompanied by  the introduc-
tion of  new criteria for adjusting their 
per capita fee, taking account of the 
region  of residence  and  disability 
status  of subscribers.  There are  al-
ready  signs  that  the  changes  are 
stimulating  increased  competition 
(in  1997,  there was a difference of 
40% between the highest and lowest 
flat-rate premiums charged by funds 
to  subscribers  as  against  10%  in 
1996) and greater efforts to  contain 
costs (such as  through greater coor-
dination of referrals by GPs to spe-
cialists, the development of lists of 
preferred providers and the provision 
of more information on costs and re-
source use to doctors). 
In  addition,  plans  have  been  an-
nounced to deregulate the prices for 
treatment  and  to  remove  controls 
over capacity (except in the case of 
large hospital investment), giving the 
insurance  funds  responsibility  for 
negotiating prices with providers and 
enabling the latter to plan the devel-
opment of  facilities. (At present, pro-
viders are paid on a fee-for-service 
basis, the fees being set by Govern-
ment  and  adjusted  downwards  the 
following  year  if expenditure  ex-
ceeds the initial target.) 
At the  same  time,  the  Government 
has introduced a scheme fixing maxi-
mum prices for groups of registered 
drugs, equal to their average price in 
Belgium, France, Germany and the 
UK, which has already yielded signi-
ficant  cost  savings.  Moreover, 
limited user charges have been intro-
duced to encourage people to use ser-
vices more prudently (a charge per 
hospital day  and  a 20%  fee  for  all 
other treatment except visits to GPs, 
with the charge any individual pays 
over  a  year  being  limited  to  200 
guilders - around 90 ECU - and 
with concessions for the chronically 
ill).  The complexity of the scheme, 
however,  seems  to  be  resulting  in 
heavy  administrative  costs,  which 
could  outweigh  the  revenue  col-
lected. 
For the  third  component,  amenity 
care, the intention is  to remove any 
regulations  governing  provision  or 
financing of the services, since col-
lective  responsibility  - and  their 
availability as part of the social pro-
tection  system  - is  no  longer 
deemed necessary. The scope of this 
component has been defined in terms 
of the treatment or services included 
not  being  medically  necessary,  or 
necessarily effective,  and being af-
fordable.  These are difficult criteria 
to apply in an objective and non-con-
troversial way, as  has proved to  be 
the case in practice. So far very few 
items have been included. In  1995, 
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some physiotherapy treatments were 
transferred from  basic curative care 
to  amenity care.  Since people with 
bad  teeth,  however,  experienced 
serious problems in obtaining affor-
dable insurance cover for false teeth, 
this item was transferred back again 
in  1997 following considerable pol-
itical pressure. 
Germany 
The German  health  care  system  is 
similar to the Dutch one, in that in-
surance  funds  are  responsible  for 
purchasing  treatment  and  services 
from providers, though unlike in the 
Dutch case, finance comes predomi-
nantly from  social contributions le-
vied  on  employers  and  employees. 
The  overriding  concern  in  recent 
years  has  been to  limit  the  rise  in 
contribution rates, which are a signi-
ficant  element  in  non-wage  labour 
costs,  without  damaging  the  high 
standard  of care  which  prevails 
(overall expenditure on health care is 
the highest in the Union in relation to 
GDP). The two main pieces of legis-
lation to  reform  the  system,  which 
were introduced in  1988  and  1992, 
were aimed at achieving this, essen-
tially  by  endeavouring to  limit ex-
penditure  to  the  income  received 
from contributions. 
In both 1995 and 1996, however, the 
deficit  on  health  care  amounted  to 
around 6-7 billion deutschmarks (3-
31/z billion ECU) prompting a further 
step in the reform process. Competi-
tion  between  insurance  funds  for 
members  has  been  introduced,  but 
perhaps  the  main  aspect  is  a  shift 
from contributions to direct charges 
levied on  patients who already pay 
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significant  fees  (covering  20%  of 
spending  on  drugs),  the  intention 
being  to  increase  the  total  amount 
collected  in  direct  charges  - to 
around  6%  of total  expenditure  to 
enable average contribution rates to 
be reduced once the deficit has been 
eliminated. Such copayments, in ad-
dition to being indexed to keep pace 
with wages, are planned to be linked 
to  insurance premiums - each 0.1 
percentage  point  rise  in  premiums 
leading automatically to an increase 
of 1 deutschmark in copayments. As 
a result, the share of health costs met 
directly by patients is set to rise sig-
nificantly in future, though provision 
for  the  relief from  charges  for  the 
chronically ill and the poor has been 
extended. 
The intention is that linking charges 
to  premiums  in  this  way  will  put 
pressure on insurance funds to hold 
down costs to  avoid having to raise 
contribution rates, which could lose 
them  members  since  these  are 
allowed  to  shift  from  one  fund  to 
another  whenever rates  are  in-
creased.  At same  time,  however,  a 
number  of cost  control  measures 
have been abolished, such as  provi-
sions for controlling drug prices, or 
modified,  such  as  regulations  gov-
erning the prescription behaviour of 
doctors  and  their  remuneration, 
which  seem  likely to  make it more 
difficult to monitor and control bud-
gets and harder for insurance funds to 
contain costs and premiums. 
Although the intensification of com-
petitive pressure on insurance funds 
might lead them to introduce stricter 
measures to control costs and adopt 
tougher bargaining positions in their 
negotiations  with  health  care  pro-
viders,  in  practice,  it  proved  im-
possible  to  implement the  link  be-
tween premiums and direct charges 
in 1997 and, as it is an election year, 
political considerations suggest that 
it will not be  fully  implemented in 
1998 either. Nevertheless, the figures 
for expenditure in 1996 seem to indi-
cate that insurance funds have begun 
to  make  greater  efforts  to  reduce 
costs. 
At the same time, looking beyond the 
preoccupation  with  contribution 
rates, there are signs of a shift in the 
orientation of policy, towards giving 
more weight to the growth potential 
of  the health sector and to the evident 
desire  of many  people  for  higher 
quality and more innovative services, 
which they seem willing to pay for. 
A new provision oflegislation, there-
fore, gives insurance funds an ability 
to expand the range of benefits they 
provide, though any such expansion 
has to be financed entirely by those 
insured and not by employers, who at 
present account for just under half of 
contributions. 
France 
The health system in France is simi-
lar to that in Germany, with insurance 
funds  financed  mainly  from  con-
tributions responsible for purchasing 
services  from  a mix  of public  and 
private sector providers. As in Ger-
many, expenditure is high relative to 
GOP and  the  public  component of 
this,  in particular, has  continued to 
grow significantly during the 1990s, 
giving  rise  to  significant  deficits 
which policy has  been aimed at re-
ducing, though so far without much 
success. In  the  case  of ambulatory  care  (ie 
non-hospital in-patient care), charges 
are on a fee-for-service  basis, with 
rates negotiated between doctors' or-
ganisations  and  insurance  funds 
(Caisses nationales). Patients pay the 
total price and then receive refunds 
from the national insurance funds of 
between 40% for 'comfort' drugs and 
75% for consultation. If  they are in-
sured under a private scheme (which 
87% of the population are), they can 
also receive a refund, either full  or 
partial,  to  cover the  remaining 
amount  (the  ticket  moderateur). 
Around 10% of patients are exempt 
from charges because of long-term 
illness,  while  extra  charges  are 
payable if so-called Secteur II spe-
cialists are consulted. 
Patients  have  direct  access  to  care 
through four different points of entry 
- GPs,  specialists,  hospital  out-pa-
tient departments and the emergency 
services - and the only restraint on 
their demand is the ticket moderateur, 
the  effect of which is  reduced if the 
person has private insurance. On the 
supply  side,  the  only  response  to 
spending increases has been to freeze 
fees,  but  the  effect  of these  can  be 
circumvented  by  doctors  over-pres-
cribing or stipulating return visits and 
unnecessary examinations. Moreover, 
GPs who face direct - and, in some 
degree,  unfair  - competition  from 
specialists may readily agree to over-
prescribe drugs or give certificates for 
time off work. 
In  1992,  a  Caisse  Nationale  report 
identified inefficiencies in the system, 
estimated  at up  to  10%  of the  total 
budget, and argued that, because of  the 
problems indicated above, these could 
be  reduced  without  fundamentally 
changing  the  system,  by  more  sys-
tematic use of  evaluation methods and 
clear definitions of standard practices 
rather than by limiting fees or increas-
ing direct charges. 
In the  case of hospitals,  patients are 
free to choose between the two-thirds 
which  are  public  and  the  one-third 
which are  private, both of which are 
covered by national insurance. Invest-
ment has been planned centrally since 
1970, and public hospitals have been 
subject to global budgeting since 1984, 
which has curbed growth, but which 
has had a limited effect in encouraging 
greater efficiency since any surpluses 
they  make are claimed back. Private 
hospitals continued to be reimbursed 
on a fee-for  -service basis up until the 
1990s, resulting in a shift of activity to 
these. 
The system generates inequalities be-
tween patients insofar as entitlement to 
benefit is related to professional activ-
ity rather than medical need. Those not 
covered by private insurance tend to be 
the poor and elderly and while social 
assistance gives them free entitlement 
to health services, because they have 
to pay the full cost of consulting with 
a GP or specialist before receiving a 
refund, this leads them to use public 
hospitals  more  frequently  and  post-
pone  treatment.  In  addition,  direct 
charges have increased to cover almost 
31% of total ambulatory expenditure 
in 1996. 
During  the  1990s,  emphasis has  fo-
cused on performance-related regula-
tion of supply rather than competition 
between providers, as in the UK or the 
Netherlands.  Global  budgeting  has 
been extended to  private clinics and 
treatment centres, with these having to 
pay back insurance funds if they over-
spend or into  a  special  fund  if they 
underspend.  In addition,  since  1994, 
indicative aggregate levels of  spending 
on drugs  have  been negotiated  with 
pharmaceutical companies in place of 
the  previous  system  of fixed  prices, 
which because they were low encour-
aged  over-prescription,  while  pre-
scribing guidelines have been set for 
individual doctors to follow, with the 
possibility of  fmancial sanctions if  they 
exceed them. Though caps on expen-
diture  have  succeeded in  restraining 
growth,  experience demonstrates  the 
importance of good information sys-
tems to help determine targets and for 
monitoring performance. 
The Juppe Plan of the previous Gov-
ernment, announced in 1995, endorsed 
the view that control should shift from 
trying to limit demand to regulating the 
performance of providers, though no 
changes were proposed to the fee sys-
tem for doctors or for restraining pa-
tient demand. The main aims were: 
•  to  widen the contributions' base 
by raising social charges on the 
unemployed  and  pensioners 
(from  1.4%  to  2.6%) and to  in-
crease the share of funding from 
taxation  by  extending  the  CSG 
(Contribution  Sociale  Generali-
see) to health care; 
•  to improve coordination between 
the State, insurance funds,  local 
health  authorities  and  repre-
sentatives of health care profes-
sionals; 
•  to regionalise expenditure targets; 
•  to  improve  systems  of informa-
tion; 
•  to  improve  continuity  of  care 
through better patient records and 
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further  education  for  doctors 
compulsory; 
•  to  improve  evaluation  and  ac-
creditation  of hospitals  and  the 
regional allocation of funds; 
•  to stimulate increased productiv-
ity in hospitals  by  varying their 
target rates of  expenditure growth 
and reducing disparities between 
public and private hospital care. 
Though the plan has proved deeply 
controversial,  the  process  of in-
creased regulation of  professional ac-
tivities is likely to continue and, after 
many years of short-term cost con-
tainment, reforms of a more structu-
ral nature seem to be in prospect. 
Italy 
A national health service (SSN), on 
essentially UK lines, was established 
in Italy in 1978.  Unlike in the UK, 
funding  came  mainly  from  social 
contributions and though there have 
been plans to shift entirely to a tax-
based financing system, they still ac-
count for almost half of  total revenue. 
Like in the UK, however, by the early 
1990s,  though  health  expenditure 
was not excessive in relation to GDP 
(at around the Union average), there 
was growing dissatisfaction with its 
overly bureaucratic and complex ad-
ministrative features, which resulted 
in cumbersome decision-making un-
responsive  to  patient needs,  ineffi-
cient resource  allocation  and 
deficient audit mechanisms. 
Though some 25% of  the SSN's bud-
get went to  purchase services from 
outside providers, there was little at-
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tempt to use its potential bargaining 
power to stimulate greater efficiency 
or quality  improvement.  Payments 
were generally on a fee-for-service 
basis  or based  retrospectively  on 
costs in the case of public sector pro-
viders.  Inefficiencies  were  exacer-
bated  by  the  fact  that  both  the 
Ministry of Health and the regions 
were formally responsible for plan-
ning and regulation, making it diffi-
cult for the centre to control not only 
the allocation of resources within re-
gions but also their overall expendi-
ture.  (The  Constitutional  Court 
declared  it  illegitimate  for  central 
government to make regions respon-
sible  for  exceeding  the  spending 
limits set, so giving them no incen-
tive to respect these limits or contain 
costs.)  As  a  result,  the  deficit  on 
health care averaged 12% of expen-
diture between 1987 and 1992. The 
response  of Government  was  to 
freeze  employment,  impose  tight 
limits  on capital  spending  and  de-
liberately  underfund  the  service, 
which served to  aggravate the effi-
ciency problem further. 
The reforms introduced in 1992-93 
were  aimed  at  improving  expen-
diture control and efficiency. Organi-
sational  and  administrative 
responsibility  for  health  care  was 
transferred to the regions and a ceil-
ing was set on the Government's con-
tribution  to  regional  funding  (the 
amount  in  each  case  considered 
necessary to ensure uniform levels of 
care less revenue from compulsory 
contributions  attributable to  the  re-
gion), any spending in excess of this 
needing  to  be  financed  from  a  re-
gion's own resources - either from 
direct charges or from increased con-
tribution  rates  (within  centrally-set 
limits). As a result, the richer regions 
receive little or nothing from  Gov-
ernment, the poorer ones up to half of 
their total budget. In general, the ef-
fect has been to persuade regions to 
stay below their spending limits. In 
the  longer-term,  however,  it  could 
give rise to wider differences in ser-
vices  and,  because  of the  small 
amounts  transferred  to  richer re-
gions,  weaker State  influence  over 
the care provided 
To stimulate greater efficiency and 
more attention to quality of service, 
following the example of the quasi-
market  mechanisms  introduced  in 
some  other Member States  (  espe-
cially the UK), measures were taken 
to separate purchasers and providers 
and to encourage an element of  com-
petition. To reduce bureaucracy and 
improve  management,  the  existing 
659 Local Health Units were trans-
formed into 228 Local Health Enter-
prises (LHEs), with more operating 
autonomy,  commercial  accounting 
procedures  and performance  audit-
ing and administered by senior man-
agers  appointed  by  the  region  for 
fixed  terms  with  performance-re-
lated salaries.  In addition,  90 large 
hospitals were transformed into Hos-
pital Enterprises, independent from 
LHEs  and  administered  by  con-
tracted senior managers, and, while 
other health facilities continue to be 
managed directly by LHEs, the inten-
tion is  that they should have opera-
ting autonomy. 
In practice, the implementation of  the 
measures has been slow in some re-
gions and, though managers are well 
paid, few have come from the private 
sector.  Nevertheless, improvements 
in efficiency are  already evident in 
many LHEs and Hospital Enterprises 
and  relations with patients  seem to have  improved  (national  surveys 
suggest that satisfaction levels have 
risen), partly as a result of the com-
pulsory publication of Service Char-
ters,  setting  out patient  rights  as 
regards, for example, waiting times, 
access to information and complaint 
procedures. 
In principle, patients have the right to 
choose between providers, public or 
private,  accredited  by  the  regional 
authorities, which are responsible for 
setting fees in line with national gui-
delines and which have wide discre-
tion over the form which competition 
between  providers  takes.  This  has 
varied considerably between regions, 
though  in  many  cases  priority  has 
been  given  to  expenditure  control 
and planning, leaving little scope for 
competition between providers  and 
limited  freedom  for  patients  to 
choose between them. In such cases, 
the danger is that the status quo will 
be maintained and the separation of 
purchasers  and  providers  will  be 
largely  illusory.  In  a  few  regions, 
however (such as Lombardy), com-
petition between providers is  being 
actively encouraged. 
At the same time, the latter develop-
ment might weaken expenditure con-
trol  if providers  are  no  longer 
regulated.  While  in  all  regions, 
mechanisms have been introduced to 
combat the  tendency  for  fee-based 
payment systems to encourage over-
treatment  by  penal  ising  levels  ex-
ceeding  those  negotiated,  little 
consideration has so far been given to 
the potential use of  detailed contracts 
to regulate providers. Moreover, al-
though  regions  have  the  power  to 
increase  and  extend  direct  charges 
for services - and although charges 
were  raised  significantly  by  the 
centre in the 1990s to curb expendi-
ture -no  region has so far used this 
power. 
A more recent form of control is the 
drawing up of  approved lists of  drugs 
and  treatments  which  can  be  pre-
scribed. Though these at present are 
fairly  comprehensive,  they  may  be 
less so in the future (the 1997 Finance 
Act contained a series of  measures to 
encourage  responsible  prescription 
behaviour  by  doctors,  with  gui-
delines for treating specific ailments, 
while,  in  Emilia-Romagna,  a basic 
package  of services  has  been 
defined). As the imperative for curb-
ing expenditure diminishes, attention 
is likely to focus more on the way that 
resources are allocated and increased 
efficiency is stimulated, as well as on 
equality  of access  to  services  both 
between individuals and regions. 
Spain 
A national health service- the Sis-
tema Nacional  de  Salud (SNS)  -
was  introduced  in  Spain  in  1986. 
Public sector capacity was expanded 
to improve access to hospital care in 
rural  areas  and  the  organisation  of 
primary care, while the shift to  tax-
based  financing  was  accelerated 
(though around 15% of income still 
comes from social contributions) as 
was the transfer of power to the re-
gions. For the rest of the  1980s, ex-
penditure  increased  substantially, 
regional  budgets  being  determined 
largely by  past spending  with  little 
incentive  for  restraint.  Despite this 
growth, waiting lists lengthened, pa-
tient satisfaction was at a low level 
and  there  was  mounting  concern 
about  inefficient  management.  The 
main concern, however, was to con-
trol  expenditure  and  to  reduce  the 
growing budget deficit. In the Pro-
grama  de  Convergencia,  measures 
for  structural  and  management 
change were set out with the aim of 
reducing spending on health care by 
1%  of GDP,  initially  covering  the 
period  1992  to  1996  and  sub-
sequently extended for a further four 
years. 
Under  the  programme,  the  overall 
health care budget is linked explicitly 
to GDP growth, while the allocation 
between regions is based largely on 
population  (though  it  is  generally 
agreed that age composition, patient 
mobility and medical teaching costs 
should also be  taken into account). 
Regions  have  undertaken  to  avoid 
incurring  deficits  but have  been 
given greater powers to levy taxes so 
as to supplement revenue from Gov-
ernment,  encouraging  at  the  same 
time  a more responsible attitude to 
spending growth. 
In addition, measures have been in-
troduced in a number of regions, as 
well by  the central health authority 
(INSALUD which is responsible for 
managing health care in smaller re-
gions), to increase efficiency and the 
quality  of care.  In  Catalonia,  and 
some  other regions,  contracts  with 
GP cooperatives specifying terms for 
the supply of services have been de-
veloped together with the integration 
of primary care teams with hospitals. 
In  Valencia,  long-term  monopoly 
concessions have been granted to pri-
vate  operators  for  the  provision  of 
hospital  care.  In  Catalonia,  Galicia 
and Andalusia, some hospitals have 
been converted into public founda-
tions  or public  enterprises  to  give 
them  greater  managerial  flexibility 
and autonomy. INSALUD has intro-
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grama  (programme  agreements)  to 
regulate  relations  with  hospitals, 
with an activity index being used to 
prevent the  provision of care  from 
being distorted by per diem fees. As 
yet, however, there has been little or 
no explicit attempt to establish com-
petition between providers. 
At the same time, innovation has met 
resistance. In Andalusia, an attempt 
to  introduce private management of 
public facilities was blocked, as was 
INSALUD's plan to introduce quasi-
markets in all the regions which it is 
responsible  for.  Overall,  there  has 
been patchy implementation of new 
management techniques, which have 
so far failed to bring about significant 
organisational change. Nevertheless, 
programme agreements seem to have 
raised efficiency in the hospitals con-
cerned,  while  satisfaction  with  the 
SNS among patients is reported to be 
increasing.  This,  however,  may  be 
due to  a shortening of waiting lists 
caused by a specific government pro-
gramme to treat by the end of 1996 
all patients who had been waiting for 
over  a  year  (only  5%  were  not 
treated), as  much as  to  their greater 
freedom to choose GPs and special-
ists  and  other  changes  associated 
with the reforms. 
Limited use has so far been made of 
direct charges, except in respect of 
prescribed drugs for which a fee  of 
40% of the  price has  been charged 
since  1978,  people  retired  being 
exempt. Proposals to  withdraw this 
concession and extend copayment to 
other services have been strongly op-
posed. Positive and negative lists of 
drugs  and  services  (ie  those  which 
can and cannot be prescribed), how-
ever,  have  been  developed  and 
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measures  introduced  to  encourage 
responsible  prescription  behaviour 
and treatment on the part of doctors. 
While the measures introduced in the 
early 1990s seem to have curbed ex-
penditure  growth  (growth  in  real 
spending  over  the  period  1990--95 
averaged  3%  a year as  opposed to 
over 8%  a year over the  preceding 
five years) and led to some incentive 
to  increase efficiency, problems re-
main over the formula for allocating 
funds between regions, which needs 
to take proper account of underlying 
differences in patient characteristics. 
Moreover, with the greater autonomy 
given to regions, differences seem to 
be  arising  between  them  in  the 
relative weight attached to equity as 
opposed to efficiency considerations. 
Just as in Italy, therefore, concern in 
the future could well shift away from 
expenditure control per se, to ques-
tions of the nature of care provided 
and equality of access to this. Chapter 7 Social protection and long-term care 
A
s  indicated  in  Chapter  1,  the 
relative  number  of elderly 
people of 65  and over in the Euro-
pean Union is larger than ever before 
and is set to continue increasing over 
future decades. As has been widely 
discussed, this  has  implications for 
the growth of social transfers in the 
form of old-age pensions, which, as 
noted  in  Chapter  2,  has  become  a 
focus of policy concern in all Mem-
ber States. However, as  also noted, 
the implications for social protection 
are not confined to old-age pensions. 
Since  an  increasing  proportion  of 
those  drawing  pension  are  living 
longer into old age and as  they get 
older many of them will become frail 
or invalids dependent on others, the 
potential effect on the need for long-
term care is equally important. 
Although no precise figures are avail-
able, it is estimated that around 5% or 
so  of people  of 65  and  over in  the 
Union are dependent on almost con-
tinuous care and a further 15% partly 
dependent,  while for  those  of 75  or 
over,  the  corresponding  figures  are 
10%  and  25%,  respectively.  More-
over, whereas more people are living 
longer and their general health has, on 
average,  improved significantly over 
the years,  there  is  little  sign that the 
proportion of  elderly in need of care is 
diminishing, partly because advances 
in medical science mean that more life-
threatening  ailments  can  be  kept  at 
bay. The projected high rate of  growth 
of  the number of  people of75 and over 
in the Union-of  over 2% a year over 
the next 25 years - and perhaps even 
more relevantly of  the number aged 85 
and over- almost 2'/2%  a year-
therefore, implies a marked increase in 
old-age  dependency.  If the  present 
mean  population  projections  prove 
correct, then by 201 0 there will be over 
40% more people of  85 and over in the 
Union than in  1995 and by 2020, al-
most 80% more. 
At the same time, social and economic 
developments (highlighted in Chapter 
1) have led to the break-up of the ex-
tended  family,  more  people  living 
alone  and  more  women  pursuing 
working careers. In consequence, it is 
increasingly  difficult,  particularly  in 
Northern Member States where these 
trends are most pronounced, for care to 
be provided from within the family as 
it traditionally has been. These trends, 
however, have coincided with a grow-
ing recognition of the benefits of pro-
viding care at home, if at all possible, 
rather than in nursing homes or similar 
institutions. Accordingly, the increas-
ing need for care is, in practice, giving 
rise to an expanding demand for sup-
port services  and facilities  to  enable 
people  to  be  cared for  in  their  own 
homes  and  to  help family  members, 
often in paid employment, to provide 
this. 
The main debate across the Union at 
present centres on how far the state 
should be involved in the provision 
of support, in the form not only of 
social  services  but  also  of social 
transfers to help cover the costs in-
volved in caring, and how far, on the 
contrary, it should be left to individ-
uals-and families- to make their 
own arrangements.  In other words, 
the  question  is  whether  long-term 
care should be provided on a market 
or non-market basis. If  the latter, the 
additional issue concerns the role of 
the state and whether it should oper-
ate as a service provider, purchaser of 
services or simply as  a regulator of 
private suppliers. The terms of this 
debate and its  focus  vary consider-
ably between Member States reflect-
ing the very different ways in which 
caring needs  are  currently  met and 
the extent to which they are included 
within the scope of the social protec-
tion  system.  Indeed,  as  indicated 
below, there is  a vast difference be-
tween  the  extensive  state  support 
available, for example, in the Nordic 
countries to assist with most caring 
needs and the situation in much of  the 
South of the Union, where caring is 
still predominantly carried out within 
the family. 
Nevertheless, the same kinds of  issue 
are relevant in all Member States and 
are  becoming increasingly pressing 
as caring needs expand. Irrespective 
of the current situation, governments 
cannot avoid having a policy on how 
these needs will be met, if only be-
- 141-cause ultimately, given the nature of 
European  society  and  the  commit-
ment to  a comprehensive system of 
social protection, the state is the pro-
vider of last resort. While they might 
choose to leave the responsibility for 
arranging  care  to  individuals,  they 
may  still  be obliged to  provide in-
come and other forms of support if 
individuals are unable or unwilling to 
exercise this responsibility. 
Although people may be able to take 
out  private  insurance  to  cover  the 
costs of providing care  which they 
might face, they may not choose to 
do so or may fail to take out a suffi-
cient  amount.  Unless  insurance  is 
made  compulsory,  which  is  tanta-
mount  to  imposing  taxes  or social 
charges to  finance  the  provision of 
care, the state cannot easily limit its 
responsibility,  which  is  likely  to 
manifest itself in increased expendi-
ture  on  income  support  and  social 
services. Moreover, since the distinc-
tion between caring needs and health 
care is  not clear-cut, especially for 
frail elderly people whose continued 
health  depends  on  them  receiving 
sufficient care,  an  inadequate  re-
sponse to the former could well result 
in an increased demand for the latter. 
Indeed, in all Member States, provid-
ing care to the elderly accounts for a 
large share of health service budgets 
(between around a  third and a half 
according to estimates). 
In  addition,  concern  with  social 
cohesion, as well as with poverty per 
se,  implies that governments across 
the  Union cannot ignore  the  distri-
butional  consequences  of leaving 
long-term care needs to personal re-
sponsibility. This is  all  the more so 
since  the  need  tends  to  be  greater 
among  the  poorer sections  of the 
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community, who are not only more 
likely  to  face  the  often  substantial 
costs involved in providing care over 
a long period but are also likely to 
have to pay higher premiums for pri-
vate  insurance,  precisely  because 
they represent a greater risk. Even if 
risks and premiums were no higher, 
however, they would still represent a 
larger  proportionate  cost  to  poorer 
households  than  more  prosperous 
ones, contrary to the traditional prin-
ciples of systems of social welfare. 
Although it might be argued that the 
state already redistributes income to 
the elderly in  the form  of pensions 
and that these can be used to cover 
the costs of caring, pensions are in-
tended both to maintain some conti-
nuity of income and living standards 
when people retire and to ensure that 
income does not fall below an unac-
ceptable level, rather than to meet the 
often substantial additional costs in-
volved in the  provision of care.  In 
practice, as indicated below, though 
the general prosperity of those in re-
tirement may have increased in re-
cent years, the level of pensions in 
relation to earnings from work is still 
low  in  many Member States, espe-
cially  for  the  most  elderly .whose 
need for care is likely to be greatest. 
As a result, as indicated in Chapter 3 
and below, pensioner households in 
all parts of the Union are more likely 
to have poverty levels of  income than 
others. 
The concern here is to examine the 
varying approaches to the long-term 
care needs of the elderly in Member 
States and the developments which 
have occurred in recent years. First, 
however,  income  levels  of pen-
sioners  in  different  age  groups  are 
considered in relation to income from 
employment on the basis of  data from 
the  new  European  Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). 
The level 
of benefits to 
old-age pensioners 
C
omparatively little information 
has been available in the past on 
the income received by those in re-
tirement and how it compares with 
the  average  earnings  of those  in 
work.  Historically,  retirement  has 
been a rna  jor source of low income 
levels throughout the Union. There is 
growing  evidence,  however,  if too 
often piecemeal, that, because of im-
provements in pension schemes and 
the  increasing  ability  of people  to 
save for their old age as the income 
they  are  able  to  earn  during  their 
working careers has risen, the elderly 
are becoming wealthier. Although no 
time  series  data  exist  to  verify 
whether this  is  the  case across  the 
Union, the results of the first wave of 
the ECHP throw light on the relative 
income of both households in which 
the people are above pensionable age 
and of pension recipients. 
In the Union as a whole- or, more 
precisely, the 12 Member States for 
which data are available-the aver-
age benefit received in 1993 by those 
retired,  including  any  special  pay-
ments for caring needs and private as 
well as  state pensions, amounted to 
around 60% of average net earnings 
of those  in  employment (see Box). 
For women, the figure was lower at 
around 55%, partly reflecting the fact 
that  for  some  men  (and  some  but 
fewer women) in a number of coun-
tries, the pension received may also include a dependent person's allow-
ance (ie in those - Belgium, Den-
mark, Spain and Italy (in respect of 
minimum pensions), for example -
where  the  pension  payable  to  a 
couple is more than to a single person 
if one of the couple, usually the wife, 
has  not been  in  paid  employment 
and, therefore, not accumulated entit-
lement to an individual pension). The 
average level for men, however, var-
ied from around 70% or over in Ger-
many, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands to under 50% in the UK, 
Denmark,  Portugal  and  Ireland 
(Graph 78, which shows net income 
received  from  all  benefits,  except 
family-related  ones,  by  those  who 
said  that  they  were  retired;  it  ex-
cludes, however, household benefits, 
such as housing allowances, which in 
some  countries  may  be  significant 
and which are included in the ana-
lysis in Chapter 3). 
For women, average benefits relative 
to earnings (in this case, average net 
earnings of women) were lower than 
for  men  in  all  but three  Member 
States- Denmark, Ireland and the 
Netherlands  - the  level  varying 
from  over 70% in the Netherlands 
and almost 65% in Germany to 40% 
in Portugal and only just over 30% in 
Greece. 
In most Member States, the average 
benefit tends to decline with age, at 
least so far as men are concerned. In 
the Union as a whole, the average for 
men of 75 and over was some 13% 
lower than for those aged 65 to 7  4, 
and also lower in relation to average 
earnings of those in  work than the 
figure indicated above (55% instead 
of 60%)  (Graph  79).  This  reflects 
both  the  tendency  for  pension 
amounts to have increased over time, 
partly because of  the growth of  occu-
pational  and  private  pensions,  and 
the erosion of the real value of the 
pension  received  by  inflation  in  a 
number of countries  (though  pen-
sions may have kept pace with price 
inflation, they have failed to match 
the  growth  in  earnings  in  many 
cases). Though varying in extent, the 
same general  pattern is  true  of all 
Member States, except Luxembourg. 
In the Netherlands, Greece and Por-
tugal,  the  average  benefit of those 
aged 75 and over was over 25% less 
than for those in the  65  to  7 4  age 
group, while in Belgium, Germany 
and France, it was under 10% less. In 
consequence,  whereas  in  the  latter 
three countries plus Luxembourg, the 
average  benefit for men of 75  and 
over was much the same in  relation 
to earnings of those employed as for 
all men who were retired, in the other 
countries,  it  was  markedly  lower 
(around 50% of average net earnings 
in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, 
around 40% in the other countries). 
For women, however, there is no such 
general pattern-in 5 Member States, 
the average benefit of those of 75 and 
over was higher than for those under 
75, in 5 it was lower and in the other 
two, much the same (Graph 80). Only 
in Germany and the Netherlands, how-
ever, was the level for those over 75 
more than 60% of earnings; in Ireland 
and Portugal, it was only around a third 
and in Greece under 25%. 
These  averages  conceal  wide  vari-
ations in benefit levels between indi-
viduals,  which  are  substantial  in  a 
number of Member States, especially 
in  the  less  prosperous  ones.  In the 
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- 143-Table 9-Benefits of men and women aged 65 and over in retirement 
relative to average earnings by quintile, 1993 
B  DK 
Men 
Bottom quintile  44.2  32.5 
2nd quintile  55.0  38.1 
3rd quintile  64.1  44.4 
4th quintile  80.3  60.1 
Mean  64.2  48.6 
Women 
Bottom quintile  35.3  42.6 
2nd quintile  52.3  53.2 
3rd quintile  62.1  57.5 
4th quintile  76.9  69.6 
Mean  57.7  58.4 
Union as whole, 60% of men aged 65 
and over in retirement in 1993 received 
benefits  which  were  50%  or less  of 
average  earnings  from  employment 
and for 20% the amount received was 
under 28% of average earnings (Table 
9, showing relative benefits of  men and 
women by quintile  ). At the same time, 
only  20%  received benefits of more 
than 70% of average earnings. 
Low  benefit  levels  are  particularly 
evident in Portugal, where only 20% 
D  GR  E  F  IRL 
43.0  10.5  36.8  35.0  26.4  31.7 
57.0  42.0  40.3  52.9  29.8  43.3 
70.4  54.1  51.8  70.3  40.8  61.6 
88.1  81.7  73.9  96.4  55.6  80.1 
69.6  51.3  56.6  73.3  42.5  58.8 
30.5  11.5  30.0  20.7  35.0  37.6 
50.5  11.5  38.5  36.3  37.8  40.8 
71.1  20.4  41.3  53.8  43.2  47.6 
93.0  50.0  51.1  79.8  64.8  74.4 
64.1  32.5  45.5  54.6  48.6  54.2 
of men were in receipt of payments 
of more than 57% of average earn-
ings, while 60% had benefit levels of 
30%  or  less  of average  earnings. 
Moreover, in Denmark, Ireland and 
the  UK,  for  60%  for  men,  benefit 
levels were under 45% of earnings, 
while  in  Greece,  where  extremely 
low benefits are most evident, 20% 
received  an  amount  equivalent  to 
only 10% or less of average earnings. 
By  contrast,  in  Belgium,  Germany 
and Luxembourg, only 20% or so of 
% average earnings men/women, 25-64 
L  NL  p  UK  E12 
43.6  36.7  19.3  27.8  27.9 
58.8  53.2  24.0  35.0  39.1 
75.4  65.1  30.5  45.1  50.4 
97.9  102.1  56.3  67.1  70.8 
76.0  70.2  42.7  49.2  60.3 
31.2  43.6  22.2  26.1  24.9 
55.3  58.1  29.3  36.9  41.6 
63.3  66.7  33.2  41.7  47.4 
74.1  82.9  49.6  57.4  65.2 
59.9  73.1  40.2  45.1  54.8 
men received benefits of under 45% 
of average earnings, and in France, 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands, 
for around 20% of men benefits were 
similar to average earnings or higher. 
Much the same pattern of dispersion 
of benefit  levels  is  evident  for 
women,  though  in  some  Member 
States,  there  are  significant  dif-
ferences.  In  Greece,  in  particular, 
low benefit levels are even more in 
evidence for  women than for men, 
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E  F  L  E12  IRL  UK  GR  P 60% of those aged 65 and over who 
have  retired  receiving  amounts  of 
only 20% or less of  average earnings, 
while  in  Denmark,  proportionately 
fewer women than men seem to have 
low benefit levels, only just over 20% 
receiving amounts equivalent to 45% 
of average earnings or less. 
In sum, therefore, a significant num-
ber of people of 65  and over across 
the Union receive relatively low le-
vels of benefit, from which they may 
have to cover the costs of caring. 
Pensioner 
households 
with low income 
T
he level of benefit which retired 
individuals receive gives only a 
very partial insight into problems of 
low  income among the elderly and 
one  which  can  be  misleading.  A 
much more complete picture can be 
gained  by  examining  income  by 
household, which takes account both 
of the possibility that people living 
together each receive a pension, or 
other benefits,  and of income from 
sources other than benefits, such as 
interest from savings. It also allows 
household  benefits,  such  as  allow-
ances for rent, to be included in the 
analysis. 
The  results  indicate  that  pensioner 
households  are  far  more  likely  in 
most Member States to have low le-
vels of  income than other households 
and  that a substantial proportion of 
them have poverty levels of income 
as  conventionally defined (less than 
50%  of average  income  in  the 
country in which they are located). 
As  noted  in  Chapter  3,  pensioner 
households, defined as  those where 
the  members  were  all  65  or over, 
accounted for 22% of all households 
in the Union in  1993, but for 30% of 
households  with  income  of under 
half the national average (income by 
household is weighted by the number 
of adults and children living in them 
-see  Chapter 3). Accordingly, just 
under 24% of households consisting 
of people of 65  and over had an in-
come of under half the national aver-
age,  significantly  more  than  the 
figure  of 17%  for  all  households. 
Moreover, for just over 45% of pen-
sioner households, income was  less 
than  65%  of average  as  compared 
with  only  30%  of all  households 
(Graph 81). 
The  relative  number  of pensioner 
households  with  low  levels  of in-
come  varies  markedly  across  the 
Union, broadly in line with the vari-
ation in  average  benefits  examined 
above,  with  the  exception  of Den-
mark,  where  despite  relatively  low 
individual benefit levels, a compara-
tively  small  proportion  of elderly 
people live in households with pov-
erty  levels  of income.  In Portugal, 
where a large number of those of 65 
and over had low benefit levels, 55% 
of pensioner households had income 
of  under half  the national average and 
71% income below 65% of average, 
while in Greece, where benefit levels 
were also low for many people, the 
respective proportions were 44% and 
61%. Similarly, in  the UK and Ire-
land,  around  a  third  of pensioner 
households (slightly more in the UK, 
slightly less in Ireland) had income 
of under 50%  of average  and  well 
over 60% - more than in Greece -
had income of less than 65% of  aver-
age.  These proportions  were,  in  all 
cases,  much  higher than  the  corre-
sponding figures for all households, 
though the latter were higher in these 
four countries than in the rest of the 
Union (see Chapter 3). 
By contrast, a much lower proportion 
of pensioner  households  had  pov-
erty-levels  of income  in  Member 
States where a relatively large num-
ber  of those  retired  received  high 
benefits,  except  in  Denmark,  as 
noted.  In particular,  in  the  Nether-
lands,  Belgium and  Germany, only 
around 17% of  pensioner households 
had income of under half the national 
average- in Denmark, under 15% 
-and in France, only 37% had in-
come  below  65%  of average.  Al-
though  these  proportions  were,  for 
the most part, closer to the figures for 
all households than in the case of the 
countries  examined  above,  they 
were, nevertheless, higher. Indeed, in 
Denmark, which had the lowest pro-
portion  of households  below  half 
average earnings in the Union (only 
8'/z%),  the  figure  for  pensioner 
households  was  markedly  higher, 
and some 42% of  all households with 
income  below  this  level were  ones 
where the members were 65 or over. 
The evidence, in general, therefore, 
seems to confirm the findings for in-
dividual  benefit  levels,  that  a  sub-
stantial proportion of elderly people 
in retirement have relatively low le-
vels of income in a number of Mem-
ber  States  and  that  throughout  the 
Union  the  relative  number of pen-
sioner households with low income 
was  greater than for  other types  of 
household. Moreover, as indicated in 
Chapter 2,  the  tendency  across  the 
Union is to reduce state pensions be-
cause of  the growth in the numbers in 
retirement, though this may be offset 
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cupational  and  private  pensions  to 
supplement  the  amounts  received 
from the state. 
Policy 
developments 
across the Union 
T
he response of governments in 
Member States to the growing 
demand  for  long-term  care  as  the 
number of elderly people increases 
has taken various forms,  according 
largely to the system already in place 
for providing support. The main de-
velopments  are  described  below 
country by country, the aim being not 
to present an exhaustive account of 
the  measures  which  have  been 
adopted but to indicate the direction 
of change and the variant approaches 
to the problem. 
The description does  not cover the 
four  Southern Member States, 
largely because the issue is not yet so 
pressing in these countries, partly re-
flecting the greater prevalence of the 
extended family and the tendency for 
care to be provided from within the 
home.  While  social  assistance  is 
available for low income households, 
this  tends  to  be organised on a re-
gional basis  and so  varies  between 
different areas. Nevertheless, there is 
some  debate  in  the  countries  con-
cerned on developing more coherent 
and extensive systems of support for 
long-term care. In Italy, in particular, 
the Onofri Report at the beginning of 
1997 recommended that a new fund 
be  established for  the  provision  of 
long-term care. 
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The account of developments below 
is  organised by groups of countries 
with similar features, as follows: 
•  Germany and Austria, where new 
social  benefits  have  been  intro-
duced  in  recent  years  to  help 
cover caring needs; 
•  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and 
France, in which social protection 
is organised in a similar way and 
where there are proposals to intro-
duce an allowance for caring; 
•  Denmark,  Finland  and  Sweden, 
where social services and support 
facilities are more extensive than 
anywhere else in the Union and 
where there is little distinction be-
tween the provision of long-term 
care and health services, together 
with  the  Netherlands,  which  is 
similar in the latter respect; 
•  the UK and Ireland, where there 
is considerable reliance on infor-
mal  and  voluntary  care,  where 
social services locally are under-
funded and where financial  sup-
port is means-tested and available 
only to those on low incomes. 
Germany 
The introduction in Germany in 1995 
of  a new specific function for provid-
ing support for the long-term care of 
the elderly-Pflegeversicherung-
as part of  the social insurance system 
was  an  innovation  which  attracted 
much attention in  other parts of the 
Union facing similar problems. The 
motivation was the fact that around a 
quarter of people over 60 seem  to 
require  some kind  of assistance  in 
their daily life and a great many of 
these are in need of social assistance 
to  help  cover  the  costs  involved. 
(Some  70%  of those  in  residential 
care, for example, require social as-
sistance in the former West Germany 
and all  of those in the former East 
Germany.) 
The scheme introduced is intended to 
provide only a basic level of income 
support, priority being given initially 
to  community  care,  where  the  need 
seemed to be greatest. Benefits for care 
at home became payable in April 1995 
and those  for  residential  care (either 
short or long-term) in July 1996. Since 
then  beneficiaries  have  been free  to 
choose between the two forms of  care, 
the  maximum amount payable being 
the same in both cases. The scheme is 
a compulsory part of social insurance 
for those in work. It is fmanced from 
income-based  contributions  split 
equally between employers and em-
ployees (though the potential effect on 
labour costs was offset by the withdra-
wal of one day's holiday each year) 
and covers around 90% of the popula-
tion. People are free to take out addi-
tional  private  insurance  if they  wish 
and receive a .tax  incentive to  do so. 
Contributions are intended to fmance 
all social expenditure on care, includ-
ing investment in support services and, 
for  example,  the  construction  of 
residential homes. 
The amount payable under the scheme 
is  not means-tested, though it  varies 
according  to  the  extent  of care  re-
quired, people being classified to one 
of three  groups  - those  who  need 
daily help, those who need help three 
times a day and those who need per-
manent care.  It is  also  higher when 
support is provided in kind through the 
direct provision of services rather than 
in cash. The scheme covers, in addi-tion, some of the social contributions 
which informal carers have to pay, as 
well as equipment which the person in 
need of care might require, such as a 
wheel chair. 
Austria 
In Austria, efforts have been made in 
recent years to reform the health in-
surance  system,  with the  particular 
aim of reducing hospital-based care, 
which absorbed a major part of the 
health budget, and increasing the role 
of  community care, which accounted 
for  a  minor  share  and  which  was 
generally  considered  to  be  under-
funded.  Responsibility for the latter 
lies  with the  regions,  or provinces, 
which up until the early 1990s, were 
also responsible for financing expen-
diture, and which differ in terms of 
the regulations applied to the provi-
sion of care and the precise systems 
in  operation.  The partial  system of 
allowances,  which existed  up  until 
1993 to help those in need of care to 
meet  some  of the  additional  costs 
involved, was also administered and 
funded by  individual provinces and 
varied  in  its  application  across  the 
country. 
In  1993,  the  Federal  Attendance 
Allowance  Act  introduced  a  new 
allowance,  the Bundespflegegeld, 
with  guaranteed  funding  from  the 
Federal  government out of general 
taxation, but still administered by the 
provinces. This is payable not just to 
the elderly but to  all  those over the 
age of  two with disabilities or chronic 
illnesses, who accordingly require at 
least 50 hours of attendance or care a 
month.  The  amount  paid  is  not 
means-tested, as it is, for example, in 
the UK or Ireland, but is based on a 
medical assessment of the hours of 
care needed each month. In 1996, the 
amount was reduced by some 20% in 
nominal terms and since then it has 
not been indexed for inflation. (There 
are 7 levels of payment, at present, 
ranging from  160 ECU a month for 
50-75 hours of  care and 275 ECU for 
7  5 to  120 hours  to  1  ,200 ECU for 
over  180  hours  of constant attend-
ance  and  1  ,600  ECU  for  complete 
immobility;  just over  half of all 
beneficiaries  fall  into  the  75-120 
hour category.) 
The allowance is  intended to  cover 
the additional costs that the person in 
need of care  incurs - for  support 
services, diets, housing and heating, 
in particular. For those in residential 
care who are entitled to an allowance, 
80%  or  so  of the  amount  payable 
goes  directly  to  the  care  provider 
(usually the provincial government), 
while the people themselves receive 
some 42 ECU  a month  as  'pocket 
money'  (reduced  from  85  ECU  in 
1996). Other beneficiaries are free to 
spend the allowance as  they choose 
and,  although  it can  be  effectively 
transformed  into  direct  services  if 
people are not able to  organise care 
for themselves, most recipients use it 
to  pay  for  informal  care  provided 
from within the family. 
At present, there is a growing politi-
cal  debate  in  the  context of rising 
unemployment on  whether the pay-
ment  should  be  transformed  into 
some  kind  of system  of vouchers, 
redeemable against the provision of 
care from outside the family, so cre-
ating new employment opportunities 
in social services. 
Belgium 
A  new  old-age  insurance  system 
('autonomy' insurance) is planned in 
order to increase social protection for 
the elderly and ensure that they are as 
independent  as  possible  during  the 
later stages of their life. Support will 
take  the  form  of a  cash  allowance 
intended  to  cover  the  non-medical 
costs arising from the need for care 
- ie  those which are additional to 
normal  living  expenses  - the 
amount  payable  being  determined 
for each individual by a multi-disci-
plinary team in the light of their de-
gree of dependency and income. 
The scheme will replace the present 
allowance for assisting older people 
and will be financed partly from the 
present budget for this,  partly from 
the health insurance budget for dis-
trict  nursing,  which covers  old-age 
and nursing homes, and partly from 
new social contributions (though ad-
ditional 'start-up' funding will be re-
quired to create working capital and 
reserves). Potential problems which 
might  arise  concern  both  the  pro-
posed method of funding, in that the 
transfer of some of the functions and 
budget from the health insurance pro-
gramme will not be accompanied by 
any additional resources, which seem 
at present to be insufficient to meet 
needs, and the possible difficulty of 
distinguishing  non-medical  canng 
needs from medical ones. 
Luxembourg 
In  Luxembourg,  a  draft  bill  was 
presented in October 1996 proposing 
the  introduction of 'dependency in-
surance' as a new aspect of the social 
protection system, intended to cover 
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assistance required. The new benefit 
will be financed partly from general 
taxation  (45%)  and  mainly  from 
compulsory social contributions, le-
vied  on  those  in  employment  and 
those  receiving  insurance  benefits 
(old-age pensions, for example) at a 
rate  of 1%  of earnings.  It  will  be 
payable  to  the  person  insured  and 
their  families  on  an  unconditional 
basis (ie it will not be means-tested) 
in  the  event of them needing care. 
The two priority areas of  expenditure 
will be on rehabilitation- ie on at-
tempts to  get the  person concerned 
well enough not to need care - and 
on horne support. 
France 
In France, where no specific scheme 
exists for providing long-term care to 
the elderly, there has been much de-
bate  in  recent years  about creating 
such an  arrangement as  part of the 
social  insurance  system.  This  has 
been prompted by the  apparent in-
adequacy  of certain services,  espe-
cially a lack of medical facilities  in 
both residential and community care 
and  the  difficulty  of many  elderly 
people in need of care to pay for the 
services they require, which has led 
to an increase in social assistance as 
well as greater financial pressure on 
the families concerned. 
A  number  of proposals  have  been 
made  to  improve  the  situation.  In 
1993,  it was  suggested that a non-
means-tested dependency insurance 
scheme should be established for the 
elderly, with support taking the form 
of credits  for  horne-help,  informal 
care and any  special equipment re-
quired.  In  1995,  a trial  scheme  in-
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volving  increased  payments  to  the 
elderly in need of care was launched 
in  12 French regions, payment con-
sisting of the  existing means-tested 
allowance  (allocation  compensa-
trice  ),  administered  on  a  regional 
basis and differing in scale across the 
country,  and  an  additional  depend-
ency allowance. The latter was allo-
cated according  to  income  and  the 
degree of dependency, with the fam-
ily potentially having to pay it back 
over time.  Initial  evaluation of the 
scheme suggested that the allowance 
was  too  small  to  cover the  cost of 
outside help for those in the greatest 
need of care and was,  accordingly, 
likely to be used to pay for informal 
care  from  within  the  family  rather 
being  a  means  of creating jobs  in 
social services. 
From  1997,  a  specific  dependency 
allowance (prestation specifique de-
pendance) has become payable on a 
means-tested  basis  and  increased 
emphasis has been placed on the role 
of  the farnil y in providing care. While 
the economy remains depressed and 
while there is a concern to avoid in-
creases  in  social  contributions,  the 
introduction of a dependency insur-
ance system, with benefits payable as 
a right, appears to be ruled out. 
Denmark 
In Denmark, as  in the other Nordic 
countries,  no  clear  distinction  is 
made  between  medical  and  non-
medical care and there is a more ex-
tensive system of publicly-financed 
support than in most other parts of  the 
Union, with services being provided 
directly by the state. Finance is from 
general taxation, though services are 
administered  and  organised  on  a 
local  basis  by  the  municipalities 
(which  are  responsible  for  nursing 
homes,  whereas  hospitals  are  or-
ganised at the county level). 
In 1988, a programme was launched 
aimed  at  increasing  the  inde-
pendence of the elderly and improv-
ing  the  quality  of services  and 
housing available to them. Following 
the  recognition  that those  living  at 
horne  would become more depend-
ent as  time passed, increasing num-
bers  of special  housing  complexes 
have  been  built  to  replace  nursing 
homes while at the same time support 
services  have  been  developed  in 
place  of residential  care.  This  has 
been accompanied by an increase in 
financial incentives to municipalities 
to encourage them to undertake such 
investment and  by  the  payment of 
subsidies  to  private  concerns  in-
volved in the construction and letting 
of special housing. 
It has  also  been accompanied by  a 
special  programme,  aimed  at  both 
helping municipalities meet their car-
ing obligations and reducing unem-
ployment through reimbursing 50% 
of the  increase  in  wage  costs  in-
volved in providing support services 
to the elderly if people unemployed 
are taken on to do this. 
Concern  at  present centres  on  two 
issues: first,  the overall cost of pro-
viding long-term care for the elderly 
in a context of  budget restraint, which 
has already seen cuts in health expen-
diture, housing subsidies and horne-
care services, and how far the  state 
should continue to take full responsi-
bility for this; secondly, the degree of 
individual  choice  over the  type  of 
care received. On the first issue, pub-
lic opinion seems to be in favour of extensive  state  support  continuing. 
On the second, there is growing rec-
ognition  that  the  present  system, 
based on the direct provision of care, 
limits the choice of the person con-
cerned  about  how  they  should  be 
cared for and how the transfers they 
are  entitled  to  are  spent  (those  in 
residential care, for example, receive 
only a small part of their pension). 
Finland 
In Finland, as in Denmark, there is a 
publicly-funded, universal system of 
protection, which gives little reason 
or incentive for private saving or in-
surance against the  risk of needing 
care. Nor is there much debate about 
moving to a different kind of system. 
There has, however, been some con-
cern  about  the  under-provision  of 
community care, which is organised 
on a regional basis, and about the way 
that services vary between different 
parts of the country. 
Although  the  provision of services 
remains based on need, some means-
testing has been introduced for non-
essential  and  non-urgent  aspects 
such as  transport.  The emphasis of 
policy is increasingly on community 
rather than residential care as well as 
on increasing the extent to which this 
is  targeted  on  those  most  in  need. 
Charges  for  both  community  and 
residential  care  have  tended  to  in-
crease significantly and,  as  in Den-
mark,  a major part of the  personal 
pension of residents is paid direct to 
the institution rather than the individ-
ual. This has prompted some concern 
about people being left with too little 
to meet incidental expenses, as well 
as about more general issues regard-
ing the quality of personnel, the re-
sponsiveness of institutions to  indi-
vidual needs and the lack of choice 
open to those being cared for, as well 
as the inadequate availability of ser-
vices in some areas. The debate, in 
other words, is focused not so much 
on financial issues or the role of the 
state but more on the quality of ser-
vice and the adequacy of provision. 
Sweden 
The system of care for the elderly in 
Sweden is similar to that in Denmark 
and Finland, with the municipalities 
being responsible for  local  support 
services  and  residential  homes  and 
with funding  provided centrally.  In 
recent years, there has been a down-
sizing of the  services available and 
the  support provided, together with 
increases  in  direct  charges  and  a 
tightening  of the  criteria  for  eligi-
bility for assistance. In 1996, public 
pressure led to new funds being made 
available  to  municipalities  for  the 
provision of care, while, as  in Den-
mark,  the  opportunity  was  used  to 
expand resources in a low-cost way 
by creating jobs for the unemployed 
in care services, funded from the un-
employment insurance funds. 
The growing demand for long-term 
care is being met by a combination of 
increased taxes and social contribu-
tions, greater efforts to improve effi-
ciency and cost effectiveness and the 
involvement  of private  insurance 
schemes to relieve the state of some 
of the  burden  of satisfying  future 
needs. As in the other two countries, 
there  has  been  growing  concern 
about the quality of care as  well as 
about  the  right  of individuals  to 
choose the form of care received. 
Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, as in other coun-
tries,  there  has  been  ongoing  dis-
cussion of  the care and housing needs 
of the  elderly,  in  a  context where, 
historically, policy has concentrated 
on providing residential care, admin-
istered and funded under the Excep-
tional  medical expenses  scheme. 
More  recently,  the  trend  has  been 
away  from  institutionalisation  to-
wards  helping  to  support  care  at 
home,  as  well as  towards changing 
the nature of  residential accommoda-
tion, converting old people's homes 
either  into  nursing  homes  or  into 
sheltered housing complexes where 
the elderly can live independently but 
within close reach of support. 
At the same time, the 1995 reform of 
the  health  care  system  has  led  to 
long-term  care  being  more  clearly 
distinguished  from  basic  medical 
care, but health and  social services 
being made less distinct, the admin-
istration being shifted from the health 
insurance funds to a single authority 
in each of  the 27 regions. This will be 
responsible  for  purchasing  care  on 
behalf of those in need and for ad-
ministering both residential facilities 
and  community  care,  including 
home-help as well as district nursing 
(see Chapter 6 for an account of the 
reform). The cost of  care provision is 
covered by national health insurance 
(A WBZ), with those being cared for 
being responsible for covering their 
living expenses. 
Although those in need of care have 
only limited choice over the way that 
this is  provided, a small part of the 
budget for home care (5%) has been 
set aside since 1995 for those being 
cared for to spend as they wish, most, 
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A  reportof an independent inquiry, established by theRowntree Founda-
tion,.  in~9  i~~~ costs of l~ng  -te:m .  care for  elderly  a~d disabled people, 
publ!sh~~in 1997, conCluded t~atthe  provision of  care ~as  shifted increas-
ingly from the National  Health Service, free  at the point of delivery, to 
means-tested provision organised by  local authorities. As a result, a number 
of people faced 'catastrophic costs' because of the relatively·low income 
plus.  accumulated savings limit applied to  eligibility for free  access  to 
services. It also pointed to  inadequacies in the prqvision of care in  the 
commuriity,ian aspect exarnil}ed b~ the National Ass?ciation of Citizens 
Advice Bureaux which reportedjp the same year. The main finding of the 
latter was that limits on centralgovernment funding to local authorities, in 
a  context  where  health  authorities  were  accelerating  the  discharge  of 
elderly and disabled people from hospitals and nursing homes, has led to 
support for home-care and other community services being rationed. While 
those affected were usually the ones with lesser needs, the lack of support 
and preventative serviCes for them made it morelikely that they would need 
· residential or hospital ca(e in the/future. 
in practice, choosing to give this to 
friends and relatives helping to look 
after them rather than to professional 
cfrers. 
UK 
In the UK, long-term care of the el-
~erly is  provided to  a major extent 
from within the family with support 
f
l  1  .  .  F.  rom vo untary orgamsatiOns.  man-
oial  assistance  is  available  both  to 
those receiving care, in the form of 
~n attendance  allowance,  and  to 
those providing it, in the form of an 
Irvalid Care Allowance,  introduced 
~s long  ago as  1975. Both are non-
contributory  but  strictly  means-
tested and are payable only in cases 
r here the person being cared for re-
quires attendance for at least 35 hours 
a week, and, in the case of the Invalid 
d:'are Allowance, where they are  in 
+ceipt of the attendance allowance 
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and where the carer earns less than a 
small  amount  from  employment. 
Although the  amounts involved are 
relatively  small,  they  are  accompa-
nied  by  entitlement  to  various 
benefits  in  kind,  to  cover  housing 
costs,  local  taxes,  heating expenses 
and so on. 
Social services and community care 
are provided by local authorities, but 
these  are  increasingly  limited  be-
cause of budget constraints and are 
targeted ever more narrowly on those 
most in  need.  The burden on  local 
authorities, moreover, has increased 
substantially in recent years with the 
implementation of the  Care  in  the 
community policy which has been as-
sociated  with  a  major  shift  from 
residential care to  caring for people 
at  home,  but  without  adequate  re-
sources being made available to pro-
vide sufficient levels of support for 
those  taking  on  caring  responsi-
bilities. At the same time, residential 
care  has  become  increasingly  pri-
vatised and fees  are covered by the 
state only if the income plus accumu-
lated  savings  of those  in  need  is 
below a certain (relatively low) level 
(see Box). 
While the former Government pro-
posed  that  people  should  take  out 
private  insurance  to  cover  their 
potential need for care in  old age, a 
recent Rowntree Commission report 
has recommended the establishment 
of a national care insurance scheme 
and a National Care Council to over-
see  policy  in  this  area.  However, 
there has as yet been no move by the 
present Government in this direction. 
Ireland 
In Ireland, a debate is just beginning 
on the possibility of including long-
term care for the elderly in the social 
insurance system. At present, the in-
formal caring sector takes a large part 
of the  burden, partly because of an 
under-provision of resources in com-
munity care- funded from general 
taxation - and a shortage of basic 
services to support caring at home as 
well as  of more advanced facilities. 
Although  a  carer's  allowance  was 
introduced  in  1990,  this  is  means-
tested  and conditions for  eligibility 
are  very  restrictive  (being  payable 
only to those living with and caring 
full-time  for  someone  else  in  the 
family). 
Residential care is also financed from 
taxation, though institutions tend to 
obtain most of the old-age pension 
paid to residents. Subsidies are avail-
able to help cover private or volun-
tary-sector  nursing  home  fees,  but these  are  limited  and  eligibility  is 
subject to  means-testing  and/or the 
extent of  disability. Residents have to 
pay a third of the costs on average, 
which  gives  rise  to  problems  for 
those with low income in areas where 
long-term places in publicly-funded 
homes are limited. 
Concluding remarks 
T
he  developments  summarised 
above indicate that, while differ-
ent approaches to the long-term care 
needs  of the  elderly  are  being fol-
lowed across the Union, there are a 
number of common aspects. In par-
ticular,  it  seems  to  be  commonly 
agreed that a primary aim should be 
to  ensure that those in need of care 
retain  as  much  independence  as 
possible. This means that, so far -
and as  long - as it is feasible, they 
should be looked after in their own 
home,  which  necessitates  the  need 
for support services to facilitate this 
and to give help to family members 
where required. Similarly, where this 
is  not possible, sheltered accommo-
dation or special housing complexes 
should ideally be developed to give 
people some independence but with 
immediate  access  to  medical  and 
other kinds of help should they need 
it. 
There also seems to be a widespread 
recognition that those being cared for 
should have more say over the form 
which care takes and over the  way 
that  the  social  transfers  effectively 
allocated to  them are spent. This is 
especially so in countries, such as the 
Nordic Member States, where social 
services are well developed and sup-
port is  organised on a formal basis, 
giving rise to substantially more jobs 
than in the rest of the Union. On the 
other hand, in Austria, where the car-
ing allowance is spent mostly on in-
formal care from within the family, 
there  are  proposals  to  move  in  the 
opposite direction. These are echoed 
in a number of other countries where 
the employment  -creating potential of 
the development of  more formal sup-
port  arrangements  has  been high-
lighted.  Budget constraints  and  a 
policy emphasis on reducing rather 
than expanding public expenditure, 
however, represent a formidable ob-
stacle to this kind of development. 
The same budget constraints, allied 
to  a  concern  to  avoid  increases  in 
taxes and social contributions, have 
deterred  the  development of social 
insurance benefits for long-term care 
outside  a  few  Member  States  and 
even there have limited the scale of 
payment  (to  covering  only  basic 
needs in Germany, while it has been 
reduced  significantly  in  Austria). 
They have also led to reductions in 
the provision of social support in the 
Nordic countries as well as in the UK 
and Ireland, where help for those in 
need  of care  is  rationed  through 
means-testing,  an  approach  which 
seems to be gaining ground in other 
countries. 
According!  y,  as  is  only  to  be  ex-
pected, private arrangements for pro-
viding care and for insuring against 
the future need for care are develo-
ping, encouraged in many cases by 
governments  anxious  to  relieve so-
cial  protection  budgets  of the  cost 
involved  in  state  provision.  In  the 
same  way  as  means-testing,  how-
ever,  such  a  policy  implies  that  a 
disproportionate cost is likely to fall 
on the poorer members of society, if 
not the poorest, who are, moreover, 
most likely to need care. 
- 151-- 152- protection as defined above. Over time, such differences ought to diminish in importance as experience is gained and 
as national systems of data collection adapt to the new conventions. 
Problems of comparability also extend to the functional classification of benefits which is intended to divide spending 
between the different needs which social protection is  aimed at meeting.  The broad functions,  or areas of need, 
distinguished in the system are as follows: 
Sickness/health care  - Income maintenance and support in cash in connection with physical 
or mental illness, excluding disability. Health care intended to 
maintain, restore or improve health irrespective of the origin of the 
ailment. 
Disability  - Income maintenance and support in cash or kind (except health care) 
in connection with the inability of people with physical or mental 
disabilities to engage in economic and social activities. 
Old age  - Income maintenance and support in cash or kind (except health care) 
in connection with old age. 
Survivors  - Income maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection with 
the death of a family member. 
Family/children  - Support in cash or kind (except health care) in connection with the 
costs of pregnancy, childbirth and adoption, bringing up children and 
caring for other family members. 
Unemployment  - Income maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection with 
unemployment. 
Housing  - Help towards the cost of housing. 
Social exclusion not elsewhere classified  - Benefits in cash or kind (except health care) specifically intended to 
combat social exclusion where they are not covered by one of the 
other functions. 
Since institutional arrangements for delivering benefits in these areas differ markedly between countries and since a 
given type of benefit is often aimed at meeting more than one kind of need, it can be difficult for Member States to 
divide expenditure precisely between these different functions and they may, indeed, lack the detailed information to 
be able to do so. Early retirement pensions, for example, which may be given in part for labour market reasons and 
which to this extent ought to be partly classified to unemployment, are an important case in point. In practice, for some 
Member States, such expenditure is at least partly included under unemployment, in others, not at all, though it is hard 
to know whether this reflects genuine differences or merely statistical difficulties. 
The social exclusion category gives rise to a similar difficulty. Insofar as this is intended to cover expenditure which 
is not primarily incurred under one of  the other heads, the spending included in this function in any Member State might 
well be affected by practical problems of allocation, though again, it is hard to identify the extent to which this is the 
case. In addition, expenditure included in the unemployment function should, in principle, encompass the provision of 
vocational training to those out of  work, insofar as this is funded by public authorities. In practice, it is included in some 
countries but not in others, which is a further source of difficulty in comparing spending between Member States both 
under this head and in total. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 of  the present report, on the one hand, aggregates expenditure on old-age and survivors, partly 
because of the potential difficulties of distinguishing consistently between the two, and, on the other hand, separates 
expenditure on health care (benefits in kind in the sickness/health care function) from sickness benefits (cash transfers 
- 154-in the sickness/health care function). Because of the comparability problems noted above, however, the analysis of the 
functional division-the pattern of social protection spending-should be interpreted as being indicative only. 
Overall, total expenditure on social protection as defined under the revised classification system is not so different from 
that defined under the previous system, which formed the basis of the 1995 Social Protection in Europe Report. The 
main change is the reduction from 12 functions to the 8 listed above, together with a more detailed division of outlays 
by type of expenditure, specifically, whether or not it is subject to means-testing and whether it is takes the form of 
cash transfers or benefits in kind. 
As emphasised in the text, the figures for expenditure are gross of any taxes or social charges levied on transfers, which 
are important in some countries and which reduce both the value of the benefit to recipients and the effective cost to 
governments. They also exclude transfers provided through tax concessions, rebates or allowances, which also vary in 
importance between countries, and to this extent understate the overall financing implications of social protection. 
For receipts, the data include contributions imputed to  employers as  well as actual social contributions. These are 
intended to reflect the costs to them of providing social benefits to their employees, other than through insurers or 
through a separate reserve. Since such benefits are included in expenditure, the related need for financing has to be 
included in receipts. 
The main focus of the analysis in the text is  on the period 1990 to  1995, for which reasonably consistent data are 
available for most Member States, though not all- data exist for Denmark only for 1990 (though not for receipts), 
1994 and 199 5, there are data for Greece only for total expenditure in 1993 to 199 5, as noted above, and data for Sweden 
only for the same years. 
Germany 
Data in this report for Germany include the former East German Lander throughout. Since consolidated figures exist 
only from 1991, the figures for 1990 have been estimated from the data for the former West Germany (specifically, the 
change for West Germany between 1990 and 1991 is applied to the 1991 figure for total Germany to derive an estimate 
for 1990 which is comparable to that for later years). This is also the case in respect of LFS data. 
UK 
ESSPROS data for the UK are on a financial year basis (ie April to March) rather than a calendar one as for other 
countries. Figures for GDP and for the relevant price indices have been adjusted approximately to the same basis when 
calculating expenditure relative to GDP and changes in real terms. 
European Union 
Figures for the European Union relate to total expenditure in the Member States indicated relative to total GDP in these 
countries or to population or are weighted averages of changes in Member States (where the weights are expenditure 
in the base year). 
GDP 




Expenditure is expressed in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS), which takes account of differences in price 
levels between Member States (specifically of those of consumer goods and services), when making comparisons of 
the level of spending in different countries. For the Union as a whole, figures in terms of PPS are the same as ECU 
figures. 
Country notes 
Denmark: No comparable data are available for receipts before 1994. Incomplete data exist to divide contributions of 
protected persons between employees, the self-employed and pensioners and other benefit recipients. They are allocated 
here wholly to employees, who are by far the largest contributors. 
Germany: Unemployment benefits include some wage subsidies paid to employers to encourage the employment of 
certain groups at risk on the labour market (amounting to around 16% of total spending on this item in 1995). The new 
long-term care benefit introduced in 1995 is included largely in old age (accounting for around 1% of spending on this 
item) and partly in disability (accounting for just over 2% of spending). 
Italy: Old-age pensions include early retirement benefits paid to those unable to  find employment. Unemployment 
benefits include spending under the CIG (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) paid to those on lay-off (amounting to some 
28% of expenditure on this item in 1995). 
Luxembourg: Data by function are available only for total expenditure on each- ie there is no breakdown between 
cash benefits and benefits in kind or between means-tested and non-means-tested benefits. 
Austria:  Unemployment benefits  include  some  subsidies to  employers (though these  accounted for  under 1%  of 
spending on this item). 
Portugal: Unemployment benefits include support for employment creation in the independent sector (accounting for 
under  2%  of spending).  'Other receipts'  include  proceeds  from  asset  transactions  which  cannot  be  separately 
distinguished.  · 
UK: Because data only for total expenditure by function are available for 1995, the detailed breakdown of spending 
within function and the cost of administration are estimated from the 1994 figures. Old-age pensions, as noted above, 
exclude Appropriate (or approved) Personal Pensions, which fall within the definition of  social protection. Means-tested 
benefits in kind in the disability, old-age and family functions include some benefits not subject to means-testing. 
For more details on the ESSPROS data, see ESSPROS Manual1996, Eurostat, 1996 and Social protection expenditure 
and receipts, 1980-1995, Eurostat, 1998 (forthcoming) 
European Community Household Panel 
The analysis of social transfers to households in Chapter 3, of unemployment benefits relative to wages in Chapter 4 
and of transfers to people retired in Chapter 7 is based on the first wave of the new European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). This is an annual survey of a representative panel of households and the individuals who live in them, 
covering a wide range of  topics, including living conditions, employment status, health, education and, most importantly 
for the present report, of income and  the  various sources from  which it  comes. The aim  is  to  interview the same 
- 156-households and individuals over a number of consecutive years so that changes in their circumstances over time can 
be monitored. The survey is based on a harmonised questionnaire, drawn up by Eurostat, and subsequently adapted by 
the national agencies responsible for collecting data in each of the countries to take account of their own institutional 
features. 
The first wave of the ECHP, which at the time of preparation of this report is the only one for which data are as yet 
available, was conducted in 1994 in the 12 Member States which then comprised the Union and covered some 60,500 
households in total (about 170,000 individuals) and 5,000 or more in most Member States. The sample size, however, 
varies between countries in relation to population. It is  relatively small for. Germany, where only 5,000 households 
were covered because of legal restrictions, and the UK, where under 6,000 households were covered, but relatively 
large for Greece, where the number was much the same as in the UK, and Spain, where over 7,000 households were 
included. The sample in all countries should be large enough to give reasonably reliable results for the issues examined 
here. Where the number of observations size falls below a minimum level (taken as 25 individuals or households), the 
country concerned is excluded from the analysis. 
Data for the second and third waves should become available during 1998, the former (for 1995) including Austria and 
the latter (for 1996) including Finland. These data will enable the results of  the first wave to be more thoroughly checked 
and verified. As a result, they are liable to change as this exercise is undertaken, which could affect the findings presented 
here. 
The data for social transfers analysed in the text relate to cash receipts by individuals and households net of any taxes 
or social charges paid on these. For France, however, the figures are gross of direct taxes which are not deducted at 
source and to this extent are not strictly comparable with those for other countries. In principle, all transfers which 
provide income support should be  included, except study grants and transfers between households. (For a detailed 
description of the ECHP methodology, see The European Community Household Panel (ECHP): Volume ]-Survey 
methodology and Implementation, Eurostat, Luxembourg, 1996.) 
European Union 
Figures for the European Union, as for the ESSPROS data, are weighted averages of those for the Member States. 
Accordingly, figures in Chapter 3 for the proportion of households with an income below a given percentage of the 
average relate to the relative number in the Union with income below this percentage of the average in the Member 
State in which they live, rather than to the proportion of  households with income below a given percentage of  the Union 
average. 
European Community Labour Force Survey 
The LFS, which is used in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 of the report, is also an annual survey of households, though the 
sample size is considerably larger than the ECHP. Conducted each year since 1983 and covering all 15 Member States, 
it is focused more narrowly than the ECHP on employment issues and is similarly based on a common set of questions 
and definitions, so abstracting from national differences in methods of classification and institutional arrangements. 
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